What Should Congress Members Do? Using Survey Embedded Experiments to Study Citizens’ Clientelistic Expectations in Mexico

Abstract

How do citizens view the work of their legislators? Do they think representatives should legislate and oversee the executive, or do they believe representatives should deliver resources to their community and help individuals with problems? Do they expect both? In Latin America surveys typically show that popular evaluations of the national congress are overwhelmingly negative but are not able to explain why. Are congresses held in low esteem because people think that congress is not legislating well or efficiently overseeing the executive, or because citizens do not know what legislators are supposed to do and want them to deliver pork for their district and personalistic benefits for themselves? Since clientelism targets the poor and plays an important role in elections in developing democ- racies, it is important to know if poor citizens truly have different views than wealthier citizens about what a member of congress should do once elected. We use quasi-experimental procedures in a public opinion survey administered in Mexico City to begin to address these questions. Our findings indicate that poorer citizens, people with no or very little education, have greater expectations of clientelism than wealthier citizens but that their view of a legislator’s job is more subtle, and more democratic than would be predicted by clientelism theory.
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Taylor-Robinson, M. M., Geva, N., Struminger, R., & Paras, P. (2011). What Should Congress Members Do? Using Survey Embedded Experiments to Study Citizens’ Clientelistic Expectations in Mexico. Revista Latinoamericana De Opinión Pública, 1, 147–182. https://doi.org/10.14201/rlop.22254

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