POLITICAL PARTIES VERSUS PRESIDENTS. AN ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGICAL CONGRUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Partidos políticos versus presidentes. Un análisis de la congruencia ideológica en América Latina

Partidos políticos versus presidentes. Uma análise da congruência ideológica na América Latina

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Abstract
This study aims to understand political congruence in Latin American presidential democracies. It analyzes the levels of ideological congruence between parties and presidential candidates with their voters. The data used come from Americas Barometer at Vanderbilt University and Latin American Elites Project at the University of Salamanca for 11 Latin American countries between 2004 and 2014. The results conclude that the ideological links in Latin America are varied. Voters tend to be more congruent with the political parties they vote for in the legislative than with the candidates they vote for president, reinforcing the idea of dual legitimacy and dual representation in these countries. The radicalism, and the number, of parties and candidates appears as the most significant variables to explain ideological congruence.
INTRODUCTION

Are Latin Americans close to their representatives? This simple question has generated many academic debates in the last few years. The most recent studies carried out on the congruence between citizens and representatives have presented different patterns of ideological and programmatic congruence across countries or between parties and voters (Rodríguez 2017; Herrera and Morales 2018), largely due to the use of different methodological approaches (Lupu et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the discussion on political congruence has been limited to the legislative power. The protagonism role of the parties as representative agents has produced an exclusive attention to the levels of congruence between citizens and representatives or between parties and their voters. Despite the importance of presidentialism in Latin America, there are no studies about congruence in which
the unit of analysis is the presidential candidates. Therefore, we do not know what level of ideological congruence is generated between the presidential candidates and their electorate, or whether this level of congruence is similar (or not) to the congruence between voters and parties.

In short, this analysis aims to fill an existing gap in political congruence research in presidential democracies: the dual legitimacy of political representation. In presidential democracies, citizens directly elect both members of the legislative chamber as well as the president; in both cases, we would expect a correspondence in terms of preferences. This article aims to see if this dual legitimacy can also be translated into a dual ideological congruence.

Which candidates and parties have greater ideological congruence with their voters? In which cases do candidates and parties show a similar ideological connection with their voters? Which countries lack legislative or presidential congruence? To answer to those questions, we compare the levels of ideological congruence in eleven Latin American countries between 2004 and 2014 using citizen surveys of Americas Barometer and the surveys of the Latin American Elites Project.

Secondly, this work explores which characteristics promote or inhibit ideological congruence in the region. Previous literature has pointed out the relevance of the type of political party in the explanation for party-voters congruence. Several studies in the European context have confirmed that larger and less ideological ‘catchall’ parties tend to display higher levels of congruence (Belchior and Freire 2013; Holmberg 2000); but there is opposing evidence found in other works (Dalton 2015; Pierce 1999). In Latin America, comparative evidence is scarce, but it points out that the more or less ideological profile of the parties has an impact on the links with the electorate (Otero-Felipe and Rodríguez 2014). In this sense, our second goal is to confirm, with a large sample of Latin American cases, what the incidence of the parties’ ideological profile on congruence is. Additionally, we check whether it is important for the congruence between the presidential candidate and the constituents. The analysis will show what other features related to political parties and candidates have an impact on the level of congruence with their voters, such as the coherence of the parties, their age, or whether candidates have an outsider profile.

To accomplish these goals, we have adopted a broad conceptualization of congruence using two indicators that capture different dimensions of the phenomenon (Achen 1978): proximity and centrism. Proximity estimates the extent to which the ideological orientations of the party or the candidates coincide with those of the

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1. One of the few works that deals with the ideological location of presidents is Trak (2011), which describes the differences in the average ideological locations between deputies of government parties, their supporters, and the location they make of presidents in such legislatures.
represented. Centrism is a measure of proximity that takes into account the variance within the group of voters.

The findings show that political parties generally perform better on both indicators of ideological congruence than presidential candidates. The ideological connection is higher in the legislative sphere than in the presidential one. The explanatory analysis also shows that both political parties and the most radical candidates tend to generate lower levels of congruence. The analysis also reveals the importance of some party system characteristics to promote or inhibit legislative and presidential ideological congruence: whereas high presidential volatility is particularly harmful to the ideological connection between the presidential candidates and their constituents, greater legislative fragmentation promotes a better congruence with their voters.

The following pages are organized in six sections, including this introduction. The second section presents a brief theoretical framework on congruence and political representation. The third section shows the main methodological alternatives used in the literature to calculate congruence and emphasizes those elements that have conditioned the findings in different contexts. The fourth section describes the results of the proximity and centrism indicators for the Latin American countries analyzed. Next, the explanatory analysis is presented. Finally, the last section concludes with the main findings and implications for future research on this phenomenon.

**CONGRUENCE AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION**

The link established between representatives and the represented has become an object of analysis in an increasing number of studies on the region. When talking about the ‘health’ of democracy in Latin America, it is common to read that there is a crisis of political representation (Mainwaring, 2006; Kitschelt et al, 2010). It is important to know to what extent the representatives use ideological or programmatic elements that are clearly differentiated from other representatives, and how these elements coincide (or not) with the preferences of a group of voters.

Approaching political representation through congruence has been the subject of a considerable number of studies, both theoretical and empirical, starting with the classic study by Miller and Stokes (1963). However, the vast majority of texts on congruence have had a mainly systemic focus, which has made it difficult to discover the origin of the links within different parties and which has conditioned the type of explanations for the degree of congruence found, mainly that of an institutional-electoral nature (Otero-Felipe, 2014). In this area of research, which is more recent in the case of Latin America (Otero-Felipe and Rodríguez 2014, Lupu and Warner 2016, Buquet and Selios 2016), carrying out a new study...
on political representation from the perspective of ideological congruence is justified. Both politicians and citizens use the left-right dimension as an instrument to understand policy without a costly process of information.

Most research on this object of study focuses its attention on the ideological and/or programmatic links established with parties or elected legislators at the country level (Luna and Zechsmeister, 2005; Otero-Felipe and Rodríguez, 2010; Rodríguez Zepeda 2017; Lupu et al, 2017) and at a specific point in time. However, this study aims to go a bit further and incorporates presidential candidates as actors of representation. In both cases, the interest is not only to find out the magnitude of the congruence, but also the possible variation within countries (parties versus candidates) and over time. Cheresky (2006) argues presidential elections illustrate, and at the same time partially absorb, the crisis of representation that has spread throughout Latin American societies, given that there is a transformation in political relationships and a change in the identities and type of leaderships. Consequently, this study aims to find out, on the one hand, if there is greater or lesser distance in ideological terms between voters and parties or the presidential candidates for whom they vote. On the other hand, party and candidates’ characteristics that could explain the different levels of ideological congruence are also explored.

The president in presidential democracies becomes particularly relevant given that he or she does not require a majority in parliament to govern, and possesses both legislative and non-legislative powers, although both the parliament and the president have veto powers that can increase or decrease the power of these actors. Within the advantages of presidentialism, Linz (1990) highlights that this form of government generates a greater degree of ‘identifiability’, linking one person with an image, discourse, and electoral promises and, in this sense, represents a fundamental object of analysis given that the figure is easily located.

All presidential candidates tend to be receptive to citizens’ preferences. However, we believe that a link with a party or the ‘outsider’s features’ of the candidate may have implications for the ideological distance it generates with potential voters. When a candidate has had an intense partisan trajectory, for example, occupying relevant representation positions, the voter has references to know their ideological positions. Therefore, we can expect a positive impact on levels of congruence with voters. On the other hand, an outsider candidate’s personality, charisma and rhetoric can overshadow ideological positions that can have a negative effect on the ideological link with their voters. All of these defining characteristics of presidentialism make it conceivable to expect a possible difference in terms of congruence between parties and candidates.
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CONGRUENCE: AN OVERVIEW

There are many ways in which the literature has approached to the measurement of congruence, revealing the absence of clear consensus on the issue. Nevertheless, it is possible to establish four elements that condition the study of the phenomenon and its results: the units of analysis, the operationalization of the concept, the data used for its estimation, and the type of issues analyzed.

Regarding the first aspect, the analyses differ in terms of which actor(s) intervenes in the relationship, giving rise to a collective or dyadic approach, which in all cases are focused on the legislative sphere. In the first case, studies focus on analyzing the level of correspondence between attitudes within the representative organism as a whole and the citizens represented in it (Weissberg, 1978; Golder and Stramski 2010; Andeweg 2011) or between the ideological or programmatic positions between voters and the government (Blais and Bodet, 2006). If, on the contrary, the study of congruence is carried out through the links between legislators and their represented or between parties and their voters (Dalton, 1985; Thomassen, 1999; Miller et al., 1999), it would be a dyadic type of case. In this context, there are no publications that have analyzed the congruence between presidential candidates and voters.

The second, and perhaps most important, element is how to measure the degree of connection between representatives and the represented. Three types of approaches can be highlighted: the simplest one, which analyzed congruence with coefficients of correlation or association of attitudes; thus, the greater the relationship the greater the congruence (Miller and Stokes, 1978; Weissberg, 1986; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Another one of the most frequently used measurements is that which uses the distances between the averages of legislators/parties or governments and citizens/voters (Mattila and Raunio, 2006; Belchior, 2010), where the greater distance there is the lesser the congruence. The indicators proposed by Achen (1978) solve part of these difficulties and are applied in this study. As will be outlined further on, the author suggested the use of two measures based on criticisms over the use of correlations and simple distances: proximity and centrism. Another approach is that carried out by Golder and Stramski (2010) and the alternative proposed by Andeweg (2011), who calculate the degree of congruence via the coincidence of the distribution of citizens and representatives’ attitudes. Although these have been the most frequently used empirical approaches to

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2. The use of correlations has been subject of criticisms because does not consider the statistical distribution of the opinions of the representatives and their represented. On the other hand, one of the main problems caused by using simple distances is that it considers legislators and voters as equivalent units of analysis, does not consider the dispersion of opinions among voters or the unequal access to information that exists between representatives and the rest of society (Otero-Felipe 2014).
measure congruence, over the last years, some alternatives for their measurement have been put forward regarding a multidimensional conception of congruence (Luna, 2014; Rodríguez Zepeda 2017; Lupu et al 2017).

A third aspect that has conditioned this type of study is the source of data used. To measure the link between citizens and representatives or political parties, public opinion survey data is often used, along with surveys carried out with experts in the countries or regions, or surveys applied to politicians or legislators. Yet it is not always easy to obtain this information. Another important obstacle is the difficulty for the questions used in both surveys to be exactly the same.

Last of all, another element that has restricted the reach of these studies is the issues analyzed. Should the measurement be the same or different, according to the issues? Should it be different according to whether what is to be measured is the ideological congruence between citizens and representatives or the programmatic congruence? The left-right axis, despite the studies that insist on questioning its validity for the Latin American case as an analytic tool, even with the differences in each national context, makes it possible in this way to predict politicians’ party membership, as well as being associated to certain political attitudes and opinions. Actors place themselves, and place parties and their leaders, on a scale where 1 is left and 10 is right. Their preferences on different political questions can be transferred to scales, making statistical analysis easier and guaranteeing the validity of the indicators.

METHODS AND DATA

This study analyzes ideological congruence considering two different dyads. First is the dyad established between the ideology of the voters of different parties and the ideological positions of the parties. Second is the dyad that considers ideological congruence between voters of candidates to the presidency and those of the presidential candidates. The decision to use just one ideological variable to talk of congruence is due on one hand to the use of this indicator. The left-right dimension structures a considerable part of party competition in Latin America and functions, to a large extent, as an indicator of other political issues.

3. The ideological position of the presidential candidates, in each country, has been measured according to the location conceded by all legislators on the left-right scale according to the PELA-USAL survey.

4. However, the authors are aware that the political space is more complex. Previous studies have found out there are political issues that are not structured in ideological terms (Harbers, De Vries and Steenbergen 2012) and that the degree to which left and right have ideological meaning can be vary according their levels of polarization (Zechmeister and Corral 2013).
The calculation of ideological congruence in this study has followed the proposal of Achen (1978) using indicators of proximity and centrim for each party-voters and presidential candidate-voters dyad.\(^5\)

The proximity indicator estimates the extent to which the ideological orientations of the party or the candidates coincide with those of the represented (understood individually). These distances have been obtained for each voters-party dyad for the party in question and for each presidential candidate-voters dyad for the candidate in question, via the sum of the difference between the mean voter position and the mean party position (or between the mean of the presidential candidate position), all of which is squared and divided by the number of voters for each party. In this way, a high score would indicate a lack of agreement between the voter and the party, or between the voter and the candidate (and, therefore less congruence) and vice versa. The formula applied is: 

\[ R = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left( c_{ij} - r_j \right)^2 \]

where \( c \) is the ideological position of voter \( i \) in the party or candidate \( j \); \( r_j \) is the ideological location of the party or candidate and \( n \) the number of voters. The range of the measure proposed by Achen at the country level goes from 0 to 1. In the same way when it is applied to the party-voter dyad transforming the scale of ideology from 0 to 1. This study opts to maintain the original scale of 1 to 10 which is more intuitively interpreted.

Secondly, centrism has been calculated to measure the absolute agreement between a party and the ideological average of its voters, or between the ideological position of the presidential candidate and the mean of his or her voters. This is an index of the performance of the representative (party or candidate) calculated as the difference between the proximity discovered (following Achen) and the variance (dispersion) in the opinions of this electorate. This indicator is calculated as follows, 

\[ C = R - \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} c_{ij}^2 - \overline{c}_j^2} \]

where \( R \) is proximity, \( \overline{c}_j \) is the mean of the ideological location of the electorate of a party or candidate \( j \), \( c_{ij} \) is the ideological location of the voter in that same party or presidential candidate and \( n \) is the sample. In the same way as before, the larger the resultant of the operation, the lower the congruence will be.\(^6\)

We used the databases of PELA-USAL and LAPOP between 2004 and 2014; the authors are grateful to the Salamanca and Vanderbilt Universities for the availability of data. To calculate congruence in the legislative sphere, on the one hand the ideological position of each party’s deputies has been considered on a scale of left (1) to right (10) via data from the PELA-USAL project and, on the other, the

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5. The use of Achen’s measures was carried out because we considered them more appropriate in the analysis of party-voters and president-voters dyads. Given the nature of our data and the goal of the article which is the party-voters congruence, we cannot use the many-to-many approaches of Golder and Stramsky or those of Lupu et al. (2017), which refer to a collective approach.

6. The calculations of congruence in this study were carried out with the Stata 13 programme.
voters’ self-placement (in legislative elections) according to the LAPOP survey on the same scale. The calculation of congruence between voters and presidential candidates is carried out by taking the ideological placement of voters in presidential elections (LAPOP) and the mean ideological position of the candidates according to the deputies of each country (PELA-USAL).

The selection of cases has been determined not only by the temporal correspondence between both data bases in the different countries, but also due to the presence of a question about the legislative and presidential vote in the public opinion surveys. This fact has meant that not all Latin American countries have been included. In total, 58 dyads of party-voters were obtained in legislative elections and 49 pairs of presidential candidates-voters in 11 Latin American countries at different moments in time. The details about countries, parties, and presidential candidates used in the analysis are shown in the online appendix available at the journal’s website.

**IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY AND CENTRISM IN LATIN AMERICA: PARTIES AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES**

Ideological proximity and centrism for the party-voters and candidate-voters dyads at the country level are presented in figures 1 and 2. It is possible to observe the extent to which the political party and presidential candidate deviate from the average values in the whole sample analyzed. In this sense, the interpretation is simple: the most congruent parties and candidates will be those who are located nearer to the origin of both axes and, on the contrary, the further away they are from 0, the lower the congruence will be.

The great dispersion of scores presented in both indicators with an average value for the regional total of political parties in the legislative elections of 7.9 in ideological proximity and 1.8 in centrism. These figures are slightly higher for presidential candidates and their voters: 8.8 and 2.7, respectively. These results show that, on average, the ideological connection with voters tends to be weaker for presidential candidates than for political parties.

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7. In the case of the deputies, parties with fewer than 6 legislators were dropped from the analysis.
8. The difference between the number of observations in presidential and legislative congruence is due to the electoral coalitions. For example, in the Chilean case legislative congruence was calculated considering the two-party coalitions that usually run for election.
Another interesting element is the unequal distribution of cases, both in the party-voters dyads as well as presidential candidates and their electors. The points of legislative proximity vary between the 3.75 of the Christian Democrat Party (PDC) in Chile in 2010 and the 19.23 of the Solidarity Party (PSO) in Panama in 2006. These two parties would be the closest and furthest from their voters in ideological terms throughout the whole sample, respectively. With regard to the presidential candidates, Antonio Saca of El Salvador’s ARENA (4.24) would be the closest ideologically to his voters while the 20 points (20.70) of Otto Guevara of Costa Rica’s Libertarian Movement (ML) place him as the least congruent of all of the presidential candidates analyzed here.

The scores on ideological centrism also show a high degree of dispersion. In the case of presidential candidates, again Otto Guevara in 2006 (with 14.90) would be the furthest from the average of his voters, whereas Hipólito Mejía (the Dominican Republic’s PRD), Nicaraguan José Rizo (PLC) and Chilean Sebastián Piñera (RN) would be the candidates with the best score of centrism (0). In the case of the political parties, the values go from the minimum score (0) obtained by Guatemala’s...
Republican Front (FRG) in 2008, Salvador’s GANA in 2012 and Chile’s Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in 2010 to 15.10 obtained by Panama’s PSO.

**Figure 2. Presidential Congruence: Proximity and Centrism in Latin America**

![Figure 2](image-url)

Source: own elaboration.

Figure 1 makes it possible to extract some additional conclusions regarding which party systems have better scores in one or both indicators of congruence. As a whole, the parties in Chile and Peru have scores of ideological proximity and centrism closer to 0. The figures are also below the regional average in Ecuador and Guatemala. The least congruent systems are El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. These results, at the country level, would show the importance of ideological polarization as an element that could have a negative impact on ideological links. This is the case of both Central American countries, whereas in the case of the Dominican Republic and Panama ideology is of little relevance in structuring the party system and the articulation of a programmatic proposal is more important than other type of linkages (clientelistic or personalistic, for instance).

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9. As the recent literature has shown (Singer, 2016), both system-level variables (polarization and clientelism) can be relevant for political representation. As we mention later, we have tried to incorporate both variables.
The greater dispersion in the scores of candidates makes it difficult to extract averages by country that are different. Most of countries enjoy extremely congruent candidates and others that reveal a high level of ideological ‘disconnection’ from their voters, except for Chile where both presidential candidates get low score on both indicators.

A considerable number of left-wing parties show the lowest levels of congruence with their electorate. Socialist Party (PS) in Chile, the Pachakutik Plurinational Movement of Unity (MUPP) in Ecuador, the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), the National Unity of Hope (UNE) in Guatemala, Honduras’ Liberal Party (PLH), the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) in Mexico, the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) in Nicaragua, and the Union for Peru (UPP) in Peru. This contradicts the literature based on European parties, which has pointed out that left-wing parties have a greater link with their electorate than right-wing parties do (Pierce, 1999; Holmberg, 2000).

Although proximity and centrism are two closely related dimensions, they do not capture the same thing. While proximity evaluates the closeness or distance between parties or candidates and each one of the voters. Centrism evaluates the distance with regard to the average of their voters, in other words, if voters are represented on average by the candidate or the party. For that reason, in the results for proximity, both the size and degree of homogeneity of the electorate for which the indicator is being calculated are very important, given that the dispersion of the group of voters does not have an effect on centrism (Otero-Felipe, 2014). In these circumstances, it can be highlighted that a high score in proximity, and therefore low in congruence, is due to the fact that the party or candidate has a very ideologically dispersed electorate, whereas the scores in centrism are very low (close to 0). This is the case of the Dominican Republic’s PLD and PRD in 2010, the ALN in Nicaragua in 2010 and GANA in El Salvador in 2012. In the sample of presidential candidates analyzed here, three Dominicans stand out: Vargas of the PLD in 2010, Mejía of the PRD in 2006 and Estrella, presidential candidate for PRSC in 2006.

In this sense, it is also possible to identify parties and presidential candidates with the highest scores on centrism, that is to say, those that are situated in the highest part of the graphs of each country. Parties such as the PS in Chile, the ML and the National Liberation Party (PLN) in Costa Rica, MUPP-NP in Ecuador, CDU, FMLN, the National Concertation Party (PCN) and PDC in El Salvador, the UNE in Guatemala, the PL in Honduras, the PRD in Mexico, the FLSN in Nicaragua, the Arnulfista Party (PA) and PSO in Panama, and the PLD in the Dominican Republic.

10. The correlation between proximity and centrism is statistically significant at a level of 0.01 for legislative elections $r=0.82$, and in the case of presidential elections the coefficient is $r=0.86$. 

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In the case of the candidates, Costa Rica’s Otto Guevara in 2006, Peru’s Lourdes Flores (2006), Álvaro Noboa (2004) in Ecuador, and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, stands out due to the high levels of centrism in the different spates of surveys in which he has been analyzed. All of these cases would be far from the average of their voters. In the words of Achen (1978), they would be biased towards one or other side of the ideological dimension and therefore would not be very congruent.

A final aspect to highlight from the descriptive analysis refers to the comparison of the scores obtained by political parties and presidential candidates. On the one hand, the cases in which ideological connection is similar, given that parties and candidates are located on nearly the same spot in the graph, either because they are equally congruent or because they are not. In the first type of case it is worth highlighting Saca and Arena in 2004, Piñera and RN in 2010, Torrijos and Panama’s PRD, UNE and Álvaro Colom in 2008, or Pacheco and PUSC in 2004. These presidential candidates were elected, and their parties achieved broad majorities in the legislature. On the other extreme, whereby both the political party and the presidential candidate have low congruence, are Daniel Ortega and the FSLN (in different legislatures), Handal and the FMLN or Varela and PA. On the other hand, it is also worth pointing out the different levels of ideological congruence that certain presidential candidates and their parties have obtained. Such is the case of Lourdes Flores and UN, in Peru, with the party being noticeably more representative than its candidate, or in the opposite case, Tony Saca, Hipólito Mejía and Héctor Silvia, three presidential candidates that were more congruent than their respective parties: the PCN (2014), the PLD (2006) and the CDU (2004).

EXPLORING DETERMINANTS OF LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL CONGRUENCE

Applying these two indicators – proximity and centrism – to 58 party-voter dyads and 49 pairs of presidential candidates-voters in Latin American countries has given an overview of the state of ideological congruence in the region. Now, what elements would explain the differences found between countries and within the party systems?

The fact that the literature has focused solely on legislators or political parties as actors of representation at the comparative level, has meant that the explicative factors of greater or lesser congruence are, almost exclusively, tested in this sphere. In any case, there are very few studies that have approached this task (Belchior 2010; Belchior and Freire 2013; Otero-Felipe 2014; Dalton 2017). On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence concerning what type of characteristics can affect congruence with the presidential candidate. For example, whether his or her career in the party or the lack of party ties has some
effect on the links established with voters, or whether the electoral rules for his or her election, are related to a greater congruence with voters. In this study, we explore the impact of certain characteristics of the party and the presidential candidates on ideological congruence. Moreover, we study the effect of electoral volatility and the number of candidates and parties in order to test the importance of the stability and supply in ideological congruence.

**Explaining Legislative Ideological Congruence**

For the predictive model of legislative congruence, we have considered two party elements related to their ideological profile: radicalism and party coherence. Parties’ ideology is an element that makes it possible to analyze the strength and similarity of positions in political issues between voters and parties. In fact, there are studies that clearly show differences between them in the European context. For example, Belchior and Freire (2013) show that catch-all parties are more congruent than ideological ones in Portugal. Otero-Felipe (2014) argues that European parties in the centre offer more diffuse information to their voters and have a weaker ideological coordination. On the other hand, Holmberg (2000) have claimed that left-wing parties have a stronger link with their electorate than right-wing parties.

This study is based on the idea that ideology establishes differences between parties in accordance with previous findings, but it also seeks to go into more depth on the possible impact of the country’s ideological scenario on the elections that are analyzed. The measure of radicalism used for this takes into account the absolute difference between the average ideological position of the country’s citizens and the average ideological position of each party, according to his Deputies in the Legislative Chamber the parties that are furthest away from the average position of citizens, and whose positions do not occupy spaces shared by other parties will have weaker ideological relationships with citizens. On the contrary, those parties with a «catch all» style, aiming to cover a broad ideological space, may generate a closer ideological identification, which ultimately has a positive impact on the development of links with its electorate. On the other hand, we have included party coherence. A cohesive political party is one in which its members share similar ideologies.

11. We also considered the impact of ideological polarization and clientelism as system-levels variables. In this sense, we add to our dataset the Singer polarization measure (2016) in the models, but this variable was no statically significant. Regarding the clientelism, we reviewed two different sources of data: the Kitschelt DALT project database (2008) wasn’t fit with our databases’ years (2004-2014). We included the clientelistic index of V-Dem dataset, but this variable wasn’t statistically significant either. Other institutional variables, such as the concurrence of elections, were included in preliminary models. However, they were not statistically significant, so they excluded from the analysis.
preferences, interests, and ideological positions (Ruiz 2008). It is expected that the most coherent parties will generate unified messages improving the levels of congruence. The measure of coherence used in this study is the standard deviation of the party’s ideological position according to its members.

Our model includes three control party variables that have been emphasized in previous studies. First is party age. Supposedly, a voter has a greater amount of information about a party which has a long electoral history and can evaluate the credibility of its proposals or how they have been carried out, if that is the case (Dalton 2017). Consequently, the expectation is that greater levels of congruence will be found in older parties. There is great variety among the different parties in terms of their background, given that some have very little electoral experience. This is the case of the Party of Citizen Action (PAC) in Costa Rica, the Renovating Institutional Party of National Action (PRIAN) in Ecuador, or the Great Alliance for National Unity (GANA) in El Salvador. GANA had less than 5 years of experience at the moment of gathering information for this study, in comparison with the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the Honduran Liberal Party (PL), or Chile’s Socialist Party (PS), with a history that stretches back over 70 years.

Second is party size. It refers to the percentage of votes that the party has achieved in the legislative election. A party’s electoral force or support could be the clearest proxy indicator of congruence that exists, particularly if it is the main issue for voters when deciding their vote. However, some authors maintain that bigger parties have more diffuse ideological profiles than smaller parties, which are likely to have similar positions to their voters (Dalton 2017). The third control variable included is the question of whether the party is in government or opposition. Voters’ identification with parties that have won the elections or who occupy positions in governments tends to increase to the same extent as the percentage of citizens who claim to have voted for the party (bandwagon effect), at a time close to the electoral contest (McAllister and Studlar, 1991). However, this variable has had different effects in the literature. For instance, while Mattilla and Raunio (2006) found a positive relationship between the government’s position and representation, Dalton (1985) did not find any effect. Given that the data used in this study come from a moment in time close to the elections, it is expected that government parties will have greater congruence than opposition parties.

There are two further aspects which will make it possible to evaluate whether the differences found in the intensity of the ideological links are related to the characteristics of the country’s party system: the effective number of parties and the volatility of the system. A higher number of parties in the party system would reflect that the voters have a broader group of options represented by various ideological positions. A party system with high levels of volatility would reflect the fact that voters change their preferences and show little loyalty towards parties, but it could also reflect that parties disappear after elections. In both situations,
volatility shows that voters’ relationship with parties disappears or changes, ideological links have become reduced, or they have turned to other parties. In this way, ideological congruence will be greater in those cases in which volatility is low and voters’ preferences for parties remain stable. This study presupposes that in those countries, ideological congruence is constant. Volatility is an aspect of party system analysis that offers information about its degree of stability. If the party system is stable and becomes institutionalized, it is easier for voters to have a clearer impression of the ideological approaches of the different parties and, hypothetically, a higher level of congruence with them.

**Table 1. Description of the variables used to measure party-voter ideological congruence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td>Radicalism</td>
<td>Difference between the average ideological position of Deputies in parliament and average ideological position of citizens</td>
<td>LAPOP and PELA-USAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal coherence</td>
<td>Standard deviation of the ideological position of political parties.</td>
<td>PELA-USAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party’s age</td>
<td>Difference between the year when the party was founded, and the year of the election considered.</td>
<td>Database of the Americas, webpages of parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Percentage of votes obtained by the party in the corresponding legislative election</td>
<td>Database of the Americas, OIR, websites of electoral tribunals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party in government</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable where 0 = party in opposition and 1 = party in government</td>
<td>Database of the Americas, webpages of parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative ENP</td>
<td>Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula for legislative elections.</td>
<td>Own elaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>Pedersen (1990) formula for legislative elections.</td>
<td>OIR and own elaboration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: own elaboration.*

The results are shown in figure 3 which compares the models with (Full Model) and without (Baseline Model) systemic variables. The interpretation is simple: the points represent the impact of the independent variables on proximity or

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12. Specific information on each regression model is offered in the online appendix (Tables A3 and A4). Additionally, we provided the correlations matrix of the variables (Tables A5 and A6).
centrism. A position on the right side of the vertical line (0) indicates a positive effect, while a position on the left side the effect is negative. The effects are statistically significant if the confidence intervals located to the left or right of each point do not touch this vertical line. The results point towards a moderate impact of the party variables on indicators of congruence.

**Figure 3. Impact of party variables on legislative ideological congruence**

In the baseline models, *radicalism* is the variable with the greatest statistical significance, both in the model of proximity and the model of centrism. The positive coefficient agrees with the theoretical expectation that was pointed out; that

13. Tests were carried out to detect possible influential observations and no cases were ruled out. Likewise tests of collinearity and homoscedasticity were also carried out. Since the latter condition was not fulfilled (given that there are observations by party at different periods of time), the analyses were corrected using the Huber-White standard errors per political party. Additionally, a bootstrap estimation was made, in order to calculate more accurate confidence intervals for the parameters obtained (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).
is to say, *ceteris paribus*, as the party increases its level of ideological radicalism, and therefore moves away from the centre, the scores on proximity and centrism increase by 1.6 and 1.3 points respectively. This means that the more ideologically radical parties have lower levels of congruence, something which the previous descriptive analysis already pointed to. These results concur with those found in Belchior and Freire’s study (2013) showing that catchall parties generate better levels of congruence than ideological ones, even controlling for the variance of voters (centrism).

Regarding the party coherence, our theoretical expectations suggested that those parties with considerable dispersion regarding ideological definition and therefore projecting an unclear image regarding internal ideological structuring would have a lower level of ideological connection with regard to their voters. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of this variable would indicate this relationship, especially in the proximity model.

On the other hand, regarding the party’s control variables (party age, position in government, size) the analysis shows that they do not have any effect on the indicators of congruence. The party’s electoral experience stands out as an aspect linked to the degree of structuring of links with the electorate, given that it makes it easier to identify the ideological approaches of a party. However, the data do not confirm the hypothesis; the age of the party is not statistically related to proximity or centrism. Consequently, being an organization with more or less experience, or more or less electoral weight, does not condition the degree of closeness to voters and will not affect the representation of its ideological position. Regarding the position in government or opposition, the analyses show that the party’s position in government does not impact the scores of proximity or centrism. Finally, contrary to our expectations, the size of the party does not seem to influence the congruence levels in the baseline model.

The last two models of figure 3 seek to explore which elements of the party system, as well as the party features, are related to proximity and centrom scores. The first difference with the previous models is that the coherence of the parties is no longer statistically significant, whereas the size of the parties is a relevant variable in both indicators. The sign of the coefficient shows that large parties are the ones that generate the most congruence. As can be observed, one of the systemic variables included – the effective number of parties (ENP) – has a significant impact on ideological links. The negative coefficient of the ENP would indicate a reduction of 1.25 points in the levels of proximity and 0.47 in centrism, as the number of competitors in the system increases, keeping the other variables constant. This confirms the hypothesis that the greater the ENP, the greater the ideological connection with voters, that is to say a greater number of parties favours the closeness of interests. On the other hand, legislative volatility does not have any impact on legislative congruence.
Explaining presidential ideological congruence

In order to find out what factors explain the degree of ideological congruence between voters and presidential candidates in different countries of Latin America, three variables related to each one of the candidates have been taken into account. Firstly, we have considered whether he or she has party links. Presidential candidates try to present themselves as actors who are sensitive to citizens’ preferences, or the way in which problems are identified and alternatives or solutions are presented. When a candidate has had a significant career in a party, occupying relevant positions of representation or organization, the voter has reference points to understand the candidate’s ideological position and therefore the efforts of seeking this information in these cases disappear. Consequently, greater ideological congruence is expected when candidates have party ties than when they do not.

Related to this variable, we have included the type of leadership of the candidate, particularly if he or she could be identified as an outsider. Presidential systems have special characteristics which mean that elections become particularly relevant and allow what Linz (1994) called one of the pathologies of presidentialism: the reinforcement of the uni-personal nature of the role, offering access to candidates who have not had a prior party career and who tend to be known as ‘outsiders’ (Carreras, 2013). These outsider politicians are characterized as people who lack parliamentary experience of prior posts of representation, and who carry out their campaign on the edge of the existing party system. Voters of outsider candidates have no reason to maintain ideological congruence with the candidates for whom they vote; generally, other factors (personality, leadership, charisma, etc.) dominate the decision-making process. On the other hand, also in relation to the characteristics of presidential candidates, the ideological position has been considered and particularly their degree of radicalism, that is, if he/she is ideologically distant from the country’s ideological centre. The expectation is that those positioned at the ends of the spectrum will have weaker ideological links with their voters.

The systemic variables considered for comparing between countries the level of ideological congruence of presidential candidates are those related to the stability of the party system, as shown in the legislative congruence. First, we have included the effective number of candidates who ran in the first round of the presidential election. The possibility of choosing from a greater number of presidential candidates means that ideological preferences may find a broader range of possibilities, which could improve the congruence with the voted candidate. In this study, the effective number of presidential candidates in the first round has been considered, given that it aims to capture the initial election in which it is more likely for motivations to be conditioned by ideological elements. In the full model we also...
have included the level of total volatility considering the first round of presidential elections. The expectation is that stability in the candidacies makes it easier for the electorate to identify the closest ideological option, generating more congruence.

**Table 2. Variables used to measure the ideological congruence of presidential candidates-voters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party career</td>
<td>Percentage of the vote obtained by the party in the previous election.</td>
<td>Database of the Americas, party webpages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of candidate (outsider)</td>
<td>Classification following Carreras (2013): Insiders (0), Outsiders (1) politicians that do not have a prior political career and compete in elections with a new party. Dissidents or mavericks (0.5), politicians who were political figures in existing parties but who create their own parties. Fans or amateurs (0.25), politicians who are new to politics but compete with traditional parties.</td>
<td>authors’ elaboration from Carreras (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism</td>
<td>Difference between the average ideological position of the candidate according to the party’s deputies (PELA-USAL survey) and the average of the ideological position of citizens (LAPOP survey).</td>
<td>Database of the Americas, parties’ webpages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Volatility</td>
<td>Pedersen (1990) formula for presidential elections.</td>
<td>Own elaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP for presidential candidates</td>
<td>Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula applied to the presidential election.</td>
<td>OIR and authors’ elaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formula of presidential election</td>
<td>Where 0 is relative majority, 0.25 is relative majority with a threshold or double snap, 0.5 is absolute majority, and 1 is second round in Congress.</td>
<td>Crespo et al. (2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration.

Finally, we have included the type of presidential electoral formula as a control variable. The electoral formula varies with regard to how voters’ preferences are aggregated, and this can condition the closeness or distance of the ideological position of the candidate that is finally chosen. Election by relative majority has been adopted by Latin American democracies since Colombia was the first to do so in 1853 (Crespo et. al, 2008). Later on, the electoral laws were reformed, and systems
of absolute majority were incorporated, with or without a second round, and with specific rules on what to do in situations of a draw with no majority. The hypothesis that will be checked is whether in those countries with presidential electoral systems with a more restrictive formula the electorate is obliged to share points of view, generating greater congruence with candidates.

In this case, also the models with variables relating to the candidate are presented first and the full model incorporating systemic factors. The expectation is to find greater ideological congruence among candidates with strong party links, ‘insiders’, or those whose parties have great strength in the legislature and on the contrary a negative relationship between being an outsider candidate and maintaining strong ideological links with electors. The results (Figure 4), however, show that these variables have no effect: being an outsider presidential candidate or having a weak party link does not appear to have an impact on ideological congruence.

Figure 4. Impact of candidate’s variables on presidential congruence

![Diagram showing the impact of candidate's variables on presidential congruence.](source: own elaboration.)
In the same way with party-voters congruence, the most important personal feature of the candidate, bearing in mind these results, is his or her degree of radicalism. In this way, the positioning at the extremes of the ideological spectrum of presidential candidates has a negative effect on ideological links with their voters, increasing the distances with voters in terms of proximity and centristm by approximately 1.7 and 1.5 points, respectively.

More interesting are the Full models that include the systemic variables. As we can see the presidential ENP appear to affect the scores of ideological proximity in a negative way, that is, to improve the congruence: ceteris paribus, the number of presidential candidacies reduces by 0.70 the proximity scores. However, this variable does not have any effect on centristm, which means that the number of candidates does not have an effect on the average representation. For its part, the effect of presidential volatility on proximity (0.09) suggests the relevance for political representation of stability in the party system and particularly in the presidential candidacies. These data show the qualitative relevance (who) versus the quantitative relevance (how many) of the candidates nominated in a presidential election, highlighting the personalistic character of this type of election in the region. Finally, the presidential formula has a partial effect, as is shown in the coefficients of the models of centristm. In this way, the most restrictive formulas signify reductions in the centristm scores; in other words, an increase in congruence of 2.25.

CONCLUSIONS

The essence of representative democracy is associated with the possibility for citizens to elect their representatives. However, the crisis of representation that currently exists in many Latin American democracies is not associated with elections, but with the loss of links between representatives and those represented. When social interests and demands do not correspond to the political interests and decisions of the representatives, we speak of a loss of legitimacy and a crisis of political representation. In presidential regimes, citizens can elect both legislators and presidential candidates. However, analyses that assess the state of political representation have mainly focused on measuring the degree of congruence of interests between voters and legislators and have forgotten the figure of the president as a source of representative legitimacy.

The contribution of this work was to evaluate the state of political representation in Latin America from a general perspective than that of other researchers, since it focuses attention on congruence through different actors that channel citizen demands: legislators and presidential candidates. For this, the degree of ideological congruence between voters and political parties in the legislature and the ideological congruence between voters and presidential candidates is analyzed.
In this article, we have provided a broader view of the crisis of political representation by trying to see if there is a loss of dual legitimacy. First, we have shown in which countries ideological (in)congruence is most relevant in global terms and over time. Second, we have pointed out whether the crisis of representation is associated with a lack of congruence between voters and legislators, between voters and presidential candidates, or both. Finally, we have presented which factors explain the degree of ideological congruence of voters with these two representation's actors. In order to measure the degree of congruence, we have calculated two indicators: proximity and centrim. One of the main advantages is that proximity and centrim take into account the size of the groups and especially their dispersion or internal heterogeneity. In this sense, we have adopted a perspective similar to that of other studies that have highlighted the importance of conceptualizing congruence in relative terms.

The results obtained in the descriptive analysis make it possible to conclude that ideological links in the countries included in this paper are quite varied: there are representatives who have close ideological ties to their voters and others who have no such ties. Thus, the first conclusion of this study is that, in general, in these countries voters tend to have greater levels of congruence with parties they vote for in the legislature than with the presidential candidates they give their vote to, which would make it possible to conclude that different actors reflect different types of representation.

The last part of this article explored which factors promote or inhibit legislative and presidential ideological congruence. Regarding the legislative sphere, the analysis reveals the importance of some party and system characteristics, albeit with differential impacts. Out of all of the variables considered as having a possible impact on the degree of party congruence, radicalism appears as the most statistically significant variable in the models of proximity and centrim. In all countries, parties that move away from the ideological average of the electorate tend to generate worse congruence scores. This effect also shows up in the presidential congruence. The candidate's degree of radicalism is more relevant than their insider/outsider profile or party links: the evidence confirms that extreme candidates represent their constituents poorly. Another interesting result is that party coherence has a positive impact on the ideological links. Those political parties that exhibit a unified and structured ideological image tend to have higher levels of congruence. Moreover, this impact is remarkable in the two calculated congruence indicators.

At the level of the party system, the analysis has shown the importance of the number of parties and candidates promoting congruence. As expected, the greater range of political options improves the representation of citizens. We now realize that this expectation is fulfilled for the party-voter congruence, but also the presidential candidate-voter congruence. On the other hand, the instability of the
system measured in terms of electoral volatility is an element that negatively affects presidential congruence.

These results offer detailed evidence regarding the state of political representation within Latin American systems analyzed, covering the existing void in relation to the presidential sphere. The variety of levels of ideological links between parties and presidential candidates, as well as possible explanations that can be offered in this sense, reflect that voters have differentiated ideas of representation and of the type of links with actors who represent them. However, this analysis also opens up new questions for future research on this area. For instance, do other party and candidate characteristics not considered in this study affect congruence? And why do ideological links between parties and candidates differ across dyads and over time?

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