El sesgo antropocéntrico en la cognición animal
Resumen En la tradición filosófica clásica, los animales tuvieron la función especial de servir como “objetos de comparación” con respecto a los humanos. En ese sentido, la filosofía adoptó una peculiar perspectiva comparada, centrada en la diferencia categórica que separa a los humanos de otras criaturas: una perspectiva excepcionalista. Así, las Humanidades elaboraron un canon antropocéntrico para estudiar a los animales y privilegiaron la búsqueda de las diferencias sobre las semejanzas de estos con los humanos. Por su parte, el gran impulso que recibieron los estudios animales bajo el influjo de la obra de Darwin, alentó una perspectiva comparada diferente en las ciencias naturales. Sin embargo, sobre todo en la psicología comparada, se dedicaron ingentes esfuerzos a evitar los errores que conllevaría el antropomorfismo: atribuir propiedades humanas a otras criaturas, privilegiando las semejanzas antes que las diferencias. Se asumió con frecuencia que el sesgo antropomórfico acarreaba un tipo de error más fundamental que el sesgo antropocéntrico. Ahora bien, ese diagnóstico asimétrico ha sido desenmascarado con distintos argumentos. En el contexto de ambas tradiciones disciplinares, resulta oportuno reexaminar las manifestaciones más persistentes y negativas del sesgo antropocéntrico como un sesgo comparativo para el estudio de la cognición animal. En este trabajo identificaré las siguientes: la homogeneización de los animales en una única categoría general; el especismo psicológico y la “desmentalización” de los animales; la supervivencia de una concepción jerárquica de las capacidades cognitivas; la aplicación selectiva -sólo a animales- del Canon de Morgan o antroponegación y su complementaria, la suposición de capacidades mentales idealizadas en el caso humano o anthropofabulación; las estrategias metodológicas asimétricas o distorsivas para el estudio de animales vs humanos que afectan las interpretaciones comparadas; y distintas manifestaciones del antropocentrismo semántico.
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de Waal, F. B., Ferrari, P. F. (2010). Towards a bottom-up perspective on animal and human cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(5), 201-207.
Döring, T. F., Chittka, L. (2011). How Human are Insects, and does it matter? Formosan Entomol, 31, 85-99.
Figdor, C. (2017). On the proper domain of psychological predicates. Synthese, 194(11), 4289-4310.
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Fitzpatrick, S. (2018). Against Morgan’s Canon. In K. Andrews and J. Beck (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, (pp. 437-447). New York: Routledge.
Flack, J. C., de Waal, F. B. (2000). ‘Any animal whatever’: Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7(1-2), 1-29.
Glock, H. J. (2012). The anthropological difference: What can philosophers do to identify the differences between human and non-human animals? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 70, 105-131.
Heil, J. (1982). Speechless Brutes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42, 400-406.
Holroyd, J., Sweetman, J. (2016). The heterogeneity of Implicit Bias. In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (Eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology (pp. 80-103). New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Horta, O., Albersmeier F. (2020). Defining speciesism. Philos Compass, 15(11), 1-9.
Hume, D. (1739/2000). A Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Lovejoy, A. O. (1936). The great chain of being: a study of the history of an idea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Malcolm, N. (1972-73). Thoughtless Brutes. Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, 46, 5-20.
Mayr, E. (1988). Toward a new philosophy of biology: Observations of an evolutionist. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
McDowell, J. (1996). Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, J. (2009). Having the World in View. Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
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Morgan, C. (1930). Autobiography of C. Lloyd Morgan. In Murchison C (Ed.) History of psychology in autobiography (Vol. 2, pp. 237-264). Worcester: Clark University Press.
Noske, B. (1993). Great Apes as Anthropological Subjects -Deconstructing Anthropocentrism. In Cavallieri, P. and Singer, P. (Eds.) The Great Ape Project .Equality beyond Humanity (pp. 258-268). New York: St. Martin Press.
Osborne, C. (2007). Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers. Humanity and the Human in Ancient Philosophy and Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Povinelli, D. J. (2004). Behind the ape’s appearance: escaping anthropocentrism in the study of other minds. Daedalus, 133(1), 29-41
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Romanes, G. (1882). Animal Intelligence. London: Kegan Paul.
Shettleworth, S. J. (2010). Clever animals and killjoy explanations in comparative psychology. Trends in Cognitive Science, 14, 477-48.
Shettleworth, S. J. (2012). Fundamentals of Comparative Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Sober, E. (2005). Comparative psychology meets evolutionary biology. In L. Daston & G. Mitman (Eds.), Thinking with animals: new perspectives on anthropomorphism (pp. 85-99). New York: Columbia University Press.
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Ullrich, R., Mittelbach, M., Liebal, K. (2017). Scala naturae: The impact of historical values on current ‘evolution of language’ discourse. Journal of Language Evolution, 3(1), 1-12.
Vasilieva, O. (2019). Beyond “uniqueness”: Habitual traits in the context of cognitive-communicative continuity. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 16, 129-150.
Vitale, A. & Branchi, I. (2023). ‘Are my animals smarter than yours?’: Concerns in comparing animal intelligence. Acta Philosophica, 1(32), 75-94.
Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
Wynne, C. (2004). The Perils of Anthropomorphism. Nature, 428, 606.
Andrews, K. (2009). Politics or metaphysics? On attributing psychological properties to animals. Biology and Philosophy, 24, 51-63.
Andrews, K. (2020a). The Animal Mind. An Introduction of Animal Cognition. London & New York: Routledge.
Andrews, K. (2020b). How to Study Animal Minds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108616522
Andrews K., Huss B. (2014). Anthropomorphism, anthropectomy, and the null hypothesis. Biol. Philos., 29(5), 711-729.
Andrews, K., Susana, M. (2021). Animal Cognition. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/cognition-animal/
Bastian, B., Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., Radke, H. R. M. (2012). Don´t Mind Meat? The Denial of Mind Used to Human Consumption. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(2), 247-256.
Bates, L. A., Byrne, R. W. (2007). Creative or Created: Using Anecdotes to Investigate Animal Cognition. Methods, 42, 12-21.
Boesch, C. (2007). What Makes us Human (Homo sapiens)? The Challenge of Cognitive Cross-Species Comparison. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 121, 227-240.
Borchert, R., Dewey, A. R. (2023). In praise of animals. Biol. Philos., 38, 24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-023-09912-2
Brandom, R. (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bräuer, J., Hanus, D., Pika, S., Gray, R., Uomini, N. (2020). Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not ‘One Cognition’. Journal of Intelligence, 8(3), 28.
Buckner C. (2013). Morgan’s Canon, meet Hume’s Dictum: avoiding anthropofabulation in cross-species comparisons. Biol Philos, 28(5), 853-871.
Buckner, C. (2017). Understanding Associative and Cognitive Explanations in Comparative Psychology. In K. Andrews and J. Beck (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds (pp. 409-418). London: Routledge.
Buckner, C. (2023). Black Boxes or Unflattering Mirrors? Comparative Bias in the Science of Machine Behavior. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 74(3), 681-712.
Chittka, L, Rossiter, S. J., Skorupski, P., Fernando, Ch. (2015). What is comparable in comparative cognition? Phil. Trans. of the Royal Society B, 36, 2677-2685.
Coetzee, J. M. (1999). The Lives of Animals. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species. London: John Murray.
Darwin, C. (1854/1989). “Letter to Joseph Hooker”, Jun 27, 1854 (1573). The Correspondence of Charles Darwin, vol. 5 1851-1855. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Darwin Correspondence Project.
Darwin, C. 1982 [1871]. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Davidson, D. (1985). Rational Animals. In E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (Eds.), Actions and Events. Oxford: Blackwell.
Dennett, D. (1998). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. (2013). Kinds of things - Towards a Bestiary of the Manifest Image. In D. Ross, J. Ladyman, & H. Kincaid (Eds.), Scientific Metaphysics (96-107). Oxford: OUP.
Descartes, R. (1991). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume III, The Correspondence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de Waal, F. B. (1999). Anthropomorphism and anthropodenial: consistency in our thinking about humans and other animals. Philosophical Topics, 27, 255-280.
de Waal, F. B. (2003). Silent Invasion: Imanishi´s Primatology and cultural biases in science. Anim. Cogn., 6, 293-299. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-003-0197-4
de Waal, F. B. (2006). Primates and Philosophers. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.
de Waal, F. B. (2009). Darwin´s last lough. Nature, 460, 175. https://doi.org/10.1038/460175a
de Waal, F. B. (2016). Are we smart enough to know how smart Animals are? New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
de Waal, F. B., Ferrari, P. F. (2010). Towards a bottom-up perspective on animal and human cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(5), 201-207.
Döring, T. F., Chittka, L. (2011). How Human are Insects, and does it matter? Formosan Entomol, 31, 85-99.
Figdor, C. (2017). On the proper domain of psychological predicates. Synthese, 194(11), 4289-4310.
Figdor, C. (2018). Pieces of mind: The proper domain of psychological predicates. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Figdor, C. (2021). The psychological speciecism of humanism. Philosophical Studies, 178, 1545-1569.
Fitzpatrick, S. (2008). Doing away with Morgan’s Canon. Mind & Language, 23, 224-246.
Fitzpatrick, S. (2018). Against Morgan’s Canon. In K. Andrews and J. Beck (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, (pp. 437-447). New York: Routledge.
Flack, J. C., de Waal, F. B. (2000). ‘Any animal whatever’: Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7(1-2), 1-29.
Glock, H. J. (2012). The anthropological difference: What can philosophers do to identify the differences between human and non-human animals? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 70, 105-131.
Heil, J. (1982). Speechless Brutes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42, 400-406.
Holroyd, J., Sweetman, J. (2016). The heterogeneity of Implicit Bias. In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (Eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology (pp. 80-103). New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Horta, O., Albersmeier F. (2020). Defining speciesism. Philos Compass, 15(11), 1-9.
Hume, D. (1739/2000). A Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Lovejoy, A. O. (1936). The great chain of being: a study of the history of an idea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Malcolm, N. (1972-73). Thoughtless Brutes. Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, 46, 5-20.
Mayr, E. (1988). Toward a new philosophy of biology: Observations of an evolutionist. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
McDowell, J. (1996). Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, J. (2009). Having the World in View. Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Midgley, M. (1978). Beast and Man. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Midgley, M. (2001). Being objective. Nature, 410(6830), 753.
Morgan, C. (1903). An introduction to comparative psychology. London: Walter Scott Pub. Co.
Morgan, C. (1930). Autobiography of C. Lloyd Morgan. In Murchison C (Ed.) History of psychology in autobiography (Vol. 2, pp. 237-264). Worcester: Clark University Press.
Noske, B. (1993). Great Apes as Anthropological Subjects -Deconstructing Anthropocentrism. In Cavallieri, P. and Singer, P. (Eds.) The Great Ape Project .Equality beyond Humanity (pp. 258-268). New York: St. Martin Press.
Osborne, C. (2007). Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers. Humanity and the Human in Ancient Philosophy and Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Povinelli, D. J. (2004). Behind the ape’s appearance: escaping anthropocentrism in the study of other minds. Daedalus, 133(1), 29-41
Preece, R. (2005). Brute souls, happy beasts, and evolution: the historical status of animals. Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press.
Rigato, E., Minelli, A. (2013). The great chain of being is still here. Evolution: Education and Outreach, 6, 18.
Ritvo, H. (2007). On the Animal Turn. Daedalus, 136, 118-122.
Romanes, G. (1882). Animal Intelligence. London: Kegan Paul.
Shettleworth, S. J. (2010). Clever animals and killjoy explanations in comparative psychology. Trends in Cognitive Science, 14, 477-48.
Shettleworth, S. J. (2012). Fundamentals of Comparative Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Singer, P. (2009[1975]). Animal liberation. New York: Harper Collins.
Sober, E. (2005). Comparative psychology meets evolutionary biology. In L. Daston & G. Mitman (Eds.), Thinking with animals: new perspectives on anthropomorphism (pp. 85-99). New York: Columbia University Press.
Suárez-Ruiz, J. E. (2021). El antropocentrismo como norma filosófica implícita: una revisión a la luz de las condiciones de posibilidad de la Covid-19. Anacronismo e Irrupción, 12(22), 78-96.
Ullrich, R., Mittelbach, M., Liebal, K. (2017). Scala naturae: The impact of historical values on current ‘evolution of language’ discourse. Journal of Language Evolution, 3(1), 1-12.
Vasilieva, O. (2019). Beyond “uniqueness”: Habitual traits in the context of cognitive-communicative continuity. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 16, 129-150.
Vitale, A. & Branchi, I. (2023). ‘Are my animals smarter than yours?’: Concerns in comparing animal intelligence. Acta Philosophica, 1(32), 75-94.
Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
Wynne, C. (2004). The Perils of Anthropomorphism. Nature, 428, 606.
Scotto, C. (2024). El sesgo antropocéntrico en la cognición animal . Artefactos. Revista De Estudios Filosóficos Sobre Ciencia Y Tecnología, 13(1), 85–116. https://doi.org/10.14201/art2024.31800
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