El a priori relativo. ¿Hacia una noción pragmatista de la ciencia?
Resumen Se propone una revisión del concepto de a priori relativo desde la propuesta de Michael Friedman. Se comenzará exponiendo los aspectos de las obras de Carnap y Kuhn que cimientan las dimensiones estática y dinámica de la obra de Friedman. Se argumentará que, a pesar de las virtudes de su interpretación, la falta de sensibilidad pragmática le impide caracterizar adecuadamente la elección teórica. A continuación, se expondrán varias críticas a la elucidación de Friedman. Por último, a raíz de tales críticas, se explorarán lecturas pragmatistas del a priori relativo como superación de las dificultades analizadas.
- Referencias
- Cómo citar
- Del mismo autor
- Métricas
Carnap, Rudolf (1934). Logical Syntax of Language. Abingdon: Routledge [Reedición de 2001].
Carnap, Rudolf (1950). Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4 (11), pp. 20-40.
Cassirer, Ernst (1910). Substance and Function. Estados Unidos: Open Court [Edición de 1953].
Chang, Hason (2008). Contingent Transcendental Arguments for Metaphysical Principles. En Michela Massimi (Ed.), Kant and Philosophy of Science Today (pp. 113-133). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246108000076
Chang, Hason (2012). Is Water H2O? Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3932-1
Coffa, José Alberto (1991). The Semantic tradition: From Kant to Carnap. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139172240
De Boer, Karin (2010). Kant, Reichenbach, and the Fate of A priori Principles. European Journal of Philosophy, 19 (4), pp. 504-537. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00397.x
De Pierris, Graciela (1992). The Constitutive A Priori. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1), pp. 179-214. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1992.10717303
Friedman, Michael (1994). Kant and the Twentieth Century. En Paolo Parrini (Ed.), Kant and Contemporary Epistemology (pp. 27-46). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0834-8_2
Friedman, Michael (1999). Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173193
Friedman, Michael (2001). Dynamics of Reason. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Friedman, Michael (2002). Kant, Kuhn and the Rationality of Science. Philosophy of Science, 69, pp. 171-190. https://doi.org/10.1086/341048
Friedman, Michael (2007). Coordination, Constitution and Convention. En Alan Richardson y Thomas Uebel (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism (pp. 91-116). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521791782.005
Friedman, Michael (2008). Einstein, Kant and the A Priori. En Michela Massimi (Ed.), Kant and Philosophy of Science Today (pp. 95-112). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Friedman, Michael (2010a). Synthetic History Reconsidered. En Mary Domski y Michael Dickson (Eds.), Discourse on a New Method (pp. 571-801). Illinois: Open Court.
Friedman, Michael (2010b). A Post-Kuhnian Approach to the History and Philosophy of Science. The Monist, 93 (4), pp. 497-517. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist201093430
Friedman, Michael (2011). Extending the Dynamics of Reason. Erkenntis 75, pp. 431-444. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9342-7
Friedman, Michael (2012). Reconsidering the Dynamics of Reason. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 43 (1), pp. 47-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.10.006
Habermas, Jürgen (1981). Teoría de la acción comunicativa. Madrid: Taurus. [Edición de 1999].
Irzik, Gürol y Grünberg, Teo (1995). Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46 (3), pp. 285-307. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.3.285
Kant, Immanuel (1787). Crítica de la Razón Pura. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica [Edición de 2009].
Kordig, Carl R. (1971). The Justification of Scientific Change. Dordrecht: Reidel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1734-3
Korkut, Buket (2011). The Real Virtue of Friedman's Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science, 78, pp. 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1086/658092
Kuhn, Thomas (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press [3º Edición de 1996].
Kuhn, Thomas (1977). Objectivity, Value Judgement and Theory Choice. En The Essential Tension (pp. 320-339). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas. (1991). The Road Since Structure. En James Conant y John Haugeland (Eds.), The Road Since Structure (pp. 90-104). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas (1993). En James Conant y John Haugeland (Eds.), The Road Since Structure (pp. 224-252.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Leinonen, Mikko (2016). Assesing Rickert's Influence on Carnap. En Christian Damböck (Ed.), Influences on the Aufbau (pp. 213-232). Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21876-2_11
Lewis, Clarence Irving (1923). A Pragmatic Conception of the a Priori. Journal of Philosophy, 20 (7), pp. 169-177. https://doi.org/10.2307/2939833
Lewis, Clarence Irving (1929). Mind and World Order. Nueva York: Dover Publications. [Edición de 1990].
Massimi, Michela (2005). Pauli's Exclusion Principle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511535352
McArthur, Dan (2005). Normative Naturalism and The Relativised A Priori. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 36, pp. 331-350. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-0038-7
Mormann, Thomas (2012). A Place for Pragmatism in the Dynamics of Reason? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 43 (1), pp. 27-37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.10.004
Padovani, Flavia (2011). Relativizing the Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach Axioms of Coordination Divided. Synthese, 181, pp. 42-62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9590-0
Pap, Arthur (1946). The a Priori in Physical Theory. Nueva York: Russel & Russel.
Peláez Cedrés, Álvaro (2008). Lo a priori constitutivo: historia y perspectiva. México: Anthropos.
Potochnik, Angela (2017).
Idealization and the Aims of Science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1975). What is Mathematical Truth. En Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1976). Two Dogmas Revisited. Reimpreso en Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason (pp. 87-97). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625275
Putnam, Hilary (1995). Pragmatism. Estados Unidos: Blackwell.
Reichenbach, Hans (1920). The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge. Berkeley y Los Angeles: Cambridge University Press [Edición de 1965].
Richardson, Alan (2002). Narrating the History of Reason Itself. Perspectives on Science, 10 (3), pp. 253-274. https://doi.org/10.1162/106361402321899050
Richardson, Alan (2010). Ernst Cassirer and Michael Friedman: Kantian or Hegelian Dynamics of Reason? En Mary Domski y Michael Dickson (Eds.), Discourse on a New Method (pp. 279-294). Illinois: Open Court.
Ryckman, Thomas (2005). The Reign of Relativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195177177.001.0001
Shaffer, Michael J. (2011). The Constitutive A Priori and Epistemic Justification. En Michael J. Shaffer y Michael L. Veber (Eds.), What place for the A Priori? (pp. 193-210). Chicago: Open Court.
Scheffler, Israel (1967). Science and Subjectivity. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Schlick, Moritz (1925). General Theory of Knowledge. Austria: Springer [Edición de 1974].
Stump, David J. (2015). Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science. Nueva York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315712581
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2015). Reconsidering the Carnap-Kuhn Connection. En William J. Devlin y Alisa Bokulich (Eds.), Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 years on (pp. 51-70). Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13383-6_5
Van Dyck, Maarten (2009). Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project. Philosophy of Science 76, pp. 689-700. https://doi.org/10.1086/605823
van Fraassen, Bas Cornelis (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244274.001.0001
Carnap, Rudolf (1950). Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4 (11), pp. 20-40.
Cassirer, Ernst (1910). Substance and Function. Estados Unidos: Open Court [Edición de 1953].
Chang, Hason (2008). Contingent Transcendental Arguments for Metaphysical Principles. En Michela Massimi (Ed.), Kant and Philosophy of Science Today (pp. 113-133). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246108000076
Chang, Hason (2012). Is Water H2O? Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3932-1
Coffa, José Alberto (1991). The Semantic tradition: From Kant to Carnap. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139172240
De Boer, Karin (2010). Kant, Reichenbach, and the Fate of A priori Principles. European Journal of Philosophy, 19 (4), pp. 504-537. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00397.x
De Pierris, Graciela (1992). The Constitutive A Priori. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1), pp. 179-214. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1992.10717303
Friedman, Michael (1994). Kant and the Twentieth Century. En Paolo Parrini (Ed.), Kant and Contemporary Epistemology (pp. 27-46). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0834-8_2
Friedman, Michael (1999). Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173193
Friedman, Michael (2001). Dynamics of Reason. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Friedman, Michael (2002). Kant, Kuhn and the Rationality of Science. Philosophy of Science, 69, pp. 171-190. https://doi.org/10.1086/341048
Friedman, Michael (2007). Coordination, Constitution and Convention. En Alan Richardson y Thomas Uebel (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism (pp. 91-116). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521791782.005
Friedman, Michael (2008). Einstein, Kant and the A Priori. En Michela Massimi (Ed.), Kant and Philosophy of Science Today (pp. 95-112). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Friedman, Michael (2010a). Synthetic History Reconsidered. En Mary Domski y Michael Dickson (Eds.), Discourse on a New Method (pp. 571-801). Illinois: Open Court.
Friedman, Michael (2010b). A Post-Kuhnian Approach to the History and Philosophy of Science. The Monist, 93 (4), pp. 497-517. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist201093430
Friedman, Michael (2011). Extending the Dynamics of Reason. Erkenntis 75, pp. 431-444. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9342-7
Friedman, Michael (2012). Reconsidering the Dynamics of Reason. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 43 (1), pp. 47-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.10.006
Habermas, Jürgen (1981). Teoría de la acción comunicativa. Madrid: Taurus. [Edición de 1999].
Irzik, Gürol y Grünberg, Teo (1995). Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46 (3), pp. 285-307. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.3.285
Kant, Immanuel (1787). Crítica de la Razón Pura. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica [Edición de 2009].
Kordig, Carl R. (1971). The Justification of Scientific Change. Dordrecht: Reidel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1734-3
Korkut, Buket (2011). The Real Virtue of Friedman's Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science, 78, pp. 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1086/658092
Kuhn, Thomas (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press [3º Edición de 1996].
Kuhn, Thomas (1977). Objectivity, Value Judgement and Theory Choice. En The Essential Tension (pp. 320-339). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas. (1991). The Road Since Structure. En James Conant y John Haugeland (Eds.), The Road Since Structure (pp. 90-104). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas (1993). En James Conant y John Haugeland (Eds.), The Road Since Structure (pp. 224-252.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Leinonen, Mikko (2016). Assesing Rickert's Influence on Carnap. En Christian Damböck (Ed.), Influences on the Aufbau (pp. 213-232). Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21876-2_11
Lewis, Clarence Irving (1923). A Pragmatic Conception of the a Priori. Journal of Philosophy, 20 (7), pp. 169-177. https://doi.org/10.2307/2939833
Lewis, Clarence Irving (1929). Mind and World Order. Nueva York: Dover Publications. [Edición de 1990].
Massimi, Michela (2005). Pauli's Exclusion Principle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511535352
McArthur, Dan (2005). Normative Naturalism and The Relativised A Priori. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 36, pp. 331-350. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-0038-7
Mormann, Thomas (2012). A Place for Pragmatism in the Dynamics of Reason? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 43 (1), pp. 27-37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.10.004
Padovani, Flavia (2011). Relativizing the Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach Axioms of Coordination Divided. Synthese, 181, pp. 42-62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9590-0
Pap, Arthur (1946). The a Priori in Physical Theory. Nueva York: Russel & Russel.
Peláez Cedrés, Álvaro (2008). Lo a priori constitutivo: historia y perspectiva. México: Anthropos.
Potochnik, Angela (2017).
Idealization and the Aims of Science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1975). What is Mathematical Truth. En Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1976). Two Dogmas Revisited. Reimpreso en Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason (pp. 87-97). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625275
Putnam, Hilary (1995). Pragmatism. Estados Unidos: Blackwell.
Reichenbach, Hans (1920). The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge. Berkeley y Los Angeles: Cambridge University Press [Edición de 1965].
Richardson, Alan (2002). Narrating the History of Reason Itself. Perspectives on Science, 10 (3), pp. 253-274. https://doi.org/10.1162/106361402321899050
Richardson, Alan (2010). Ernst Cassirer and Michael Friedman: Kantian or Hegelian Dynamics of Reason? En Mary Domski y Michael Dickson (Eds.), Discourse on a New Method (pp. 279-294). Illinois: Open Court.
Ryckman, Thomas (2005). The Reign of Relativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195177177.001.0001
Shaffer, Michael J. (2011). The Constitutive A Priori and Epistemic Justification. En Michael J. Shaffer y Michael L. Veber (Eds.), What place for the A Priori? (pp. 193-210). Chicago: Open Court.
Scheffler, Israel (1967). Science and Subjectivity. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Schlick, Moritz (1925). General Theory of Knowledge. Austria: Springer [Edición de 1974].
Stump, David J. (2015). Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science. Nueva York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315712581
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2015). Reconsidering the Carnap-Kuhn Connection. En William J. Devlin y Alisa Bokulich (Eds.), Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 years on (pp. 51-70). Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13383-6_5
Van Dyck, Maarten (2009). Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project. Philosophy of Science 76, pp. 689-700. https://doi.org/10.1086/605823
van Fraassen, Bas Cornelis (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244274.001.0001
Sanjuán Salina, M. (2019). El a priori relativo. ¿Hacia una noción pragmatista de la ciencia?. Artefactos. Revista De Estudios Filosóficos Sobre Ciencia Y Tecnología, 8(2), 139–160. https://doi.org/10.14201/art201982139160
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