THE ROLE OF THE ROMAN NAVY IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: THE STRATEGIC CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN*

El papel de la armada romana en la segunda guerra púnica: el control estratégico del Mediterráneo

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RESUMEN: A pesar de la inmensa cantidad de investigación moderna referente a la Segunda Guerra Púnica, el papel que la armada romana jugó ha sido en gran parte ignorado. En su lugar, casi todos los estudios se concentran en gran escala en los compromisos de la infantería, destacando el general cartagines Aníbal frente a los líderes de la república. Este estudio pretende abordar esta laguna resaltando el papel de la armada en la victoria a largo plazo sobre los cartagineses. Un análisis de los antiguos barcos y las estrategias de la contienda revelan que había muchas limitaciones, las cuales obstaculizaron la capacidad de la flota a partir de la línea costera, carente de ciudades amistosas portuarias. Debido a una combinación de la geografía, estrategias y sucesos bélicos Roma pudo explotar estas limitaciones frente a los cartagineses. La trascendencia de los esfuerzos de la armada fue un significante hecho en la victoria romana.

* The term “Roman navy” has been used as a convenient shorthand for “Roman armed naval forces”. All dates are BCE unless otherwise noted.

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ABSTRACT: Despite the vast amount of modern research concerning the Second Punic War, the role in which Roman fleets played has been largely ignored. Instead, nearly all studies focus on the large-scale infantry engagements featuring Hannibal the Carthaginian general versus the leaders of the Roman Republic. This study aims to address this lacuna by highlighting the Roman navy’s role in the long-term victory over Carthage. An analysis of ancient ships and warfare strategies reveals that there were many limitations which hindered the ability of a fleet from operating along coastlines lacking friendly port cities. Due to a combination of geography, strategy, and success in battle Rome was consistently able to exploit these limitations at Carthaginian expense. The implication being that the efforts of naval forces were a significant factor in the eventual Roman victory.

Keywords: Roman Navy; Second Punic War; Military Strategy.

1. **Introduction**

Never without an enemy actually at the gates had there been such terror and confusion in the city [...] two consular armies annihilated, both consuls’ dead, Rome left without a force in the field, without a commander, without a single soldier.

Livy’s description of the aftermath of Cannae gives a good insight into later Roman psyche concerning the Second Punic War. The focus of the war was always Hannibal, who through his audacity and generalship nearly overwhelmed Rome on its own doorstep. This Hannibal centred assessment is to some degree justified, but as a result, much of the action in the greater Mediterranean has been left in Hannibal’s shadow. Nowhere is this oversight more apparent than in the actions of Rome’s navy during the war. Even in modern scholarship, the activities of Roman fleets are still seen as more of a sideshow and supplement to the real action of large scale infantry engagements. While the Second Punic war did lack the large and notorious naval engagements which characterised the First Punic War, its role in the long-term victory of Rome was just as important. The following inquiry will examine the nature of ancient naval warfare and the individual naval activities in each theatre of war. From this analysis, it will

1. Livy, 22.54.9.
be suggested that through the protection of its territorial coasts, shipping lines, and success in battle, the Roman navy made a significant contribution to Rome's long-term success in the Second Punic War.

2. The State of the Question

There have been remarkably few works examining the Second Punic War from a naval perspective. The only major study remains Thiel's 1946 *Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times*, which dedicates a substantial amount of material to the Second Punic War. While a helpful guide to the Roman navy's activities during the period, the work is at times dated in its analysis, notably regarding the motivations of both navies as well as in its overall idea of a weak Carthaginian navy versus the "landlubberish nature" of the Romans. As a result, Thiel largely underestimates the importance of the navy on both sides during the war, and in the words of Rankov, "is somewhat apologetic" in his analysis. However, despite the age of Thiel's work and sometimes inadequate conclusions, the area has remained largely ignored. As a consequence, since Thiel, few authors have devoted any significant attention to the subject. The first being Rankov, whose 1996 article briefly examined naval strategy in the war based on the functions and limitations of ancient warships. While offering useful counterpoints to Thiel's arguments, the brevity of the article and its limited subject material can only, in Rankov's words himself, "draw some general conclusions", and leaves a more thorough analysis to be desired. Likewise, Rey da Silva's 2012 article focuses on the historical development of both navies and the types of warships used, but only briefly mentions the events of the war itself.

The third scholar to have discussed the topic in depth is Steinby, who has published two works concerning the Roman navy during the Second

3. Thiel, 1946, 32-199. Although largely ignored in modern scholarship, Rodgers 1937 work *Greek and Roman Naval Warfare: A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from Salamis (480 B.C.) to Actium (31 B.C.)* discusses Rome's naval involvement in the war and offers a more persuasive argument than Thiel. Rodgers, however, does not cite any of his statements and frequently presents his own opinions as historical fact. By modern standards, Rodgers' work would not be considered academic, see: Rodgers, 1937, 308-376.

4. For his overall conclusion of the Romans being inherent "landlubbers" and Carthage being "such a miserable figure at sea" against Rome, see: Thiel, 1946, 186-193.

5. Rankov (1996, 49) describes Thiel as constantly excusing the lack of energy in naval warfare during the war.

6. The conclusions themselves are largely strategic, see: Rankov, 1996, 56.

Punic War. The first, published in 2004 and reprinted in 2007, takes the form of a naval case study, and argues against many of Thiel’s findings and for a greater importance of Rome’s naval operations as a factor in winning the war. The second, published in 2014, acts as a chronological history of naval events from the 6th century down to the destruction of Carthage in 146. In both works, Steinby is at times able to effectively point out that Thiel’s interpretation of the Romans as landlubbers is oversimplified, and that the Roman navy played more of an important role than has been given credit. Her analysis, however, suffers from many methodological flaws and her arguments are often speculative, rather than being supported by primary source evidence. In the words of Dart, «there is a tendency to infer a great deal from even relatively slender evidence and, as discussed above, some of the conclusions in these sections are not very convincing». As a result of these speculative inferences, Steinby often finds herself arguing directly against Polybius and Livy without having counter evidence to back her claims. This is most apparent in her analysis of Pre-Punic War Rome and pervades throughout both works. Essentially, in an effort to showcase the importance of naval activities, Steinby has done a complete reverse in relation to Thiel, and greatly overestimates the role and capabilities of both sides during the Second Punic War. The overall scarcity of scholarship and the problems with these few existing works warrant a more balanced analysis of the importance of Rome’s navy in the Second Punic War.

3. Naval Warfare and Historical Background

To understand the actions of the Roman navy during the war it is first necessary to understand how naval warfare itself was conducted during antiquity. Beginning with the ships themselves, warships on both the

8. STEINBY, 2004, 77-114. The reprinted version of 2007 is included as a chapter in a larger work on the Roman navy. Due to its expanded subject material as well as convenience, the latter will be referenced henceforth, see: STEINBY 2007, 105-42.

9. STEINBY (2014, 2) states that «this book concentrates on the fleets and warfare at sea and the role the fleets played in the Punic Wars». Because of this scope, the book functions as more of a chronological history and does not contain as much analysis as the previous work.


11. According to DART (2009, 31), «Many will probably be inclined to side with the more conservative interpretation of early Roman naval endeavours suggested by Thiel, but the Roman Republican Navy does provide an interesting counterpoint to his work». 
Carthaginian and Roman side relied on oar powered vessels. This meant that ships required a large amount of manpower to move even short distances. In practice, this amounted to a large number of men packed into a ship with little room for supplies such as food, water, or supplementary arms\(^{12}\). For example, the main ship type used by both sides during the war, the quinquereme, has been estimated at 51.5 meters long with a crew of 364 men, of which around 300 were dedicated to rowing\(^{13}\). Consequently, space was incredibly limited and oarsmen sat nearly on top of one another with no room for leaving one’s position even when not rowing\(^{14}\). As a result of these uncomfortable, strenuous, and presumably unsanitary conditions, warships did not travel in the open sea or row overnight unless necessary. Instead, they chose to hug the coastlines of the Mediterranean to regularly stop at friendly ports or inlets for food, water, and sleep\(^{15}\).

This method essentially means that a fleet needed to always be somewhat close to a friendly port, or else run the risk of a lack of necessary rest and supplies. This also makes travelling long distances or within enemy territory a very dangerous endeavour. A fleet traveling a long distance along hostile coastline may have to go multiple days with little food and no rest. As ships tended to sail along the same coastal routes, a fleet in unfriendly territory also ran the risk of accidentally running into the enemy along its route\(^{16}\). For example, in Livy’s account he mentions multiple occasions where the Roman fleet just so happens to come across a Carthaginian fleet resulting in an impromptu battle\(^{17}\). For an exhausted fleet caught out in enemy waters this would surely spell disaster. This danger would have been even more so for transport vessels bringing supplies to armies abroad, as they lacked the ability to defend themselves if

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13. Pitassi, 2011, 100. Rey da Silva (2012, 50) gives a somewhat more conservative estimate for Carthaginian quinqueremes with around 280 rowers and 20 deck crew. Rey da Silva, however, does not incorporate marines in his estimate. In a battle of the 1st Punic War Polybius states that the Roman quinqueremes contained 300 rowers/crew and 120 marines, or 420 men total, see: Polyb., 1.26.7.
14. Rankov, 1996, 50. Roman warships did have a sail which they would try and use as much as possible to ease the strenuous conditions mentioned above. During battle or emergencies, the sail would be stowed away and the oars used exclusively, see: Casson, 1971, 278-280.
17. Livy, 28.4.5-7 and 23.41.8-9 are good examples. Impromptu battles on the open ocean were often perilous for both sides, see: Martínez Gazquez, 1988, 725-729.
sighted by an enemy fleet. As a result, fleets of warships often accompanied even bigger fleets of transport vessels acting as a sort of bodyguard if they were attacked.

Regarding naval warfare itself, both Rome and Carthage utilised largely the same technology, although Carthage had more expertise and a richer history of naval expedition. In fact, Polybius states that during the First Punic War, the inexperienced Romans actually based their quinqueremes on a shipwrecked Carthaginian model. Although generally acknowledged in modern scholarship, Steinby argues against this idea of an inexperienced First Punic War Roman navy and boldly states that, ‘the Romans were not novices at all’. In her 2014 work she expands upon this idea by stating, ‘during the ninety years before the First Punic War Roman naval operations rapidly increased’. Recently, Harris has gone even further by claiming that Rome ‘was a force to be reckoned with at sea’ as early as the mid 310’s. Both authors are at odds with Polybius, and are not supported by other primary evidence. Firstly, Steinby uses the creation of the *duumviri navales*, two officials responsible for the fleet, in 311 as a sign of a fully fitted trireme based navy by the end of the 4th century. To support this argument, she uses an example from the Pyrrhic War (282-272) in which Appian mentions the Romans sailing along Southern Italy with 10 ‘decked ships’. Harris, mirroring Steinby, also extrapolates Appian’s statement by speculating, ‘perhaps the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy was also defended by a serious naval force’.

18. For example, Livy describes a fleet of 100 transports being escorted by 20 warships to send aid to Scipio in Africa, see: Livy, 30.24.5.
20. Carthage had been the dominant maritime power in the Western Mediterranean since the 6th century, see: Rey da Silva, 2012, 45-47.
23. Steinby (2014, 35-36) bases her argument from Livy’s account of sea raiders attacking Italy in 348. However, in the passage cited, Livy explicitly mentions that the ‘Romans could not fight at sea’. Contrary to the passage, Steinby argues that it is wrong to assume Rome lacked a navy at this time, although she gives no sources or argument for her statement, see Livy, 7.26.13.
25. Steinby, 2014, 39. The passage of Livy only mentions the position’s creation and offers no additional information, see: Livy, 9.30.3.
27. Harris, 2017, 24. Harris acknowledges that his overall argument has been ‘somewhat marred by C. Steinby’, see: Harris, 2017, 15.
Rather than proving the strength of the pre-Punic War Roman fleet, this scant evidence only serves to display its comparative weakness. For example, the office of the *duumuiri navales* was not a regularly elected magistracy and is only known from five instances in Roman history. When first elected in 311, the duumuirs do appear to have been placed in charge of an already existing state-owned Roman fleet. This fleet, however, appears to have been a rudimentary force limited to a total of 20 ships, or 10 per duumuir. Furthermore, these officials seem to have had little authority or duties. Instead, they were limited to fitting out the state fleet, finding a suitable crew, and general support and reconnaissance for the infantry. Contrary to both Steinby and Harris, a state-owned fleet of 20 ships with occasionally elected officials to manage them when necessary is hardly suggestive of a commitment to strong naval prowess. While it can be agreed that Polybius exaggerates the ineptitude of the Romans by stating that they, ‘had not even a single boat’, there is no evidence to suggest they had any sort of naval force navy which could be remotely comparable to the Carthaginians before the First Punic War. Instead, the evidence cited by Steinby and Harris seems to largely support Polybius, that the Romans were originally at a significant naval disadvantage.

From a warfare perspective, the goal of naval combat was to either sink an enemy’s ship or render it unusable by the crew. This was usually done by sailing around an enemy fleet and then ramming them from behind with a specially fitted ram attached to the front of the ship. As a result, the enemy ship would be either too heavily damaged to continue or the ship could be boarded and attacked by marines. As Carthage was an experienced sea power, they took advantage of their well-trained crews and utilised this technique with great effect. Other common methods included breaking the oars off an enemy ship in order to render it unusable or lighting a ship on fire with a variety of catapults and missiles. The Romans, lacking the aforementioned experience and technical skill of the

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28. The first occurring in 311 and the last in 176. For an in-depth discussion on the *duumuiri navales* and their purpose, see Dart, 2012, 1000-1015. Harris (2017, 19) does not acknowledge any scholarly work on the *duumuiri navales* and treats them as a yearly office.
31. Rey da Silva, 2012, 51-52. Underwater archaeological surveys off the Aegadian Islands of Sicily have uncovered 11 examples of bronze warship rams almost certainly associated with the final naval battle of the 1st Punic War, see: Prag, 2014, 727-729.
Carthaginians, instead put most of their efforts into boarding the enemy vessel. This was achieved in the First Punic War with the development of the *corvus*, or raven. The *corvus* was essentially a bridge on a swivel with a spike on the end which the Romans would attach to an enemy ship in order to board it\(^34\). Along with the *corvus* the Romans would also add an additional century of 80 marines onto their ships during battle\(^35\). As most of a ship’s crew were non-fighting rowers, this addition of 80 armed soldiers greatly swung battle in the Romans favour by turning it into an almost land battle at sea. With these innovations, the Romans were able to fight on even terms with that of the Carthaginians during the First Punic War despite their inferiority in seamanship\(^36\). According to Polybius,

> even though their naval expertise falls well short of that of the Carthaginians [...] the valour of their troops brings them victory in the end\(^37\).

Although the Romans encountered a steep learning curve, with the loss of multiple fleets to storms and battles against the Carthaginian navy, they were not only able to survive, but eventually come out of the conflict as victors. In the 46-year period from the onset of the First Punic War until the beginning of the second, the Romans were able to greatly improve their abilities at sea. The *corvus*, which could lead to stability issues, was replaced with a more reliable boarding bridge\(^38\). Ship design was improved, and crews would have been more familiar with naval warfare. It is during this period from 264-218 in which the Romans can be said to have first dedicated themselves to becoming a sea power, comparable to, and arguably surpassing Carth\(^39\). In short, through its increased naval expertise and superior boarding ability, Rome had made itself more than a match for the Carthaginians by the Second Punic War. Thiel, citing Carthage’s loss in the First Punic War, goes as far to say that ‘from 241-218, Rome was by far the greatest naval power of the Western Mediterranean’\(^40\).

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34. Polyb., 1.22.3-11.
36. In the words of Dart (2009, 31), ‘This supports Polybius’ argument over that of Steinby’s, that the Romans were able to apply their skills in land combat to naval engagements to give their soldiers an advantage over experienced mariners’.
37. Polyb., 6.52.8.
40. Thiel, 1954, 357. Over the next 2 centuries, Rome’s naval supremacy would be a crucial factor in its eventual dominance over the entire Mediterranean, see: Carro, 2016, 106-109.
Taking all of this into consideration, the most famous event of the war, Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, can be explained as the only option available rather than an audacious gamble. Hannibal had no choice but to march over the Alps as all of the northern Mediterranean was either controlled by Rome or largely Roman friendly. Thus no ports would have been available for Hannibal’s troops to rest and resupply. A direct crossing from Hispania to Italy would have taken multiple days, and as Rome is known to have had at least 220 quinqueremes in service at the onset of the war, they could have intercepted Hannibal’s exhausted fleet as it neared Italy. This meant that Hannibal had to choose between risking his whole force being destroyed on the way to Italy or taking the dangerous Alpine route which would surely deplete forces, but not necessarily destroy them. Therefore, Thiel’s analysis of Hannibal’s crossing as a result of Roman naval superiority can be confirmed to some extent, but not throughout the entire Mediterranean. Instead, it can be said that the now experienced Romans maintained naval superiority within their sphere of the Northern Mediterranean, as the geography prevented Hannibal from taking advantage of a safe port along the way. While still a bold move, Hannibal was simply playing strategy and chose the lesser of two evils when invading Italy.

4. Hispania

Now that the scene has been set regarding naval strategy, it is necessary to take a chronological look at the naval activity in each theatre during the war. This analysis will primarily refer to naval contributions and will omit land activity unless it is correspondingly relevant. Beginning at the onset of the war in 218, the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio (cos. 218) was sent to Tarraco in north-east Hispania with 60 quinqueremes, but left the area under the care of his brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus (cos. 222) as he returned to Italy to combat Hannibal. In opposition, Hannibal had left his brother Hasdrubal in defence of Hispania with 50 quinqueremes and 5 triremes, although manpower limitations only

41. The Romans knew that Hannibal wouldn’t be able to travel by sea, see: Livy, 21.17.8.
42. FRONDA, 2011, 251.
44. THIEL (1946, 36-37) is very general in his descriptions of naval supremacy, and largely does not account for geographic factors.
45. Livy, 21.17.8; Polyb., 3.76.1.
allowed him to equip 32 of the quinqueremes and the triremes\textsuperscript{46}. After a winter of inactivity in Carthago Nova, Hasdrubal managed to reinforce his active fleet to 40 ships, left it under the command of a Hamilcar, who then sailed north along the coast. In response, Gnaeus Scipio sailed south from Tarraco with 35 ships, leading to a confrontation at the mouth of the Ebro River in Northern Hispania\textsuperscript{47}.

The battle itself was unspectacular. In fact, Appian neglects the conflict entirely, stating that ‘Gnaeus did nothing in Hispania worthy of mention before the return of his brother’\textsuperscript{48}. As the Romans approached the Ebro mouth, the Carthaginian fleet embarked to confront them. At the same time, Hasdrubal lined up his infantry forces along the river bank as a backup in case the naval engagement ended poorly. This action, however, only provided the Carthaginian fleet with an easy escape route. As a result, the Romans met the Carthaginians in the river and had a bit of success, which led the Carthaginians to immediately panic and make for the coast and the safety of their infantry. After beaching their ships, the Romans simply followed and towed away 25 of the Carthaginians’ 40 ships\textsuperscript{49}. While not remarkable in terms of casualties, the battle had tremendous long-term repercussions. With the loss of 25 ships, Carthage’s fleet in Hispania was effectively crippled, evidenced by the fact that not a single major naval battle was fought near its shores throughout the remaining 16 years of the war. Livy directly supports this argument by stating, ‘the Romans in one easy battle had made themselves the master of the sea along the whole coast’\textsuperscript{50}.

Following the battle, Carthage’s only remaining major port in Hispania was that of Carthago Nova in the south. The loss of such substantial coastal territory early in the war would not only damage Carthaginian control in Hispania but would also greatly weaken Hannibal’s position in Italy. Hispania was essentially Carthage’s breadbasket in terms of manpower and resources, particularly metals\textsuperscript{51}. The logistical and safety risks of transporting an army from Hispania to Italy by sea were already prohibitive at the onset of the war. Now that Rome controlled most of the coast as well, this made the transport of troops from Hispania a near impossibility. It didn’t matter how many troops and resources Carthage had available, as

\textsuperscript{46} Livy, 21.22.4.  
\textsuperscript{47} Polyb., 3.95.  
\textsuperscript{48} App., Hisp. 3.15.  
\textsuperscript{49} Polyb., 3.96.1-6.  
\textsuperscript{50} Livy, 22.20.3.  
\textsuperscript{51} MACDONALD, 2015, 170-171.
they were now effectively confined within Hispania. The Roman army in Hispania could now focus all their efforts on defeating Carthage on land. Hasdrubal, like his brother, would have to march to Italy if he was to lend Hannibal any aid. As a result, he was stopped on his initial attempt by the combined efforts of the Scipio brothers in 216, and wouldn’t be able to make another attempt until nearly 10 years later.

Carthago Nova, the last bastion of Carthaginian naval hopes in Hispania would eventually fall in 210 to the later famous Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (cos. 205, II 194), son of Publius Scipio. After capturing the city in a single day he managed to seize the remaining Carthaginian ships and add them to his own. After this accomplishment, the war in Hispania from a naval perspective was totally won by the Romans. With no enemy at sea, the Romans could put their ships to better use in other areas of the war. For example, Polybius states that Scipio Africanus broke up most of his fleet and incorporated the best trained seamen into his infantry forces. A few years later he would send over 50 of his ships back to Rome for the protection of Sardinia as they were of no use to him. The loss of Hispania’s coast to the Romans was significant in that it limited all of Carthage’s safe naval havens to that of Africa itself. This meant that anytime the Carthaginian navy moved anywhere in the Mediterranean, they were most likely in enemy territory. Constantly operating in enemy territory would be difficult not only from a supply side, but also meant that through correspondence with its allies, Rome would always have a good idea where Carthaginian fleets were operating at any moment. This made Roman naval movements much safer, while at the same time putting the Carthaginian navy in great jeopardy.

5. Sicily

While the Romans had been the aggressors in Hispania, they were forced on the defence in order to protect their territory of Sicily. Officially under Roman control after the First Punic war, there were still many pro-Carthaginian factions, most notably in the important cities of Syracuse and

52. Livy, 23.27.9.
53. Livy, 27.36.1-4.
54. App., Hisp. 4.23.
55. Polybius states that he added 18 new ships, see: Polyb., 10.17.13. Livy only gives a figure of 8, see: Livy, 26.47.3.
56. Polyb., 10.35.5.
57. Livy, 27.22.
Lilybaeum\textsuperscript{58}. In 218, Carthage made its first attempt at re-establishing control in Lilybaeum. In this naval engagement, Hiero, the King of Syracuse and loyal ally of Rome learned of the attack beforehand. In response, he was able to alert the Roman praetor Marcus Aemilius (\textit{pr. 218}). This warning gave the praetor ample time to prepare his forces, and as a result the outnumbered 20 Roman quinqueremes were able to defeat the force of 35 Carthaginian quinqueremes, capture 7 ships, and take 1,700 prisoners\textsuperscript{59}. Following this battle, Syracuse would remain largely uneventful for the next few years. As long as Rome had their devoted ally Hiero, it seemed that he could control the situation largely on his own. For example, in 216 Livy states that although praetors were assigned to both Sicily and Sardinia, neither area actually required their presence\textsuperscript{60}.

The situation, however, would change drastically with the death of the elderly Hiero in 215. The crown initially passed to the Hiero's teenage grandson Hieronymous who after a short rule of uncertain loyalty was assassinated\textsuperscript{61}. Capitalising on the subsequent confusion, two of Hannibal's envoys named Epicydes and Hippocrates managed to secure the city of Syracuse in the name of Carthage\textsuperscript{62}. With this defection, other Sicilian cities also revolted throwing the question of Sicily's allegiance in doubt\textsuperscript{63}. These uprisings represented a huge blow to Roman naval control in Sicily. Since the onset of the war, Rome had been using the island as a springboard to inflict raids on the African coast\textsuperscript{64}. With the loss of Syracuse, Carthage could now turn the tables and use its port as a base for raids against Italy. Even more concerning was that with a port close to Italy, Carthage now had the ability to send reinforcements to Hannibal and directly threaten the Italian homeland\textsuperscript{65}. Cannae had happened only two years before, and Rome was still fighting an uphill battle. Reinforcements to Hannibal could give him the resources for a finishing blow.

In response, Marcus Claudius Marcellus (cos. 222, II 215, III 214, IV 210, V 208) was dispatched to Sicily and led a siege of the now hostile

\textsuperscript{58.} LAZENBY, 1978, 103.
\textsuperscript{59.} Livy, 21.49-50. Prior to Hiero's death, Syracuse's own naval forces seemed to have acted autonomously in support of Rome. Although an important supplement, they are rarely mentioned in the source material, see: CHAMPION, 2012, 198-199.
\textsuperscript{60.} Livy, 22.25.5.
\textsuperscript{61.} Rosenstein, 2012, 146.
\textsuperscript{62.} MacDONALD, 2015, 154-155.
\textsuperscript{63.} For a full account of the political situation following Hiero's death, see: CHAMPION, 2012, 200-210.
\textsuperscript{64.} For an example, see: Livy, 23.41.8.
\textsuperscript{65.} Rosenstein, 2012, 146.
Syracuse. Marcellus launched a considerable attack on Syracuse by both land and sea including a fleet of 60 quinqueremes\(^{66}\). With these forces, Marcellus attempted to storm the walls by tying his own ships together and creating a ladder and bridge siege engine on top of the connected ships. This siege engine, known as a *Sambuca*, reportedly terrified the citizens, but the famous Syracusan mathematician Archimedes had designed counter-siege engines to protect the city\(^{67}\). These remarkable engines included a variety of catapults and even a claw attached to a crane which could lift ships out of the water. The *Sambuca* itself was destroyed by dropping large stones from one of these crane-like devices\(^{68}\). While these accounts sound quite fanciful and embellished, Marcellus’ seaborne siege was certainly a failure. Instead, Marcellus would have to invest in a protracted two-year long siege in which he gradually took control of Syracuse’s surrounding suburbs\(^{69}\). This failure at sea, however, would only serve to delay the Roman advance rather than prevent it.

In 212, with Marcellus in control of most of the city, the Carthaginians grew desperate and decided to put a massive effort into saving Syracuse. A Carthaginian army under the command of a Himilco marched to the city and the fleet admiral Bomilcar sailed from Africa with a huge fleet of 130 quinqueremes and over 700 transports full of supplies for the remaining pro-Carthaginian forces in the city\(^{70}\). Based on the aforementioned figures of crew needed for a quinquereme, the number of men on the warships alone must have been between 39,000-52,000\(^{71}\). Due to bad weather, however, this force was blown off course to west of Cape Pachynum, the southernmost point of Sicily, with Syracuse on the eastern side\(^{72}\). Marcellus realizing that he, the besieger, was now going to become the besieged, sailed his fleet of 100 ships to the cape to meet the Carthaginians\(^{73}\). Bomilcar had forced a numerically inferior Marcellus to meet him in battle. The Carthaginians held the upper hand. Nevertheless, they refrained from immediately attacking as the wind was favourable to the Romans. Finally, when the wind died down the Carthaginians moved out towards the Romans. As the opposing fleets came close for battle,

\(^{66}\) Plut., *Vit. Marc.* 14.3.  
\(^{67}\) Polyb., 8.5.1-11.  
\(^{68}\) Plut., *Vit. Marc.* 15.3-4.  
\(^{69}\) EDWELL, 2011, 329; For a summary of the siege, see: CHAMPION, 2012, 210-220.  
\(^{70}\) Livy, 25.27.3.  
\(^{71}\) Assuming ships carrying on average somewhere between 300-400 men, see: Polyb., 1.26.7; REY DA SILVA, 2012, 50; PITASSI, 2011, 100.  
\(^{72}\) Livy, 25.27.3.  
\(^{73}\) HOYOS, 2015, 162.
however, Bomilcar either still worried about the weather or simply losing his nerve, panicked and fled towards Italy. Thus without a naval battle even being fought, Rome was once again the undisputed master of Sicilian waters. Sicily would become fully pacified by 210, securing a significant strategic victory for Rome. Without a Sicilian port, Hannibal would remain largely isolated from Carthage, and never had the troops or resources to deliver a finishing blow. Just as important, however, is that Rome still had the means to invade Africa from Sicily, which would eventually lead to Roman victory. Through a combination of Roman daring and Carthaginian incompetence, Rome managed to hold onto Sicily and turn the tide of war in their favour.

6. Sardinia

Events in Sardinia can be seen as a mirror image, albeit on a smaller scale, to Sicily. Like Sicily, Sardinia was very important to Rome as a source of grain. Sardinia had also until recently, been under Carthaginian control and still had pro-Carthaginian remnants. Evidence of this wavering allegiance to Rome is that early in the war, the consul Gnaeus Servilius Geminus (cos. 217) sailed around both Corsica and Sardinia collecting local hostages to ensure loyalty. Despite these efforts Sardinia still experienced revolts siding with Carthage. In 216, Hasdrubal ‘the Bald’ sailed to Sardinia with 60 quinqueremes to assist these revolts. Again, like Sicily these ships were blown off course and had to land at the Balearic Islands east of Hispania. This mishap allowed the Romans time to prepare and when the Carthaginians did finally bring reinforcements, they were swiftly defeated on land. To worsen this failure, on their return to Africa they fell in with the main Roman fleet being led by Titus Otacilius Crassus (pr. 217, II 214) who captured 7 of their ships. After this event Sardinia was largely pacified although it remained an area where the Carthaginian fleet

74. Livy, 25.27.10-12.
75. Livy, 26.40.18.
76. MacDONALD, 2015, 160.
77. THIEL (1946, 85-86) goes as far as to call Bomilcar ‘one of the most inferior admirals Carthage ever possessed’ and a ‘born do-nothing’.
78. For Sardinian grain supplies, see: Livy, 25.20.3. For Sicilian grain, see Livy, 22.37.1-6.
79. Livy, 22.31.1.
80. Livy, 23.34.16 and 23.40-41.
81. Livy, 23.41.8.
managed to find refuge\textsuperscript{82}. In 210 for example, 40 Carthaginian ships successfully raided the island, and Scipio Africanus sent 50 warships from Hispania to protect the coasts as there were rumours of a fleet of 200 ships coming to attack\textsuperscript{83}. These ended up being just rumours, however, and the only other action reported from Sardinia was the capture of 80 transports which may have been trying to reach Hannibal\textsuperscript{84}. Through a combination of Carthaginian failures and Rome’s dedication to its provinces, Rome was able to secure grain supplies throughout the war and reduce attempts at Carthaginian insurrection to minor affairs.

7. Macedonia

Macedonia entered the war quite early on, but due to Roman naval power, they played an insignificant role. In 217, Phillip V King of Macedon, organized the construction of 100 Illyrian style small warships known as \textit{lemboi}\textsuperscript{85}. Polybius makes it explicit that

he needed a fleet and crews — not so much for fighting (he never expected to be capable of taking on the Romans by sea), as for troop transport\textsuperscript{86}.

These ships were launched towards Illyria, a Roman ally, but when the Illyrian king became concerned and contacted Rome, they sent 10 warships from Lilybaeum to confront the Macedonians. Phillip, fearing that these 10 warships were part of a larger fleet, fled back to Macedonia\textsuperscript{87}. For the next two years, Phillip would remain relatively inactive until the aftermath of Cannae when he sent envoys to Hannibal suggesting a pact of friendship between Carthage and Macedonia. These envoys were captured by Roman ships on their way back to Macedonia, and the terms were revealed to the Romans\textsuperscript{88}. Polybius gives the terms of this pact, and while there is nothing explicitly mentioning Phillip invading Italy, Rome certainly feared the possibility\textsuperscript{89}.

\textsuperscript{82} RANKOV, 1996, 53-54.
\textsuperscript{83} Livy, 27.6.13-14 and 27.22.
\textsuperscript{84} For an example of the difficulties involved with shipping supplies or troops to Hannibal in Italy from Africa without a port in-between, see: App., \textit{Hann}. 8.54.
\textsuperscript{85} EDWELL, 2011, 325.
\textsuperscript{86} Polyb., 5.109.1-2.
\textsuperscript{87} Polyb., 5.110.1-11.
\textsuperscript{88} Livy, 23.38.4.
\textsuperscript{89} Polyb., 7.9.1-17.
Now taking the threat of Macedonia seriously, Rome launched a fleet of 30 warships under the command of Marcus Valerius Laevinus (cos. 210) to watch the sea between Brundisium and the Greek coast of Calabria. Phillip did not disappoint and once again set about attacking Roman allies in Illyria. While besieging the river-side city of Apollonia, however, Laevinus arrived and placed his fleet at the river’s mouth to prevent Phillip’s escape by sea. Phillip now had two choices, either place his now fleet of 120 lemboi against Laevinus’ 30 quinqueremes or flee. Phillip chose the latter option, and decided to beach his fleet, burn it, and then marched back to Macedonia, not technically beaten but certainly disgraced. With his fleet destroyed and himself humbled, Phillip would not take any further major naval actions throughout the remainder of the war. Rome’s naval defeat of Macedon without coming to a single blow showcases how powerful Roman naval strength had grown. With just the presence of a fleet in the area of Brundisium, Rome was able to prevent Phillip from giving any help whatsoever to Hannibal throughout the war.

8. Italy

All of Rome’s naval success outside of Italy certainly influenced the war with Hannibal. After Cannae, Hannibal moved south and focused on creating defections among Roman allies. This was no easy task, however, as the Italian allies were not one cohesive unit, but instead differed greatly in terms of culture, language, and local rivalries. For example, the powerful Apulian city of Arpi revolted and joined the Carthaginians in 216, shortly after Cannae. This revolt certainly spurred many small communities to follow the example of Arpi. For many of the other powerful cities in the region such as Canusium and Teanum Apulum, however, this only strengthened their ties with Rome. Arpi’s move to join Carthage would have been seen as an attempt at strengthening their local hegemony at the expense of other Apulian cities. Therefore, Arpi’s defection ended up strengthening the Roman loyalty of other powerful cities in the area.

91. Livy, 24.40.16-17.
92. Rome would also stir the Aetolian League in Greece to declare war on Phillip, diverting his attentions from Italy, see: Rosenstein, 2012, 155-156.
94. Polyb., 3.118.3.
95. Fronda, 2010, 56.
Hannibal’s difficulties in inciting revolts can be seen most clearly in his struggles to secure a meaningful port city. After Cannae, Hannibal reached his peak of success in which Capua, the second most powerful city in Italy, revolted and took his side. Along with Capua, Hannibal made his greatest alliances in southern Italy, most notably with the Bruttians and the Greek cities in the area. According to Fronda,

most of the Bruttians came over to his side rather quickly, perhaps even in the immediate wake of Cannae, and in the course of the following year nearly every Greek city along the coast of Bruttium had also been convinced to defect.

At first glance this would seem like a huge achievement for Hannibal as he now effectively controlled nearly all ports from the heel of Italy to the toe. In reality, however, Hannibal was still at a massive disadvantage. First of all, Tarentum, the major port city in the area, wasn’t captured by Hannibal until 212. Even then, a Roman garrison managed to hold out in the citadel which was, conveniently for Rome, located on the port. Meaning that throughout his occupation of Tarentum, Hannibal never had undisputed access to its port. Even more important was that the port city of Rhegium, which controlled the strait of Messina between Sicily and Italy, remained loyal to Rome throughout the war.

The port cities which Hannibal did obtain, notably Locri and Croton, ended up being only minor help. For example, Hannibal is mentioned to have received just one shipment of reinforcements from Carthage throughout the entirety of the war in 215. These reinforcements came in at Locri and it is worth mentioning that even though Carthage was successful, Rome became aware of the shipment along the way and nearly intercepted it. The main problem with Hannibal’s port cities being on Italy’s southern coast was that Roman-controlled Sicily acted as barrier, meaning that in order to get to Locri or Croton a fleet would have to sail through enemy territory. The city of Syracuse particularly lays on the way to either Locri or Croton and would have been the ideal spot for a Carthaginian fleet to rest and resupply before moving on to Italy. By failing to retake Syracuse in 214-212, however, Carthage was left without an easy way of reaching Hannibal.

96. Livy, 23.4.5-6.
99. Livy, 25.11.11.
100. Fronda, 2010, 178.
101. Livy, 23.41.10.
Steinby suggests that there may have been much more triangular traffic between Carthage, Syracuse, and Hannibal controlled Southern Italy than mentioned in the source material. Citing only Bomilcar’s flight to Tarentum after the failed relief of Syracuse in 211, Steinby states, ‘if there was such traffic, were the Romans able to stop it? Apparently not’. Apart from this initial jump, she goes further by suggesting Bomilcar may have had a double mission involving communication with Hannibal, and that ‘the whole scheme came very close to success’. The exact nature of this proposed scheme, however, Steinby does not clarify. An analysis of the source material and understanding of ancient ship limitations, however, strongly suggests that there was no secret scheme between Hannibal and Bomilcar, or that there was any major traffic between Carthage and Southern Italy.

First of all, since the 19th century, scholarship has recognised that the most obvious reason Bomilcar fled to Tarentum was to blockade the Roman held garrison into submission. This only reinforces the idea of Carthage being desperate to open up a meaningful port in Southern Italy and is contrary to Steinby’s speculation. Furthermore, Livy explicitly states that Bomilcar sent orders to his 700 transports, which he had left in south-western Sicily at Heraclea, to return to Africa before his fleet of warships made a break for Tarentum. If Bomilcar and his 130 warships were at Cape Pachynum near Syracuse, why were his 700 transports left in Heraclea 200 kilometres to the west? The obvious answer is that they were intentionally kept away from the Roman fleet. If Bomilcar had any hope of sending 700 packed transport ships into the harbour of Syracuse, he would have to either outright defeat the Romans or at least confirm that they would not have an opportunity to stop them from entering before taking the risk of sailing his vulnerable transports anywhere near Syracuse. As transport ships typically relied on sail power, they lacked the flexibility of travel possessed by oar powered warships. Therefore, when Bomilcar was confronted by the Roman naval force at Cape Pachynum south of Syracuse and decided to avoid a battle, his only option was to send the transports back to Africa. While Bomilcar’s oar powered war fleet could escape a similarly decked Roman fleet, his fleet of transports, rely-

103. This proposed ‘double mission’ does not seem to come from any source other than Steinby’s own speculation, see: Steinby, 2007, 123.
104. The theory already appears in a biography of Bomilcar from the 1860’s, see: Smith, 1867, 499. Thiel (1946, 85-86) argues the same.
105. Livy, 25.27.12.
ing on the wind, would have had no such ability, and were thus rendered useless\textsuperscript{106}. Instead of suggesting some sort of double mission or scheme, it is much more likely that Bomilcar, realising that he would not be able to retake Syracuse, simply changed plans, dismissed his transports from Heraclea, and made for Tarentum. This example used by Steiny to suggest triangular traffic between Carthage, Syracuse and Southern Italy can, on the contrary, be used to show exactly why it likely did not occur on any significant scale. Instead, the troubles faced by Bomilcar even moving transports and supplies to Syracuse, much less to Italy, only confirms that Hannibal was largely isolated.

There was another large problem which arose due to Hannibal’s only port cities being on Italy’s southern coast. Unlike the Romans, in most cases Hannibal could not force the Italian allies into military service\textsuperscript{107}. While many of these allies would have provided troops to some degree, many actually ended up being more of a detriment rather than a support. For example, in most of the cities Hannibal captured he was forced to leave a garrison of his own troops. These troops would act as a show of force to prevent pro-Roman rebellion, but were also expected to protect the inhabitants when Rome inevitably came to retake their cities\textsuperscript{108}. As Hannibal only had a limited amount of troops, he was forced to stay near his most powerful allies with his army, or run the risk of Rome coming and taking back a city while he was engaged elsewhere\textsuperscript{109}. This was exactly what happened when Rome recaptured both Capua in 211 and Tarentum in 209\textsuperscript{110}. Furthermore, if Hannibal wanted to move northward and focus on cities other than the south, he would have been forced to create long supply lines running from the southern coast towards these northern cities. Not only was Hannibal lacking troops to maintain these supply lines, but they would be easy targets for Roman attacks. In order to move effectively out of the south, therefore, Hannibal needed to have access to port cities on the northwest and northeast coasts of Italy\textsuperscript{111}. These ports could then be used to receive supplies and operate throughout all of Italy rather than being relegated to the south.

\textsuperscript{106} For a discussion on the speed and flexibility of rowing versus sailing ships, see: Casson, 1971, 278-296.
\textsuperscript{107} Rawlings, 2011, 314.
\textsuperscript{108} Zimmerman, 2011, 288.
\textsuperscript{109} Lazenby, 1978, 78.
\textsuperscript{110} For Rome’s retaking of Capua, see: Livy, 26.12.10-14. For Rome’s retaking of Tarentum, see: Plut., Vit. Fab. 22.3.
\textsuperscript{111} Erdkamp, 2011, 75.
Hannibal made attempts at ports on both the east and west coasts of Italy, but all of them resulted in failure. After Cannae, Hannibal tried to capture the powerful west coast city of Neapolis. According to Livy, ‘He was eager to acquire a naval base, to enable his ships to cross safely from Africa’\textsuperscript{112}. Neapolis would have been a much more direct route from Africa itself, but could also have been accessed if Sicilian or Sardinian ventures would have been successful. This was short lived, however, once he learned that it would be too much of an effort. Later in 212, Hannibal turned his attention to Brundisium on the southeast coast, as he believed that it would be betrayed to him\textsuperscript{113}. Brundisium was likely seen as important due to the potential reinforcements from Greece which would be directly available. Like Neapolis, however, this effort also failed and Hannibal never managed to gain access to any port cities other than the few in the far south, which were very difficult for the Carthaginians to reach safely.

Even with the ports of Neapolis and Brundisium, it’s hard to see this making a difference in the long-term outcome of the war. Essentially, Rome’s naval successes outside of Italy prevented Hannibal from receiving support regardless of the ports he achieved in Italy. The protection of Sicily and Sardinia made sending supplies directly from Africa a risky manoeuvre as there was always the chance of running into Roman ships. Phillip V had been neutralised through Roman naval intervention as well as local hostilities, and there is no evidence of him ever sending supplies to Hannibal. Finally, with Rome’s successes on the coast of Hispania, Rome could send reinforcements to Hispania unhindered, whereas potential Carthaginian reinforcements were effectively trapped inland. As a result, Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal would be forced to bring an army over the Alps in 207 to bring aid and reinforcements\textsuperscript{114}. Hasdrubal would never reach his brother, however, as he and his army were annihilated by the Romans along the way\textsuperscript{115}. With Rome’s navy successfully defending its coasts and protecting the majority of its port cities, Hannibal was never able to receive the manpower and supplies necessary to defeat or secure good terms with Rome.

\textsuperscript{112} Livy, 23.15.1.
\textsuperscript{113} Livy, 25.22.14.
\textsuperscript{114} Livy, 27.39.1.
\textsuperscript{115} For an account of the battle, see: Livy, 27.49-50.
9. AFRICA

If not for the successes of Hannibal, the African coast may have been the scene of large scale naval battles reminiscent of the First Punic War. In 218, the consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus (cos. 218) was sent to Sicily with 160 warships with the intention of crossing into Africa\textsuperscript{116}. This mission, however, would be aborted prematurely as Sempronius’ colleague Publius Scipio had his hands full with Hannibal in northern Italy. As a result, Sempronius was recalled to come to Scipio’s aid where he would ultimately be commander during the disastrous Battle of Trebia\textsuperscript{117}. While Hannibal’s intentions are impossible to tell from the source material, it may very well have been that one of his main aims in invading Italy was to keep the Romans away from Africa\textsuperscript{118}. If this was his intention it certainly worked for the most part\textsuperscript{119}. Livy mentions multiple Roman raids of the African coast, largely successful, but they are referenced in passing, without much elaboration. In fact, the first actual battle described in Africa happened in 208 when the war effort had already been turning against Carthage. Although late in the war, these naval battles are the largest in terms of ships involved. The first involving a Roman fleet of 100 warships under the now proconsul Marcus Valerius Laevinus versus that of a Carthaginian fleet of 83 warships. The result being a Roman victory and the capture of 18 Carthaginian ships\textsuperscript{120}. The second battle occurred a year later in 207, also under Laevinus, involving 70 Carthaginian ships and a similar result\textsuperscript{121}. Like previous accounts involving Africa, these battles are described by Livy as raids in which the fleets goal was to sail to Africa, burn and loot the countryside, and then return to Italy. On both occasions, however, a Carthaginian fleet learned of the ravaging and intercepted the Roman fleet leading to impromptu battles.

Contrary to Livy, Steinby argues that these confrontations were not the result of raids at all but were concentrated efforts to find and destroy the Punic navy\textsuperscript{122}. This interpretation, however, is directly at odds with Livy’s

\textsuperscript{116} App., Hisp. 3.14.
\textsuperscript{117} Livy, 21.51.5.
\textsuperscript{118} ZIMMERMAN, 2011, 290.
\textsuperscript{119} For the difficulties in determining motives and the psychology of ancient figures, see: LEVENE, 2010, 164.
\textsuperscript{120} Livy, 27.29.7-8.
\textsuperscript{121} Livy, 28.4.5-7.
\textsuperscript{122} STEINBY (2007, 127) states, ‘When we read Livy, we get the idea that the Roman motive for going to Africa was to pillage the coastal area’. In actuality, it is quite clear from Livy’s description that he is referring to raids, see: Livy, 27.29.7-8, 28.4.5-7.
account. For example, in the battle of 208, Livy describes the Romans as being taken by surprise of the reports of an incoming Carthaginian fleet. Similarly, in 207, the battle only occurs after Laevinus has finished raiding the coast with his ships full of plunder when he unexpectedly encounters an enemy fleet on his return to Sicily. Besides the evidence to the contrary, Steinby’s argument fails when observing the situation from a purely strategic standpoint. Since the disaster at Cannae, Rome had largely been following Quintus Fabius Maximus’ (cos. 233, II 228, III 215, IV 214, V 209) conservative strategy of warfare. In 208 the war had certainly begun to turn in Rome’s favour, but Carthage was still far from defeated. Taking this into consideration, would Rome risk sailing into Carthaginian territory for the purpose of a large naval battle? Rome already had the advantage of sailing to Africa quite easily from Lilybaeum as they had been throughout the war. Defeating the Carthaginian fleet in African waters would have changed little strategically. A Roman defeat, however, could have spelled complete disaster as it would have left Sicily and possibly Italy with weakened naval defences on its coasts. Steinby’s suggestion of Roman naval attempts to crush the Punic navy in its own waters is not only directly contrary to Livy, but would have been all risk and no reward operations. Instead, Livy’s accounts of raids on the African coast make much more sense from a strategic perspective. These raids would force the Carthaginians to divert forces and resources to defend their coasts, while posing much less risk to the Romans.

From Livy’s descriptions of these raids, it can be concluded that like the rest of the Mediterranean, Rome held an advantage even in the Carthaginian’s own waters. The main reason being the geography of Africa itself. Due to the wide expanse of the North African coast, a Roman fleet could sail out from Sicily and attack a variety of port cities. This can be observed in the raid turned impromptu battles of 208 and 207, with Rome first raiding the coast of Clupea and the next year raiding the coast around Utica. The Carthaginian fleet simply didn’t have the ability to stretch itself enough to protect the entire coastline of their North African territory. Whereas the Romans could be quite sure where a Carthaginian

123. For example, even major offensives such as the retaking of Syracuse were largely a response to Carthaginian initiatives, see Sicily section above.
124. The first raid turned impromptu battle occurred before the significant defeat of Hasdrubal in 207, see: Livy, 27.49-50.
125. Livy mentions the only Carthaginian victory of any significant size at sea involving the capture of 60 transports. This battle, however, occurred in the last year of the war when Carthage was already on the brink of defeat, see: Livy, 50.10.8-21.
fleet would attack say in Sicily, Carthage would have to guess as nearly all of their most important cities lay on the coast\textsuperscript{127}. Furthermore, without any holdings outside of Africa, Carthage would have no way of knowing when Roman fleets were approaching or operating in their territory, unlike Rome with Sicily and Sardinia. Instead, they would be forced to wait for a Roman fleet to attack, learn of its whereabouts, and then attempt to intercept the fleet before it returned to Italy or Sicily. This can be seen clearly in the crossing of Scipio Africanus in 204, in which no Carthaginian resistance of any sort is mentioned\textsuperscript{128}. The geography of the African coast was simply not advantageous in mounting naval defence, with the result being largely unrestrained Roman raids and eventual victory. While not a major theatre early in the war, it would ultimately be the scene of the final defeat of Carthage at Zama.

10. Conclusions

Naval warfare during the time of the Second Punic War had many limitations which played a large part in the final outcome of the war. Ancient ships used labour intensive oar power and didn’t have much room for supplies meaning that friendly ports were necessary for fleets to be active for an extended time. As Rome was able to take control of the coast of Hispania, they made it very difficult for reinforcements to move by sea due to a lack of friendly ports outside of Africa. This was made even more difficult by Rome’s continual protection of the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia, which hindered Carthage from raiding Italy or sending reinforcements to Hannibal. Conversely, there was nothing stopping Roman ships from freely raiding Africa and, eventually, transporting the army to win the war. The Macedonian threat was also neutralised through Rome’s simultaneous defence of the Italian coast and attack on Phillip V’s forces in Greece. Essentially, Rome maintained and improved its abilities to ship troops and supplies throughout the Mediterranean, while Carthage simultaneously lost this ability. The longer the war went on, the more the lack of Carthaginian reinforcements would be felt, greatly weakening Hannibal in Italy. As a result of this long-term strategy, Hannibal was reduced to relative inactivity in the later years of the war, until he was forced to leave Italy to defend his homeland, leading to his eventual defeat at Zama.

\textsuperscript{127} The obvious choices described above as Lilybaeum and Syracuse.

\textsuperscript{128} Livy, 29.27.13.
11. Bibliography


