Los proyectos de desembarco en Alhucemas: una estrategia recurrente como solución a la «rebeldía» en el Rif (1921-1925)

a recurring strategy as a solution to the Rif’s unruliness (1921-1925)

Abstract

This article is the result of research focused on the lines of action followed by the last three governments of the Spanish Restoration in the Moroccan Protectorate, once the collapse of the General Command of Melilla in the summer of 1921 had been consummated. It also explores the actions of Primo de Rivera, from the time he perpetrated his September 1923 coup d’état until the landing operation in Al Hoceima in September 1925. Between 1921 and 1925, there were several strategic alternatives. On the one hand, preference was given to the military route, and a landing in the Bay of Al Hoceima was considered on four occasions: February 1922, August 1922, July 1923 and finally the one that took place in September 1925. On the other, during the presidencies of José Sánchez Guerra and Manuel García Prieto, between March 1922 and September 1923, «purely civilian» action was advocated, thus prioritizing the path of negotiation. There was a third line of action, when from September 1924 the dictator carried out a «rectification of fronts» which consisted of the withdrawal of the forces to stronger and more secure lines, with the aim of reducing troops and expenses; a decision which meant renouncing the system followed until then, based on the penetration of the territory by means of the establishment of positions and blockhouses, impossible to defend and supply.