Percepción y atención. Una aproximación fenomenológica

Abstract

Husserl’s analyses of perception in Logical Investigations and the lectures on Ding und Raum and Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit contain the basic theses for later phenomenological developments and point out the importance of description of everyday’s perceiving. In his phenomenology, Husserl distinguishes what we perceive and how we perceive. The primary object of perception is a particular thing, which stands before us in propria persona. This means that perception is not limited to sensory qualities, but grasps the object as a whole. Husserl’s objects of perception include particulars and state of affairs, as well as subjects in motion and dynamic objects. In connection with this, attention is approached in a similar line of thought, insisting on the claim that it allows us to grasp the moments, features and determinations of things. Moreover, Husserl’s discussion of attention in the Investigations stresses its phenomenological status in contrast with classical empiricistic theories of abstraction.