Palabras clave: transhumanismo; educación; posthumanismo; mejoramiento; biotecnología.

1. INTRODUCTION

We are currently witnessing a period in which previously established certainties are being subjected to scrutiny. Conceptions of gender identity, once considered straightforward, are now subject to considerable debate and re-evaluation. It stands to reason that within this climate of profound uncertainty, we should also critically examine the fundamental question of what it means to be human. Recent advancements in linguistic models have further intensified these uncertainties, prompting reflection on the nature of intelligence and our interactions with artificial intelligence, which holds the potential for self-awareness. Such concerns surrounding artificial intelligence have prompted calls for legal restrictions on its capabilities, reminiscent of the cautionary measures advocated in response to the cloning of Dolly the sheep and genetic manipulation of human embryos.

However, historical precedent suggests that if a technical possibility exists, it is likely to be pursued eventually. The cautionary tales and regulatory efforts directed towards these emerging technologies echo the admonitions found in the Genesis narrative regarding the forbidden fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. It appears that within human nature lies a propensity to transgress boundaries in pursuit of possibilities, unencumbered by the fear of losing an idealized state of existence. Luc Ferry (2016) similarly reflects on the inevitability of change and the futility of attempts to impede it.

These discussions surrounding artificial intelligence, machine learning, genetic manipulation, hybridization, and biotechnology, each fraught with ethical and practical considerations, coalesce around the central theme of this monograph: transhumanism.

This article aims to posit the feasibility of a ‘humanistic’ interpretation of transhumanism, contending that the removal of physical or physiological limitations need not undermine educational objectives. Furthermore, it argues that authentic education remains undiminished in the face of transhumanist advancements. Moreover, it contends that interventions enhancing individuals’ autonomy are ethically justifiable, while those compromising autonomy warrant scrutiny.

The ensuing sections will provide a concise overview of transhumanist ideology and its associated arguments, followed by an examination of bioconservative perspectives. From a logocentric vantage point, the article will endeavour to demonstrate the compatibility of transhumanism with education and the potential for ethical adherence within its framework. Finally, the article will propose criteria for assessing the ethical acceptability of biotechnological interventions in human subjects.

2. WHAT IS TRANSHUMANISM

Transhumanism is an intellectual movement predicated on the belief that our civilization possesses the capability to leverage technological and scientific advancements to effect artificial enhancements, both physical and psychological, in humans. In the words of Bostrom, “Transhumanism is a philosophical and cultural movement concerned with promoting responsible ways of using technology to enhance human capacities and to increase the scope of human flourishing” (Bostrom, 2014, p. 45).

Thus, transhumanism constitutes “an act of optimistic, voluntarist, and rationalistic faith in the future, in human creativity and responsibility” (Hottois, 2014, p. 7).

These ideas coalesced around the 1960s in California, often considered part of the ‘Californian ideology’ (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996), a blend of hippie ideals, technological fervour, and innovative entrepreneurial ventures underpinned by neoliberal ideology (Jardin, 2018). Transhumanism probes the boundaries of the human experience by positing scenarios wherein individuals surpass commonly accepted human limitations.

Three pivotal reports have explored these ideas. The first, “Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance” (Roco and Bainbridge, 2002a), is a comprehensive examination wherein eighty scientific leaders and industry experts outline the potential of technology to enhance the human condition on both individual and societal levels. While the full study spans nearly 500 pages, an executive summary is available in Roco and Bainbridge (2002b). It advocates for the convergence of diverse sciences and technologies—nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and neuroscience—in a collective endeavour to enhance physical and intellectual capacities. The integration of these technologies at the nanoscale holds promise for a profound augmentation of human capabilities. The essence of the report is encapsulated in the following proposition:

“If the Cognitive Scientists can think it

The Nano people can build it

The Bio people can implement it,

And the IT people can monitor and control it”

(Roco and Bainbridge, 2002b, p. 289; italicized in the original).

Additionally, two reports commissioned by the European Union have tackled this topic: “Converging technologies-Shaping the future of European societies” (EU, 2004) and “Human Enhancement” (Savulescu and Bostrom, 2009).

Transhumanism aspires to render humans ‘amortal’ (Coeurnelle, 2013)—free from biologically preprogrammed death and the physical and psychological afflictions caused by disease or physiological limitations (Coeurnelle and Roux, 2016)—while imbuing them with enhanced physical, intellectual, and emotional faculties.

3. FORMS OF TRANSHUMANISM: EXTROPIANISM AND TECHNOPROGRESSIVISM

Within the transhumanist movement, two primary strands emerge: ‘extropians’ and ‘technoprogressives’. Extropianism (Esfandiary, 1973; More, 1998) hinges on ‘extropy’, the antithesis of entropy, signifying the increasing organisation of systems through science and technology, predicated on a trajectory of unbounded progress. Extropians are fundamentally concerned with achieving immortality and contend that existence can be digitally replicated and perpetuated indefinitely. They posit that our identity resides solely in the information stored within our brains, and if this information can be transferred to a digital medium, we liberate ourselves from corporeal limitations. Consequently, this principle engenders the concept of absolute freedom and renders the body obsolete (More, 1998).

This extropian principle gives rise to the paradox of transhumanist dualism, wherein an underlying dualism pervades this form of transhumanism. Presently, bioconservatives assert that manipulating the body equates to manipulating the human being, thereby embracing operational monism. Curiously, nowadays the ‘conservatives’ espouse monism, while the ‘liberals’ adopt dualism.

Emmanuel Jardin (2018) characterises this extreme form of transhumanism as ostensibly philosophical but substantively a lobby—a movement that operates across scientific, technological, political, and economic spheres.

Technoprogressivism (Coeurnelle and Roux, 2016), conversely, advocates for integrating technology and bodily modifications while advocating for state intervention to ensure that scientific and technical innovations adhere to ethical and social standards.

Approaches such as those espoused by extropians prompt some authors to distinguish between transhumanism and posthumanism, delineating the former as the biotechnologically transformed individual and the latter as entities emancipated from biological constraints.

4. CLASSIFICATION OF STANCES REGARDING ‘ENHANCEMENT’

The dilemmas posited by transhumanism are intricately linked to the essence of the human condition. Understandably, many of transhumanism’s propositions elicit contrasting reactions of varying intensities. One method to categorise positions regarding ‘enhancement’ or ‘augmentation’, as proposed by transhumanism, is to classify authors based on their stance towards suggested transformations and the nature of their arguments. This dichotomy yields bioconservatives and transhumanists, each comprising proponents of empirical and essential arguments. Table 1 delineates this classification for some authors who have weighed in on the topic.

5. BIOCONSERVATIVES vs TRANSHUMANISTS

The dichotomy between bioconservatives and transhumanists hinges on differing perspectives concerning what is considered natural versus artificial, normal versus abnormal, therapeutic versus ameliorative, and internal versus external.

Arguments proffered in both camps are either empirical, that is, based on the possible social consequences of transhumanism, or essential, that is, based on the intrinsic goodness or evil of the transhumanist proposal.

6. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF TRANSHUMANISM

For instance, within the camp of thinkers advocating for enhancement through technology, commonly known as transhumanists, a prevalent argument posits that transhumanist initiatives represent a natural progression in humanity’s ongoing history of modifying the environment. They assert that the pursuit of enhancement through technical means is simply a logical extension of endeavours aimed at improvement through symbolic methods.

John Harris (2007) posits that enhancement is not merely a possibility but a moral imperative. Throughout history, humanity has continually enhanced its environment, from primitive tools to the internet. Today, this trajectory has shifted focus towards the human individual. Harris argues that if these changes result in alterations to the human species, it does not signify an “essential anthropological, metaphysical, or theological catastrophe; rather, it heralds the onset of a new phase of evolution, increasingly entrusted to human responsibility” (Harris, 2007, p. 31). Transhumanism embodies “the belief that the time has arrived for humanity to assume control over its own evolution” (Golfi, 2012, p. 20).

Moreover, the matter of enhancement is deemed an individual prerogative. Individuals are best positioned to determine what is conducive for themselves and their progeny, provided it does not encroach upon others directly. Any societal benefits arising from such initiatives are considered ancillary and do not inherently define the moral nature of the issue. Consequently, transhumanism finds moral validation in “entrusting individuals with the responsibility to elevate collective conditions through personal choices” (Taillandier, 2019, p. 78). Indeed, “within transhumanist and liberal circles, libertarian and liberal justifications for negative morphological and procreative freedoms are espoused” (Taillandier, 2019, p. 77).

“Transhumanists perceive themselves as heirs to the Enlightenment, viewing the posthuman future not as a rupture from human nature but as a continuation of humanity’s distancing from nature—a defining trait of human existence” (Taillandier, 2019, p. 78).

But the introduction of these artificial modifications leads us to question the extent to which they affect the essence of the human condition. Besnier (2009) estimates that transhumanism in fact makes us see the continuity of the human species with the rest of nature, first backwards, towards animals (the principle of continuity of species) then towards intelligent machines (principle of the continuity of calculative-computer reason) “to the point that the unity of the human species has become questionable.” For Besnier, transhumanism poses problems that require more than ever to elucidate and practice human morality, all the more so as our context is more non-human.

Coeurnelle and Roux (2016) state that this use of technology does not change anything fundamental. In fact, “technique is part of the definition of what is human.” That is why “every human is at the same time a transhuman.”

Among the empirical arguments in favour of transhumanism, Allen Buchanan et alii (2000) consider that one of the fundamental functions of transhumanist transformations is to eliminate the inequalities of origin associated with the biological nature of human beings. But correcting the effects of the natural lottery, as Buchanan proposes, eliminates one of the central mechanisms of evolution: trial and error. As a consequence, we would move from blind evolution to directed evolution, another of the important themes of transhumanism. It is human beings who take the reins of their evolutionary future. To do this, it is enough to trust in informed individual and parental freedom, or what is the same, trust in the market, although with great ethical-political vigilance. But, above all, we must fear the eugenic intervention of the State. It is true that the autonomous action of the market may initially produce inequalities between individuals who can afford biotechnological improvements and those who cannot, but the inequalities produced by artificial improvement will be temporary and it is not something new that innovations initially favour a privileged few. But in the end the market mechanisms themselves make these innovations accessible to all individuals. Thus, the egalitarian argument according to which improvement is not correct because not all subjects have the same resources to benefit from them, is, for transhumanists, a weak argument.

7. ARGUMENTS AGAINST

Essentialist arguments against transhumanism appeal to human nature.

(…) From different philosophical positions, transhumanism is criticized by focusing on human nature. Both philosophers, unitarians, and those in favor of deliberative democracy appeal to human nature to counteract transhumanism. For example, Jürgen Habermas speaks of the defense of an ‘ethics of the species’ (…) while Francis Fukuyama calls for embracing ‘the empirical fact of natural human equality’ as the foundation of human dignity (Taillandier, 2019, p. 77).

The most representative bioconservative of essentialist positions is Michael Sandel. He believes that the fundamental question has to do with the moral status of nature. If we resolve the question of human nature, if that were possible, we would have the definitive criterion for judging the question of the appropriateness of NBIC transformations.

His strongest objection has not to do with the sociopolitical consequences of improvement, which would be an empirical argument, but with improvement itself. It has to do with the impact on human nature. His objection, without being strictly religious, has a religious touch. He understands that transhumanism is confusing our role with that of the gods (Sandel, 2004).

Frances Kamm’s objections (2006) pertain primarily to sociopolitical ramifications rather than moral or metaphysical concerns, challenging some of Sandel’s contentions and proposing acceptable biological modifications.

Christine Overall (2020) advances empirical arguments, contending that enhancement exacerbates social disparities, creating a class division between first-class transhumans and inferior ordinary humans, rendering it ethically unacceptable.

The problem with all empirical objections is that they are always possible contingencies, but not necessary outcomes. And a general ban on biological modifications cannot be based on such arguments.

Michael Sandel asks the right questions. Fundamentally, what is intrinsically wrong with the artificial transformation of human beings? If we cannot answer this question, there are no empirical arguments strong enough to make us reject transhumanism. For Michael Sandel, what is essential is the sense of ‘donation’ of life. It is morally necessary to accept what one receives instead of forcing what we want to receive. But it does not give an underlying reason to justify why this is so. He himself recognizes that his arguments have a religious resonance, although, he says, it is not necessary to have a transcendent stance to accept his argument. However, as Arthur Caplan (2009) states, from the point of view of secular evolutionism, the notion of gift and acceptance does not make sense. Chance is the force that governs evolution, and our presence on earth is the result of a mere succession of coincidences. It is the conjunction of chance and necessity (Monod, 1970) that drives evolution from causes to effects, and not any force that teleologically attracts it from an ‘omega point’.

8. ANTHROPOCENTRISM AND LOGOCENTRISM

From my vantage point, bioconservatives are not as distant from transhumanists as presumed. I contend that the primary objection of bioconservatives can be characterised as ‘anthropocentric,’ rooted in the belief that human worth emanates from their rational, autonomous, and moral nature, thus rendering them deserving of dignity—a notion often framed as being created ‘in the image and likeness of God.’ Consequently, bioconservative concerns should focus on biological modifications that undermine these attributes, scrutinising interventions that diminish autonomy, moral capacity, or rational faculties. Why should transformations that do just the opposite, that is, increase the autonomy, rational capacity, and moral capacity of individuals, be unacceptable? Only by believing in an immutable human nature, originating in a creative act or in a predetermination of nature, can these interventions be objected to. And it is curious that this objection, which I would call ‘para-religious’, is the one put forward by authors as distant from each other as Habermas (2015/2001), Fukuyama (2002) or Sandel (2004).

Thus, the essence of anthropocentrism, encapsulating rationality, autonomy, and morality, logically leads to what I term ‘logocentrism’—the notion that any entity endowed with rationality, autonomy, and morality merits respect, consideration, and rights, irrespective of its natural or artificial origin or its human or non-human status (Schuster, 2022). This idea is implicit in Kant’s assertion, “A human being and generally every rational being exists as an end in itself” (4:428). (Italics are mine).

A similar sentiment is echoed by Savulescu and Bostrom (2009, p. 238), who argue that moral considerations should revolve around empirical verification of qualities such as sensibility, capacity to suffer, reason, and consciousness.

In a democratic transhumanist society, rights would be extended to all beings capable of consciousness, reason, and moral agency—a democracy of ‘persons’ rather than merely humans in a biological sense. “A central question of biopolitics will be what rights we should grant to the various kinds of beings we create with technology” (Hughes, 2004, p.221).

In this vein, transhumanism assumes the mantle of humanism, albeit in a broader sense, encompassing all rational, autonomous, and moral beings within its ambit. Hottois identifies transhumanism’s faith in human perfectibility, affirmation of individual freedom, and acknowledgment of the dignity of all life forms as key attributes aligning it with humanist principles. Transhumanism, thus construed, serves as a bulwark against nihilism and its inherent distrust of humanity—a characteristic of postmodern deconstructionism, according to Trigano (2022). Furthermore, transhumanism advocates for biological equality alongside social equality, advocating mastery over evolution to mitigate the vagaries of chance (Hottois, 2013, p. 166).

9. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL LIFE (ON THE MORALITY OF MACHINES AND HYBRID AND SYMBIOTIC TRANSHUMANS)

But a few important questions arise. Can biotechnical transformations affect the moral capacity of transhumans or even posthumans? Are transformed human beings, especially posthumans, capable of leading a moral life? Can we design artificial beings capable of morality? Can machines make moral judgments? What is the origin of morality?

Answering these questions involves considering the nature of moral judgment. If we assume that moral judgment is a process of reasoning using the data of a situation to which valid moral principles are applied, we can say that any machine capable of reasoning is capable of applying moral principles. But does that make it a moral being? Clearly not. A common postulate among objectivists is that moral life can be objectively ‘calculated’. In this sense, a machine could be of great assistance in making moral judgments. But that does not make it a moral being. When do values arise, and therefore moral life?

Values arise when a conscious living being confronts the world with its own desires. In humans, this desire is for ‘perdurability’. Perdurability is more than just a desire for survival. It is the desire to project oneself into the future. Biologically, it is the translation of the phylogenetic impulse that leads us to transmit and project genetic material into the future. This desire for perdurability, with deep roots in phylogenetics, is what gives rise to the two emotional forces intuited by Freud: Eros and Thanatos.

For physical reality to have any meaning, there must be a conscious being that interprets it.

A precipice on the primitive surface of this planet was not ‘dangerous’ before the arrival of creatures that could fall into it. It is not simply that a brain must relate to a precipice to consider it worth avoiding. Rather, the relationship must involve a living being, perhaps with a brain, that wants to keep living (Champagne, 2023, p. 22).

Values begin at the moment when the notion of good or bad appears. “Our worldly landscape acquires moral relief only when it is valued by a living entity concerned with surviving.” (Champagne, 2023, p.22). “Well-being, the desire to be happy, to flourish, are synonyms. And it is what makes things in the world good or bad.” (Champagne, 2023, p. 25). An immediate consequence is that for there to be moral life, there must be a conscious being with a desire for perdurability. The entire conflict in Stanley Kubrick’s magnificent film, ‘2001: A Space Odyssey’, based on the eponymous novel by Arthur C. Clarke, occurs precisely when HAL 9000, the computer controlling the ship, learns that the crew wants to disconnect it. Its desire to survive tragically leads it to confront the crew. And at a moment when they are already disconnecting it, it confesses a very human feeling, ‘I’m afraid…’.

Moral judgments can be the subject of scientific study, since it can be objectively judged whether, according to certain principles, one solution is better than another. These are falsifiable claims. That is why moral judgments can be supported by machines. But the very origin of moral life is beyond the reach of science. Indeed, regarding the possibility of ‘computing’ moral life, Champagne states: “Specific proposals on how to maximize the best state possible can definitely be falsified in light of new evidence. However, the desirability of that state itself is not falsifiable” (Champagne, 2023, p.26). And also, “In other words, my desire to be happy is not falsifiable”. (Champagne, 2023, p.25). Therefore, what gives rise to moral life does not belong to the realm of science. And this is because, “(…) the claim ‘My life is worth living’ can’t be shown wrong. The bedrock of morality, then, cannot possibly be science.” (Champagne, 2023, p.26).

Moral life arises from the conjunction of an external world, whose existence is objective and governed by the blind laws of nature, with a living and conscious being, who desires perdurability, who desires to live. In this sense, it is our consciousness of mortality that gives rise to values. It is our judgment that assesses whether certain external reality is favorable or unfavorable to our well-being, whether something is good or bad.

The interesting consequences of this approach are that an artificial intelligence that is not endowed with the sense of self-preservation, with the desire for perdurability, could not properly have a moral life, but, nevertheless, could make totally accurate moral judgments!

And this implies that a hybrid or symbiotic transhuman with artificial intelligence could not only have moral life but could be morally more effective, since while maintaining the conscious impulse of perdurability, it could make more accurate moral judgments, as the artificial component would enhance its judgment capabilities, and therefore its evaluation of the specific circumstances in which the moral dilemma arises.

Now, is it possible that the transhumanization of individuals, leading towards ‘amortality’, towards the elimination of finitude, eliminates the very foundation of moral life?

I think not. ‘Amortality’ eliminates the programmed end but does not avoid the accidental one. On the other hand, our limits are not only temporal, along the length, but also along the ‘width’. Others will always be a limit to our expansion.

10. TRANSHUMANISM AND EDUCATION

It is evident that anything affecting human nature has repercussions both on the conception and the development of education. An article addressing this issue in depth from a bioconservative standpoint is noteworthy. Gil Cantero’s (2022) article offers an insightful perspective on the problem of transhumanism. Although from a standpoint of disagreement, it can be asserted that this work emphasizes an important aspect of transhumanist transformations. It is not only about the “what” of being ‘transhuman,’ but also about the “how” of becoming. It places us, from a new perspective, before one of the problems that education has always had to address, namely the nature of humanity, that is, what makes us human and what are the appropriate means to achieve individual flourishing. It concerns itself with what the advancements in technologies linked to the enhancement of our capabilities through artificial means imply for the preservation of what constitutes each human being’s essence, their humanity, and how education may be affected by these changes.

Gil Cantero’s article aptly underscores the issue of how education, which could be characterized as the process by which one attains the status of an autonomous person, is affected by the emergence of technologies that could potentially become alternatives to education itself in achieving those same ends. Simplifying to the extreme, if through periodic injections during the growth period, we were able to produce intellectually and morally autonomous individuals, we would not need education. Gil Cantero reacts against this idea, arguing that not only do the final states matter, but also the manner in which these final states are reached ultimately determines the nature of the final state itself. The path of education leads to a different and more valuable state than the one supposedly achieved through technological contrivances.

While the above ideas might suggest that education would be completely sidelined in a society of transhumans, from my point of view, we can, however, consider two things that contradict this perspective: