Sensorial, Trans-Sensorial Perception, and Intelligent Behaviors in (Human and non-Human) Aristotelian Animals
Abstract
The verb αἰσθάνομαι (and its cognates) means «sensorial perception» but also «noticing» or «being aware of», an ordinary meaning in colloquial Greek which is given a distinctly philosophical interpretation by Aristotle. This paper argues that Aristotle emphasizes a sort of complementarity between sensorial and trans-sensorial perception, which applies to both rational and irrational animals. Also, it is suggested that (i) perception, in both senses, can function as a principle of animal conservation, and (ii) that, within the Aristotelian conceptual framework, nature operates according to a principle of compensation, resulting in certain species having highly developed perceptual abilities while others possess much weaker ones (a fact that in the case of humans is compensated with a powerful intelligence) and (iii) that the physical characteristics of each animal species determines the potential for developing intelligence in both humans and non-human animals.
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