Chakravartty: Metaphilosophy, Philosophy of Science and Semirealism

  • Óscar L. Gonzalez-Castán
    Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía Teórica, Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Complutense de Madrid oscar.gonzalez[at]


Chakravartty’s philosophy of science faces an internal tension when he deals with problems related with scientific realism and, more generally, with the ontology and epistemology of science. On the one hand, he develops a “metaphilosophical” line of thought to establish what the epistemic status of the most relevant theories or stances in the philosophy of science is. On the other hand, there is an “analytic” vein in that he argues against empiricism and other versions of scientific realism to defend his semirealism. I shall claim that this twofold approximation to scientific realism faces various problems. In the first place, there are internal problems with Chakravartty’s semirealism because it requires an untenable a prioricriterion to discern what parts of our scientific theories are liable to realistic ontological commitments and what parts are not. Secondly, there are structural problems because his metaphilosophy shifts all theories in the philosophy of science, including his semirealism, to the realm of a voluntary choice of personal taste.
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Gonzalez-Castán, Óscar L. (2018). Chakravartty: Metaphilosophy, Philosophy of Science and Semirealism. ArtefaCToS. Revista De Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La tecnología, 7(2), 59–82.


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