Hacia una noción más robusta de adecuación empírica

María CAAMAÑO ALEGRE

Resumen


En este artículo se propone un criterio de adecuación empírica orientado a la superación de ciertas limitaciones que afectan a las concepciones tradicionales, consecuencialistas del éxito empírico de las teorías. En el criterio propuesto cobran especial importancia los siguientes aspectos: a) la superioridad de la predicción sobre la acomodación, b) la resolución de anomalías no refutatorias, y c) el uso limitado de hipótesis ad hoc.


Palabras clave


adecuación empírica; predicción; acomodación; anomalías no refutatorias; hipótesis ad hoc

Texto completo:

PDF

Referencias


Balzer, Wolfgang, Moulines, Carlos U., Sneed, Joseph D. (1987). An Architectonic for Science. The Structuralist Program, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Barnes, Eric C. (2018). "Prediction versus Accommodation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = .

Brush, Stephen G. (1996). Nebulous Earth: The Origin of the Solar System and the Core of the Earth from Laplace to Jeffreys, Cambridge: CUP.

Caamaño Alegre, María (2018a). "Making Sense of Non-Refuting Anomalies", Journal for General Philosophy of Science, DOI 10.1007/s10838-018-9409-0, 2018.

Caamaño Alegre, María (2018b). “Drift Theory and Plate Tectonics: A Case of Embedding in Geology”, Foundations of Science, 23, n.1, marzo, 2018, 17-35.

Carrier, Martin (1988). “On Novel Facts. A Discussion of Criteria for Non-ad-hoc-ness in the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, 19, 2, 205-231.

Cohen, I. Bernard (1985/2001). “Continental Drift and Plate Tectonics: A Revolution in the Earth Science”, Revolution in Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 29: 446-466.

Duhem, Pierre (1908/2015). To Save the Phenomena. An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory From Plato To Galileo, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Forster, Malcolm R. (2002). “Hard Problems in the Philosophy of Science: Idealisation and Commensurability”, in R. Nola & H. Sankey (ed.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 231-250.

Giere, Ronald N. (1979/1984). Understanding Scientific Reasoning, second edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Harker, David (2008). “On the Predilections for Predictions”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(3): 429-453.

Hitchcock, Christopher & Elliott Sober (2004). “Prediction versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(1): 1–34.

Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962/1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Kuipers, Theo A. F. (2005). “The Threefold Evaluation of Theories. A Synopsis of From Instrumentalism To Constructive Realism. On Some Relations Between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation (2000)”, in R. Festa, A. Aliseda & J. Peijnenburg (eds.), Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation (Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 83). Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 23-85.

Lakatos, Irme (1967/1978). Mathematics, Science and Epistemology (Philosophical Papers Vol. II), ed. J. Worrall and G. Currie, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laudan, Larry (1977). Progress and its problems, Berkeley: UCP.

Laudan, Larry (1981). “Anomalous Anomalies”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 48, n. 4: 618-619.

Laudan, Larry (1995). “Damn the Consequences!”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, 69, pp. 27-34.

Laudan, Larry (2000). “Is Epistemology Adequate to the Task of Rational Theory Evaluation?”, en R. Nola & H. Sankey (ed.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 165-175.

Laudan, Rachel (1978). “The Recent Revolution in Geology and Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Change”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 2, Symposia and Invited Papers: 227-239.

Leplin, Jarrett (1975). “The Concept of an Ad Hoc Hypothesis”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 5, 309-345.

Lipton, Peter (1991/2004). Inference to the Best Explanation, New York: Routledge, 2004.

Mackie, John L. (1965). “Causes and Conditions”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 12: 245–65.

Maher, Patrick (1988). “Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988, 1: 273–285.

Mayo, Deborah G. (1996). Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Moulines, Carlos U. (2000). “Is There Genuinely Scientific Progress?”, en Adam Jonkisz & Leon Koj (eds.), On Comparing and Evaluating Scientific Theories, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 72: 173-197.

Nickles, Thomas (1988). “Truth or Consequences? Generative versus Consequential Justification in Science”, PSA, 2, 393-405.

Peirce, Charles S. (1931-58/1958). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss & Arthur W. Burks (eds.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Popper, K. R. (1962/1965). “Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge”, en Conjectures and Refutations, New York: Harper and Row, 215-252.

Thagard, Paul R. (1978). “The Best Explanation: Criterion for Theory Choice”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 2, Feb., pp. 76-92.

Thagard, Paul R. (1992). Conceptual Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Van Fraassen, Bas (1976). “To Save the Phenomena”, en Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992, 187-194.

Whewell, William (1840). The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History, London: John W. Parker.

White, Roger (2003). “The Epistemic Advantage of Prediction Over Accommodation”, Mind, 112 (448):653-683.

Worrall, John (2014) “Prediction and Accommodation Revisited”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 45: 54–61.




DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14201/art201872165184





Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.