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James F. Woodward
Universidad de Pittsburgh
Estados Unidos
Vol. 9 Núm. 1 (2020), Sección Monográfica, Páginas 13-45
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14201/art2020911345
Aceptado: abr 19, 2020
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Resumen

Este artículo explora algunas relaciones entre [dos aspectos:] por un lado, las teorías filosóficas normativas de la causalidad y el razonamiento causal; y, por otro lado, las teorías descriptivas de la cognición causal del tipo generado en Psicología. Estos temas se tratan desde la perspectiva de una concepción intervencionista de la causalidad. La atención se centra en lo que llamo distinciones entre las relaciones causales, en términos de características tales como la invarianza, la especificidad y la proporcionalidad, y la relevancia psicológica de estas [relaciones]. Se argumenta que las teorías normativas y descriptivas sobre la causalidad tienen mucho que aprender unas de otras.

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