A Dynamic View of Hypothesis Generation in Abduction

Abstract

This paper explores our proposal’s conceptual depth and implications for the hypothesis generation as conditional. To do so, we will contrast it mainly with reading passages from one of the paradigmatic presentations of hypothesis generation: the work of C.S. Peirce. Indeed, in his work, the notion of hypothesis gains a relevant place from a logical point of view. In particular, we will focus on (i) showing that “hypothesis” in Peirce can hardly be identified with just a section of the rule that subsumes the surprising case and (ii) we will show that the proposed hypotheses generation as conditionals allows for a complementary and enlightening reading of his idea of abduction.
  • Referencias
  • Cómo citar
  • Del mismo autor
  • Métricas
Bellucci, F. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (2023). Peirce’s Abduction. In L. Magnani (Ed.), Handbook of Abductive Cognition (pp. 7–20). Cham: Springer.

Fann, K. T. (1970). Peirce’s Theory of Abduction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Frankfurt, H. G. (1958). Peirce’s Notion of Abduction. The Journal of Philosophy, 55(14), 593–597.

Frigg, R. & Nguyen, J. (2017). Models and Representation. In L. Magnani & T. Bertolotti (eds.), Handbook of Model-Based Science (pp. 49–102). Dordrecht-New York: Springer.

Frigg, R., & Nguyen, J. (2016). Scientific Representation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-representation/

Hanson, N. R. (1958a). Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hanson, N. R. (1958b). The Logic of Discovery. Journal of Philosophy, 55(25), 1073–1089. 10.2307/2022541

Hanson, N. R. (1960). More on the “Logic of Discovery”. Journal of Philosophy, 57(6), 182–188. 10.2307/2022388

Hanson, N. R. (1961). Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery? In H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (Eds.), Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science (pp. pp. 20–35). New York: Holt, Rinehart And Winston Of Canada Ltda.

Peirce, C. S. (2019-2021). Logic of the Future. Writings on Existential Graphs (3 Vols). Edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.

Peirce, C.S. (1958/1878). Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis. In The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (CP 2.619). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Peirce, C. S. (1908). On an Unpretentious Argument for the Reality of God. Digital Peirce Archive, [MS 0905]. https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/view.php?ref=1329

Redmond, J. (2021). A Free Dialogical Logic for Surrogate Reasoning: Generation of Hypothesis Without Ontological Commitments. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 36 (3). pp. 297–320. 10.1387/theoria.21902

Redmond, J. & Lopez-Orellana, R. (2023) Interactive Hypotheses: Towards a Dialogical Foundation of Surrogate Reasoning. Philsci Archive [Preprint]. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21994

Redmond, J., & Lopez-Orellana, R. (2022). ¿Surrogative Reasoning as Representational or Logical-Based Thinking? ArtefaCToS, 11(2), 191–207. 10.14201/art2022112191207

Rescher, N. (2007). Conditionals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Robin, R. S. (1967). Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Worcester: University of Massachusetts Press.

Strawson, P. F. (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen.

Swoyer, C. (1991). Structural Representation and Surrogative Reasoning. Synthese, 87(3), 449–508. 10.1007/BF00499820
Redmond, J., & Lopez Orellana, R. (2023). A Dynamic View of Hypothesis Generation in Abduction. ArtefaCToS. Revista De Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La tecnología, 12(2), 139–153. https://doi.org/10.14201/art2023.31543

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.
+