Las patentes como un arma estratégica para limitar la competencia: la industria farmacéutica de Estados Unidos a mediados del siglo XIX

Abstract

This paper examines a case study, the ethical drug industry in USA during last mid-twentieth century, with the objective to study if a patent is a way to restrict competition and to create monopolies rather than to protect the innovator. Since physicians almost always write prescriptions specifying brand name the patient and the pharmacist are completely captive. We also outline that every new market is rapidly divided among compounds that are roughly equivalent due to the predominance of imitative research in those drugs protected by patents, with the assignment of different brand names to identical substances which are highly advertised. Price competition among ethical drugs was effectively prevented, for the most part, by the existence of product patent privileges. The only real competition that we show in the drug industry is the tremendous competition in pharmaceutical advertising and promotion aimed at doctors.