Contenido principal del artículo

Damián Islas
University of Toronto
Canadá
Biografía
Vol. 16 (2014): Filosofía práctica y emociones, Varia, Páginas 133-147
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14201/11957
Aceptado: nov 14, 2014

Resumen

El criterio de progreso científico como resolución de problemas defendido por Thomas S. Kuhn y Larry Laudan, respectivamente, ha sido criticado por varios autores. Recientemente, Alexander Bird (2007, 2008 y 2010) sugirió que el criterio de progreso científico como “resolución de problemas” es regresivo y anti-intuitivo. En este texto hago una reevaluación de las posturas de Kuhn, Laudan y Bird y muestro que los argumentos de Bird en contra de Kuhn y Laudan son insostenibles.

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