Metafísica analítica: de sus problemas y una posible solución

Abstract

This article examines A. W. Moore’s (2012; 2017; 2025) conception of metaphysics and its capacity to address two problems that have plagued analytic metaphysics since its origins: scientism and conceptual conservatism. Since these two problems presuppose an unbridgeable gap between ourselves and the world, only a metaphysics that understands itself in creative rather than representational terms could be in a position to overcome them. Such a conception, more characteristic of the continental than the analytic tradition, seems to clearly distance itself from scientism. However, it is not clear that it is free from conceptual conservatism, as it often falls into a certain basic anthropocentrism that, in principle, limits creativity. This tension could be resolved by appealing to the Deleuzian idea that the human perspective is ontologically derived from creativity. Although it is not clear that this path is free of difficulties, it at least has the merit of opening a fruitful dialogue between two seemingly divergent philosophical traditions.