Horizontal accountability and presidential dominance: a difficult combination. The case of the Dominican Republic, 1967-2009
Abstract This article studies horizontal accountability in the Dominican Republic. First it analyses the rules regulating the system of checks and balances. Although important, institutional rules cannot explain the variation in the levels of accountability across time found in the Dominican case. Therefore, the article focuses on the execution of national budgets and the financial situation of the accountability institutions. The article suggests using an index of budgetary disproportionality based on a comparison of the congressionally approved budget and the executed budget to measure the level of horizontal accountability. A multivariate time-series regression analysis shows that budgetary disproportionality increases with presidential dominance. The article concludes that for the period 1967-2009, it is presidential behaviour more than any other factor that has prevented an effective system of checks and balances. Therefore the case confirms O’Donnell’s hypothesis of Delegative Democracies.
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Marsteintredet, L. (2011). Horizontal accountability and presidential dominance: a difficult combination. The case of the Dominican Republic, 1967-2009. América Latina Hoy, 56, 85–109. https://doi.org/10.14201/alh.7787
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