Myths and Falsehoods about Scientific Realism


Selective realist projects seek to strengthen scientific realism, but influential reactions (from anti-realist as well as realist camps) regard selectivist achievements as problematic and misguided developments, because -the story goes- those developments disfigure and devalue realism, transforming it into a position that is not worth taking into account. An examination of the charges formulated against selective realism and their respective historical background suggests, however, that the charges in question rest in myths and falsehoods about the character of realist positions; if so, the charges fail.
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