institutional Integrity, Electoral Democracy, and Organized Crime: An Analysis through PCA and Multilevel Models
Abstract
This article analyzes how electoral democracy and organized crime conflict affect institutional integrity in Latin America and the Caribbean using an index constructed via a principal component analysis of V-Dem data. The results show that democracy does not by itself guarantee greater integrity, nor does conflict necessarily lead to its deterioration, both effects vary across countries, distinguishing scenarios of institutional resilience and erosion.
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Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Santos, R. J. (2013). The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 5-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01099.x
Ali Trabelsi, M. (2023). The Impact of Corruption on Economic Growth: A Nonlinear Evidence. En J. Fahed-Sreih (Ed.), Corruption–New Insights. IntechOpen. https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108876
Bauhr, M., & Grimes, M. (2014). Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal Accountability. Governance, 27(2), 291-320. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12033
Boese, V. A., Edgell, A. B., Hellmeier, S., Maerz, S. F., & Lindberg, S. I. (2021). How democracies prevail: Democratic resilience as a two-stage process. Democratization, 28(5), 885-907. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1891413
Campbell, Y., & Harriott, A. (2024). The Resort to Emergency Policing to Control Gang Violence in Jamaica: Making the Exception the Rule. Journal of Latin American Studies, 56(1), 115-136. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X24000075
Coppedge, M., Edgell, A. B., Knutsen, C. H., & Lindberg, S. I. (Eds.). (2022). Why Democracies Develop and Decline (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009086974
Diamond, L., & Morlino, L. (2004). The Quality of Democracy: An Overview. Journal of Democracy, 15(4), 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0060
Donno, D. (2013). Defending democratic norms: International actors and the politics of electoral misconduct. Oxford University Press.
Duncan, G., & Suárez, C. (2019). The Threat of Organized Crime in Post-Conflict Colombia. En J. Meernik, J. H. R. DeMeritt, & M. Uribe-López (Eds.), As War Ends (1.a ed., pp. 112-132). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108614856.006
Durán-Martínez, A. (2018). Las múltiples dimensiones de la violencia relacionada con las drogas. Drogas y Violencias en América Latina, 35. https://www.icip.cat/perlapau/es/articulo/las-multiples-dimensiones-de-la-violencia-relacionada-con-las-drogas/?pdf
Evans, P., & Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of «Weberian» State Structures on Economic Growth. American Sociological Review, 64(5), 748-765. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312249906400508
Farah, D., & Babineau, K. (2017). The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras. PRISM, 7(1), 58-73.
Fazekas, M., & Tóth, I. J. (2016). From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework with Empirical Applications from Hungary. Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), 320-334. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916639137
Fewsmith, J., & Nathan, A. J. (2019). Authoritarian Resilience Revisited: Joseph Fewsmith with Response from Andrew J. Nathan. Journal of Contemporary China, 28(116), 167-179. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1511390
Flores Márquez, H., Jiménez Gómez, A., & Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. (2024). Sources of Economic Growth in Mexico: Application of Bayesian Model Averaging. Análisis Económico, 39(102), 107-133. https://doi.org/10.24275/uam/azc/dcsh/ae/2024v39n102/Flores
Flores Rivera, L. E. (2024). Conflictos de organizaciones criminales y el principio electoral de la democracia. Política. Revista de Ciencia Política, 62(1), 141-171. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-5338.2024.72097
Freedom House. (2025). El Salvador: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2024
Fukuyama, F. (2004). The Imperative of State-Building. Journal of Democracy, 15(2), 17-31.
Fukuyama, F. (2013). What Is Governance? Governance, 26(3), 347-368. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12035
Grzymala-Busse, A. (2008). Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4-5), 638-673. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313118
Hellman, J., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000). «Seize the state, seize the day»: State capture, corruption, and influence in transition. World Bank Group.
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(04), 725-740. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592704040472
HIIK. (2024). HIIK – Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research [Dataset]. https://hiik.de/
Human Rights Watch. (2022, julio 19). Ecuador: Gang Control of Prisons Enabled Massacres. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2022/07/28/ecuador-gang-control-prisons-enabled-massacres
Innes, A. (2014). The Political Economy of State Capture in Central E urope. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1), 88-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12079
InSight Crime. (2024, septiembre 6). Honduras Profile. InSight Crime. http://insightcrime.org/honduras-organized-crime-news/honduras/
Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490965
Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2009). Variation in Institutional Strength. Annual Review of Political Science, 12(1), 115-133. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015a). Corruption: Good governance powers innovation. Nature, 518(7539), 295-297. https://doi.org/10.1038/518295a
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015b). The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316286937
Norris, P. (2015). Why Elections Fail (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107280908
O’Donnell, G. A. (1996). Illusions About Consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7(2), 34-51. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0034
O’Donnell, G. A. (1998). Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. Journal of Democracy, 9(3), 112-126. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0051
Pierre, J., & Peters, B. G. (2020). Governance, politics, and the state (2nd ed). Red globe press.
Ponce, A. F. (2016). Cárteles de droga, violencia y competitividad electoral a nivel local: evidencia del caso mexicano. Latin American Research Review, 51(4), 62-85. https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2016.0049
Przeworski, A. (2019). Crises of Democracy (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108671019
Reuters. (2024, enero 3). El Salvador says murders fell 70 % in 2023 as it cracked down on gangs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-says-murders-fell-70-2023-it-cracked-down-gangs-2024-01-03/
Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226729589.001.0001
Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions. Governance, 21(2), 165-190. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2008.00391.x
Scharpf, F. (1997). Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1), 18-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/135017697344217
Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295457.001.0001
Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing Accountability. En The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/books/the-self-restraining-state-power-and-accountability-in-new-democracies/
Schomaker, R. M., & Bauer, M. W. (2020). What Drives Successful Administrative Performance during Crises? Lessons from Refugee Migration and the Covid‐19 Pandemic. Public Administration Review, 80(5), 845-850. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13280
Shirk, D., & Wallman, J. (2015). Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(8), 1348-1376. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715587049
Snyder, R., & Durán-Martínez, A. (2009). Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia. Colombia Internacional, (70), Article 70.
Snyder, R., & Durán-Martínez, A. (2009). Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(3), 253-273. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z
Steenbergen, M. R., & Jones, B. S. (2002). Modeling Multilevel Data Structures. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 218. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088424
Swaleheen, M. (2011). Economic growth with endogenous corruption: An empirical study. Public Choice, 146(1-2), 23-41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9581-1
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399-457. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00092-4
Treisman, D. (2007). What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? Annual Review of Political Science, 10(1), 211-244. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.095418
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2016). Federalismo, drogas y violencia. Por qué el conflicto partidista intergubernamental estimuló la violencia del narcotráfico en México. Política y gobierno, 23(1), 11-56.
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2018). Why Did Drug Cartels Go to War in Mexico? Subnational Party Alternation, the Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Large-Scale Violence. Comparative Political Studies, 51(7), 900-937. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720703
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2020). Votes, Drugs, and Violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico. Cambridge University Press.
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2021). High-profile criminal violence: Why drug cartels murder government officials and party candidates in Mexico. British Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 203-229.
Vdeminstitute/vdemdata [R]. https://github.com/vdeminstitute/vdemdata
World Justice Project. (s. f.). WJP Rule of Law Index. Recuperado 18 de junio de 2025, de https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=21846723301&gbraid=0AAAAA-TYemvujS36xt3tmAkB_IHzHpUvp&gclid=CjwKCAjwx8nCBhAwEiwA_z__00GlomYKvktCxJdzT8sncaVsXI9ZvXeW0rs-FIhPNYC1QNhKC38OAhoCCF8QAvD_BwE
Ali Trabelsi, M. (2023). The Impact of Corruption on Economic Growth: A Nonlinear Evidence. En J. Fahed-Sreih (Ed.), Corruption–New Insights. IntechOpen. https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108876
Bauhr, M., & Grimes, M. (2014). Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal Accountability. Governance, 27(2), 291-320. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12033
Boese, V. A., Edgell, A. B., Hellmeier, S., Maerz, S. F., & Lindberg, S. I. (2021). How democracies prevail: Democratic resilience as a two-stage process. Democratization, 28(5), 885-907. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1891413
Campbell, Y., & Harriott, A. (2024). The Resort to Emergency Policing to Control Gang Violence in Jamaica: Making the Exception the Rule. Journal of Latin American Studies, 56(1), 115-136. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X24000075
Coppedge, M., Edgell, A. B., Knutsen, C. H., & Lindberg, S. I. (Eds.). (2022). Why Democracies Develop and Decline (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009086974
Diamond, L., & Morlino, L. (2004). The Quality of Democracy: An Overview. Journal of Democracy, 15(4), 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0060
Donno, D. (2013). Defending democratic norms: International actors and the politics of electoral misconduct. Oxford University Press.
Duncan, G., & Suárez, C. (2019). The Threat of Organized Crime in Post-Conflict Colombia. En J. Meernik, J. H. R. DeMeritt, & M. Uribe-López (Eds.), As War Ends (1.a ed., pp. 112-132). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108614856.006
Durán-Martínez, A. (2018). Las múltiples dimensiones de la violencia relacionada con las drogas. Drogas y Violencias en América Latina, 35. https://www.icip.cat/perlapau/es/articulo/las-multiples-dimensiones-de-la-violencia-relacionada-con-las-drogas/?pdf
Evans, P., & Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of «Weberian» State Structures on Economic Growth. American Sociological Review, 64(5), 748-765. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312249906400508
Farah, D., & Babineau, K. (2017). The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras. PRISM, 7(1), 58-73.
Fazekas, M., & Tóth, I. J. (2016). From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework with Empirical Applications from Hungary. Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), 320-334. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916639137
Fewsmith, J., & Nathan, A. J. (2019). Authoritarian Resilience Revisited: Joseph Fewsmith with Response from Andrew J. Nathan. Journal of Contemporary China, 28(116), 167-179. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1511390
Flores Márquez, H., Jiménez Gómez, A., & Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. (2024). Sources of Economic Growth in Mexico: Application of Bayesian Model Averaging. Análisis Económico, 39(102), 107-133. https://doi.org/10.24275/uam/azc/dcsh/ae/2024v39n102/Flores
Flores Rivera, L. E. (2024). Conflictos de organizaciones criminales y el principio electoral de la democracia. Política. Revista de Ciencia Política, 62(1), 141-171. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-5338.2024.72097
Freedom House. (2025). El Salvador: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2024
Fukuyama, F. (2004). The Imperative of State-Building. Journal of Democracy, 15(2), 17-31.
Fukuyama, F. (2013). What Is Governance? Governance, 26(3), 347-368. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12035
Grzymala-Busse, A. (2008). Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4-5), 638-673. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313118
Hellman, J., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000). «Seize the state, seize the day»: State capture, corruption, and influence in transition. World Bank Group.
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(04), 725-740. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592704040472
HIIK. (2024). HIIK – Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research [Dataset]. https://hiik.de/
Human Rights Watch. (2022, julio 19). Ecuador: Gang Control of Prisons Enabled Massacres. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2022/07/28/ecuador-gang-control-prisons-enabled-massacres
Innes, A. (2014). The Political Economy of State Capture in Central E urope. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1), 88-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12079
InSight Crime. (2024, septiembre 6). Honduras Profile. InSight Crime. http://insightcrime.org/honduras-organized-crime-news/honduras/
Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490965
Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2009). Variation in Institutional Strength. Annual Review of Political Science, 12(1), 115-133. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015a). Corruption: Good governance powers innovation. Nature, 518(7539), 295-297. https://doi.org/10.1038/518295a
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015b). The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316286937
Norris, P. (2015). Why Elections Fail (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107280908
O’Donnell, G. A. (1996). Illusions About Consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7(2), 34-51. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0034
O’Donnell, G. A. (1998). Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. Journal of Democracy, 9(3), 112-126. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0051
Pierre, J., & Peters, B. G. (2020). Governance, politics, and the state (2nd ed). Red globe press.
Ponce, A. F. (2016). Cárteles de droga, violencia y competitividad electoral a nivel local: evidencia del caso mexicano. Latin American Research Review, 51(4), 62-85. https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2016.0049
Przeworski, A. (2019). Crises of Democracy (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108671019
Reuters. (2024, enero 3). El Salvador says murders fell 70 % in 2023 as it cracked down on gangs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-says-murders-fell-70-2023-it-cracked-down-gangs-2024-01-03/
Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226729589.001.0001
Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions. Governance, 21(2), 165-190. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2008.00391.x
Scharpf, F. (1997). Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1), 18-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/135017697344217
Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295457.001.0001
Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing Accountability. En The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/books/the-self-restraining-state-power-and-accountability-in-new-democracies/
Schomaker, R. M., & Bauer, M. W. (2020). What Drives Successful Administrative Performance during Crises? Lessons from Refugee Migration and the Covid‐19 Pandemic. Public Administration Review, 80(5), 845-850. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13280
Shirk, D., & Wallman, J. (2015). Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(8), 1348-1376. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715587049
Snyder, R., & Durán-Martínez, A. (2009). Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia. Colombia Internacional, (70), Article 70.
Snyder, R., & Durán-Martínez, A. (2009). Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(3), 253-273. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z
Steenbergen, M. R., & Jones, B. S. (2002). Modeling Multilevel Data Structures. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 218. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088424
Swaleheen, M. (2011). Economic growth with endogenous corruption: An empirical study. Public Choice, 146(1-2), 23-41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9581-1
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399-457. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00092-4
Treisman, D. (2007). What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? Annual Review of Political Science, 10(1), 211-244. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.095418
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2016). Federalismo, drogas y violencia. Por qué el conflicto partidista intergubernamental estimuló la violencia del narcotráfico en México. Política y gobierno, 23(1), 11-56.
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2018). Why Did Drug Cartels Go to War in Mexico? Subnational Party Alternation, the Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Large-Scale Violence. Comparative Political Studies, 51(7), 900-937. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720703
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2020). Votes, Drugs, and Violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico. Cambridge University Press.
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2021). High-profile criminal violence: Why drug cartels murder government officials and party candidates in Mexico. British Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 203-229.
Vdeminstitute/vdemdata [R]. https://github.com/vdeminstitute/vdemdata
World Justice Project. (s. f.). WJP Rule of Law Index. Recuperado 18 de junio de 2025, de https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=21846723301&gbraid=0AAAAA-TYemvujS36xt3tmAkB_IHzHpUvp&gclid=CjwKCAjwx8nCBhAwEiwA_z__00GlomYKvktCxJdzT8sncaVsXI9ZvXeW0rs-FIhPNYC1QNhKC38OAhoCCF8QAvD_BwE
Flores Rivera, L. E., & López Estrello, A. A. (2026). institutional Integrity, Electoral Democracy, and Organized Crime: An Analysis through PCA and Multilevel Models. América Latina Hoy , 96, e32394. https://doi.org/10.14201/alh.32394
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