The relative a priori. Towards a pragmatist conception of science?

Abstract

I put forward a revision of the concept of the relative a priori from Michael Friedman’s proposal. I will begin by exposing those aspects of Carnap and Kuhn that underlie the static and dynamic dimensions of Friedman’s project. It will be argued that, despite its virtues, the lack of pragmatic awareness prevents him from properly characterize theory choice. Hereafter, some criticism will be presented. Lastly, stemming from criticism, some pragmatic readings of the relative a priori will be explored as overcoming the issues addressed.
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Author Biography

Mariano Sanjuán Salina

,
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Ayudante en el Departamento de Lingüística General, Lenguas Modernas, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Teoría de la Literatura y Literatura Comparada.  Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Módulo IV BIS. Despacho 311. 
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