Social Mechanisms, Antropomorphism and Cognitive Processes in Non-Human Animals. 40 Years after Chimpanzee Politics
Abstract The attribution of thoughts and mind to non-human animals generates heated debates and controversies among scholars of animal behavior. Social mechanisms –such as play as a behavior produced by natural selection that has survival value– strongly catch the attention of ethologists, psychologists and philosophers of mind when it comes to establishing how far can we go in embracing scientific anthropomorphism without falling into hasty analogies of naive and uninformed anthropomorphism. This paper appeals to the concept of social mechanisms, among others, in de Waal to address the problem of how to study some survival strategies in social groups, how to justify scientific anthropomorphism and to what extent we can talk about mental processes in other animals.
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Allen, Colin y Bekoff, Marc (1999). Species of Mind. The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Allen-Hermanson, Sean. (2005). Morgan’s Canon Revisited. Philosophy of Science, 72(4), 608-631. https://doi.org/10.1086/505187
Andrews, Kristin y Huss, Brian (2014). Anthropomorphism, anthropectomy, and the null hypothesis. Biol Philos, (29), 711-729. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9442-2
Asensio, Norberto (2014). Etología social. En S. Sánchez López (Ed.), Etología. La ciencia del comportamiento animal (pp. 419-442). Barcelona: UOC.
Bekoff, Marc y Pierce, Jessica (2010). Justicia salvaje. La vida moral de los animales. Madrid: Turner.
Bermúdez, José Luis (2003). Thinking without Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159691.001.0001
Buckner, Cameron (2013). Morgan’s Canon, meet Hume’s Dictum: avoiding anthropofabulation in cross-species comparisons. Biol Philos, (28), 853-871. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9376-0
Burghardt, Gordon (1985). Animal awareness: Current perceptions and historical perspective. American Psychologist, (40), 905-919. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.40.8.905
Byrne, Richard, y Corp, Nadia (2004). Neocortex size predicts deception rate in primates. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, (271), 1693-1699. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2004.2780
Call, Josep (2000). Representing space and objects in monkeys and apes. Cognitive Science, (24), 397-422. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2403_3
Call, Josep (2001). Chimpanzee social cognition. Trends in cognitive sciences, 5(9), 388-393. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01728-9
Call, Josep (2005). La evolución de la inteligencia ecológica en los primates: el problema de encontrar y procesar alimento. En F. Guillén-Salazar (Ed.), Existo, luego pienso: los primates y la evolución de la inteligencia humana (pp. 47-73). Madrid: Ateles Editores.
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Call, Josep (2010). Do apes know that they could be wrong? Animal Cognition, (13), 689-700. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-010-0317-x
Castrodeza, Carlos (2009). La darwinización del mundo. Barcelona: Herder.
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Colmenares, Fernando (2005). De laberintos sociales y de cómo salir de ellos: inteligencia social. En F. Guillén-Salazar (Ed.), Existo, luego pienso: los primates y la evolución de la inteligencia humana (pp. 75-128). Madrid: Ateles Editores.
Colmenares, Fernando (2014). Etología social. En S. Sánchez López (Ed.), Etología. La ciencia del comportamiento animal (pp. 295-348). Barcelona: UOC.
Crook, John y Goss-Custard, John (1972). Social Ethology. Annual Review of Psychology, 23, 277-312. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.23.020172.001425
Cuevas, Ana (2016). Artefactualidad animal. Ludus Vitalis, XXIV(45), 155-173.
Darwin, Charles (1936)[1871]. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. New York: The Modern Library.
Davidson, Donald (1982). Rational Animals. Dialectica, 36(4), 317-327. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1982.tb01546.x
Davidson, Donald (1999a). The emergence of Thought. Erkenntnis, 51 (1), 7-17.
Davidson, Donald (1999b). Reply to Simon J. Evine. En L. Hanh (Ed.), The Philisophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 305-310). Chicago: Open Court.
Davidson, Donald (2001). What Thought Requires? En J. Branquinho, The Foundations of Cognitive Science (pp. 121-132). New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198238904.003.0008
Davidson, Donald (2003). Tres variedades de conocimiento. En D. Davidson, Subjetivo, intersubjetivo, objetivo (pp. 280-300). Madrid: Cátedra.
De Waal, Frans (1989). La política de los chimpancés. Madrid: Alianza editorial.
De Waal, Frans (1997). Bien natural. Los orígenes del bien y del mal en los humanos y otros animales. Barcelona: Herder.
De Waal, Frans (2007). Seres moralmente evolucionados. En F. De Waal (Ed.), Primates y filósofos. La evolución de la moral del simio al hombre (pp. 23-111). Barcelona: Paidós.
Delius, Juan y Godoy, Adrian (2001). Los procesos cognitivos en las aves y sus diversos orígenes. En J. Mora (Ed.), Neuropsicología cognitiva: Algunos problemas actuales (pp. 196-218). Aljibe: Archidona.
Dennett, Daniel (2006). Breaking the spell. Religion as a natural phenomenon. New York: Penguin Books.
Diéguez, Antonio (2005). ¿Hay diferencia esencial entre hombres y animales? Animales por derecho. THÉMATA. Revista de Filosofía, (35), 83-90.
Diéguez, Antonio (2012). ¿Pueden pensar los animales? En J. Martínez y A. Ponce de León (Eds.), Darwin y el evolucionismo contemporáneo (pp. 313-326). México: Siglo XXI.
Diéguez, Antonio (2014). Pensamiento conceptual en animales. En A. Diéguez y J. M. Atencia (Eds.), Naturaleza animal y humana (pp. 83-114). Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
Dretske, Fred (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Dyer, Fred y Gould, James (1983). Honey bee navigation. Amer. Sci., (71), 587-597.
Fitzpatrick, Simon (2008). Doing Away with Morgan’s Canon. Mind & Language, 23(2), 224-246. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00338.x
Flombaum, Jonathan y Santos, Laurie (2005). Rhesus monkeys attribute perception to others. Current Biology, 15(5), 447-452. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2004.12.076
Glock, Hans-Johann (2009). La mente de los animales: problemas conceptuales. Oviedo: KRK.
Glock, Hans-Johann (2015). Comunicación personal vía correo electrónico con Hans-Johann Glock sobre procesos mentales en animales no humanos.
Gould, James (1982). Why do honey bees have dialects. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol, (10), 53-56. https://doi.org//10.1007/BF00296395
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Hare, Brian, Call, Josep y Tomasello, Michael (2006). Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding. Cognition, 101(3), 495-514. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.011
Herrnstein, Richard. (1990). Levels of stimulus control: a functional approach. Cognition, 37(1-2), 133-166. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(90)90021-B
Heyes, Cecilia (1998). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(1), 101-134. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X98000703
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Call, Josep (2000). Representing space and objects in monkeys and apes. Cognitive Science, (24), 397-422. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2403_3
Call, Josep (2001). Chimpanzee social cognition. Trends in cognitive sciences, 5(9), 388-393. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01728-9
Call, Josep (2005). La evolución de la inteligencia ecológica en los primates: el problema de encontrar y procesar alimento. En F. Guillén-Salazar (Ed.), Existo, luego pienso: los primates y la evolución de la inteligencia humana (pp. 47-73). Madrid: Ateles Editores.
Call, Josep (2006). Descartes’ two errors: Reason and reflection in the great apes. En S. Hurley y M. Nudds (Eds.), Rational Animals? (pp. 219-234). Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0010
Call, Josep (2010). Do apes know that they could be wrong? Animal Cognition, (13), 689-700. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-010-0317-x
Castrodeza, Carlos (2009). La darwinización del mundo. Barcelona: Herder.
Causey, Kayla y Bjorklund, David (2016). La evolución de la cognición. En V. Swami (Ed.), Psicología evolucionista. Una introducción crítica (pp. 42-83). México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
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Colmenares, Fernando (2014). Etología social. En S. Sánchez López (Ed.), Etología. La ciencia del comportamiento animal (pp. 295-348). Barcelona: UOC.
Crook, John y Goss-Custard, John (1972). Social Ethology. Annual Review of Psychology, 23, 277-312. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.23.020172.001425
Cuevas, Ana (2016). Artefactualidad animal. Ludus Vitalis, XXIV(45), 155-173.
Darwin, Charles (1936)[1871]. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. New York: The Modern Library.
Davidson, Donald (1982). Rational Animals. Dialectica, 36(4), 317-327. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1982.tb01546.x
Davidson, Donald (1999a). The emergence of Thought. Erkenntnis, 51 (1), 7-17.
Davidson, Donald (1999b). Reply to Simon J. Evine. En L. Hanh (Ed.), The Philisophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 305-310). Chicago: Open Court.
Davidson, Donald (2001). What Thought Requires? En J. Branquinho, The Foundations of Cognitive Science (pp. 121-132). New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198238904.003.0008
Davidson, Donald (2003). Tres variedades de conocimiento. En D. Davidson, Subjetivo, intersubjetivo, objetivo (pp. 280-300). Madrid: Cátedra.
De Waal, Frans (1989). La política de los chimpancés. Madrid: Alianza editorial.
De Waal, Frans (1997). Bien natural. Los orígenes del bien y del mal en los humanos y otros animales. Barcelona: Herder.
De Waal, Frans (2007). Seres moralmente evolucionados. En F. De Waal (Ed.), Primates y filósofos. La evolución de la moral del simio al hombre (pp. 23-111). Barcelona: Paidós.
Delius, Juan y Godoy, Adrian (2001). Los procesos cognitivos en las aves y sus diversos orígenes. En J. Mora (Ed.), Neuropsicología cognitiva: Algunos problemas actuales (pp. 196-218). Aljibe: Archidona.
Dennett, Daniel (2006). Breaking the spell. Religion as a natural phenomenon. New York: Penguin Books.
Diéguez, Antonio (2005). ¿Hay diferencia esencial entre hombres y animales? Animales por derecho. THÉMATA. Revista de Filosofía, (35), 83-90.
Diéguez, Antonio (2012). ¿Pueden pensar los animales? En J. Martínez y A. Ponce de León (Eds.), Darwin y el evolucionismo contemporáneo (pp. 313-326). México: Siglo XXI.
Diéguez, Antonio (2014). Pensamiento conceptual en animales. En A. Diéguez y J. M. Atencia (Eds.), Naturaleza animal y humana (pp. 83-114). Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
Dretske, Fred (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Dyer, Fred y Gould, James (1983). Honey bee navigation. Amer. Sci., (71), 587-597.
Fitzpatrick, Simon (2008). Doing Away with Morgan’s Canon. Mind & Language, 23(2), 224-246. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00338.x
Flombaum, Jonathan y Santos, Laurie (2005). Rhesus monkeys attribute perception to others. Current Biology, 15(5), 447-452. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2004.12.076
Glock, Hans-Johann (2009). La mente de los animales: problemas conceptuales. Oviedo: KRK.
Glock, Hans-Johann (2015). Comunicación personal vía correo electrónico con Hans-Johann Glock sobre procesos mentales en animales no humanos.
Gould, James (1982). Why do honey bees have dialects. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol, (10), 53-56. https://doi.org//10.1007/BF00296395
Gould, James (2002). Can honey bees create cognitive “maps”. En M. Bekoff, C. Allen y G. Burghardt (Eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition (pp. 41-46). Cambridge: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1885.003.0009
Hare, Brian, Call, Josep y Tomasello, Michael (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal Behaviour, (61), 139-151. https://doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1518
Hare, Brian, Call, Josep y Tomasello, Michael (2006). Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding. Cognition, 101(3), 495-514. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.011
Herrnstein, Richard. (1990). Levels of stimulus control: a functional approach. Cognition, 37(1-2), 133-166. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(90)90021-B
Heyes, Cecilia (1998). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(1), 101-134. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X98000703
Jamieson, Dale y Bekoff, Marc (1993). On aims and methods of cognitive ethology. Philosophy of Science Association, (2), 110-124. https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192828
Kaminski, Juliane, Call, Josep y Tomasello, Michael (2008). Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe. Cognition, 109(2), 224-234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.010
Krupenye, Christopher, Kano, Fumihiro, Hirata, Satoshi, Call, Josep y Tomasello, Michael (2016). Great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs. Science, 354(6308), 110-114. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf8110
Llorente, Michael (2019). Primates. Biología, comportamiento y evolución. Barcelona: Lynx Edicions.
Manning, Aubrey y Dawkins, Mariam S. (2012). An Introduction to Animal Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139030304
Mitchell, Sandra (2005). Anthropomorphism and cross-species modeling. En L. Daston y G. Mitman (Eds.), Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism (pp. 100-117). New York: Columbia University Press.
Morgado, Ignacio (2017). Cómo percibimos el mundo. Una exploración de la mente y los sentidos. Bogotá: Ariel.
Morgan, C. Lloyd (1896). Habit and Instinct. London: Edward Arnold. https://doi.org/10.1037/12922-000
Morgan, C. Lloyd (1903). An Introduction to Comparative Psychology. Londres: Scott. https://doi.org//10.1037/13701-000
Mulcahy, Nicholas y Call, Josep (2006). Apes save tools for future use. Science, (312), 1038-1040. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1125456
Newen, Albert y Bartels, Andreas (2003). Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology, 20(3), 283–308. https://doi.org//10.1080/09515080701358096
Osvath, Mathias y Karvonen, Elin (2012). Spontaneous Innovation for Future Deception in a Male Chimpanzee. PLoS ONE, 7(5), e36782. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0036782
Penn, Derek y Povinelli, Daniel (2013). The Comparative Delusion: the ‘behavioristic’ / mentalistic’ dichotomy in comparative Theory of Mind research. En J. Metcalfe y H. Terrace (Eds.), Agency and Joint Attention (pp. 62-80). Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199988341.003.0004
Povinelli, Daniel, Bering, Jesse y Giambrone, Steve (2000). Toward a science of other minds: escaping the argument by analogy. Cognitive Science, 24(3), 509-541. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2403_7
Prades, Josep (2009). Introducción. Expresión y contenido intencional. En H.-J. Glock (Ed.), La mente de los animales: problemas conceptuales (pp. 11-56). Oviedo: KRK.
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