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## ANALYTIC SUMMARY

Paul F. SNOWDON

McDowell on Skepticism, Disjunctivism, and Transcendental Arguments

Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 23-48

McDowell's disjunctive account of perceptual knowledge contains a novel addition to his interesting response to skepticism by placing within it a transcendental argument. It is not clear that such addition strengthens it. McDowell's disjunctivism seems to involve both epistemological and experience-theoretical commitments. It is a two-sided structure, from which it could be raised questions about the assumed relation between the two sides. The purpose of this paper is to make some progress with evaluating McDowell's contribution to the discussion on perceptual knowledge and illuminate more general aspects of the debate about disjunctivism.

Sandra PINARDI

Visibility, Invisibility and Expression: Reflections about the «Ontology of Feeling»

proposed by Merleau-Ponty

Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 49-65

The purpose of this paper is to question and reflect about the «ontology of feeling» (or «intraontology») proposed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, especially regarding his notion of *flesh*. In this respect this text intends to establish that Merleau-Ponty's notion of *flesh* is a radical attempt to disarm the autonomous notions of subject elaborated both by modern philosophy as by phenomenology, proposing instead a «passive» notion of subject which is based in an ontologic primacy of sensitivity: in a *Sensible in itself (flesh)* which he understands as «native presence» and as «the background from which all sense of donation can be considered». It also pretends to demonstrate how this «ontology of feeling» gives place both to «a horizon of invisibility» which underlies all representations, as well as to a corporal, expressive, gestural, and creative idea of language (that has its model in the languages of art, especially in literature and visual arts).

Lambert WIESING

From *Conditions of Possibility* to *Consequences of Reality*. On Phenomenology of perception

Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 67-78

In the recent history of the philosophy of perception can be seen noteworthy consensus. The interpretative or constructivist paradigm dominates for more than 200 years the philosophical and no philosophical thinking about perception. However, difficulties arise in describing the consequences of the reality of perception without falling into dubious assumptions involved in the subject primacy analysis. Given this it seems to be plausible to turn the analysis to the primacy of perception as basis of the subject's dependence on the reality.

María del Carmen PAREDES MARTÍN

Perception and Attention. A Phenomenological Approximation

Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 79-92

Husserl's analyses of perception in *Logical Investigations* and the lectures on *Ding und Raum* and *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit* contain the basic theses for later phenomenological developments and point out the importance of description of everyday's perceiving. In his phenomenology, Husserl distinguishes *what* we perceive and *how* we perceive. The primary object of perception is a particular thing, which stands before us *in propria persona*. This means that perception is not limited to sensory qualities, but grasps the object as a whole. Husserl's objects of perception include particulars and state of affairs, as well as subjects in motion and dynamic objects. In connection with this, attention is approached in a similar line of thought, insisting on the claim that it allows us to grasp the moments, features and determinations of things. Moreover, Husserl's discussion of attention in the *Investigations* stresses its phenomenological status in contrast with classical empiricistic theories of abstraction.

Jorge Alfonso CHÁVEZ GALLO

On the Nietzschean Thesis of the Will of Power as Thesis about the essentiality of the Real

Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 93-106

By means of the thesis of will of power Nietzsche intends to establish the possibility to understand the «material world» as a «previous form of life». According to this, there's no point to suppose the existence of two different worlds (mental and material) and the way to explain that what occur in the physical world is not essentially different of the way to explain the actions of living creatures. According to this thesis would not have another reality (Realität) than that of the affections and passions («our world of appetites and passions» as the only thing that is «given»), so that the matter would be but a previous form of the concrete reality. In aphorism 36 of *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche concludes that the «world seen from within, the world defined and designated in its 'intelligible character', would be fully 'will to power' and nothing more». On the basis of this assumption is the distinction between active and reactive forces, which indicates the primacy of the former over the latter. According to Nietzsche the phenomenon of life might not even be thought not aware that primacy.

Gustavo SARMIENTO

Some Reflections on Method, Immanence and Evidence in Modern Philosophy

Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 107-122

In this paper a critique of the perspective of consciousness æcharacteristic of modern philosophyæ is proposed: Beginning with a mistaken interpretation of the method of mathematics, Descartes and modern philosophy came to think that philosophical knowledge is based on the evidence of a principle, the certainty of the ego, what is evident to that ego and what follows from this. Elaborating on this initial error, the modern doctrine of sensory perception reduces all immediacy of the things given to man to the immediacy of what is given to sensory perception, denying that there may be another immediacy, that of the absence of representations in man's relationship to things, among which he would exist. There are solely the ego, reduced to consciousness, and representations. Immediate knowledge of the things themselves is refused, leading to the doctrine of the immanence of consciousness.

Luciano ESPINOSA RUBIO

Social Perception of the Environment: dangerous dissociations  
Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 123-144

Human beings have taken wrong decisions about their own survival many times along the history and, in the middle of a very dangerous ecological crisis, it is urgent to analyse the causes and consequences of that fact. On the other hand, environmental questions are civilization ones today and the key is a changing in our way of life. But first of all it is necessary to have a right social perception of the problems in order to evaluate them and to prepare the action.

Deyvis Deniz MACHÍN

Hierocles and the genesis of self-awareness  
Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 145-164

Through the appropriation concept (οικείωσις) stoicism achieved to work out a notion of consciousness or self-awareness (συνείδησις/συναίσθησις) certainly not yet present at the classic period. Both concepts have their roots in *onto-epistemic* considerations, which have in the perception (αἴσθησις) or, exactly speaking, in the *aesthetic* faculty (αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις), its genesis as well as its permanent and reciprocal articulation. In this regard, Hierocles, stoic philosopher who probably lived in the second century a. D., in his work *Elementa Moralia* (PBer. Inv. 9780v) with all sorts of details sets forth how, beginning from which moment, and under which circumstances all animals, as soon as they are born, have continual and uninterrupted self-awareness or at least a sense of themselves. Consequently, in order to shape a notion of self-awareness which has its genesis and its articulation by virtue of the *aesthetic* faculty, in other words, its development depends on it, Hierocles made use of συναίσθησις rather than the traditional term συνείδησις. His concern, therefore, is to highlight that the *percipient* as soon as it perceives something, simultaneously *co*-perceives itself along with the perceptible object and from here on by itself establishes the corporeal-spatial boundaries of its own constitution.

Javier AOIZ  
The Evidence in Ancient Philosophy  
Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 165-179

*Enargeia* became a technical term –to which Cicero coined the neologism *evidentia* for its translation– in the Hellenistic Epistemology, so it seems, beginning from Epicurus. In his analysis of the perceptive evidence he developed a relevant reformulation of the nature of perceiving and the Aristotelian typology of *sensibilia* which bases the truth of perception on the autonomy and opacity of each one of the senses in relation to the rest of the senses and other faculties such as memory or reason. Sextus Empiricus objected to this type of approach that every perceptive act entails synthesis, in which memory or reason get involved, and requires the affection (*pathos*), which comes between perception and object, and makes the perceptive evidence another case of inference through signs. The basic reflexivity mode which was designated as *synaisthesis* in Late Antiquity seems to have been put forward against the second objection of Sextus Empiricus.

Jaime LLORENTE  
Cabins in the Desert of the Neuter: Critic of Levinas' Rejection to Heidegger's  
Concept of «Dwelling»  
Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 183-205

The aim of the present article is to show the contradictions and internal paradoxes contained in the polemical position assumed by Levinas in reference to Heidegger's apology of «listening of Being» as an event that favors human dwelling. In opposition to the stances held by both thinkers, we try to indicate how the opening to the neutral Being (identified by Levinas with a pagan ontological perspective) constitutes precisely the authentic dissolution of «neopagan» natural rootedness defended by Heidegger's ontology.

Josefa ROS VELASCO

Hans Blumenberg: metaphorology and anthropology  
Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 207-231

The concepts of metaphorology and anthropology appear together as the title of the following article to let the reader know that they are going to be analyzed: the existing relationships between them; the lines that lead from the blumenbergian metaphorology to the anthropological thesis, which, according to human survival, legitimizes and estimates the project's metaphorological works. Based on the underlying discussion about the eternity or the contingency of the abstract questions that the human being asks himself, we are going to argue how to relate the necessity of metaphoric answers to these questions to the anthropogenetic function of human selfpreservation. Regarding this point, we will bring up the blumenbergian critique to the freudian drive death, which ultimately releases itself from its philosophical anthropology.

M.<sup>a</sup> Idoya ZORROZA

The natural human domain on things in Alfonso de Madrigal  
Azafea. Rev. filos. 14, 2012, 233-252

This paper deals with the theory of human dominion over the things what we can find in the fifteenth century Salamanca's Professor Alfonso de Madrigal, «el Tostado». Madrigal is the mainly author of a renewal at the University of Salamanca, called «humanist». In his comments on *Genesis* and *Chronicles*, Madrigal has a theory of the problem of *dominion*, asking how can be human being owner, the relationship and subordination of the domain to the full and primary domain –what it is in God, the governor of creation–, the question of positivity and naturality or human appropriation, the incardination of dominion in the intelligence and prudence, with which man can give a new order to reality and he can submitted things by divine donation and grant.