¿Surrogative Reasoning as Representational or Logical-Based Thinking?

Abstract

The aim of our paper is to carry out a critical analysis of the notion of representation as a basis for hypothesis generation in scientific modelling. Indeed, we will show the inconsistencies generated by this way of grounding hypothesis generation in some of the most representative approaches to scientific representation. Depending on the approach and the definition of representation considered, we show that these inconsistencies range from the use of non-logical resources to a certain circularity in the definitions. The idea underlying all this critique is that surrogative reasoning must find its foundations in logic itself.
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Redmond, J., & Lopez-Orellana, R. (2022). ¿Surrogative Reasoning as Representational or Logical-Based Thinking?. ArtefaCToS. Revista De Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La tecnología, 11(2), 191–207. https://doi.org/10.14201/art2022112191207 (Original work published October 29, 2022)

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Author Biography

Juan Redmond

,
Universidad de Valparaíso
Profesor Titular Jornada Completa del Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Valparaíso. Investigador Responsable Conicyt: Proyecto Fondecyt Regular 2014 N° 1141260 (2014-2016); Miembro del Comité Académico del Doctorado en Estudios Interdisciplinarios (Universidad de Valparaíso); Miembro del Núcleo de Investigación Arte y Nuevos Medios (Universidad de Valparaíso); Director (junto a Shahid Rahman) de la serie Cuadernos de Lógica, Epistemología y Lenguaje, Editorial College Publications, desde 2006 (Dov Gabbay, King’s College, UK) http://www.collegepublications.co.uk; Director de la Serie Selección de Textos, Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Valparaíso; Director (junto a Adolfo Vera) de la Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, Ed. del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad de Valparaíso, ISSN 0719-424.
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