Chernobyl as ‘Post-Normal Accident’. Critical Review of its Technological Causes
Abstract
This article proposes a critical review of the technological causes that led to the Chernobyl disaster, pointing out some issues that are still debatable and controversial even for the nuclear experts themselves. How is it possible that an electro-nuclear reactor could be destabilized and explode like a bomb due to the wrong decisions taken by its operators? What if it had been a sabotage or —as one would say today— a terrorist act? Based on these questions and due to the dual conception (military and civil) of the ill-fated RBMK-1000 prototype, together with the uncertainty of not really knowing how its explosion occurred, allow Chernobyl to be awarded the character of “post-normal accident”, both from an extra-technical as well as an intra-technical point of view. With this theoretical proposal and from an engineering perspective, the article exhorts to reconsider the epistemological challenge that the unique nature of nuclear and radiological risk represents for the STS field of studies.
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Abagyan, A. A. (1986). Informatsiya ob avari na Chernobylskoi AES i yeyo posledstviya podgotovlennaya dlya MAGATE (Informacion sobre el accidente de la CEN de Chernobyl y sus consecuencias, preparada para el OIEA). Atomnaya energia, 61(5), 301-320.
Abramov, M. I, Avdeev, V. I., Adamov, E. O. et al. (2006). Kanalni yaderni energuiticheski reaktor RBMK-1000 (Reactor de canales de gran potencia RBMK-1000). Moskva: GUP NIKIET.
Beck, U. (2008). La sociedad del riesgo mundial: en busca de la seguridad perdida. Barcelona: Paidós Ibérica.
Borysenko (2017). O nekotorij parametraj yadernoi besopasnosti uran-grafitovij reaktorov (Sobre la seguridad nuclear de los reactores uranio-grafito). http://proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7281
Burlakova, E. B., Kuznietsov, V. M., Mosalenko, V. A., Nazarov, A. G., Ostrietsvov, I. N., Simonov, E. Ya., y Chepenko, B. A. (2006). Neizviestni Chernobyl: istoriya, sobytiya, facti, uroki (El Chernobyl desconocido: historia, sucesos, evidencias, lecciones). Moskva: Izdatelstvo MHEPY.
Calcines (1996). Memorias del Minotauro. Bohemia. Abril, 24-27.
Dollezhall, N. A. (1989). U iztokob rukotvornogo mira: zapiski konstruktora (En los orígenes del mundo artificial. Apuntes de un constructor). Moskva: Znanie.
Dollezhal, N. A., y Yemeliánov, I. Ya. (1980). Kanalni yaderni energuiticheski reaktor (Reactor energético nuclear con canales). Moskva: Atomizdat.
Dyatlov, A.C. (1995). Why INSAG Has Still Got It Wrong. Nuclear Ingineering International, 494(40), 17-21.
Dyatlov, A.C. (2003). Chernobiyl. Kak eto bylo (Chernobyl. Cómo fue). Moskva: Nauchtejlitizdat.
Gorbachev, M. (2006). Turning Point at Chernobyl. https://www.gorby.ru/en/presscenter/publication/show_25057/
Hagen, E. W. (1980). Common-mode/common-cause Failure: a review. Annals of Nuclear Energy, 7(9), 509-517.
Hilgartner, S. (2009). Las dimensiones sociales del conocimiento experto del riesgo. En Moreno Castro (Ed.), Comunicar los riesgos. Ciencia y tecnología en la sociedad de la información (pp. 159-170). Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, OEI.
Hopkins, A. (1999). The Limits of Normal Accidente Theory. Safety Science, 32, 93-102.
Hopkins, A. (2001). Was Three Mile Island a `Normal Accident’? Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 9(2),65-72.
Hopkins, A. (2009). Learning from High Reliability Organisations. CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney.
IAEA (1992). The Chernobyl accident: Updating of INSAG-1: INSAG-7: a Report. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency.
Karpan, N. V. (2005). Chernobyl. Mest mirnogo atoma (Chernobyl. La venganza del átomo pacífico). Kiev: Kantri Laif.
Kruglov A.K. (1995) Kak sozdavalas atomnaya promyshlennost v SSSR (¿Cómo fue creada la industria atómica en la URSS?). Moskva: TsNIIatomin-form.
La Porte , T. (1982). On the Design and Management of Nearly Error-Free Organizational Control Systems. En Sils, D., Wolf, C. y Shelanski, V. (eds.), Accident at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (pp. 185-198). Boulder, Colo: Westview.
Legásov, V. A. (1996). Moi dolg razkazat ob etom (Mi deber es contarlo). Energuiya, 9, 41-49.
Le Coze, J. C. (2015). 1984-2014. Normal Accidents. Was Charles Perrow Right for the Wrong Reasons?. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 23(4), 275-286.
Le, Coze, J. C. (2020). Post Normal Accident: Revisiting Perrow’s Classic. Milton: Taylor & Francis Group.
Perrow, C. (1982). The Presidents Commission and the Normal Accident. En Sils, D.,Wolf, C. y Shelanski, V. (Eds.), Accident at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (pp. 173-184). Boulder, Colo: Westview.
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. New York: Basic Books.
Perrow, C. (1999). Living with high-risk technologies. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Perrow, C. (2011). Fukushima, risk, and probability: Expect the unexpected. Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, 1 de abril.
Petrosian, A. M. (1985). La energía atómica en la ciencia y la industria. La Habana: Editorial Pueblo y Educación.
Rasmussen, J. (1986). Information Processing and Human-Machine Interaction: an Approach to Cognitive Engineering. New York: North-Holland.
Reason, J. T. (1990a). Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reason, J. T. (1990b). The Age of the Organizational Accident. Nuclear Enginering International, 18-19.
Reason, J. T. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Farnham: Ashgate.
Reason, J. T. (2000). Safety Paradoxes and Safety Culture. International Journal of Injury Control and Safety Promotion, 7, 3-14.
Rijpma, J. A. (1997). Complexity, Tight-Coupling and Reliability: Connecting Normal Accidents Theory and High Reliability Theory. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 5, 15-23.
Rosa, E. (2005). Celebrating a Citation Classic and More: Symposium on Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents. Organization & Environment, 18, 229-234.
Rumyantsev A.N. (2011). Loguika RBMK (La lógica del RBMK). Atomnaya strateguia, 52, 6-10.
Sagan, S. D. (1993). The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Schmid, S. D. (2015). Producing Power: the Pre-Chernobyl History of the Soviet Nuclear Industry. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Sharaevski, I. G., Fialko, H. M., Zimin, L. B. (2016). Neizvestnie diagnosticheskie aspekti zaproektnoi avari v Chernobyskoi AES (Aspectos desconocidos del diagnóstico de las causas de la avería fuera de proyecto en la CEN de Chernobyl). Problemi bezleki atomnnij elektrostantsi i Chernobylia, 26, 5-14.
Sidorenko, V. A. (2002). Vvodnie zamechania k urokam chernobylskoi avari (Notas introductorias a las lecciones de la avería de Chernobyl). En Istoria atomnoi energuetiki Sovietskogo Soyuza i Rossii (Historia de la energía atómica de la Unión Soviética y Rusia), 4, 4-16.
Soloviov S. M., Kudryakov , N. N., Subbotin, D. V. (2020). Valeri Legasov: Visvecheno Chernobyliem (Valeri Legásov: iluminado por Chernobyl). Moskva: Izdatelstvo AST.
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. (2001). Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Winner, L. (1996). Do Artifacts Have Politics? Daedalus, 109, 121-136.
Abramov, M. I, Avdeev, V. I., Adamov, E. O. et al. (2006). Kanalni yaderni energuiticheski reaktor RBMK-1000 (Reactor de canales de gran potencia RBMK-1000). Moskva: GUP NIKIET.
Beck, U. (2008). La sociedad del riesgo mundial: en busca de la seguridad perdida. Barcelona: Paidós Ibérica.
Borysenko (2017). O nekotorij parametraj yadernoi besopasnosti uran-grafitovij reaktorov (Sobre la seguridad nuclear de los reactores uranio-grafito). http://proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7281
Burlakova, E. B., Kuznietsov, V. M., Mosalenko, V. A., Nazarov, A. G., Ostrietsvov, I. N., Simonov, E. Ya., y Chepenko, B. A. (2006). Neizviestni Chernobyl: istoriya, sobytiya, facti, uroki (El Chernobyl desconocido: historia, sucesos, evidencias, lecciones). Moskva: Izdatelstvo MHEPY.
Calcines (1996). Memorias del Minotauro. Bohemia. Abril, 24-27.
Dollezhall, N. A. (1989). U iztokob rukotvornogo mira: zapiski konstruktora (En los orígenes del mundo artificial. Apuntes de un constructor). Moskva: Znanie.
Dollezhal, N. A., y Yemeliánov, I. Ya. (1980). Kanalni yaderni energuiticheski reaktor (Reactor energético nuclear con canales). Moskva: Atomizdat.
Dyatlov, A.C. (1995). Why INSAG Has Still Got It Wrong. Nuclear Ingineering International, 494(40), 17-21.
Dyatlov, A.C. (2003). Chernobiyl. Kak eto bylo (Chernobyl. Cómo fue). Moskva: Nauchtejlitizdat.
Gorbachev, M. (2006). Turning Point at Chernobyl. https://www.gorby.ru/en/presscenter/publication/show_25057/
Hagen, E. W. (1980). Common-mode/common-cause Failure: a review. Annals of Nuclear Energy, 7(9), 509-517.
Hilgartner, S. (2009). Las dimensiones sociales del conocimiento experto del riesgo. En Moreno Castro (Ed.), Comunicar los riesgos. Ciencia y tecnología en la sociedad de la información (pp. 159-170). Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, OEI.
Hopkins, A. (1999). The Limits of Normal Accidente Theory. Safety Science, 32, 93-102.
Hopkins, A. (2001). Was Three Mile Island a `Normal Accident’? Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 9(2),65-72.
Hopkins, A. (2009). Learning from High Reliability Organisations. CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney.
IAEA (1992). The Chernobyl accident: Updating of INSAG-1: INSAG-7: a Report. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency.
Karpan, N. V. (2005). Chernobyl. Mest mirnogo atoma (Chernobyl. La venganza del átomo pacífico). Kiev: Kantri Laif.
Kruglov A.K. (1995) Kak sozdavalas atomnaya promyshlennost v SSSR (¿Cómo fue creada la industria atómica en la URSS?). Moskva: TsNIIatomin-form.
La Porte , T. (1982). On the Design and Management of Nearly Error-Free Organizational Control Systems. En Sils, D., Wolf, C. y Shelanski, V. (eds.), Accident at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (pp. 185-198). Boulder, Colo: Westview.
Legásov, V. A. (1996). Moi dolg razkazat ob etom (Mi deber es contarlo). Energuiya, 9, 41-49.
Le Coze, J. C. (2015). 1984-2014. Normal Accidents. Was Charles Perrow Right for the Wrong Reasons?. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 23(4), 275-286.
Le, Coze, J. C. (2020). Post Normal Accident: Revisiting Perrow’s Classic. Milton: Taylor & Francis Group.
Perrow, C. (1982). The Presidents Commission and the Normal Accident. En Sils, D.,Wolf, C. y Shelanski, V. (Eds.), Accident at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (pp. 173-184). Boulder, Colo: Westview.
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. New York: Basic Books.
Perrow, C. (1999). Living with high-risk technologies. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Perrow, C. (2011). Fukushima, risk, and probability: Expect the unexpected. Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, 1 de abril.
Petrosian, A. M. (1985). La energía atómica en la ciencia y la industria. La Habana: Editorial Pueblo y Educación.
Rasmussen, J. (1986). Information Processing and Human-Machine Interaction: an Approach to Cognitive Engineering. New York: North-Holland.
Reason, J. T. (1990a). Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reason, J. T. (1990b). The Age of the Organizational Accident. Nuclear Enginering International, 18-19.
Reason, J. T. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Farnham: Ashgate.
Reason, J. T. (2000). Safety Paradoxes and Safety Culture. International Journal of Injury Control and Safety Promotion, 7, 3-14.
Rijpma, J. A. (1997). Complexity, Tight-Coupling and Reliability: Connecting Normal Accidents Theory and High Reliability Theory. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 5, 15-23.
Rosa, E. (2005). Celebrating a Citation Classic and More: Symposium on Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents. Organization & Environment, 18, 229-234.
Rumyantsev A.N. (2011). Loguika RBMK (La lógica del RBMK). Atomnaya strateguia, 52, 6-10.
Sagan, S. D. (1993). The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Schmid, S. D. (2015). Producing Power: the Pre-Chernobyl History of the Soviet Nuclear Industry. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Sharaevski, I. G., Fialko, H. M., Zimin, L. B. (2016). Neizvestnie diagnosticheskie aspekti zaproektnoi avari v Chernobyskoi AES (Aspectos desconocidos del diagnóstico de las causas de la avería fuera de proyecto en la CEN de Chernobyl). Problemi bezleki atomnnij elektrostantsi i Chernobylia, 26, 5-14.
Sidorenko, V. A. (2002). Vvodnie zamechania k urokam chernobylskoi avari (Notas introductorias a las lecciones de la avería de Chernobyl). En Istoria atomnoi energuetiki Sovietskogo Soyuza i Rossii (Historia de la energía atómica de la Unión Soviética y Rusia), 4, 4-16.
Soloviov S. M., Kudryakov , N. N., Subbotin, D. V. (2020). Valeri Legasov: Visvecheno Chernobyliem (Valeri Legásov: iluminado por Chernobyl). Moskva: Izdatelstvo AST.
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. (2001). Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Winner, L. (1996). Do Artifacts Have Politics? Daedalus, 109, 121-136.
Calcines Pedreira, A. (2021). Chernobyl as ‘Post-Normal Accident’. Critical Review of its Technological Causes. Artefactos. Philosophical Studies on Science and Technology, 10(2), 101–123. https://doi.org/10.14201/art2021102101123
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