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THE MELANCHOLIC AND THE CHOLERIC: TWO KIND OF EMOTIONAL INTELLECTUALITY

El melancólico y el colérico: dos tipos de intelectualidad moral

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we will conduct a reformulation of the means of emotional representation in intellectuals according to the principles of cognitivism, searching for the existence of an emotional archetype distinct from the classical *melancholic* and the *choleric*. In both cases, we look to explore the emotions related to the melancholic and choleric temperament and propose a link between multiple sociological theories of knowledge, before ending with a reinterpretation of the famous metaphor of the bee and the spider as representations of the characteristic features of the choleric and the melancholic intellectual respectively.

Key words: cognition, emotion, intellectual, history of philosophy, pychology of behaviour, sociology.

RESUMEN

En este ensayo realizaremos una reformulación de los medios intelectales de representación emocional en de acuerdo con los principios del cognitivismo, buscando un arquetipo emocional que es diferente de los clásicos *melancólico* y *colérico*. En ambos casos, queremos explorar las emociones que están relacionadas con los temperamentos melancólico y colérico y proponer

un vínculo entre multiples teorías sociológicas del conocimiento y llega a terminar con una reinterpretación de la famosa metáfora de la abeja y de la araña como representaciones de los rasgos característicos del colérico y del melancólico respectivamente.

Palabras clave: cognición, emoción, intelectual, historia de la filosofía, psicología del comportamiento, sociología.

1. Introduction

In recent decades, the study of the history of emotions has been revitalized thanks to a large number of publications that have attempted to analyze the linguistic turn which has set down its roots in the early sixties. And, ultimately, according to the father of logical positivism Alfred Jules Ayer[1] became stifled by its insistence on the connection between knowledge and definition. In researchers' attempts to break free of this relationship, we can trace a return to the "life sciences" that has otherwise neglected to consider the relationship that intellectuals have themselves maintained with emotions as a starting point for their analysis of the discipline in question. Futhermore, in the few studies that have addressed this, including Aristotle's *Problem XXX*, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* by Robert Burton, *Great Men* [*Grösse Manner*] by Wilhelm Ostwald, Jung's *Psychological Types* [*Psychologische Typen*], *The Origin of German Tragic Drama* [*Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*] by Benjamin, *What is a European intellectual?* [*Aufstieg und Fall der Intellektuellen in Europa?*], and *Melancholy and Society* [*Melancholie und Gesellschaft*] by Wolf Lepenies, *Saturn and Melancholy* by Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, and *Montaigne and Melancholy* by Screech, we constantly run up against the deficiencies inherent in the use of the obsolete categories associated with concepts such as temper and humor.

Stemming from Aristotle's reflections on the incipient analogy between genius and temperament in *Problem XXX*, there has emerged a long tradition that associates the *intelligentia* exclusively with a certain melancholic emotional character. Nevertheless, philosophy and psychology now offer new niches for research that allows us to address the history of emotions and the role of the intellectual from a perspective capable of overcoming such reductionism by providing a much-enriched and reliable narrative history of the phenomenon. Henceforth, we will attempt to explicate the conditions that make possible the opening up of a new conceptual terrain that might

1. Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth, and Logic.* London: Gollancz, 1946, p. 35.

facilitate an understanding of the already-existing reciprocity between intellectuals and the emotions that characterize them. This would allow for a fresh perspective from which to address a problem that remains as relevant today as it was in preceding centuries, with the proposal of a new emotional model: the choleric.

In order to approach a "choleric" form of intellectual emotionality - with the intention of avoiding the monism of the traditional connection between intellectuals and melancholy and the implicit humoral immutability that this entails – we will take a cognitive approach, with Alexander Shand, Magda Arnold, Anthony Kenny and Richard Stanley Peters as our main points of reference and complementing the rational elements of their work with a sociocultural component. The postulation to which all of them subscribe in some way lies in the link between emotion and belief based on a relationship of mutual dependence. In this context, we will analyze the key aspects of humoral theory to outline the existence of a new type of intellectual from its precepts and, thus, overcome the limitations of presenting a cognitivist definition not only of the traditional melancholic mood of the intellectual, but also of that put forward in this work: the choleric. In the case of melancholy, we will use the observations of Walter Benjamin to identify the particular belief that lies behind a melancholic state. In the case of the choleric, we limit our study to a very specific spatio-temporal framework in which Deleuze's notion of the fold and the sources of these folds are highly representative.

Once we have established the existence of two emotionalities, we will then examine how melancholy is associated with "creation ex nihilo" and why the same cannot be said with regards to the choleric temperament, the formation of which is tied to a particular transferal of signifiers. We briefly review the properties of each in relation to properties such as mental agility, monomania and omnimania, and intellectual rigour among others. After presenting some illustrative cases of each, this project will culminate with the proposal of a unifying framework that brings together the divergent sociological theories regarding the reality of the intellectual and the emotions they experience in their relationship with the academy. On the one hand, we note that melancholic intellectuals adhere to a form of innovation that excludes any and all academic institutions: they are "outsiders" that live on the borders of cultural ecumene, conditions that turn them into eccentric philosophers who spread their influence through writing rather than through a direct impact on their contemporaries. On the other, we have the cholerics, characterized by a natural competetivness and a boldness that leads to high levels of sociability, whose cultural production takes shape inside institutions that provide individuals on whom they can impose themselves. As a final point, we conclude

our paper with the reinterpretation of a literary metaphor that will serve as a unique synthesis of all that we have discussed along the way. In doing so, not only will we make visible a gap in research into the history of emotions, but will also open a new and unexplored line of inquiry through which to open up a fresh dialogue about the role that emotions play in shaping the intellectual character.

2. Reviewing humoral theory: A non-initiate emotionality at the dawn of the history of the emotions of the genius

> "Au petit matin, le roi François I^{er} quittait le lit de sa maîtresse pour regagner incognito son château. Il passa alors devant une église juste au moment où les cloches sonnaient l'office. Emu, il s'arrêta pour assister à la messe et prier dévotement".
>
> Lucien Febvre

In "L'Histoire des mentalités", thenFrench historian Philippe Ariès transcribed his compatriot Lucien Febvre's story about King Francis I[2]. This is a story which forces us to ask ourselves the following question: Did King Francis act hypocritically? The classical historian, prisoner of the conviction of moral coherence, will think that the sanctuary bell awakens the King's regret for his sin and pushes him to pray for God's forgiveness. The historian of emotions, however, will suspect that the King is not really aware of the contradictions to which he has fallen prey by acting so spontaneously and naïvely, as much in his devotional as in his amorous behaviour. With this reference in mind, we would like to invite readers to start thinking about the ontological character of emotions.

As suggested by D'Holbach in *Système de la nature* in the late-eighteenth century, the historical origins of genius and the study of its related emotions are foreshadowed in mythology[3]. Subsequently, a more plausible explanation was pursued through a dual anthopological-physiological approach, leading to a humoral proto-theory of hydraulic origins. Following Silvia Vegetti[4], it is in Plato that we find the first hints of this proto-theory in an axiomatic

2. Ariès, P. "Historia de las mentalidades", en le goff, J.; revel, R. C., *La Nueva Historia*. Bilbao, Mensajero, 1980, 60-61, and "L'Histoire des mentalités", en, le goff, J., *La Nouvelle Histoire*. Brussels: Complexe, 2006, p. 167.

3. D'Holbach, P. H. T., *Sistema de la Naturaleza*, edition by José Manuel Bermudo, Madrid, Nacional, 1982, p. 386.

4. Vegetti, S., *Historia de las pasiones*, Buenos Aires, Losada, 1998, 69 ff.

biologist who turned emotions into immutable categories based upon the existence of a magma of liquids that could be located inside the human body. This model that would later be taken up without any substantive changes by Greek physician Galen of Pergamum. Thus, classical studies understood the most primal emotions as physical, unshakable, hydraulic and irrational[5].

Both the irrational and biological components were eventually superseded during the Hellenic period, when the emphasis in the understanding of the nature of emotions began to shift towards rational factors deduced from the analysis of emotional discourse. Nonetheless, we can trace this trend all the way from Aristotle to the present, through what is roundly considered to have been a cognitive revolution in the study of emotions[6]. Aristotle noted that an emotion such as anger was caused by the feeling of having been despised defining it from the perspective of the physicist "as the appetite for returning pain for pain"[7] and from that of the naturist "as a boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart"[8]. He even considered that the emotion of fear corresponded to a mental representation of some destructive or painful future evil [9]. His approach was eminently rational as it implied that there is a component which responds to beliefs based on a rational judgment of any emotion. Sextus Empiricus would have agreed with Aristotle on this matter, exclaiming that "there are the unfounded opinions we have about the things [which] cause our confusion, and make us unhappy"[10]. However, away from the Aristotelian schema, in a magisterial essay on Hellenistic philosophy, American philosopher Martha Nussbaum demonstrates how this rational component only took hold over the study of emotions relative to the varying degrees of influence, constitution and competence of the different academies of the period. Thus, for example, the Stoics considered emotions as a certain sort of "belief or judment"[11]. They were not an immutable phenomenon, but rather something susceptible to change.

5. Panksepp, J., "Toward a general psychobiological theory of emotions" en *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences,* 5, 1982, 407-467; Ekman P., *Emotion in the human face*, New York, CUP, 1982; Averill, J. R. "A semantic atlas of emotions concepts", *JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology*, 5, 1975, 330.

6. Fortenbaugh, W. W., *Aristotle on Emotion*, London, Duckworth, 1975, p. 15.

7. Aristotle, *The Major Works*. Pittsburgh, Centaur, 2015, 1; 1987, p. 135.

8. Aristotle, *Ibid.*, p. 135.

9. Aristotle, 1999, 96, 1382a23.

10. Sextus empiricus, translation and edition by R. G. Bury, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Loeb Classical Library, 1987, 439.

11. Nusbaum, M., *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*. Princeton, Oxford, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 85; *La terapia del deseo: teoría y práctica en la ética helenística*, Barcelona, Paidós, 2012, p. 461 ff.

The consideration of emotions in terms of their rational component permeated the borders of the Ancient World, influencing the thought of some of the greatest minds of Modernity. The character perhaps most representative of this phenomenon is Spinoza, who stated that "love is just pleasure with the accompanying idea of an external cause"[12]. Once again we may observe that ideas and beliefs inevitably accompany the emotions.

After the great wave of behaviourism came a rebirth of cognitivism in the form of *Emotion and Personality* (1963) by Czech-American theorist Magda Arnold. Her formulation of the theory of emotions, known as "appraisal theory", mantained that emotions were activated by a previous cognition, possibly unconscious, that could materialize itself in our consciousness through reflection. Emotions, in this sense, would include not only "an appraisal of the situation as being of a certain sort that is harmful or beneficial to the agent"[13], but also "a felt tendency towards or away from an object". These thoughts stem from the English writer and lawyer Alexander Shand's claim that emotions are cognitive attitudes[14] and are subsequently reflected - after Arnold - by Leeper, who states that "emotions are perceptual processes [with a] definite cognitive content"[15] and by Peter who stressed the appreciatory nature that resides in every emotion which cannot be identified without a prior assessment that the experiencing subject conducts about itself[16]. While cognitive psychologists were contributing their own grain of sand toward the creation of a robust theory of emotions by facing up to the premises of the past, sociological theorists were making strides with their own particular focus that would, ultimately, complement the first. If cognitivism had established that emotions were a kind of model for evaluation, or a hermeneutics of the mental states of individuals, sociology noted that this evaluation was itself determined by the socio-cultural context in which it occurred. After Othello, perceptions of emotions such as jealousy began to take shape in the light of a new set of parameters; diseases associated with the emotions of Freud's patients were studied according to Viennese cultural

12. Spinoza, B. *Ethic: Demonstrated in Geometrical Order,* London, Trünmer & Company, 1883, p. 216; *Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico*, Madrid, Trotta, 2005, p. 131.

13. Arnold, 1960 ápud Peters, 1970, *Feelings and Emotions*: *The Loyola Symposium,* Chicago, Academic Press, p. 193.

14. Shand, A. *The Foundations of Character*, London, Macmillan, 1914, p. 178.

15. Leeper, R. W., "The Motivational and Perceptual Properties of Emotions as Indicating their Fundamental Character and Role" en Arnold, M.: *Feelings and Emotions*: *The Loyola Symposium.* Chicago, Academic Press, 1970, 1970, ápud Arnold, 1970, p. 156.

16. Leeper, *Ibídem.*.

patterns whilst the same thing occurred with Bowlby and Winnicott's analysis of emotional life in Britain[17].

The social dimension of emotions, as with the cognitivist perspective, also finds its roots in Modernity with Sir Francis Bacon. Bacon had already noticed that "men in company are more open to affections and impressions than when alone"[18]. Thus, melancholy, for instance, could affect a particular social group at a given moment - as with the German bourgeoisie – whilst leaving the rest of society intact[19]. Similarly, social changes that accompanied the transition from "noblesse d'épée' to 'noblesse de robe" would have an impact not only on the experience of emotions, but also on their understanding and comprehension. In short, research into social contexts and their relationships to the emotions of the past and present have led to the formation of a new science of "emotionology", spearheaded by authors such as Peter Stearns, Professor of History at Harvard University, who addressed "the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, mantains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression"[20]. In sum, the idea that we should take away from this brief summary of Humoral Theory is that the complexity of emotion lies is in its multi-faceted cognitive, sociocultural and biological constitution. Therefore, the keys to an accurate interpretation of emotions lie in the evaluation of each of these parts in relation to the whole. However, in this paper, as warned at the beginning, we do not address them all. Instead, we limit ourselves to signposting some areas that still require examination, with an emphasis on the cognitive and sociological aspects in order that we may use them to address the very nature of intellectual emotionality.

3. Intellectual emotionality

A hermeneutics which is capable of forming a holistic theory of emotions, should be able to overcome the descriptive and systematic gap in the analysis

17. nussbaum, m., *Paisajes del pensamiento: la inteligencia de lasemociones*, Barcelona, Paidós, 2008, p. 171.

18. Bloom, H, *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, xxxvi; *La ansiedad de la influencia. Una teoría de la poesía*. Translation by Javier Alcoriza and Antonio Lastra. Madrid, Trotta, 2009, p. 38.

19. Lepenies, W., ¿Qué es un Intelectual Europeo? *Los intelectuales y la política del espíritu en la historia europea*, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2007, pp. 55-75.

20. Stearns, P. N.; Stearns, C. Z., "Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards", in *American Historical Review*, 90, 1985, p. 113.

of the relationship between the intellectuals who take up a particular position in relation to emotions and the emotions by which they themselves are characterized. At this point, it is important to briefly present an outline of the many definitions of the character of the intellectual that have been presented throughout history and will serve as our framework.

The emergence of the figure of the intellectual is traditionally ascribed to Modernity. In early modern times, the concept of the intellectual was one of a form of secular clergy[21], and as part of the process of self-affirmation of man[22].The modern intellectual represented the Promethean incarnation that overcame the Divine Order, reaffirming their autonomy through the rational control of the natural world[23] and producing a disenchantment that would then be accentuated during the Reformation[24]. Although we have inherited this image of the intellectual and it has, until now, retained its primacy, many contest the idea that the intellectual appeared as a figure during this period. French historian and epistemologist François Dosse, for example, indicates that St. Louis had already used the adjective "intellectualis" by the early-Middle Ages in reference to those who maintained some sort of relationship or attitude towards the mental faculty of intelligence[25]. Similarly, French historian Jacques Le Goff, again dates the appearance of the intellectual to the Middle Ages in the context of the dispute between nominalists and realists[26]. Even more ambitious are the proposals that enacted a breaking down of the spatiotemporal constitution of the intellectual, extending them across all of time and space[27].

3.1. *The melancholic intellectual*

In this regard, the need to define what the *intelligentia* and the intellectual are, may always have been present in man. Pseudo-Aristotle was the first to

21. Benda, J., *La traición de los intelectuales*, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2007, p. 23

22. Blumenberg, H. *La legitimación de la Edad Moderna*. Translation by Pedro Madrigal, Valencia, Pretextos, 2008, p. 145.

23. Blumenberg., H., *Trabajo sobre el mito*, Barcelona, Paidós, 2003, p. 603.

24. Weber, M., *La ética protestante y el espíritu del capitalismo*, Barcelona, Península, 1997, 147.

25. Dosse, F., *La marcha de las ideas: historia de los intelectuales, historia intelectual*, Valencia, Universidad de Valencia, 2007, p. 21.

26. Le Goff 1996, p. 33.

27. Aron, R., *L'Opium des intellectuels*. Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1955, p. 213.

deal with these issues. He was pioneering in his relating of them to the emotions. In his view, intellectual or heroic exceptionality could not be separated from melancholic suffering: "Why is it that all those men who have become extraordinary in philosophy, politics, poetry, or the arts are obviously melancholic, and some to such an extent that they are seized by the illnesses that come from black bile, as is said in connection with the stories about Heracles among heroes?"[28]. In ancient times, Saturn was the celestial body that induced melancholy; it guided men to the contemplation of supreme realities and produced unusual philosophers strongly attracted to the transcendent. Melancholy would be the consequent emotion of an intellectual reflection on reality, resulting in the assertion of a world devoid of meaning. Few definitions of this feeling of meaninglessness are as astute as Pascal's: "The soul finds in herself nothing which satisfies; she finds nothing but what grieves her when she thinks of it. This compels her to look abroad, and to seek, by a devotion to external things, to drown the consciousness of her real condition. Her joy consists in this oblivion; and to compel her to look within, and to be her own companion, is enough to make her wretched"[29].

German-Canadian philosopher Raymond Klibansky might be deemed to have come close in his portrayal of a young Italian philosophy student, Carlo Michelstaedter. Michelstaedter described this impossible-to-explain feeling, in kierkegaardian terms, as the source of the melancholy suffered by the intellectual: "Melancholy is a slow, regular rainfall, because she expresses to man the infinite monotony, the immutability, the absence of finality in all things (a.trans.)" ["La mélancolie est une pluie lente, régulière, parce qu'elle dit à l'homme l'infinie monotonie, l'immutabilité, le manque de but des choses"[30]].

The intellectual is melancholic because he suffers a painful blow that causes a change in his relation of signifiers; it is the dramatic affirmation of a truth which leads to an emotional state of affliction, causing him retreat from the social sphere. Melancholy is not exclusively the fruit of the intellectual relationship with reality in an absolute sense, as German philosopher Hans Blumenberg states[31]. It also occurs in those who experience the most mundane pains. Thus, for example, Heraclitus, the dark philosopher of Ephesus, fell pray to misanthropy and went to live to the mountains where he ate herbs

28. Pseudo-Aristotle, 2011, p. 277; 2004, p. 382.

29. Pascal, *Thoughts of Blaise Pascal*, Boston, Gould, Kendall and Lincoln, 1849; *Pensamientos*. Madrid, Alianza, 1981, p. 60.

30. Klibansky, R.; Panofsky, E.; Saxl, F., *Saturno y la melancolía*, Madrid, Alianza, 1991, 1998, p. 164; 1999, p. 105.

31. Blumenberg. H., 2008, p. 12.

and plants to avoid suffering the consequences of the inept political structures of the state[32]. In a similar vein, Hamlet, who was exceedingly hot-heated[33], became melancholic when he found himself overcome with passion[34]; Robert Burton, author of one of the finest essays on menalcholy to date (see 1998), became melancholic after suffering the torments of an unloved childhood before being bullied as a student, after which he became a disorganized student and dissatisfied bachelor[35]; Auguste Comte fell into a period of melancholy[36] as a result of the Clotilde's death; and, finally, John Stuart Mill wistfully accepted that all his knowledge and skills were useless[37]. The most striking case is probably that of Spinoza. Through his experience, it becomes clear that melancholy is inherent in the experience of life. His story is that of a man who discovers that "all the usual occurrences of social life are vain and futile" ["tout ce qui arrive communément dans la vie ordinaire est vain et futile"[38]] and decides, in the summer of 1661, to confine himself to a room on the ourskirts of Rijnsburg in a village located about 10 kilometers west of the university town of Leiden[39] (cf. Stewart, 2006: 59). With the exception of Heraclitus, these are all victims of the melancholic feeling that emerges from Lutheranism and, as Walter Benjamin's posits[40], carrys with

32. Eggers Lan, C.; Juliá, V. E., *Los filósofos presocráticos*. Madrid, Gredos, 1986, p. 319.

33. Campbell, L. B., *Shakespeare`s Tragic heroes: Slaves of Passion*, London, Matheun, 1978, p. 112.

34. Shakespeare, W. *Obras completes*, Madrid, Aguilar, 1967, p. 1359.

35. Mesnard, P., "Robert Burton, théoricien et clinicien de l'humeur mélancolique". *La Vie médicale*, *special number Humeur et agnoisse*, 1962, p. 69.

36. Comte, A., *Correspondance*, Paris, Mouton, 1977, p. 374.

37. Mill, J. S., "Autobiography and Literary Essays", en robson, J. M.; stillinger, J.: *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981, pág 139.

38. Mill, J. S., *On the Improvement of the Understanding. The Ethics. Correspondence*. Translation and introduction by R. H. M. Elwes. New York, Dover, 2012, p. 3; *Traité de la Réforme de L'Entendement et de la meilleure voie a suivre pour parvenir a la vraie connaissance des choses,* Translation and notes by A. Koyré, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin,1994, p. 4. *Traité de la Réforme de L'Entendement*, Translation by A. Koyré, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1974, p. 5.

39. Stewart, M., *The Courtier and the Heretic. Leibniz, Spinoza and the fate of God in the Modern World*, New York, London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2006, 59.

40. Benjamin, W., *El origen del Trauerspiel alemán*. Edition by Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser. Translation by Alfredo Brotons Muñoz. Madrid: Abada, 2012, p. 136.

it a certain disenchantment with reality.[41] Benjamin was himself considered by friends as a sad person[42] and once stated that "the characteristic of the sad man is primarily his intellectual depth" (a.trans).

As we noted earlier, one of the main symptoms of the melancholic intellectual is a detachment from earthly things and the present that manifests itself in an intense fixation on the past. The melancholic intellectual is a nostalgic. Too often they tend to monomania, to exaggerated passion over misconceptions so intense that it robs them of their freedom[43]. Therefore, they are able to specialize in certain subjects on which they may work for years. Their need to always appear free from error in the eyes of the world and to pursue perfection at all costs means that their works are rare and oft-delayed, as with the Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and Comte's *Course in Positive Philosophy*. At the same time, these individuals are characterized by their aesthetic carelessness, as was the case with Spinoza[44]. Marsilio Ficino justified this carelessness on the basis that melancholic intellectuals conceived of the psyche as detached from the earthly body and without an afterlife, much like the children of Saturn children after being devoured by their father[45].

The experience of the futility of all things that accompanies such saturnine leanings towards the disdain of creation shines through in the search for utopia[46]; in trying to "form a social order such as is most conducive to the attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least difficulty and danger" ["former une société, telle qu'elle doir être afin que le plus grand nombre [d'hommes] arrivent, aussi facilement et aussi sûrement qu'il se peut, à ce but"] (1994: 12; 2012: 6-7; 1974: 80). However, this utopianism is hypothetical. It does

41. Benjamin explains that, by rendering the works of man as manifestations of vanity, a corollary of Lutheranism would be to make life insipid (*cf.* 2012: 136) and leave man with "an empty world" (1998: 139 Benjamin, W., *El origen del Trauerspiel alemán*. Edition by Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser. Translation by Alfredo Brotons Muñoz. Madrid: Abada, 2012, 136). Moreover, Luther himself noticed that many of this followers began to suffer from melancholy: "Nothing but anxiety can be gained from forever tormenting oneself with the question of election" (ápud Midelfort, 1999: 106). The consequence is the death of the relationship between meanings, as these have been modified to generate the self-stimulation necessary to initiate certain responses (Kristeva, J., *Sol negro. Depresión y melancolía*, Caracas, Monte Ávila, 1991. p. 15).

42. Scholem, G., *Walter Benjamin. Historia de una amistad*, Barcelona, Península, 1987, p. 38.

43. Durkheim, E., *El suicidio*. Madrid, Akal, 2008, 22-23.

44. Domínguez, A., *Biografías de Spinoza*. Madrid, Alianza, 1995, p. 112.

45. Ficino, M., *Tres libros sobre la vida*, Madrid, Asociación Española de Neuropsicología, 2006, 27.

46. Lepenies., 2007, p. 40 ff.

not look for a translation into reality, but is a purely intellectual exercise. Those pursuing utopia do not try to convince others, so they exert little influence on their contemporaries. Spinoza puts this beautifully in a famous letter to German theologian and philosopher Henry Oldenburgen in which he states that he let everyone live according to their own values and judgements, whereas he lived according to the truth[47]. At other times, this desire to escape reality has drastic consequences, thus Jousset and Moreau de Tours warn in their *Dictionnaire de médecine et de chirurgie prátique* that melancholy may result in suicide[48].

French writer Maurice Barrès stated that all intellectuals are melancholic (cf. 1889: 64). In our view, this widely-held preconception needs to be revised in order to avoid the bias of a diagnosis that obviates any meaningful characterization of the intelligentsia. Is it fair to say that the omnimaniacal Leibniz, the ardent Voltaire or the imposing Rousseau were melancholic? These and many others demonstrate a different kind of emotional intellectuality that has clearly been neglected. It was Nobel Prize winner in Chemistry (1909) Wilhelm Ostwald who in his studies - which were certainly very inspiring to Swiss doctor Carl Gustav Jung - proposed the existence of two kinds of intellectuals, the classic sort and the romantic sort (cf. 1910: 44). If we compare the four ancient temperaments and, taken as a demarcation criterion, the mental reaction-rate proposed by Ostwald[49], the result is clear and definitive: the classic intellectual would be he who reacts slowly, linking him to the phlegmatic and melancholic temperament; on the opposite side, the romantic intellectual, who reacts quickly, would be identified with the sanguine and choleric temperament (cf. Ostwald, 1910: 372). Although Ostwald's observations represent an obvious starting point, we wish to distance ourselves from them because they lead to a temperamental fatum that we intend to refute. We instead recognize two non-temperamental emotional types, the melancholic and the choleric, which are in a way debtors of the classic and romantic, but transcend the immutability of those categories and render themselves dependent on a cognitive framework that attributes a value judgment to emotional states.

47. Spinoza, *Correspondencia*, Madrid, Alianza, 1988, p. 231.

48. Durkheim, E. *El suicidio*. Madrid: Akal, 2008, p. 27.

49. Ostwald, W. *Grösse Manner*, Leipzig, Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1910, p. 44 ff. Jüng found this classification superficial as if focussed too much on external impressions of the subjects. He stated that the fact that a certain reaction was not externalized quickly does not imply that the reaction itself did not occur (Jüng, C. G., *Tipos psicológicos*. Translation by Ramón de la Serna, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana Buenos Aires, 1964, p. 431). He also found the Kantian distinction between "slow minds" and "fast minds" to be superficial (see Kant, I., *Antropología*, Madrid, Alianza, 1991, p. 46).

3.2. *The choleric intellectual*

We now look back to the France of the "Grand Siècle" that, as historian Jules Micheleto explains, Voltaire himself called "The Century of Louis XIV". During the Baroque period, the notion of the intellectual was refined and the majority of kingdoms in it were transformed into absolute monarchies. There was also a centralization of power which resulted in an increasingly efficient bureaucratic machine. In an ever-more sophisticated State, a predominantly uneducated warrior nobility ("noblesse d'épée") emerged as a problem. Thus, it had to be incorporated into the "noblesse de robe" formed of members of the lower nobility and country-dewllers with administrative and legal posts. However, the problem, far from being solved, was exacerbated further by the formation of military groups such as the Fronde. There also appeared the threat of mass suicide as a result of what Louis XIV himself called "la fureur des duels" (1860: 377; 1988: 17). The idea, according to Jewish-German sociologist Norbert Elias[50] was to disable the nobility through the creation of an exhaustive formal system and the formation of a court society which would guarantee the stability of the Kingdom and, at the same time, control the constant tussle for prestige and noble status. Still, the situation of the "noblesse d'épée" was nonetheless dramatic. It was consecrated as a reflection of what was, in the words of French historian Jean-Hippolyte Mariéjol, the sorriest state ever known: burdened by poverty; wracked by idleness; opressed to the point of despair (cf. 1905: 390). The final outcome, against all the odds, would entail a drastic change of direction.

The Baroque, as it was understood by Gilles Deleuze, represented more than merely an essence, pointing us towards the operational function of the fold[51]. In these terms, the nobility can be seen to bow to the Republic of Letters, with the conversion of the militarist into the philosopher[52]. In this context, we cannot talk of a sublimation as would be deduced from Schopenhauer's hydraulic design, since the fold does not neutralize strength; it rather, in the nietzschean sense, allows this force to manifest itself in the turning of heated debate into a matter of two wills to power looking impose themselves on one another. Although the nobility would not cease to fight, they would no longer do so with the sword but with pen: warriors' attacks were replaced by literary battles. It was precisely at this point that the Hall and

50. Elías, N., *La sociedad Cortesana,* Madrid, FCE, 1982, 107 ff.
51. Deleuze, G., *El Pliegue: Leibniz y el Barroco,* Barcelona, Paidós, 1989, p. 111.
52. *Ibid.* 2009: 119.

the Royal Academies, as spaces or "battlefield", were created.[53] These spaces allowed for the emergence of very tight emotional communities in which emotional bonds were established and through which attempts were made to define and assess the emotions that were brewing in other environments, whilst simultaneously proposing their own means of emotional expression in opposition to these[54].

The emotional code par excellence of such close-knit groups was choleric in nature. Whereas Evagrius Pontic condemned melancholy for its sinfulness[55], these communities rejected melancholy as it was an emotion that refused the struggle for the cultural capital that flourished in the aforementioned Republic of Letters. The "noblesse d'épée", heirs to the medieval "bellatores", accepted choleric emotion by dint of its own virtue; only in servants was it seen as a "disease of the soul"[56].

Much as the melancholic, as discussed above, is identifiable with a particular belief, the choleric may be discussed in the same terms. The origin of the choleric temperament was rooted in the belief that one had been underestimated[57]. Furthermore, it first involved a desire for revenge and, secondly, the belief that those who had committed the offense should be punished. These new *choleric intellectuals* believed that a redressing of the balance was in order.[58] In these terms, as a primary emotion, the choleric temperament necessarily preceeded the enactment of a desire to impose dominance over others; to compete and to win.

Choleric intellectuals might be described as restless[59]; they feel a very powerful force that moves them violently towards action[60]. They have what

53. It would be applied to the political sphere as a public space of action, following Hannah Arendt's *Human Condition* (Arendt, H. *La condición humana*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1993, p. 56).

54. Rosenwein, B. H., "Worrying about emotions in history", in *American Historical Review,* 107, 3, 2002, 821-845.

55. Ponticus, E., *Obras espirituales*, Madrid, Ciudad Nueva, 1995, p. 138.

56. Plato, *Timaeus* Translation with introduction by Donald J. Zeyl, Indianapolis, Cambridge, Hackett, 2000, p. 84; *Timeo* Translation and edition by Ramón Serrano y Cantarín and Mercedes Díaz de Cerio Díez. Madrid, CSIC, 2012 30187a.

57. Aristotle, *Retórica* Translation and edition by Antonio Tovar, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1999, p. 97, 1378a31-33.

58. Aristotle, 1999, p. 96, 1378b1, ff.

59. Proust, 1987, p. 305.

60. Von Arnim, H., *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, 3 vols. Leipzig, Teubner (1903-1905), p. 390.

Kant termed a "cancer of pure practical reason"[61]. Borrowing Seneca's beautiful expression, the choleric rides a wave, and nobody know where it will break[62]. In accordance with Ortega y Gasset, the lives of choleric intellectuals find meaning in the doing of great deeds and in producing works of high caliber: "for certain men, the supreme delight is the frantic effort to create things - for the painter, painting; for the writer, writing; for the politician, organizing the state" (a. trans.) ["para ciertos hombres la delicia suprema es el esfuerzo frenético de crear cosas –para el pintor, pintar; para el escritor, escribir; para el político organizar el Estado"[63]] Again, unlike the melancholic, the choleric exerts a strong and direct influence over his contemporaries. His omnimania is unmistakable: he is more concerned with creating a vast multiplicity of originals works than with the refininement of each individual work.

A considerable portion of the Enlightenment philosophers that belonged to the "noblesse de robe" rather than the "noblesse d'épée" ended up incorporating the beliefs of the latter. Leibniz himself admitted, using traditional medical categories, that "the choleric tendencies, however, seem to have the ascendancy"[64]. His 150,000-page manuscript, full of bright ideas on just about every subject imaginable, gives a good account of his omnimania[65]. Whilst the melancholic feels a fixation with the time, the choleric is obsessed with space; the place where he might take action, his battlefield. Perhaps that is why the author of *Theodicy* attempted, by any means possible, to enter the prestigious Royal Society with his famous calculating machine[66] and, shortly afterwards, tried his luck at the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris[67]. D'Alambert, who belonged to the latter from the age of 25 - an early genius of history and, together with Diderot, father of *L'Encyclopédie*[68] - developed his research - as a good choleric should - in prestigious scientific institutions like the Royal Society of London and the Academy of Sciences in Berlin. With the help of Voltaire, he found his way into philosophical

61. Kant, I., *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Cup, 116 y Antropología, Madrid: Alianza, 1991, 204.

62. Seneca, *Tragedias: Hércules loco, Las Troyanas, Las Fenicias, Medea*, Madrid: Gredos, 1979, p. 392.

63. Ortega y Gasset, J., *Obras Completas*, Madrid, Alianza-Revista de Occidente, 1983.

64. Ápud Stewart, M,. *The Courtier and the Heretic. Leibniz, Spinoza and the fate of God in the Modern World*. New York, London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2006, p. 46.

65. Stewart, 2006, p. 147.

66. Echevarría, J., *El autor y su Obra: Leibniz*, Barcelona, Barcanova, 1981, p. 23.

67. Echevarría, J., *Ibid*. 24.

68. Pagden, A., *La Ilustración y por qué sigue siendo importante para nosotros,* Madrid, Alianza, 2015, p. 54.

circles through Madame Geoffrin's Hall[69]. All this helped to foster his sense of belonging to the *Republic of Letters*[70], turning him together with Lagrange, into one of the great patriarchs of the European salons[71]; a common desire of the choleric intellectual. The encyclopaedic Louis Jaucourt also fits the profile of this sort of intellectual, contributing more than seventeen thousand of the seventy thousand entries that made up the *Encyclopedia*. Even Diderot once even told Sophie Volland, referring to Jaucourt, that he was not bored of his papers because God had made him for that this very task[72]. Rousseau, despite his plebeian origins, promptly incorporated the noble beliefs that articulated choleric emotionality in service of his desire to stand out. Readily evident as early as his first work, *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts*, is a violent emotion and a passion that remains apparent in every word. Later, in *Confessions*, he related how his own passion sometimes clouded his understanding and prevented him from writing a single word, forcing him to make a huge effort to gather his thoughts[73]. His choleric character is extremely pronounced and he himself recognizes it in a letter to his mother dated 27 January, 1749: "The black bile gives me strength, and even wit and science. My choleric temperament is enough and is worth the same as an Apollo [...] Everyone has their weapons; rather than write songs for my enemies, I write them entries in the dictionary" (a.trans.) ["la bilis me da fuerzas e incluso ingenio y ciencia. La cólera basta y vale lo que un Apolo [...] Cada cual tiene sus armas; en vez de hacer canciones a mis enemigos, les hago artículos de diccionario"][74]. He yearned to shine in society and to enter in the grand Salons. However, he would instead be condemned to poverty by his vile temper and his incredible insolence[75]. His eyes attracted wide attention for their brightness, revealing a sharp wit. This also happened to Voltaire, who represents a paradigmatic and extreme case: "Thin, curmudgeonly, bile-con-

69. Moscoso, J., *Ciencia y técnica en la Enciclopedia Diderot y D'Alembert*. Madrid, Nivola, 2005, p. 112.

70. *Ibid.,* 12.

71. Ferrone, V., "El científico", en Vovelle, M.; Arasse, D.; Bergueron, L. *El hombre de la Ilustración.* Madrid, Alianza, 1992, p. 217.

72. Trousson, R., *Diderot. Una biografía intelectual*. Barcelona, Acantilado, 2011, p. 75.

73. Rousseau, J-.J., *Oeuvres complètes*. Edition by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, Paris, Gallimard, 1995, *pp.* 113-114.

74. Ápud Guéhenno, J., *Jean-Jacques. Histoired'uneconscience*, Paris, Gallimard, 1952, 172.

75. Crocker, G. K., *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Quest, 1712-1758*, New York, MacMillan, 1974, p. 263.

sumed, gaunt, an expression between spiritual and caustic, with brilliant, cunning, malignant eyes" (a.trans.) ["Delgado, de temperamento seco, la bilis consumida, el rostro descarnado, la expresión entre espiritual y cáustica, los ojos brillantes, astutos y malignos"[76]], he put the ardor of his works into his actions. Nervous and exalted, possesive of an explosive temper, so alive as to be bewilidering, he is the choleric intellectual par excelence, capable of fighting battles left and right[77].

Within this emotional schema, we cannot avoid reference to some choleric literary figures. In Jonathan Swift's famous novel, *Gulliver's Travels*, we find clear references to both the melancholic and the choleric temperaments. The Lilliputians were melancholic beings, lovers of the abstract and unaware of their own bodies[78]. However, inhabitants of Balnibarbis[79] walked quickly along the streets, with fierce aspect and a fixed-gaze; they are clearly choleric. In *Fathers and Sons* by Russian novelist Iván Turguénev, the main character, Bazarov, is challenging and scathing. His omnimania is evident when he is asked about his employment and replies that he employs himself in "natural sciences in general"[80]. His lover, Anna Sergeyevna, lives terrified by him and senses an unfettered intellectual energy so anarchic that it suggests in her the deepest chaos explaining that living with him is like "walking on the edge of a precipice"[81]. Returning to *Gulliver's Travels*, in the context of this article we will soon note the appearance of our own "Academy of Projectors": the critics of the Royal Society, from whom we can observe an attack on institutionalized knowledge.

4. Sociology of knowledge and emotions

In recent times, sociology has been to some degree responsible for reinforcing a belief in the existence of two forms of intellectual emotionality, yielding

76. Moscoso, J., *Ciencia y técnica en la Enciclopedia Diderot y D'Alembert*. Madrid, Nivola, 2005, p. 81.

77. Goulemot, J. M.; Launay, M. *El siglo de las Luces*, Madrid, Guadarrama, 196, p. 105.

78. Swift, J., *Los viajes de Gulliver*, Edition by Pilar Aena. Madrid, Cátedra, 1992, p. 384 ff.

79. Swift, J., *Ibid.* 413.

80. Turguéniev, I. S. *Padres e Hijos.* Translation and notes by Rafael Cansinos Assens. Barcelona, Planeta 1987, p. 27; *Fathers and Sons*. Translation by Richard Hare. United States, RHYW, 2008.

81. *Ibid*. 329; 1987: p. 187.

results that allow both to become inter-linked through two of the most representative theories in the field: one that looks at the social networks operating between intellectuals and another that focuses on intellectual innovation.

Hungarian sociologist Karl Mannheim and the Viscount of Tocqueville, Alexis Henri Charles de Clérel, are key representatives of the sociological debate surrounding the link between the intellectual and society, be that as a whole or in relation to a particular group or social class. In the work of the first, we immediately recognize a rendering of the melancholic intellectual figure who has transcended subjectivity to reach the level of objectivity[82]. The melancholic intellectual ("freischwebende Intelligenz")[83] is, in his view, socially disembodied; he lives lost in thought, abstracted, in exile. Set apart from the core of society – the emotional cauldron in which conflicts and debates take place - he has access to a more reliable understanding of reality. By contrast, the choleric intellectual does not subscribe to the tocquevillian thesis that links intellectuals to social class[84]. The choleric establishes an ambiguous relationship with society: he is influenced by it, but exerts influence upon it. Turning to Jewish the philosopjer Norbert Elias, he is both "die and coin"[85].

With regard to theories of intellectual innovation - those which attempt to highlight the ways in which the intellectual produces knowledge - we encounter two crucial proposals: the first from American sociologist Thorstien Veblen and the second from Frenchman Pierre Bourdieu. The proposals of each have been synthesized by Elias into the traditional and the innovative respectively [86]. Firstly, in Veblen's work we find reference to the figure of the sniper –or, as Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto would have it, the intellectual speculator[87]– readily associable with the profile of the melancholic intellectual. According to Karl Jaspers' definition[88], they experience a "marginality in suffering that crushes but does not destroy the existence [and] offers the chance to experience the limits that remain hidden to those living sheltered lives and to achieve maximum awareness of the reality of existence" (a.trans.) ["la

82. Klibansky, R.; Panofsky, E.; Saxl, F.: *Saturno y la melancolía*, Madrid, Alianza, 1991.

83. Mannheim takes this expresion from Alfred Weber en 1987, *Ideología y Utopía*. Mexico, FCE, 1987, p. 137.

84. Lefebvre, G., *El nacimiento de la historiografía moderna*, Barcelona, Martínez Roca, 1974, p. 219.

85. 2001: 60; 1991: 97.

86. Elias, N., *Conocimiento y poder*, Madrid, Piqueta, 1994, p. 102.

87. 1935 ápud Burke, P., *Historia social del conocimiento: De Gutenberg a Diderot*. Barcelona, Paidós, 2002.

88. Jaspers, K., *Los Grandes Filósofos I: Los hombres decisivos*. Buenos Aires, Sur, 1966, 87.

marginalidad en el sufrimiento que aplasta pero no llega a destruir la existencia [y que] ofrece la posibilidad de experimentar los límites que permanecen ocultos a los que viven amparados y así lograr la máxima conciencia de la realidad total de la existencia"]. Here we are undoubtedly confronted with the painful reality of the melancholic. Veblen linked this form of intellectual production to the Jews, who rejected their own cultural heritage without fully assimilating heritage of the gentile; their idols destroyed without others coming to occupy their place. Their position on the frontier between two cultural worlds made possible the emergence of truly original approaches and it is for this reason that the ethics of Hasidic Jews are rooted in the recognition of themselves as "different and elsewhere" (a.trans.) ["diferente y en otra parte"][89]. Furthermore, through work with a patient named Azariah, Doctor Joao Rodrigues de Castelo Branco –also known as Amato Lusitano– came to believe that almost all the Jews are, by nature, sufferes of black bile[90]. Similarly, Américo Castro stated that Jews were characterized by sadness: "The contradiction experienced by these souls - of feeling like both citizens and outlaws who had to walk in the shadows of the roofs - is latent and patent in the gloomy flowers of the ascetic and picaresque style" (a.trans.) ["La contradicción vivida por estas almas –de sentirse a la vez ciudadanos y forajidos que habían de andar a sombra de tejados–, está latente y patente en las flores lúgubres del estilo ascético y picaresco"][91]. It is no accident that the picaresque novel is a style far-removed from the conventionalism of institutionalized knowledge. The condition of the melancholic relegates him to the outskirts of the habermasian city; or, as Thucydides would have put it, makes him a man ill-adapted to the needs of his city (cf. 1992: 457). They are the exiles of Edward Said[92], those who do not feel themselves of the world because it has lost its charm. In the present, such a refusal might be likened, in Eco's terms, to the segregatory attitude in mass culture of those of apocalyptic sensibilities[93]. Here, as Piedmontese says, pessimism is symptomatic, seeking to comfort the reader with the existence of a community of supermen "capable of rising up, if only through rejection,

89. Eco, U. *Apocalípticos e integrados*, translation by Andrés Boglar, Buenos Aires, Lumen, 1977, p. 13.

90. Lusitanus, A., *Curationum medicinalium centuriae quatour*. Venice: Balthesarem Constantium, 1557, p. 397; Bartra, R. *Cultura y melancolía: Las enfermedades del alma en la España del siglo de Oro*. Barcelona, Anagrama, 2001, p. 103.

91. Castro, A., *España en su historia. Cristianos, moros y judíos*. Barcelona, Crítica, 1984, p. 578.

92. Said, E., *Representaciones del Intelectual*. Barcelona, Paidós Studio, 1996, p. 59.

93. Eco, U. *Apocalípticos e integrados*, translation by Andrés Boglar, Buenos Aires, Lumen, 1977, *Ibid*., p. 13.

above banality" (a.trans.) ["capaces de elevarse, aunque sólo sea mediante el rechazo, por encima de la banalidad media"][94].

Bourdieu offers the most plausible sociological model with regards to the intellectual counterpoint to the melancholic, the choleric. Choleric intellectuals are very comfortable forming part of the flow of institutionalized knowledge in all its forms: salons, clubs, universities and academies. Their high level of sociability pushes them to seek environments in which to exhibit themselves and compete, as they find a way to measure the will to power through dialectical struggles and the fight for symbolic capital[95]. They enjoy defeating their rivals and want to excel in the constant struggle through which their life is transformed. Choleric intellectuals are those who, as Pareto points out[96], work within a tradition and fight to achieve a certain reputation[97]. The reality of *The Republic of Letters* is that choleric intellectuals were divided into literary factions within which, according to Adam Smith, "each cabal [was] often avowedly, and almost secretly, the mortal enemy of the reputation of every other, and [employed] all the mean arts of intrigue"[98]. It is no coincidence that Bourdieu, in relation to the assumption we raised about the emergence of this emotional type, described the award of diplomas like the act of knighting that gave rise to a "noblesse de robe"[99].

This social dimension generates exclusory dynamics, inculcating a very competitive emotional community which expels all those not governed by the same emotional patterns and those who do not hold the necessary levels of cultural capital: the melancholic. Particularly remarkable among the many exclusory acts is what Florian Znaniecki calls "neofobia", which describes how existing institutional pressures govern which new ideas are accepted or rejected. This institutional logic leads to a conformist intellectual output that neglects to alter the statu quo in the interest of its own survival. Melancholic intellectuals, often as a result of their philosophical radicalism, generate

94. Eco, U., *Ibid.* p. 13.

95. Bourdieu, *La nobleza del estado: educación de élite y espíritu de cuerpo*, Argentina, Siglo veintiuno, 2013, p. 123.

96. Pareto, V., *The Mind and Society*. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1935, ápud Burke, P. *Historia social del conocimiento: De Gutenberg a Diderot*, Barcelona: Paidós, 2002, p. 52.

97. Bourdieu, *Sobre el Estado: Cursos en el Collège de France (1989-1992)*, Barcelona, Anagrama, 2014, p. 265.

98. Smith, A., *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Edition by Knud Haakonssen, Cambridge, CUP, 2002, p. 145; 2009, pp. 240-241.

99. Bourdieu, *Ibid*, p. 112.

instability and are marginalized. Following the Eco's simplification, the cholerics are integrated as they are those who agree. It is here that the dichotomy between the dominant and the dominated appears. The choleric reproduces social stratifications because he had adopted the beliefs of the nobility, one way or another. He requires the dominated for his continued existence, generating a hierarchical system. These assumptions help us to understand just why, in terms of the emotions, the cultural field is so embedded in the field of power, contributing to the perpetuation of power structures.

5. The metaphor of the bee and the spider

As a postscript to this paper, we would like to present a reinterpretation of the well-known metaphor of the bee and the spider, as a result of the parallels that it demonstrates with our thesis of the two models of intellectual emotionality; an allegory that finds its earliest precedent in Francis Bacon, but might even be traced back as far as Ancient Greece. In its original formulation, it was an epistemic simile that aided understanding of the different forms of existing knowledge: the rational, represented by spiders, and the empirical, embodied in ants. Later, the aforementioned Jonathan Swift revisited the premise, replacing the figure of the ant with the bee in order to add clarity to what French writer Charles Perrault described as the quarrel between the ancients and moderns. His version of metaphor takes place in a library, specifically in oncorner of the library where the spider lives. The spider meets a curious bee that has mistakenly entered his home, leading to a heated discussion between the two. The spider calls the bee a "freebooter over fields and gardens"[100] who would just as soon steal a nettle as a violet. The symbolism of the bee is highly suggestive given the neatness of the parallels it holds with the choleric intellectual. Virgilio warns us about its character: "There's no end to the wrath of bees - vexed, they'll inflame their stings with poison and, fastening to a vein, deposit darts that you can't see - inflicting harm, they'll forfeit their own lives"[101].

100. Swift, J. A., *Tale of a Tub. Written for the Universal Improvement of Mankind. To which is Added, An Account of a Battel, Between the Antient and Modern Books in St. James's Library*. 5.ª ed. With the author's apology and explanatory notes by William Wotton, B. D. London, John Nutt, near Stationers-Hall, 1710, 2004, 266; *Historia de una barrica*, Barcelona, Labor, 1976, 204.

101. Virgil, *Georgics*. Translation by Peter Fallon. Introduction and notes by Elaine Fantham. Oxford, OUP, 2004, p. 82; *Bucólicas, Geórgicas, Apéndice Virgiliano*. Madrid, Gredos, 1990, p. 235.

One intellectual who would fit the profile of the bee is Montaigne; he had a method of borrowing ideas from his library, as if he were a bee extracting pollen to produce honey (cf.).[102] We also recognize in the bee the monomaniac whose wisdom includes a real diversity of knowledge. The bee, "by an universal range, with long search, much study, true judgment, and distinction of things, brings home honey and wax"[103]. The spider, meanwhile, lived in the highest corner, an expression of his detachment from the world. It undoubtedly symbolizes the melancholic intellectual who lives in exile on the existential margins. The spider denies any external inspiration, extracting everything from its own insides to weave its thread. As with melancholic intellectuals, it stores within itself "a good plentiful store of dirt and poison"[104]: black bile. The spider is monomaniacal and its lazy contemplation takes it no further than four inches outside of itself[105].

6. Problems and new lines of research

To conclude, we would like to make a value judgment on the issues we have addressed here, and also to give exposure to new lines of research currently in development that are pending further work. As regards the methodology used throughout these pages, we have employed a cognitivist framework that emphasizes the rationality of emotions, leaving aside issues related to the social or cultural components of emotions which remains to some degree unresolved. This approach is not without its critics, as can be seen from the premises of "Beyond Ontology: Ideation, Phenomenology and Cross Cultural Study of Emotions" by Professor of Continental Philosophy Robert Solomon[106] and a paper entitled "The Not Altogether Social Construction of Emotions: a Critique of Harré and Gillet"[107] by psychology Professors Maury Silver (John

102. "The bees plunder the flowers here and there, but afteward they make of them honey, which is all theirs; it is no longer thyme or marjoram. Even so with the pieces borrowed from others; he will transform and blend them to make a work that is all his own, to wit, his jugdment", en Montaigne, M., *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*. Translated by Donald. M. Frame, Stanford, California, SUP, 1958, 111. *Ensayos*. Buenos Aires: Aguilar, 1962, 177.

103. Swift, 2004, *cfr.* 268; *Historia de una barrica*, Barcelona, Labor, 1976, pp. 205-206.

104. Swift, 2004: 167; *Historia de una barrica*, Barcelona, Labor, 1976, 205.

105. Swift, *Ibid.* p. 205.

106. Solomon, R. C. "Emotions", *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 27, 2-3 (1997), 296-297.

107. 1998: pp. 223-235.

Hopkins University) and John Sabini (University of Pennsylvania). Moreover, we have only provided two explanations for the formation of two emotions around two beliefs. The reasoning presented for the concept of the choleric intellectual relies on the particularly circumspect spatiotemporal framework of the seventeenth century, it remains to be seen how a different belief system from another time would have articulated choleric emotions. Much the same should be said for the connection between belief and melancholy. The possibilities are vast and we have not sought to offer a totalizing explanation, merely to present a consistent and enlightening hypothesis. It was not our wish to talk in terms of pure categories. The word "emotion" is not without ambiguity, since its emergence, which dates back to the eighteenth century, to the present, when behaviorism come to prophesise the disappearance of the term. There are of course other similar expressions, not discused here, which would provide further nuances, such as "affect" or "sensitivity". Nor have we begun to consider language and the variations in the representation of emotions over time. Another factor worthy of consideration when looking towards the future is that if we suppose all emotion is uniquely linked to cognition, other attractive approaches emerge. For example, the possibility of different forms of "knowing" in choleric and melancholic intellectuals. The return to narrative history, the clearest echoes of which are found in biographies, involves its consideration as a form of epistemological approach to an approximation of the individual's character. This presupposes a limitation since biographies, whilst so useful for medicine and, of course, for psychology, are sometimes hamstrung by a very pronounced hagiographic and apologetic bias. This seriously restricts access for the researcher, who somehow has to overcome these mystifications to arrive somewhere close the reality of the character in question.

Ultimately, we would like to emphasize the idea that, when compared to traditional literature that has approached intellectuals and emotions from positions well outside of the most up-to-date philosophical traditions, we have purposely looked to the the intimate union between belief and emotion: i.e., cognitivism. From this starting point, we hoped to elucidate the sort of beliefs that are directly related to the emotions and the ways in which they play a role in the development of intellectual activity. The Saturnian, like the spider, refuses to engage in institutions of any kind, maintaining his precarious livelihood on the existential boundaries where he is able to observe human activity with greater clarity and perspective. This figure, perhaps because of its romantic nature, eclipsed the existence of another intellectual archetype, the choleric, which we have looked to bring to light through this work. The lives and the development of these bee-like intellectuals was born out of the far-from-insignificant context of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in

which a number of noble beliefs persisted - furtively and in other forms, but with the same intensity - and acted as the springboard for an emotionality on the offensive. Finally, we looked to connect two intellectuals that offer perhaps the most unique case studies in the field of the sociology of knowledge, in an attempt to construct an all-encompassing framework around a seemingly incongruous plurality.

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