Ronald Giere’s Naturalism


This article presents Ronald Giere’s naturalism, showing its basis in Herbert A. Simon’s notions of limited rationality and satisfaction. It is argued that, despite the interest of his proposal, Giere’s claim to make epistemology a branch of psychology or biology is an overreaction to the apriorist extremes of traditional epistemology and neopositivist logicism. The article concludes with some observations on his position on the issue of truth in science.
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Giere, Ronald (1985). Philosophy of Science Naturalized. Philosophy of Science, 52, 331- 356.

Giere, Ronald (1988). Explaining Science. A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Giere, Ronald (1989a). Scientific Rationality as Instrumental Rationality. Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 20, 377-348.

Giere, Ronald (1989b). The Units of Analysis in Science Studies. En S. Fuller, M. De Mey, T. Shinn y S. Woolgar (eds.), The Cognitive Turn (pp. 3-11). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Giere, Ronald (1990). Evolutionary Models of Science. En N. Rescher (ed.), Evolution, Cognition and Realism (pp. 21-32). Lanham: University Press of America.

Giere, Ronald (1991). Understanding Scientific Reasoning. Hartcourt: Fort Worth.

Giere, Ronald (1992). What the Cognitive Study of Science is not. En R. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (pp. 481-484). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Niiniluoto, Ikka (1991). Realism, Relativism, and Constructivism. Synthese, 89, 135- 162.
Diéguez Lucena, A. (2021). Ronald Giere’s Naturalism. ArtefaCToS. Revista De Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La tecnología, 10(1), 35–45.


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