John Scarle on the problem of consciousness. Biological naturalism or biological dualism?
Abstract For thirty years, Searle has been arguing that the mind-brain problem has a very simple solution that all we know it’s true. According to this solution, mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and, at the same time, they are features of the brain. Searle’s label to this proposal is «Biological Naturalism», an anti-reductionist conception of phenomenal consciousness that treats it as a systemic causally emergent property of certain kinds of neuronal activity. In the following pages we will weigh up the extent to which biological naturalism provides a coherent response to the problem of consciousness focusing on the ontological shortcomings of Searle’s theoretical framework, shortcomings caused by his superficial treatment of the notion of causality.
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Searle, John R. (2001): Rationality in Action. Cambridge, ma: mit Press.
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Searle, John R. (2004a): Mind: A Brief Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John R. (2004b): Freedom & Neurobiology. Reflections on Free Will, Language and Political Power. New York: Columbia University Press [Trad. de M. Candel, Barcelona: Paidós, 2005].
Searle, John R. (2006): «What is to be done», Topoi, vol. 25, n.º 1, pp. 101-108.
Searle, John R. (2007): «Dualism revisited», Journal of Physiology-Paris, vol. 101, n.º 4-6, pp. 169-178.
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1962): «Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man», Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, R. Colodny (ed.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 35-78 [citamos por la reimpresión publicada en W. S. Sellars, (1963) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, pp. 1-40].
Stapp Henry P. (2007/2011): Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer (2nd ed.). Berlin, Springer.
Stapp, Henry P. (2011): «Searle’s ‘Dualism Revisited’», Review of Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 10, pp. 141-149.
Corcoran, Kevin J. (2001): «The Trouble with Searle’s Biological Naturalism», Erkenntnis, vol. 55, n.º 3, pp. 307-324.
Dardis, Anthony (2008): Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem. New York: Columbia University Press.
Freeman, Walter J. (1990): «Consciousness as Physical Self-Organizing Processes», Behavioural and Brain Sciences, vol. 13, n.º 4, pp. 604-605.
Freeman, Walter J. & Skarda, Christine A. (1991): «Mind/Brain Science: Neuroscience on Philosophy of Mind», John Searle and his Critics, E. Lepore & R. Van Gulick (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 115-127.
Garrett, Brian J. (1995): «Non-Reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the Mind», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 55, n.º 1, pp. 209-215.
Guerrero del Amo, José Antonio (2001): «Problemas epistemológicos subyacentes a la teoría de la mente de Searle», Logos: Anales del seminario de metafísica, vol. 34, pp. 297-316.
Kim, Jaegwon (1995): «Mental Causation in Searle’s «Biological Naturalism»», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 55, n.º 1, pp. 189-194.
Kim, Jaegwon (1998): Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge, ma: mit Press.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine (2002): «Causal Reduction, Ontological Reduction, and First-Person Ontology. Notes on Searle’s Views about Consciousness», en Speechs Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. Discussions with John R. Searle; G. Grewendorf & G. Meggle (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 205-21.
Pereira, Gómez (1554): Antoniana Margarita. Santiago de Compostela: Servicio de publicaciones de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela [Texto traducido del latín por José Luis Barreiro Barreiro y Concepción Souto García y publicado por primera vez en español en el año 2000].
Pérez Chico, David (1999): «¿Problema? ¿Qué problema? Naturalismo biológico y el problema mente-cuerpo», Teorema, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 125-138.
Prigogine, Ilya (1988): La nascita del tempo. Roma: Theoria [Trad. de J. M. Pons, Barcelona: Tusquets, 2012].
Searle, John R. (1983): Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [Trad. de U. Benítez y L. M. Valdés Villanueva, Madrid: Tecnos, 1992].
Searle, John R. (1984): Minds, Brains, and Science. The 1984 Reith Lectures. Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press [Trad. de L. M. Valdés Villanueva, Madrid: Cátedra, 1985].
Searle, John R. (1989): «Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality», Philosophical Topics, vol. 17, n.º 1, pp. 193-209.
Searle, John R. (1990): «Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science», Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 13, pp. 585-642.
Searle, John R. (1991): «Response: Perception and the Satisfaction of Intentionality», John Searle and his Critics, E. Lepore & R. Van Gulick (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 181-192.
Searle, John R. (1992): The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, ma: mit Press [Trad. de L. M. Valdés Villanueva, Barcelona: Crítica, 1996].
Searle, John R. (1995a): The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press [Trad. de A. Domènech, Barcelona: Paidós, 1997].
Searle, John R. (1995b): «Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: A Reply», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 55, n.º 1, pp. 217-232.
Searle, John R. (1997): The Mystery of Consciousness. New York: The New York Review of Books.
Searle, John R. (2000): «Mental Causation, Conscious and Unconscious: A Reply to Anthonie Meijers», International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 8, n.º 2, pp. 171-177.
Searle, John R. (2001): Rationality in Action. Cambridge, ma: mit Press.
Searle, John R. (2002): «Why I am not a property dualist?», Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 9, n.º 12, pp. 57-64.
Searle, John R. (2003): «Reply to Jaegwon Kim on Mental Causation», URL: http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/132/.
Searle, John R. (2004a): Mind: A Brief Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John R. (2004b): Freedom & Neurobiology. Reflections on Free Will, Language and Political Power. New York: Columbia University Press [Trad. de M. Candel, Barcelona: Paidós, 2005].
Searle, John R. (2006): «What is to be done», Topoi, vol. 25, n.º 1, pp. 101-108.
Searle, John R. (2007): «Dualism revisited», Journal of Physiology-Paris, vol. 101, n.º 4-6, pp. 169-178.
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1962): «Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man», Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, R. Colodny (ed.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 35-78 [citamos por la reimpresión publicada en W. S. Sellars, (1963) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, pp. 1-40].
Stapp Henry P. (2007/2011): Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer (2nd ed.). Berlin, Springer.
Stapp, Henry P. (2011): «Searle’s ‘Dualism Revisited’», Review of Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 10, pp. 141-149.
Arias Domínguez, A. (2016). John Scarle on the problem of consciousness. Biological naturalism or biological dualism?. ArtefaCToS. Revista De Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La tecnología, 6, 181–200. Retrieved from https://revistas.usal.es/cinco/index.php/artefactos/article/view/15592
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