APROBACIÓN PRESIDENCIAL Y CLARIDAD DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD EN UN CONTEXTO DE CAMBIO POLÍTICO E INSTITUCIONAL: EL CASO URUGUAYO
Abstract ¿Cómo evalúan los uruguayos a sus presidentes? ¿Lo hacen según el modelo cíclico de aprobación característico de los sistemas presidencialistas con mandatos fijos? El modelo cíclico de aprobación implica que los mandatos comienzan con una “luna de miel” marcando altos niveles de aprobación, luego decrece y nuevamente se recupera al final del período. En Uruguay los datos muestran que este patrón se presenta en las cuatro últimas administraciones, pero no para las primeras tres de la serie (desde 1985 al 1999). De hecho, en ellas no se registran lunas de miel y los niveles de aprobación son bajos e impredecibles. ¿Cómo se explican los cambios en la dinámica de la aprobación presidencial? El artículo argumenta que se debe a los cambios introducidos en la reforma constitucional de 1997 y en el reequilibrio del sistema de partidos. Usando datos del Executive Approval Project analiza algunas implicaciones observables de este argumento. El análisis temporal muestra que, bajo los nuevos contextos institucionales, el apoyo popular al presidente crece, aumentando la “claridad de la responsabilidad” que permite a los ciudadanos evaluar a sus presidentes según el resultado de las políticas económicas y el ciclo electoral. Por esta razón, la dinámica se vuelve cíclica. En definitiva, a través del análisis del caso uruguayo este artículo intenta brindar evidencia sobre la importancia del diseño institucional en la aprobación de la gestión presidencial.
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Anderson, C. J. (2007). “The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability”. Annual Review of Political Science, 10, pp. 271-296.
Berlemann, M. & S. Enkelmann (2012). “The Economic Determinants of U.S. Presidential Approval - A Survey”. Working Paper Series in Economics 272, University of Luneburg, Institute of Economics, 2012.
Boelhower, D. (2018). “Aprovação presidencial (1996-2015) na América Latina: mais participação pode ser uma saída quando a economía vai mal”. Em: Revista de Ciências Sociais (UFC) no Dossiê Os Significados das Novas Quedas Presidenciais na América Latina, Vol. 49, Nº 1, pp. 134-165.
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León, Sandra (2010). “Who Is Responsible for What? Clarity of Responsibilities in Multilevel States: The Case of Spain”. In: European Journal of Political Research 50: 80–109, 2010 doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01921.x.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. & M. C. Ratto (2013). “Economic Voting in Latin America: a General Model.” Electoral Studies 32(3):489-493. Luján D. & C. López Burian (2016). “El tercer gobierno del Frente Amplio en Uruguay: Supremacía electoral de la izquierda y perspectiva de reformas institucionales”. Revista Postdata, 21(1).
Luna, J. P. (2002). “¿Pesimismo estructural o voto económico? Sobre la racionalidad agregada del electorado uruguayo”. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, pp. 13: 123-152.
Mc.Allister, I. (1999). “The Economic Performance of Governments”. In: Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, pp. 188-203. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Mueller, J. E. (1970). “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, Nº 1, pp. 18-34.
Mueller, John. (1973). War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Newman, B. & A. Forcehimes (2010). “’Rally Round the Flag’ Events for Presidential Approval Research”. Electoral Studies, 29(1), 144–154.
O’Donnell, G. (2007). Disonancias: críticas democráticas a la democracia. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.
Pérez-Liñán, A. (2007). Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Powell G. B. & G. D. Whitten (1993). “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.” American Journal of Political Science 37(2):391-414.
Przeworski, A., S. Stokes & B. Manin (1999). Democracy, Accountability and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Renno, L. & W. Gramacho (2010). “Let’s Blame Everyone: Executive and Legislative Evaluations of Economic Performance in Brazil and Chile.” Journal of Politics in Latin America 2(1):53-78.
Rius, A. (1992). “El gobierno, la economía y el hombre de la calle.” Revista SUMA 7, Montevideo, pp. 7-35.
Rudolph, T. J. (2003). “Institutional Context and the Assignment of Political Responsibility.” Journal of Politics 65(1):190-215.
Samuels, D. (2004). “Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective.” American Political Science Review 98(3):425-436.
Shapiro R. Y. & B. M. Conforto (1980). “Presidential Performance, the Economy, and the Public’s Evaluation of Economic Conditions”. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 42, Nº 1, pp. 49-67.
Sirin, C. V. & J. D. Villalobos (2011). “Where Does the Buck Stop? Applying Attribution Theory to Examine Public Appraisals of the President.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 41(2):334-357.
Stimson, J. A. (1991). Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Stokes, S. C. (2001). Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tavits, M. (2007). “Clarity of responsibility and corruption.” American Journal of Political Science 51(1):218-229.
Vairo, D. & J. R. Rodríguez (2017). “Treinta años de democracia en Uruguay: a modo de balance”.
Anderson, C. J. (2000). “Economic Voting and Political Context: A Comparative Perspective”. En: Electoral Studies, 19, 151-170.
Anderson, C. J. (2007). “The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability”. Annual Review of Political Science, 10, pp. 271-296.
Berlemann, M. & S. Enkelmann (2012). “The Economic Determinants of U.S. Presidential Approval - A Survey”. Working Paper Series in Economics 272, University of Luneburg, Institute of Economics, 2012.
Boelhower, D. (2018). “Aprovação presidencial (1996-2015) na América Latina: mais participação pode ser uma saída quando a economía vai mal”. Em: Revista de Ciências Sociais (UFC) no Dossiê Os Significados das Novas Quedas Presidenciais na América Latina, Vol. 49, Nº 1, pp. 134-165.
Booth J. A. & M. A. Seligson (2009). The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Buquet, D. & R. Piñeiro (2014). “La consolidación de un nuevo sistema de partidos en Uruguay - The Consolidation of a New Party System in Uruguay”. Debates. 8. 127-148.
Butler D. & D. Stokes (1969). Political change in Britain. St. Martin’s Press, 1971.
Cabezas, J. M. (2015). “Aprobación presidencial en América Latina, 2010- 2012. Voto Económico y preferencias políticas”. Política. Revista de Ciencia Política. Vol. 53, Nº 1, 2015. p. 15-35.
Calvo, E. (2007). “The Responsive Legislature: Public Opinion and Law Making in a Highly Disciplined Legislature”. British Journal in Political Studies, 37(2), 263–280.
Carlin, Ryan E., Jonathan Hartlyn, Timothy Hellwig, Gregory J. Love, Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo, & Matthew M. Singer. “Public Support for Latin American Presidents: The Cyclical Model in Comparative Perspective”. Research & Politics, Vol. 5, Issue 3, July 1, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018787690.
Carlin R., G. Love & C. Martínez-Gallardo (2015a). “Security, Clarity of Responsibility, and Presidential Approval. In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, DOI: 10.1177/0010414014554693.
Carlin R. E., Gregory J. Love & Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo (2015b). “Cushioning the Fall: Scandals, Economic Conditions, and Executive Approval.” Political Behavior DOI 10.1007/s11109-014- 9267-3.
Carlin R., C. Martínez-Gallardo, & J. Hartlyn (2012). “Executive Approval Dynamics under Alternative Democratic Regime Types”. In: Douglas Chalmers & Scott Mainwaring (eds.) Problems Confronting Contemporary Democracies: Essays in Honor of Alfred Stepan. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.
Carlin, R. & K. H. Hunt (2015). “Peasants, Bankers, or Piggbankers? The Economy and Presidential Popularity in Uruguay”. Política. Revista de Ciencia Política. Vol. 53, Nº 1, pp. 73-93.
Chasquetti, D. (1998). “Compartiendo el gobierno: multipartidismo y coaliciones en el Uruguay (1971-1997)”. En: Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, Nº 10 (25-45).
Chasquetti, D. (2013). “Cabinets and Legislative Cartels in Uruguay: Examining the Legislative Consequences of Government Formation” Journal of Politics in Latin America, 5(1), 67-94.
Dalton, R. (2000). “The Decline of Party Identification”. In: Russell J. Dalton & Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.) Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Erikson, Robert. S., M. MacKuen, & J. A. Stimson (2002). The Macro Polity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fiorina, M. P. (1981). Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gramacho, W (2005). “Ciclos de información y funciones de popularidad: El período Cardoso en Brasil (1995-2002)”. Desarrollo Económico, Vol. 45, Nº 177, 2005, pp. 99-121.
Goodhart, C.A. E. & R. J. Bhansali (1970). “Political economy”. Political Studies 18, PP. 43–106
Holmberg, S. (2009). “Partisanship Reconsidered”. The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. 557-570. 10.1093/oxfordhb/ 9780199270125.003.0029.
Huber, John D., G. Kernell, & E. L. Leoni (2005). “Institutional Context, Cognitive Resources and Party Attachments across Democracies”. Political Analysis [online]. No date, Vol. 13, Nº 4, pp. 365–386. Retrieved z: doi:10.1093/pan/mpi025.
Key, V.O. (1968). The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960, New York: Vintage Books.
Lebo M. & D. Cassino (2007). “The Aggregated Consequences of Motivated Reasoning and the Dynamics of Partisan Presidential Approval”. Political Psychology, Vol. 28, Nº 6, pp.719-746.
León, Sandra (2010). “Who Is Responsible for What? Clarity of Responsibilities in Multilevel States: The Case of Spain”. In: European Journal of Political Research 50: 80–109, 2010 doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01921.x.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. & M. C. Ratto (2013). “Economic Voting in Latin America: a General Model.” Electoral Studies 32(3):489-493. Luján D. & C. López Burian (2016). “El tercer gobierno del Frente Amplio en Uruguay: Supremacía electoral de la izquierda y perspectiva de reformas institucionales”. Revista Postdata, 21(1).
Luna, J. P. (2002). “¿Pesimismo estructural o voto económico? Sobre la racionalidad agregada del electorado uruguayo”. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, pp. 13: 123-152.
Mc.Allister, I. (1999). “The Economic Performance of Governments”. In: Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, pp. 188-203. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Mueller, J. E. (1970). “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, Nº 1, pp. 18-34.
Mueller, John. (1973). War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Newman, B. & A. Forcehimes (2010). “’Rally Round the Flag’ Events for Presidential Approval Research”. Electoral Studies, 29(1), 144–154.
O’Donnell, G. (2007). Disonancias: críticas democráticas a la democracia. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.
Pérez-Liñán, A. (2007). Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Powell G. B. & G. D. Whitten (1993). “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.” American Journal of Political Science 37(2):391-414.
Przeworski, A., S. Stokes & B. Manin (1999). Democracy, Accountability and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Renno, L. & W. Gramacho (2010). “Let’s Blame Everyone: Executive and Legislative Evaluations of Economic Performance in Brazil and Chile.” Journal of Politics in Latin America 2(1):53-78.
Rius, A. (1992). “El gobierno, la economía y el hombre de la calle.” Revista SUMA 7, Montevideo, pp. 7-35.
Rudolph, T. J. (2003). “Institutional Context and the Assignment of Political Responsibility.” Journal of Politics 65(1):190-215.
Samuels, D. (2004). “Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective.” American Political Science Review 98(3):425-436.
Shapiro R. Y. & B. M. Conforto (1980). “Presidential Performance, the Economy, and the Public’s Evaluation of Economic Conditions”. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 42, Nº 1, pp. 49-67.
Sirin, C. V. & J. D. Villalobos (2011). “Where Does the Buck Stop? Applying Attribution Theory to Examine Public Appraisals of the President.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 41(2):334-357.
Stimson, J. A. (1991). Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Stokes, S. C. (2001). Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tavits, M. (2007). “Clarity of responsibility and corruption.” American Journal of Political Science 51(1):218-229.
Vairo, D. & J. R. Rodríguez (2017). “Treinta años de democracia en Uruguay: a modo de balance”.
Selios, L. (2019). APROBACIÓN PRESIDENCIAL Y CLARIDAD DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD EN UN CONTEXTO DE CAMBIO POLÍTICO E INSTITUCIONAL: EL CASO URUGUAYO. Revista Latinoamericana De Opinión Pública, 8(2), 157–195. https://doi.org/10.14201/rlop.22357
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