Prevendo corridas de dois cavalos em novas democracias: exatidão, precisão e erro

Resumo

O objetivo deste artigo é explorar a previsão eleitoral em corridas de dois cavalos em novas democracias. Especificamente, ele aplica um modelo linear dinâmico Bayesiano (nomeado de modelo de dois estágios, TSM) para observar o plebiscito nacional de duas perguntas do Chile em 2020. O objetivo final é testar o TSM em termos de precisão (quão próximo está dos resultados?), exatidão (quão próximo está de outros métodos de previsão?) e erro (quanto se desvia da precisão / exatidão perfeita?). O artigo conclui que, embora o TSM seja um estimador estável, sua exatidão e precisão são afetadas sob certas condições. Usando a diferença nos resultados das duas questões do plebiscito, o artigo discute como mudanças repentinas e inesperadas nas preferências eleitorais podem influenciar as previsões.
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