Causality and Indeterminism in Human Action. Reflections on Causes and Reasons

  • Rafaela García Elskamp
    Centro de Investigación de Filosofía de la Ciencia y la Tecnología, UDC rgelskamp[at]gmail.com

Abstract

When explaining the origin of human action, one of the thematic axes is the study of “causality” and its compatibility with indeterminism. The existence of regularities in the field of social sciences can only be explainable by acknowledging the regularities that underlie human actions. An action is the result of a decision-making process, which has a starting intention. This intentionality is what imposes on the action its regularity and at the same time its singularity. Actions reflect in their structure our rational being, which is therefore free, and also our cultural being: each action is the reflection of historical-cultural conditions that make it predictable. In the analysis of an action, all the elements that lead here to formulate an intention are “causes” of the action; the “causes” no longer exercise as such when, at least, they are dominated intellectually. In this case, the force they exert on the concrete individual decreases, so they are now considered as “reasons”.Within the current context of causality, where Woodward has an influential role, this article considers the conception of Tuomela on the formation of the social action, Salmon’s analysis of causality, and Anscombe’s characterization of intention.
  • Referencias
  • Cómo citar
  • Del mismo autor
  • Métricas
Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M. (1963). Intention. Oxford: B. Blackwell.

Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M. (1968). Intention. En Alan R. White (ed.), The Philosophy of Action. (pp. 144-152). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Apel, Karl Otto (1976). Causal Explanation, Motivational Explanation, and Hermeneutical Understanding. En Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy (pp. 161-176). Stockfield: Oriel Press.

Bratman, Michael E. (1990). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Engle, Robert F. y White, Halbert (eds.) (1999). Cointegration, Causality and Forecasting: A Festschrift in Honour of Clive Granger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

González, Wenceslao J. (2003). Racionalidad y Economía: De la racionalidad de la Economía como Ciencia a la racionalidad de los agentes económicos. En Wenceslao J. González (ed.), Racionalidad, historicidad y predicción en Herbert A. Simon (pp. 65-96). A Coruña: Netbiblo. https://doi.org/10.4272/84-9745-021-3

Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. (2015). Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in Economics. Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08885-3

Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. (2018a). Configuration of Causality and Philosophy of Psychology: An Analysis of Causality as Intervention and its Repercussion for Psychology. En Wenceslao J. Gonzalez (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Causality and Psychological Subject. New Reflections on James Woodward's Contribution (pp. 21-70). Boston/Berlín: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110576054-002

Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. (2018b). New Contributions to Psychology as a Special Science: The Interpretation of Causality and the Characterization of the Psychological Subject. En Wenceslao J. Gonzalez (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Causality and Psychological Subject. New Reflections on James Woodward's Contribution (pp. 1-17). Boston/Berlín: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110576054-001

Rescher, Nicholas (1953). Some Remarks on an Analysis of the Causal Relation. Journal of Philosophy, 51, 239-241. https://doi.org/10.2307/2021094

Rescher, Nicholas (1998). Predicting the Future. N. York: State University of New York Press.

Rescher, Nicholas (1999). Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica. Barcelona: Paidós.

Salmon, Merrilee H. (1992). Philosophy of Social Sciences. En Merrilee Salmon et al., Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (pp. 404-425). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Salmon, Merrilee H. (2002). La explicación causal en Ciencias Sociales. En Wenceslao J. González (ed.). Diversidad de la explicación científica (pp. 161-180) Barcelona, Ariel.

Salmon, Merrilee H. (2003). Causal Explanations of Behavior. Philosophy of Science, 70(4), 720-738. https://doi.org/10.1086/378861

Salmon, Wesley C. (2002a). La estructura de la explicación causal. En Wenceslao J. González (ed.), Diversidad de la explicación científica (pp. 141-159). Barcelona: Ariel.

Salmon, Wesley C. (2002b). Explicación causal frente a no causal. En Wenceslao J. González (ed.), Diversidad de la explicación científica (pp. 97-115). Barcelona: Ariel.

Simon, Herbert A. (1952). On the Definition of the Causal Relation. The Journal of Philosophy, 49(16), 517-528. https://doi.org/10.2307/2021114

Simon, Herbert A. (1953). Causal Ordering and Identifiability. En William C. Hood y Tjalling C. Koopmans (eds.), Studies in Econometric Method (pp. 49-74). New York: J. Wiley.

Simon, Herbert A. (1955). Further Remarks on the Causal Relation. [Réplica a la reseña de N. Rescher sobre el artículo 'On the Definition of the Causal Relation']. Journal of Philosophy, 52(1), 20-21. https://doi.org/10.2307/2020692

Simon, Herbert A. y Rescher, Nicholas (1966). Cause and counterfactual. Philosophy of Science, 33(4), 323-340. https://doi.org/10.1086/288105

Sosa, Ernest y Tooley, Michael (eds.) (1993). Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tuomela, Raimo (1985). A Theory of Social Action. Dordrecht: Reidel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5263-8_7

Tuomela, Raimo (2002). The Philosophy of Social Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487446

Tuomela, Raimo (2007). The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. N. York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313390.001.0001

von Wright, Georg Henrik (1976). Determinism and the Study of Man. En Juha Manninen y Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Essays on Explanation and Understanding (pp. 415-435). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1978). The Blue and Brown Books. Preliminary Studies of the 'Philosophical Investigations'. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophische Untersuchungen. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Woodward, James F. (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. N. York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195155270.001.0001
García Elskamp, R. (2020). Causality and Indeterminism in Human Action. Reflections on Causes and Reasons. ArtefaCToS. Revista De Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La tecnología, 9(1), 47–60. https://doi.org/10.14201/art2020914760

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.
+