ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

Diego S. GARROCHO SALCEDO
On passion and desire: confronting an ambiguity in aristotle's ethics

Music and poetry are not part of the rational part of the soul, they go deeper than that. In Greek aesthetics, it plays a very important role. Right from Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle, it has been placed at the centre of catharsis and politics. Despite the difficulty in establishing a precise concept of what music is in either philosophy or cosmology, or even as an aesthetic phenomenon, it is impossible to do without it if we want to understand Greek philosophy.

Stephaan BLANCKE
Are emotions reliable guide for policy making? An evolutionary approach

Technology has become all-important in modern society. For each application, it is crucial for society to have a good understanding of the risks and benefits involved. However, experts tend to assess the risks very differently than the public. One of the main reasons is that experts tend to rely on an objective analysis of the facts, whereas lay people's judgment is also based on other factors, including emotional responses. The question remains however whether that is a good thing. Some argue that emotions lead to biases and should be treated with great suspicion; others claim that the laypeople's approach to risk is much richer and should also be taken into consideration. In this paper, I explore how

we can answer that important question from an evolutionary perspective. First, I briefly outline the role of emotions in judgment and decision making. Next, I discuss two approaches that have defended the rationality of emotions: Roeser's concept of emotions as trustworthy indicators of moral risks and Kahan's cultural evaluator theory. Subsequently, I briefly discuss the evolution of emotions and their impact on risk assessment. I conclude from that account that emotions are not trustworthy guides for policy making.

Gottfried SCHWEIGER
Humiliation and justice for children living in poverty
Azafea. Rev. filos. 16, 2014, 57-72

As a matter of justice children are entitled to many different things. In this paper we will argue that one of these things is positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem), and that this implies that they must not be humiliated. This allows us to criticize poverty as unjust and to conclude that it should be alleviated. We will defend this claim in three steps: (1) we will introduce and examine three types of positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) and argue that children are entitled to all of these; (2) we will move on to examine the concept of humiliation and argue that acts of humiliating are unjust even if the victims do not experience them as humiliating; (3) finally, we will provide five arguments as to why it is humiliating for children to live in poverty. The five arguments presented in the last section are: (a) poverty is connected to other forms of injustice; (b) poverty is undeserved and represents an arbitrary feature of affected children for which they cannot be held responsible; (c) poverty is widespread among children; (d) poverty is imposed on children because they are part of a larger social group; (e) poverty is an enduring humiliation and not just an occasional incident.

Alba MONTES SÁNCHEZ
Shame, recognition and love in Shakespeare's *King Lear*
Azafea. Rev. filos. 16, 2014, 73-93

In this paper, I explore the experience of shame and its connections to recognition and love as manifested in Shakespeare's *King Lear*. My main focus in

this paper is the ethical relevance of shame. I start from Sartre's account of shame in *Being and Nothingness*, and I consider Webber's attempt to reformulate it in terms of bad faith. I reject this and propose a way to rethink shame through a study of the workings of recognition in *King Lear*, following Stanley Cavell's reading of this tragedy. I claim that the experience of shame has a relational structure, which makes it a crucial part of our ethical sensibility. My analysis of *King Lear* brings out this structure and underlines the ethical significance of shame at this structural level, by highlighting its connection to recognition and love.

Juan FERNANDO SELLÉS
The agent intellect Iosepho de Aguilera Salmanticensis (s. XVIII)
Azafea. Rev. filos. 16, 2014, 97-109

Joseph of Aguilera defends some tomist thesis respect of the agent intellect: it is a *potency* of the soul; it is really different from the possible intellect; it forms the species. But he defends other that are own and peculiar thesis: his operation is not immanent; it is a divine motion; it can depend on the will. It defends also others affirmations which are typical of his epoch: it needs of the *phantasmata* to form the species; it is not cognitive.

Christian BENAVIDES
The Being in Thomas Aquinas and Hegel from Cornelio Fabro's perspective
Azafea. Rev. filos. 16, 2014, 111-131

The names of Thomas Aquinas and Hegel have a prominent place in history of philosophy. Their metaphysical conceptions rise as two large buildings that summarize the whole culture and thought of an Era. Cornelio Fabro considers that they both have two clearly defined speculative positions which deserve special confrontation with regard to the central problem of Metaphysics: the problem of the being. The present paper aims to show the innovative interpretation of these two great authors made by the Italian philosopher, in order to revalue his exegesis and speculative reflection.

"Problem-solving" as a criterion of scientific progress defended by Thomas S. Kuhn and Larry Laudan, respectively, has been criticized by several authors. Recently, Alexander Bird (2007, 2008 & 2010) has suggested that problem-solving as a criterion of scientific progress is regressive and anti-intuitive. In this text I reassess Kuhn, Laudan and Bird's positions and I show that Bird's arguments are untenable.