Obstruction and decision-making process in the Chamber of Deputies: Brazil 1991-2010
Abstract In this article we explore how the management of governing coalitions and attributes of the dynamics of the conflict between and within governing and opposition coalitions affect obstructionist movements in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies from 1991 to 2010. Obstructionist movements are operationalized by the percentage of monthly roll call votes related to procedural requirements that delay decisions on legislative proposals. We find that the proportionality in the distribution of ministerial posts reduces obstruction in minority coalitions. In larger coalitions, this type of incentive has little effect in reducing obstructionist moves. Smaller, more cohesive, and better managed governing coalitions are more capable than oversized coalitions of diminishing problems for decision making in the Chamber of Deputies.
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AMES, Barry. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001.
AMORIM neto, Octavio. Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalitions Discipline in Brazil. En morGenstern, Scott y naciF, Benito (eds.). Legislative Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
AMORIM neto, Octavio. The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies, 2006, vol. 39 (4): 415-440.
AMORIM neto, Octavio. O Governo Presidencial e a Sustentação Parlamentar: Uma História Trágico-Marítima? En ribas vieira, José (õrg.). Constituição Cidadã de 1988: Efetivação e Impasse Institucional? Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2008: 59-68.
AMORIM neto, Octavio. El Moderno Sistema de Gobierno Presidencial Brasileño. En lanzaro, Jorge (org.). Presidencialismo y Parlamentarismo: América Latina y Europa Meridional. Madrid: cepc, 2010.
AMORIM NETO, Octavio; COX, Gary y MCCUBBINS, Mathew. Agenda Power in Brazil’s Câmara dos Deputados, 1989-98. World Politics, 2003, vol. 55: 550-578.
BINDER, Sarah. The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96. American Political Science Review, 2001, vol. 93 (3): 519-533.
BINDER, Sarah. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, d.c.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
BINDER, Sarah; LAWRENCE, Eric y SMITH, Steven. Tracking the Filibuster: 1917 to 1997. American Politics Research, 2002, vol. 30 (4): 406-422.
BINDER, Sarah y SMITH, Steven. Politics or Principle? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
CAMERLO, Marcelo y PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, Aníbal. Minister Turnover, Critical Events, and the Electoral Calendar in Presidential Democracies. ics Working Paper, 2013.
CAMERLO, Marcelo y PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, Aníbal. Whom to Remove, Whom to Protect? Presidential Approval, Minister Profiles, and Survival in Office. Prepared for delivery at Third Annual General Conference of the European Political Science Association. Barcelona, June 20-22, 2013.
CEBRAP. Banco de datos legislativos. São Paulo, Brazil: CEBRAP, 2011.
CHASQUETTI, Daniel; BUQUET, Daniel y CARDARELLO, Antonio. La designación de gabinetes en Uruguay: estrategia legislativa, jerarquía de los ministerios y afiliación partidaria de los Ministros. America Latina Hoy, 2013, vol. 64: 15-40.
COX, Gary y KERNELL, Samuel (eds.). The Politics of Divided Government. Boulder, San Francisco y Oxford: Westview Press, 1991.
DIERMEIER, Daniel. Coalition Government. Mimeo, 2005. Published later 2006 Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, edited by weinGast, Barry y wittman, Donald, 162-179. Oxford University Press.
FIGUEIREDO, Argelina y LIMONGI, Fernando. Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1999.
GAYLORD, Sylvia y RENNO, Lucio. Behind Closed Doors: Cabinet Authorship of Legislative Proposals in a Multiparty Presidential System. Prepared for Delivery at Madrid 2012, XXII World Congress of Political Science, July 8-12, 2012.
HIROI, Taeko. The Dynamics of Lawmaking in a Bicameral Legislature: The Case of Brazil. Comparative Political Studies, 2008, vol. 41 (12): 1583-1606.
INÁCIO, Magna. Mudança Procedimental, Oposições e Obstrução na Câmara dos Deputados. En INÁCIO, Magna y RENNO, Lucio (eds.). Legislativo Brasileiro em Perspectiva Comparada. Belo Horizonte: Editora da uFmG, 2009: 353-380.
KREHBIEL, Keith. Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1996, vol. 8 (1): 7-40.
KREHBIEL, Keith. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of u.s. Lawmaking. Chicago y Londres: The University of Chicago Press, 1998.
LEMOS, Leany. O Congresso Brasileiro e a Distribuição de Benefícios Sociais no Período 19881994: Uma Análise Distributivista. Dados, 2001, vol. 44, n.º 3: 561-605.
LIMONGI, Fernando y FIGUEIREDO, Argelina. Poder de Agenda e Políticas Substantivas. En INÁCIO, Magna y RENNO, Lucio. Legislativo Brasileiro em Perspectiva Comparada. Belo Horizonte: Editora da UFMG, 2009.
MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO, Cecilia. Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections From the Government in Presidential Systems? Comparative Political Studies, 2012, 45 (1): 62-90.
MAYHEW, David R. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 19461990. New Haven y Londres: Yale University Press, 1991.
OLSON Jr., Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, 1965.
OVERBY, Marvin y BELL, Lauren. Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation? Filibustering among Retiring Senators. The Journal of Politics, 2004, vol. 66, n.º 3: 906-924.
PEREIRA, Carlos y MUELLER, Bernardo. Comportamento Estratégico em Presidencialismo de Coalizão: As Relações entre Executivo e Legislativo na Elaboração do Orçamento Brasileiro. Dados, 2002, vol. 45, n.º 2: 265-301.
PEREIRA, Carlos; POWER, Timothy y RAILE, Eric. The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in Multiparty Presidential Regime. Political Research Quarterly, 2011, vol. 64: 323-334.
PEREIRA, Carlos; POWER, Timothy y RENNO, Lucio. Under What Conditions Do Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Theory and Evidence from the Brazilian Case. Journal of Politics, 2005, vol. 67 (1): 178-200.
PEREIRA, Carlos; POWER, Timothy y RENNO, Lucio. Agenda Power, Executive Decree Authority, and the Mixed Results of Reform in the Brazilian Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2008, vol. 34: 5-34.
PEREIRA, Carlos y RENNO, Lucio. O que é que o reeleito tem? Dinâmicas político-institucionais locais e nacionais nas eleições de 1998 para a Câmara dos Deputados. Dados, 2001, vol. 44, n.º 2: 133-172.
PEREIRA, Carlos y RENNO, Lucio. O que é que o reeleito tem? O retorno: o esboço de uma teoria da reeleição no Brasil. Revista de Economía Política, São Paulo, 2007, vol. 27, n.º 4.
PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, Aníbal. Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, Aníbal. Instituciones, coaliciones callejeras e inestabilidad política: perspectivas teóricas sobre las crisis presidenciales. America Latina Hoy, 2008, vol. 49, Nuevas Formas de Inestabilidad Politica.
RENNO, Lucio y WOJCIK, Stefan. Cabinet Cosponsorship Networks in Brazil. Prepared for presentation at the ecpr Joint Sessions of Workshops, Johannes Gutenberg Universität, Mainz, Germany, 11-16 March 2013.
RIKER, William. A Theory of political coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
SAMUELS, David. Ambition and Competition: Explaining Legislative Turnover in Brazil. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2000, xxv (3): 481-497.
SANTOS, Fabiano. Em Defesa do Presidencialismo de Coalizão. En soares, Glaucio y renno, Lucio (eds.). Reforma Política: Lições da História Recente. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da FGv, 2006: 281-296.
SANTOS, Fabiano y ALMEIDA, Acir. Fundamentos Informacionais do Presidencialismo de Coalizão. Curitiba: Appris, 2011.
TSEBELIS, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
TSEBELIS, George y ALEMAN, Eduardo. Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America. World Politics, 2005, 57 (3): 396-420.
ZUCCO, Cesar y LAUDERDALE, Benjamin. Distinguishing Between Influences on Brazilian Legislative Behavior. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2011, 36: 363-396.
ZUCCO, Cesar y POWER, Timothy. Elite Preferences in a Consolidating Democracy: The Brazilian Legislative Surveys, 1990-2009. Unpublished manuscript, 2011.
AMORIM neto, Octavio. Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalitions Discipline in Brazil. En morGenstern, Scott y naciF, Benito (eds.). Legislative Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
AMORIM neto, Octavio. The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies, 2006, vol. 39 (4): 415-440.
AMORIM neto, Octavio. O Governo Presidencial e a Sustentação Parlamentar: Uma História Trágico-Marítima? En ribas vieira, José (õrg.). Constituição Cidadã de 1988: Efetivação e Impasse Institucional? Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2008: 59-68.
AMORIM neto, Octavio. El Moderno Sistema de Gobierno Presidencial Brasileño. En lanzaro, Jorge (org.). Presidencialismo y Parlamentarismo: América Latina y Europa Meridional. Madrid: cepc, 2010.
AMORIM NETO, Octavio; COX, Gary y MCCUBBINS, Mathew. Agenda Power in Brazil’s Câmara dos Deputados, 1989-98. World Politics, 2003, vol. 55: 550-578.
BINDER, Sarah. The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96. American Political Science Review, 2001, vol. 93 (3): 519-533.
BINDER, Sarah. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, d.c.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
BINDER, Sarah; LAWRENCE, Eric y SMITH, Steven. Tracking the Filibuster: 1917 to 1997. American Politics Research, 2002, vol. 30 (4): 406-422.
BINDER, Sarah y SMITH, Steven. Politics or Principle? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
CAMERLO, Marcelo y PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, Aníbal. Minister Turnover, Critical Events, and the Electoral Calendar in Presidential Democracies. ics Working Paper, 2013.
CAMERLO, Marcelo y PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, Aníbal. Whom to Remove, Whom to Protect? Presidential Approval, Minister Profiles, and Survival in Office. Prepared for delivery at Third Annual General Conference of the European Political Science Association. Barcelona, June 20-22, 2013.
CEBRAP. Banco de datos legislativos. São Paulo, Brazil: CEBRAP, 2011.
CHASQUETTI, Daniel; BUQUET, Daniel y CARDARELLO, Antonio. La designación de gabinetes en Uruguay: estrategia legislativa, jerarquía de los ministerios y afiliación partidaria de los Ministros. America Latina Hoy, 2013, vol. 64: 15-40.
COX, Gary y KERNELL, Samuel (eds.). The Politics of Divided Government. Boulder, San Francisco y Oxford: Westview Press, 1991.
DIERMEIER, Daniel. Coalition Government. Mimeo, 2005. Published later 2006 Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, edited by weinGast, Barry y wittman, Donald, 162-179. Oxford University Press.
FIGUEIREDO, Argelina y LIMONGI, Fernando. Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1999.
GAYLORD, Sylvia y RENNO, Lucio. Behind Closed Doors: Cabinet Authorship of Legislative Proposals in a Multiparty Presidential System. Prepared for Delivery at Madrid 2012, XXII World Congress of Political Science, July 8-12, 2012.
HIROI, Taeko. The Dynamics of Lawmaking in a Bicameral Legislature: The Case of Brazil. Comparative Political Studies, 2008, vol. 41 (12): 1583-1606.
INÁCIO, Magna. Mudança Procedimental, Oposições e Obstrução na Câmara dos Deputados. En INÁCIO, Magna y RENNO, Lucio (eds.). Legislativo Brasileiro em Perspectiva Comparada. Belo Horizonte: Editora da uFmG, 2009: 353-380.
KREHBIEL, Keith. Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1996, vol. 8 (1): 7-40.
KREHBIEL, Keith. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of u.s. Lawmaking. Chicago y Londres: The University of Chicago Press, 1998.
LEMOS, Leany. O Congresso Brasileiro e a Distribuição de Benefícios Sociais no Período 19881994: Uma Análise Distributivista. Dados, 2001, vol. 44, n.º 3: 561-605.
LIMONGI, Fernando y FIGUEIREDO, Argelina. Poder de Agenda e Políticas Substantivas. En INÁCIO, Magna y RENNO, Lucio. Legislativo Brasileiro em Perspectiva Comparada. Belo Horizonte: Editora da UFMG, 2009.
MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO, Cecilia. Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections From the Government in Presidential Systems? Comparative Political Studies, 2012, 45 (1): 62-90.
MAYHEW, David R. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 19461990. New Haven y Londres: Yale University Press, 1991.
OLSON Jr., Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, 1965.
OVERBY, Marvin y BELL, Lauren. Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation? Filibustering among Retiring Senators. The Journal of Politics, 2004, vol. 66, n.º 3: 906-924.
PEREIRA, Carlos y MUELLER, Bernardo. Comportamento Estratégico em Presidencialismo de Coalizão: As Relações entre Executivo e Legislativo na Elaboração do Orçamento Brasileiro. Dados, 2002, vol. 45, n.º 2: 265-301.
PEREIRA, Carlos; POWER, Timothy y RAILE, Eric. The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in Multiparty Presidential Regime. Political Research Quarterly, 2011, vol. 64: 323-334.
PEREIRA, Carlos; POWER, Timothy y RENNO, Lucio. Under What Conditions Do Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Theory and Evidence from the Brazilian Case. Journal of Politics, 2005, vol. 67 (1): 178-200.
PEREIRA, Carlos; POWER, Timothy y RENNO, Lucio. Agenda Power, Executive Decree Authority, and the Mixed Results of Reform in the Brazilian Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2008, vol. 34: 5-34.
PEREIRA, Carlos y RENNO, Lucio. O que é que o reeleito tem? Dinâmicas político-institucionais locais e nacionais nas eleições de 1998 para a Câmara dos Deputados. Dados, 2001, vol. 44, n.º 2: 133-172.
PEREIRA, Carlos y RENNO, Lucio. O que é que o reeleito tem? O retorno: o esboço de uma teoria da reeleição no Brasil. Revista de Economía Política, São Paulo, 2007, vol. 27, n.º 4.
PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, Aníbal. Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, Aníbal. Instituciones, coaliciones callejeras e inestabilidad política: perspectivas teóricas sobre las crisis presidenciales. America Latina Hoy, 2008, vol. 49, Nuevas Formas de Inestabilidad Politica.
RENNO, Lucio y WOJCIK, Stefan. Cabinet Cosponsorship Networks in Brazil. Prepared for presentation at the ecpr Joint Sessions of Workshops, Johannes Gutenberg Universität, Mainz, Germany, 11-16 March 2013.
RIKER, William. A Theory of political coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
SAMUELS, David. Ambition and Competition: Explaining Legislative Turnover in Brazil. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2000, xxv (3): 481-497.
SANTOS, Fabiano. Em Defesa do Presidencialismo de Coalizão. En soares, Glaucio y renno, Lucio (eds.). Reforma Política: Lições da História Recente. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da FGv, 2006: 281-296.
SANTOS, Fabiano y ALMEIDA, Acir. Fundamentos Informacionais do Presidencialismo de Coalizão. Curitiba: Appris, 2011.
TSEBELIS, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
TSEBELIS, George y ALEMAN, Eduardo. Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America. World Politics, 2005, 57 (3): 396-420.
ZUCCO, Cesar y LAUDERDALE, Benjamin. Distinguishing Between Influences on Brazilian Legislative Behavior. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2011, 36: 363-396.
ZUCCO, Cesar y POWER, Timothy. Elite Preferences in a Consolidating Democracy: The Brazilian Legislative Surveys, 1990-2009. Unpublished manuscript, 2011.
Renno, L., & Hiroi, T. (2015). Obstruction and decision-making process in the Chamber of Deputies: Brazil 1991-2010. América Latina Hoy, 70, 135–163. https://doi.org/10.14201/alh201570135163
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