Representations as Systems
Abstract One of the problems that are often indicated as a criticism of different forms of representationalism is the difficulty of finding definitions that are neither semantic nor realist in a simple sense. The present work tackles this class of critiques from a contextualist point of view, assuming those semantic aspects that are necessary for a concept of representation, but showing that semantic relations of representation should neither be static, nor strictly referential in a classical and realist sense. Two distinctions are crucial for our proposal: On the one hand, we have the distinction between closed and open systems; on the other, a tripartite distinction between structural, informational and semantic representations. On this basis, we understand representations in terms of asymmetric variations between contextual models.
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von Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications. New York: George Braziller.
Bateson, G. (1970/1972). Forma, Sustancia y Diferencia. Pasos hacia una Ecología de la Mente. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company.
Cellucci, C. (1992). Gödel’S Incompleteness Theorem and The Philosophy of Open Systems. Travaux de logique, 7, 103-127.
Floridi, L. (2005). Is semantic information meaningful data? Philosophy and phenomenological research, 70(2), 351-370.
Frigg, R. (2010). Models and fiction. Synthese, 172(2), 251-268.
Hempel, C. (1970). On the ‘Standard Conception’ of Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. 4, pp. 142-163). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Hutto, D. D., Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism. Basic Minds without Content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Hutto, D. D., Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Jackendoff, R. (1976). Toward an explanatory semantic representation. Linguistic inquiry, 7(1), 89-150.
Knuuttila, T. (2017). Imagination extended and embedded: artifactual versus fictional accounts of models. Synthese, 198(21), 5077-5097.
Korzybski, A. (1933/1958). Science and Sanity. An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. Brooklyn, New York: Institute of General Semantics.
Lombardi, O., Fortin, S., Vanni, L. (2015). A Pluralist View About Information. Philosophy of Science, 82(5), 1248-1259.
Rosenberg, A. (2013). Disenchanted Naturalism. In B. Bashour and H. D. Muller (Eds.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications (pp. 13-17). London: Routledge.
Suppes, P. (1960). A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences. Synthese, 12, 287-301.
Thomson-Jones, M. (2006). Models and the Semantic View. Philosophy of Science, 73(5), 524-535.
Tye, M. (2000). The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1987). The Semantic Approach to Scientific Theories. In The Process of Science (pp. 105-124). Dordrecht: Springer.
von Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications. New York: George Braziller.
Céspedes, E., & Valdivia, C. (2022). Representations as Systems. ArtefaCToS. Revista De Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La tecnología, 11(1), 23–37. https://doi.org/10.14201/art20221112337 (Original work published May 17, 2022)
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