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Hospedería de Fonseca, n.º 2. - 37002 Salamanca (España)
Telf. +34 923 294 636
Correo electrónico: rlop@usal.es

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ARTÍCULOS

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SAME SAME… BUT DIFFERENT? SUPPORT FOR THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY VS. SOLID DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT

Lo mismo… ¿pero diferente? Apoyo al ideal de democracia vs. apoyo sólido a la democracia

O mesmo… mas diferente? Apoio ao ideal da democracia vs. apoio sólido à democracia

PAOLO MONCAGATTA pmoncagatta@usfq.edu.ec [1 2]
WILLEM E. SARIS w.saris@telefonica.net [2]
MATEO FIERRO mfierrot@estud.usfq.edu.ec [1]

[1] Universidad San Francisco de Quito
[2] Research and Expertise Centre for Survey Methodology – Universitat Pompeu Fabra

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Abstract
Measurement of citizen support for democracy has been problematic, as most research on the topic has focused on assessing support for an abstract concept: the "ideal" of democracy. This article proposes a different conception of democratic support, labeled "solid democratic support," which combines multiple items that tap attitudes toward various essential attributes of democratic government. Using data from the AmericasBarometer surveys, the "solid support" measure is compared to a traditional measure of support for the ideal of democracy in Chile and Venezuela. Important differences are found in the levels of the two indicators and in their correlates, demonstrating that they are in fact different concepts. As well, substantial differences are found between the two countries, suggesting that analyses of democratic support that do not consider the country-specific political context may be flawed.

Palabras clave: apoyo a la democracia; cultura democrática; actitudes políticas; Chile; Venezuela

Resumen
La medición del apoyo ciudadano a la democracia ha sido problemática, ya que la mayoría de investigación sobre el tema se ha centrado en evaluar apoyo a un concepto abstracto: el "ideal" de democracia. Este artículo propone una concepción diferente del apoyo democrático, denominada "apoyo sólido a la democracia", que combina múltiples ítems que miden actitudes hacia varios atributos esenciales del gobierno democrático. Utilizando datos de encuesta del Barómetro de las Américas, la medida de "apoyo sólido" se compara a una medida tradicional de apoyo al ideal de democracia en Chile y Venezuela. Se observan diferencias importantes en los niveles de ambos indicadores y en sus correlatos, lo que demuestra que son en realidad conceptos diferentes. Además, se observan diferencias sustanciales entre los dos países, lo que sugiere que los análisis de apoyo democrático que no tienen en cuenta el contexto político específico de cada país pueden ser defectuosos.

Palavras-chave: apoio à democracia; cultura democrática; atitudes políticas; Chile; Venezuela

Resumo
A medição do apoio dos cidadãos à democracia tem sido problemática, uma vez que a maior parte das investigações sobre o tema tem se centrado na avaliação do apoio a um conceito abstrato, ou "ideal" de democracia. Este artigo propõe uma concepção diferente de apoio democrático, denominada "apoio democrático sólido", que combina vários itens que avaliam as atitudes em relação a vários atributos essenciais do governo democrático. Usando dados de pesquisas do AmericasBarometer, a medida de "apoio sólido" é comparada a uma medida tradicional de apoio ao ideal de democracia no Chile e na Venezuela. São encontradas diferenças importantes nos níveis dos dois indicadores e nos seus correlatos, demonstrando que se trata, de facto, de conceitos diferentes. Além disso, são encontradas diferenças substanciais entre os dois países, o que sugere que as análises de apoio democrático que não consideram o contexto político específico do país podem estar incorretas.

INTRODUCTION

There is wide consensus among political scientists that democratic support is a necessary condition for the consolidation and stability of democracy (Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1975; Inglehart, 2003; Linz, 1978; Lipset, 1959; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Norris, 1999; Rose *et al.*, 1998). Not only do democratic regimes depend on the public's willing acquiescence and support for their survival and effective functioning (Easton, 1975; Mishler & Rose, 2001), but a democracy can only be considered as consolidated when democratic procedures and institutions become "the only game in town" (Linz & Stepan, 1996b, p. 15). In this line, a strong current of literature has granted great importance to understanding the conditions under which citizens develop and maintain positive attitudes towards democratic rule.

Still, support for democracy has proven to be a difficult concept to study. Discussions regarding which indicators are better suited for its empirical assessment date back to the 1970s (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974). Almost two decades later, the literature on democratic support was still being described as "ambiguous, confusing and noncumulative" (Kaase, 1988, p. 117). Today, the debate is far from closed, as the indicators used to measure democratic support are still severely and recurrently criticized. There is no scholarly agreement on exactly how the concept of support for democracy should be interpreted or empirically assessed.

Building on an idea initially proposed by Mishler and Rose (2001), this article argues that most research on support for democracy has been misconceived, as it has adopted an "idealist approach (which) assesses popular support by measuring citizens' commitment to democracy as an abstract ideal" (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 305). The main problem with this approach is that support for democracy in the abstract does not necessarily imply support for democracy's essential attributes. For example, in certain contexts it is not hard to find people answering that "democracy is always preferable to any other type of government" to a survey question, while at the same time being in favor of restrictions on freedom of press or on the right to vote of certain individuals. Because there is strong evidence that citizens have different understandings and expectations of what democracy is and what it should deliver (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Kriesi *et al.*, 2016; Linde & Ekman, 2003; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007), it seems clear that not all citizens who express democratic support through the traditional support for democracy survey items necessarily refer to the same concept. In this sense, it is important to differentiate those citizens who only express support for democracy in the abstract from those who have actual, consistent democratic attitudes.

This paper offers tree main contributions to the scholarly literature on democratic culture and political attitudes. First, an alternative measure of support for democracy is proposed, which we have labeled "solid democratic support". The solid support measure is novel because it combines multiple indicators that tap support for the essential attributes of a democratic system into a non-compensatory composite score, which permits distinguishing those citizens who have consistent positive attitudes towards democratic rule from the rest. Second, by means of logistic regression analysis, we show that there are important differences between the correlates of support for the ideal of democracy and those of solid democratic support. Third, we demonstrate that when studying support for democracy, context matters: the recent political history of the country and the ideological position of the incumbent play a role in determining the sources of democratic support in nations.

TRADITIONAL MEASUREMENT OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

In the political attitudes literature, support for democracy has been traditionally related to David Easton's seminal concept of "diffuse" political support: a durable, generalized attachment that is normally "independent of outputs and performance in the short run" (Easton, 1975, pp. 444-445). Also interpreted as a measure of the legitimacy of a political system, diffuse support has been described as "a deep-seated set of attitudes towards politics and the operation of the political system that is relatively impervious to change" (Dalton, 2004, p. 23). As well, this type of support has been related to the "affective" orientations citizens have towards political systems (Almond & Verba, 1963; Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999). It is that "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants" (Easton, 1965, p. 273).

When assessing support for democracy through surveys, most researchers have relied on items that capture citizens' attitudes towards an abstract concept: that of the "ideal" of democracy (Bratton, 2002; Fuchs *et al.*, 1995; Lagos, 2003, 2008; Linz, 1978; Linz & Stepan, 1996a; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Rose & Mishler, 1996; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006). The AmericasBarometer Survey's version of the *Linzian* indicator asks "With which of the following statements do you agree with the most?" and offers respondents three possible answers: "(a) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic," "(b) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government," or "(c) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one."

Figure 1 reports the levels of support for the ideal of democracy found in seventeen countries of North, Central and South America in 2014 through the use of the aforementioned Linzian indicator by the AmericasBarometer Surveys.[1] Although the range between the countries with the highest and lowest levels of support is large, majorities of the population express support for democratic rule in all countries. When considering democracy in abstract terms –as an ideal– there seems to be little doubt that citizens in the Americas agree that it is preferable to any other form of government.

The Linzian indicator, widely used in studies of democratization, can provide a first impression of levels of citizen support for democracy across nations. This may, however, be a *naïve* impression, because of two reasons. First, because there is no certainty about what the actual meaning of this support in fact is. Figure 1 shows countries with very different democratic histories having similar levels of

1. For producing this figure, we used the 2014 AmericasBarometers because it is the most recent wave where the Linzian indicator was asked to the majority of the countries in the region (including Chile and Venezuela, the cases analyzed in this article).

Figure 1. Support for the ideal of democracy (% of people who believe democracy is preferable)



Source: 2014 AmericasBarometer (Latin American Public Opinion Project)

democratic support. Costa Rica, a nation that has enjoyed one of the longest democratic traditions in the Americas -as well as the highest ratings from the Freedom House organization throughout the last decades– has virtually the same level of democratic support as Guatemala, a country that experienced a remarkably unstable democratic trajectory in the twentieth century and that has consistently obtained very poor ratings from Freedom House since the late 1970s (Freedom House, 2015b; McClintock & Lebovic, 2006, p. 34).[2] The figure suggests the uncertainty analysts face regarding what citizens in different countries have in mind when thinking about an abstract construct such as democracy: it seems plausible that a nation's democratic trajectory determines the general conceptual framework under which its citizens understand democracy (Linde & Ekman, 2003; Rose *et al.*, 1998). In this sense, it would not be correct to make cross-country comparisons of levels of democratic support found through an indicator of this kind, as it is likely that we would be comparing different things, and even run the risk of not knowing what we are comparing at all.

Second, is the fact that traditional measures of democratic support[3] such as the Linzian indicator have been assessing support for an abstract concept: the ideal of democracy. One may question if simply expressing "lip service" to an ideal is enough for a person to be considered as having support for it. If the object to be measured is that "deep-seated set of attitudes towards politics" Russell Dalton talks about (2004, p. 23), there are enough grounds to question this. It seems safe to argue that it is not the same to answer that "democracy is preferable to any other form of government" in a survey than to actually have positive attitudes towards the fundamental aspects of democratic rule.

In fact, several scholars have expressed doubts on the validity of the traditional indicators used to measure support for democracy (Carlin & Singer, 2011; Ferrín, 2012; Inglehart, 2003; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). There is an emerging consensus that democratic support is a multidimensional concept. Hence, an improved approach to its measurement would imply using several indicators that captured support towards specific core principles and institutions of a democratic system.

There have been few efforts to analyze the multidimensional nature of democratic support through empirical research. One of the first steps in this direction

2. For producing its well-known classification of "free", "partly free" and "not free" countries, Freedom House gives numerical scores –from 1 to 7– to two categories in each country: political rights and civil liberties. It is to these ratings I refer to. For detailed information on Freedom House's methodological procedures and the individual country ratings throughout the years see Freedom House (2015a, 2015b) and McClintock and Lebovic (2006).

3. Another example of a commonly used indicator measuring support for the ideal of democracy is the *"Churchillean"* indicator, developed by Rose and Mishler (1996). The indicator asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government."

was taken by Michael Bratton and colleagues, developers of the Afrobarometer surveys in the late 1990s. Bratton and Mattes differentiated the rationalities undergirding support for democracy in African citizens as either "intrinsic" or "instrumental" types of rationalities: while some citizens will support democracy based on intrinsic reasons, or what they describe as "an appreciation of the political freedoms and equal rights that democracy embodies when valued as an end in itself" (2001, p. 448), others will support democracy based on instrumental calculations, such as the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of living standards. In later works, the authors developed an "index of commitment to democracy" which included a direct question measuring support for democracy in the abstract, plus other indicators asking for opinions on rejection of military, one-party and one-man rule (Bratton, 2002; Mattes & Bratton, 2007). They found that almost a third of the respondents said they preferred democracy, but failed to consistently reject all other forms of authoritarianism.

In a similar line, but aiming to achieve a detailed understanding of citizens' conceptions of democracy, Schedler and Sarsfield developed a classification of what they called "democrats with adjectives": people who support the ideal of democracy in the abstract while rejecting one or more core principles of liberal democracy (2007). Through their index of support for democracy, these authors classified citizens into six different groups, based on their different ideological profiles towards democracy: "liberal democrats," "intolerant democrats," "paternalistic democrats," "homophobic democrats," "exclusionary democrats," and "ambivalent non-democrats."

Carlin and Singer (2011), performed an examination of citizens' support for the core values of "polyarchy," Robert Dahl's concept for real world approximations of true democracy (Dahl, 1971). They identified five profiles of citizens: "polyarchs," "hyper-presidentialists," "pluralist autocrats," "hedging autocrats," and "autocrats". They found that most Latin American respondents were not pure "polyarchs" or "autocrats," but showed mixed attitudes towards democracy. In an attempt to draw a clearer picture of the different groups of citizens they identified, they examined the socioeconomic, attitudinal and ideological correlates of the profiles and found that support for polyarchy is highest among the most educated, politically engaged, wealthy, and those who dislike the president (2011).

MEASURING "SOLID DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT"

This section presents the definition of democracy we use as a basis for assessing "solid democratic support." Following Munck and Verkuilen's (2002) advice, the section is divided into three parts: the first part addresses the issue of conceptualization, laying out the necessary conditions for a political system to be

considered a democracy. The second part tackles the measurement challenge, describing what data and indicators are used to operationalize solid democratic support. The third part explains the aggregation procedure chosen for constructing the solid support indicator, as well as the arguments behind that choice.

Conceptualization

One of the main arguments driving this article is that a measure of solid democratic support should consider citizen support for all essential attributes of democracy. What, then, are the essential features of a democratic system? In other words, what are the minimum necessary conditions for a political system to qualify as a democracy?

Multiple definitions of democracy have been offered throughout the last decades (see among others, Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Diamond & Morlino, 2004; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Tilly, 2007). In fact, it has been repeatedly described as an "essentially contested" concept (Gallie, 1956), in the sense that its definition is the focus of endless disputes that "although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence" (Gallie, 1956, p. 169). In recent years, however, a procedural minimum definition based on Robert Dahl's concept of "polyarchy" (1971) has gained acceptance as a reference point for operationalizations of the concept (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Alvarez *et al.*, 1996; Baker & Koesel, 2001; Carlin & Singer, 2011; Schneider, 2008; Vanhanen, 2003).

According to Dahl, the minimum requirements for "polyarchy" to exist are: (1) the right to vote; (2) freedom of organization; (3) freedom of expression; (4) equal eligibility for public office; (5) the right to compete for votes; (6) availability of diverse sources of information about politics; (7) free and fair elections; and (8) the dependence of public policies on citizens' preferences. These eight guarantees, Dahl argued, correspond to two separate underlying dimensions, contestation and inclusiveness, at both the conceptual and empirical levels. Contestation refers to the extent to which citizens have equal opportunities to express their views and form organizations. Inclusiveness refers to the variation in "the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government..." (1971, p. 4). Dahl claimed that these two dimensions vary somewhat independently and that they are generally fundamental, in the sense that they are not artifacts of time or geography.

Various empirical studies of quality of democracy and democratization have adapted Dahl's ideas to construct indices of democracy. In fact, most of the best known indices of democracy (Alvarez *et al.*, 1996; Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990; Freedom House, 2015b; Gastil, 1991; Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) have been

measuring variations of Dahl's two dimensions (Coppedge *et al.*, 2008). The majority of these indices have primarily focused on the contestation dimension, while only a few have included the inclusiveness dimension (Coppedge *et al.*, 2008).

This article follows Dahl's concept of polyarchy and its two dimensions to specify the definition of democracy used for assessing solid democratic support. In addition to polyarchy's dimensions of contestation and inclusiveness, one more dimension is included in our definition. The additional dimension deals with support for a key aspect of democratic institutionality: an appropriate system of checks and balances. In their examination of citizen support for democratic ideals and institutions in the Americas, Carlin and Singer note that besides including support towards contestation and inclusiveness, measures of democratic support should also capture "citizens' orientations to the basic institutions that undergird these twin dimensions" (2011, p. 1505). In this line, they introduce a dimension labeled "institutions and processes" which measures respect for the institutions charged with exercising the checks and balances necessary to ensure the correct functioning of a democratic system.

In sum, the definition of democracy used in this article to assess solid democratic support consists of three dimensions: "contestation," "inclusiveness," and "checks and balances". All three dimensions are considered necessary conditions for a political system to be deemed a democracy and consequently, support towards all three is necessary for a person to be considered to have solid democratic support.[4]

Measurement

Data for constructing the solid support indicator is taken from the 2006/2007 round of the AmericasBarometers, a series of national representative surveys conducted by Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).[5] The 2006/2007 round of the AmericasBarometers included a series of questions that asked citizens about their attitudes towards different democratic principles and institutions, which have not been asked again in their entirety up to the date of publication of this article. A total of seven items were selected to operationalize the three dimensions outlined in the previous section —three in the

4. While this article argues that the three dimensions specified are necessary conditions for a political system to be considered a democracy, no claims are made that the three of them taken together is sufficient for a system to be considered democratic. There may be other attributes that political systems are required to have to be considered democratic.

5. The authors thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.

case of "contestation" and two in the cases of "inclusiveness" and "checks and balances." By no means are the selected items considered to be perfect measures of the concepts they aim to assess: it is evident that some are better measures than others; but they all are –to our judgment– the best indicators the database offered for each concept's particular case. All indicators included in each dimension are considered to be formative indicators: that is, support towards every one of them is considered as necessary for their corresponding dimension to be fulfilled. In this line, support towards all seven indicators used is seen as a necessary condition for a person to be considered to have solid democratic support.

a) Contestation

Several scholars have interpreted the dimension of democratic contestation as focusing solely on the electoral process: "democracy, for us, is thus a regime in which some governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections" (Alvarez *et al.*, 1996, p. 4). There are other authors, however, that include subcomponents such as freedom of organization, freedom of expression and pluralism in the media (Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990). In Dahl's original terms, contestation refers to "the extent of permissible opposition, public contestation, or political competition" (1971, p. 4). While there is no doubt that free and fair elections are of utmost relevance for any democratic system, we argue that the existence of contestation should not be exclusive to the electoral process, but be extended to daily political practices. For this reason, we advocate a broad understanding of contestation and use three indicators for measuring support towards the distinct subcomponents of freedom of organization, freedom of press, and freedom of opposition.[6]

b) Inclusiveness

The dimension of inclusiveness has been neglected from various indices of democracy, for diverse reasons (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). For example, Alvarez et. al. (1996) and Coppedge & Reinicke (1990) argue that their research is concerned with the post-World War II era and that universal suffrage can be taken for granted in this period. However, while it could be argued that universal suffrage is an attribute of democracy that could be taken for granted today, the same is not necessarily true with citizen attitudes towards it. As the aim of this article is

6. The survey questions used to assess these and all following indicators are presented in the online appendix.

assessing citizens' attitudes towards the fundamental attributes of democracy, it is necessary to also include the dimension of inclusiveness in our analysis. In this line, we use two indicators to assess support towards inclusiveness, conceived here as the extent to which every citizen has the right to participate in political life. The first one concentrates on the most common conception of the inclusiveness dimension, that is, the universal right to vote. But participation in the political process should not be solely interpreted as having the right to vote: it also implies citizens having equal eligibility for public office (Dahl, 1971). Therefore, we include a second item in our assessment of inclusiveness that taps opinions towards the universal right of running for public office.

c) Checks and balances

Finally, the dimension of checks and balances aims to tap citizen respect for the institutions responsible of exercising these controls in a democratic system. Here, we borrow the conceptualization of this dimension from Carlin and Singer (2011) and operationalize it, as they did, through two items that tap respect for the legislative, and respect for the judiciary.

Table 1 presents the percentages of respondents who support each of the seven components discussed above, both for Chile and Venezuela. Interesting findings can be highlighted. First, it is relevant to note that the components that have to do with what we have called "checks and balances" (or respect for institutions) are the ones that -by far– receive the most support in both countries: more than 80% of citizens express respect for the judiciary and for the legislative, both in Chile and in Venezuela. On the other hand, the two items tapping attitudes towards inclusiveness are the ones that suffer from the least support, again in both countries: while in Venezuela the universal right to vote and to run for public office are supported by close to 60% of the respondents, in Chile these components of democracy receive the astonishingly low levels of approximately 40% each. The items tapping the "contestation" dimension of democracy lie somewhere in between the "checks and balances" and the "inclusiveness" dimensions in both countries.

Table 1. Support for each of the components of democracy (%)

	Chile	Venezuela
Freedom of organization	68.4	68.1
Freedom of press	80.6	69.7
Freedom of opposition	74.8	61.9

	Chile	Venezuela
Universal right to vote	43.7	58.3
Universal right to run for public office	40.3	56.7
Respect for legislative	88.3	82.7
Respect for judiciary	89.0	82.9

Source: AmericasBarometer 2006/2007

Aggregation

Solid democratic support is defined as having consistent positive attitudes towards all of democracy's essential components. Because all seven indicators described above tap distinct essential features of democratic rule, they are all considered necessary conditions for a complete understanding of solid support. In this line, we argue that only those citizens who show positive attitudes towards each and every one of the seven indicators are considered to have this type of support.

A common mistake made by theorists of democracy is that "almost everyone, which is a large number of people, conceptualizes democracy in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but at the same time almost no quantitative measures use the mathematics of logic appropriate to the concept. Instead the inappropriate mathematics of addition, average, and correlation are almost universally adopted" (Goertz, 2006, p. 11). In fact, by relying on aggregation rules based on addition or correlation, such as factor analysis, the empirical measurement of democracy usually falls prey to what he calls the most common form of measurement-concept inconsistency: "a necessary and sufficient concept with an additive (or averaging) measure" (Goertz, 2006, p. 98).

To avoid this mistake, we construct a binary non-compensatory composite score as the measure of solid democratic support. The construction process itself was made up of three steps. In the first step, answers to all seven indicators measuring support for democracy's essential attributes were recoded in binary fashion, where positive answers were given a score of 1 and all other answers a score of 0. In the second step, the scores of all seven binary items were added to create an aggregated variable with scores ranging from 0 to 7. Finally, the binary non-compensatory composite indicator of "solid support for democracy" was constructed, where only scores of 7 in the aggregated variable were recoded as "solid support".[7]

7. For complete details on the three steps followed to construct the "solid democratic support" indicator, refer to the online appendix.

The use of a non-compensatory composite indicator as the measure of solid democratic support is the most appropriate, as the primary interest of this article is differentiating those citizens who have consistent positive attitudes towards *all* of democracy's essential features from those who show inconsistent (or even negative) attitudes. This argument is similar to the one proposed by Alvarez et al. (1996) for developing their dichotomous classification of political regimes. These authors justify their use of a nominal classification to differentiate between "democracies" and "dictatorships" with the argument that "the analogy with the proverbial pregnancy is thus that while democracy can be more or less advanced, one cannot be half-democratic: there is a natural zero point" (Alvarez *et al.*, 1996, p. 21). In this article, that natural zero point is having solid democratic support: here, we are not interested in finding the degree of democratic support an individual has, but in differentiating those who have consistent democratic attitudes from all others. The advantage of using a non-compensatory composite indicator is that, unlike factor scores, it does not allow for negative answers to one or more questions to be compensated by positive answers to the other questions included in the index, that way avoiding possible conceptualization-measurement inconsistencies.[8]

CASE SELECTION: CHILE AND VENEZUELA

We have argued that expressing support for the ideal of democracy in the abstract does not necessarily imply supporting democracy's essential principles; and that because of this, democratic support should be studied by looking at support for the fundamental attributes of a democratic system. As well, we argue that supporting democracy in one place does not necessarily mean the same as supporting it in a different one. Both the meaning and the nature of support for democracy may vary depending on the context. In this sense, it is illustrative to perform a comparative examination of countries where the democratic support debate has been constructed on different terms. We have selected Chile and Venezuela as this article's cases of study because they are two countries with transcendental differences in their democratic trajectories that make them appropriate for comparative analysis.

Prior to its dramatic democratic breakdown in 1973, Chile enjoyed a relatively long history of democracy, with a party system and institutions similar to those

8. Also, the use of a non-compensatory composite indicator implies all indicators used in the analysis are given the same importance for the final measure. Thus, it makes no sense in applying different weights to the indicators if they are all considered necessary for a complete understanding of solid support.

found in Western Europe (Valenzuela, 1977). The *coup d'état* of September 11, 1973 resulted in the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, which lasted until 1990. This regime, despite facing intense internal problems and widespread international rejection, managed to maintain a great deal of support among important sectors of the Chilean population throughout its entire period. Even after the re-establishment of democracy, support to Pinochet's regime has been substantial, to the extent that the authoritarian-democratic conflict was a defining cleavage in the formation of the Chilean party system (Torcal & Mainwaring, 2003). In fact, both sides were represented in the post-dictatorship party system: in broad terms, the authoritarian side through the right-wing *"Renovación Nacional"* and *"Unión Democrática Independiente"* parties and the democratic side through the leftist *"Concertación"* coalition.

There is little doubt that Pinochet's regime has been very influential in shaping Chileans' political attitudes in the last decades. It is on these grounds that debates about democracy in Chile have been held upon: Chilean citizens have been permanently exposed to discussions held by elites who strongly promoted democracy and its values versus those who were, to call it somehow, more "sympathetic" to authoritarian regimes, personified by Pinochet. This is particularly the case for older citizens who experienced the dictatorship firsthand and are able to compare it to the democratic regimes that came after 1990. But even for the younger generations, the authoritarian-democratic conflict has been a defining issue, as it has been the basis of the competition between the Chilean political parties. This has been exemplified in the 2019 and 2020 protests, where demonstrations composed mostly of young university students focused on showing rejection of alleged features of the Pinochet regime that were still present within the constitution and the economic model.

Some preliminary hypotheses can be proposed from the nature of the debate on democratic support in Chile. First, that individuals' self-placement in the left-right scale should have an influence on their attitudes towards democracy: because Pinochet's regime can be considered a "right-wing dictatorship" it would be expected that those who locate themselves on the left side of the scale would be more supportive of democracy. This should occur for both measures of support: Chilean left-wingers should show a greater tendency to both support democracy as an ideal and to have solid democratic support.

One might also expect a positive effect of age on support for democracy. It can be argued that those who experienced Pinochet's dictatorship firsthand will appreciate the virtues of democratic governance more than their fellow citizens who were politically socialized after the dictatorship had ended. However, this might not necessarily be the case as a good percentage of Chile's older population supported Pinochet during his regime and afterwards, making it also possible that the effect of age on support for democracy is null.

In Venezuela, the debate on democratic support in the last decades has been built on very different grounds. Unlike Chile, Venezuela did not have an authoritarian regime since democracy was reestablished in 1959 until very recently, which makes it one of the longer lasting representative democracies in the region, despite its clear deficiencies (Coppedge, 2005; Roberts, 2003). The political elites in Venezuela have not constructed the regime debate in terms of preferences for authoritarianism versus preferences for democracy, as in Chile, but in terms of how democracy's functioning could be improved (Canache, 2002). This conflict has been exacerbated in the last decades since the arrival of Hugo Chávez to the presidency of the republic and the subsequent continuation of his regime and discourse by the current president Nicolás Maduro.

Venezuelan democracy since Chávez's arrival has undergone important transformations. The increasing concentration of power on the executive branch has resulted in an almost inexistent horizontal accountability (Frank, 2010). Freedoms of expression and organization have been substantially weakened, and several concerns about the validity of the electoral processes held in the past decade have been voiced in the media. This led opposition parties and media to continuously refer to Chávez's regime as a dictatorship. Chávez himself, on the other hand, heavily promoted his regime as the *Revolución Bolivariana*, a true democracy that is deeply transforming Venezuela. This resulted in the polarization of the Venezuelan electorate around the figure of Chávez, and ultimately, around two different conceptions of democracy (Moncagatta, 2013). On one side, stand the citizens who sympathize with Chávez and believe that "democracy" is the type of regime that his and Maduro's government have established. On the other side, stand Chávez's opponents, who believe "democracy" is something else, a regime different from the one the incumbent government has been promoting throughout the last decade.

The influence of Chávez in Venezuelan politics makes it safe to argue that Venezuelans' political attitudes in the last decades have been shaped by citizens' alignments in respect to him and with the different understandings of democracy that arise from these alignments. The debate over democracy in Venezuela has not revolved around the question of whether people prefer democracy over authoritarian regimes, as in Chile, but if they prefer a certain kind of democracy over another. In other words, if they are *"Chavist"* democrats or not.

At least two conceptions of democracy are present in Venezuela's political scenario, and it is important to identify what specific attitudes are related to each conception. Because the conception of democracy Chávez and Maduro have promoted is one that has allowed concentration of power in the executive, limits on freedom of expression and organization, and other non-democratic practices, it could be expected that citizens who align themselves with this conception of democracy will, in general, possess weaker democratic attitudes, at least in the measurement of solid

democratic support. In this sense, citizens who evaluate Chávez's mandate in positive terms should tend to show lower levels of solid democratic support than their counterparts who evaluate his performance in poor terms. If ideology is to have any effect on Venezuelans' support for democracy, it should be in the opposite direction than in Chile: because Chávez's regime is considered by his opponents as a "left-wing populism" (and even dictatorship), it should be expected that right-wingers in Venezuela show stronger democratic attitudes.

However, it is likely that there is no relationship between support for the ideal of democracy and alignment with Chávez. It is impossible to know what type of regime people are supporting in Venezuela when they agree with the statement that "democracy is always preferable" in a survey question. The support expressed might be support towards Chávez's *democracia bolivariana* or it might be support towards a completely different -and utterly opposed– model of democracy. What citizens' conceptions of democracy are should not make a difference, at least in principle, in the levels and explanations of support for democracy as an ideal.

SUPPORT FOR THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY VS. SOLID DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT

Democracy is a concept which in general has positive connotations, and it can be expected that most people express support for it, whether that expressed support is based on real attitudes or not. In this line, there are reasons to be suspicious about the levels of support for a concept with such positive connotations, as they might be inflated by the presence of vacuous conceptions of democracy, social desirability and a number of other biases (Baviskar & Malone, 2004; Carlin & Singer, 2011; Carrión, 2008).

Figure 2 illustrates how both Venezuela and Chile appear to enjoy high levels of support for the ideal of democracy when assessed through the Linzian indicator. Venezuela displays outstanding and quite stable levels of around ninety percent of the people who answer that "democracy is preferable to any other type of regime" between 2006 and 2014. These levels of support are among the highest recorded in the Americas throughout the whole period, and as high as the levels found in the last decade in some of the most advanced Western European democracies (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Diamond & Plattner, 2008; Klingemann, 1999; Lagos, 2003). Chile also shows stable levels of support for the ideal of democracy in the same period, although somewhat lower than the ones found in Venezuela. While a strong majority of the Chilean population still supports democracy as an ideal, there is a history of sympathy for authoritarian regimes, a legacy of Pinochet's rule. It is no surprise to find that throughout the whole period (2006-2014),

there is roughly a quarter of the Chilean samples who stated to be either open to the possibility of having an authoritarian regime or indifferent to the type of regime.

Figure 2. Support for the ideal of democracy through time (% of people who believe democracy is preferable)



Source: AmericasBarometers Surveys (Latin American Public Opinion Project)

Figure 3 compares the levels of support for the ideal of democracy and the constructed measure of solid democratic support found in Chile and Venezuela in the 2006/2007 wave of the AmericasBarometer survey. There is a large difference between the percentages of citizens who express support for the ideal of democracy and those who have consistent democratic attitudes and can be considered to have solid democratic support: only around a fifth of the samples in both countries can be considered to have solid democratic support. While Venezuela presents a higher percentage of citizens who have solid democratic support than Chile, the difference in this measure is substantially smaller than the one found between both countries on support for the ideal of democracy. As well, it seems clear that these indicators are not measuring the same, as they are only weakly correlated, with r = 0,195 in Venezuela and r = 0,150 in Chile.[9]

9. The numbers refer to Pearson's r correlation coefficients, and both were significant at the 0.01 level. The correlations were calculated between the binary measure of solid democratic support and a recoded version of the Linzian indicator, where 1 = "support for the ideal" and 0 = "all other answers".

Figure 3. Support for the ideal of democracy vs. Solid democratic support



Source: 2006/2007 AmericasBarometer (Latin American Public Opinion Project)

EXPLANATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT

The assessment of the sources of citizens' support for democratic rule has been an important and recurrent issue in the political attitudes literature. Despite the considerable efforts deployed in identifying the variables that influence support for democracy, no clear consensus has been achieved among scholars. Common explanations have stressed the roles of early socialization processes (Easton & Dennis, 1967; Inglehart, 2003), interpersonal trust and social capital (Putnam, 1993), institutional arrangements (Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Norris, 1999), citizens' previous electoral experiences (Anderson *et al.*, 2005; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Singh *et al.*, 2011), or the performance of democratic institutions and leaders (Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Whitefield & Evans, 1999). While all of these factors have been shown to play a role, the variation of their influence across contexts has been significant and few sound conclusions have been reached.

This section examines the correlates of support for the ideal of democracy and solid democratic support in both Chile and Venezuela. The aim is twofold: first, to demonstrate that explanations of supporting the ideal of democracy may differ from explanations of solid democratic support. Second, to distinguish

the different effects variables show in different contexts. With these objectives in mind, two logistic regression models were specified for each country: the first, for support for the ideal of democracy, and the second, for solid democratic support.

The independent variables used in the regression models include some of the usual predictors found in theoretical explanations of support for democracy. A first set includes six relevant modernization and demographic variables: age, gender, education, wealth, urban/rural residence, and religion. A second set of variables deals with psychological engagement in politics, and includes measures of political interest and political knowledge. A third set is composed of political variables and includes ideology -through the use of left-right self-placement– and a variable that distinguishes citizens who voted for a losing candidate in the last presidential election. Finally, three variables assessing short-term outputs of the political system were included: the first is an evaluation of the president's performance while the other two are current evaluations of the country's economy and of personal finances.[10]

Table 2 presents the results of the four logistic regression models, expressed in odds ratios. The dependent variable used in the models of support for the ideal of democracy is again the Linzian indicator, recoded in binary fashion: answers stating that "democracy is preferable to any other form of government" were given a value of "1" (supporters) and those who chose either of the two other answer possibilities (non-supporters/indifferent) were given a value of "0". The dependent variable used in the models of solid democratic support is the binary indicator constructed previously with "1" equating to solid support.

Table 2. Logistic regression estimates for support for democracy (odds ratios)

	Venezuela (ideal)	Venezuela (solid)	Chile (ideal)	Chile (solid)
Age	1.010 (0.008)	0.999 (0.007)	1.016** (0.005)	1.001 (0.006)
Gender (female)	1.097 (0.208)	0.836 (0.152)	1.019 (0.153)	0.756 (0.128)
Education (years)	1.087** (0.028)	1.002 (0.024)	1.015 (0.026)	1.014 (0.030)

10. For details on the wordings of the original questions and any recodings performed, refer to the online appendix. To facilitate the interpretation of the regression coefficients, all independent variables were recoded from negative (left) to positive (right) when necessary.

	Venezuela (ideal)	Venezuela (solid)	Chile (ideal)	Chile (solid)
Wealth (quintiles)	1.013 (0.066)	1.110 (0.068)	1.039 (0.067)	1.073 (0.080)
Residence (urban)	1.250 (0.512)	0.837 (0.399)	0.984 (0.216)	1.421 (0.417)
Religion (catholic)	0.806 (0.201)	1.096 (0.275)	1.166 (0.181)	0.831 (0.143)
Political interest	0.945 (0.090)	0.850 (0.080)	1.025 (0.084)	1.130 (0.098)
Political knowledge	0.987 (0.067)	1.217** (0.083)	1.202** (0.072)	1.152* (0.082)
Left-right self-orientation	1.024 (0.032)	1.051 (0.034)	0.851*** (0.028)	0.937 (0.034)
Voted for losing candidate	0.741 (0.240)	1.385 (0.339)	0.640* (0.112)	0.950 (0.197)
Evaluation of president	0.711** (0.081)	0.807* (0.082)	1.170 (0.116)	0.920 (0.101)
Evaluation of country's economy	0.818 (0.102)	0.778* (0.088)	1.293* (0.129)	1.330* (0.152)
Evaluation of personal economy	1.150 (0.142)	1.054 (0.125)	0.856 (0.093)	0.846 (0.101)
Observations	920	920	1141	1141
Pseudo R^2	0.050	0.081	0.073	0.044

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: AmericasBarometer 2006/2007

DISCUSSION

There are clear differences in the variables that show significant relationships to the two conceptions of democratic support. This is evidence that it is not the same to express support for the ideal of democracy as an abstract concept as to expressing support for an indicator that incorporates the essential attributes of

democracy. In Venezuela, only the evaluation of the president has a significant effect in both the models for support for the ideal and solid support. This effect is negative, implying that those citizens who evaluate the president the best tend to show less support for democracy, both as an ideal and as solid democratic attitudes. In Chile, there are two variables that show significant effects for both conceptions of support: political knowledge and the evaluation of the country's economy all have similar effects in both of the models.

The table also shows that the reasons behind support for the ideal of democracy and solid support are not the same in Venezuela as in Chile. In the case of solid support, there is only one variable –political knowledge– that has a similar significant effect in both countries: people who know more about politics tend to show more solid support for democracy in both Chile and Venezuela. An interesting variable is the evaluation of the country's economy, which has significant effects in the solid support models in both countries, but while in Venezuela it shows a negative effect, in Chile it has a positive effect. This is a relevant finding that reinforces the argument that the political context should be taken into account when studying support for democracy. While Carlin and Singer, in their region-wide analysis of the Americas, found that "citizens who judge the national economy as strong or report an improved personal situation are significantly less supportive of polyarchy" (2011, p. 1518), in Chile we find the exact opposite: as evaluations of the national economy improve, there is a higher tendency to have solid democratic support (and support for the ideal of democracy, as well). This suggests that performing analysis of political attitudes without considering the political context may obscure important relationships and lead to erroneous generalizations.

In the case of support for the ideal of democracy, there are no variables that have significant effects across both countries. In Venezuela, only education and evaluation of the president show significant effects in this model. This implies that the more educated and those who give worse evaluations of Chávez tend to show more support for democracy as an ideal, as was proposed in the preliminary hypotheses offered for Venezuela. Having only two variables that show significant coefficients in this model could be related to the fact that the regime debate in Venezuela revolves around different conceptions of democracy, and it is more difficult to discern which conception citizens have in mind when expressing support for democracy in the abstract. While a good proportion of the citizens (85.8%) expressed support for democracy through this indicator, it is likely that many of them expressed support for different conceptions of democracy. In this context, it makes little sense to try to find explanations for support for a unitary conception of democracy. When, in the abstract, there are at least two conceptions of the ideal of democracy competing, any explanatory model will face difficulties, as it will be in fact explaining two concepts instead of one. This seems to be the case for support for the ideal of democracy in Venezuela.

In Chile, a different scenario can be seen regarding support for the ideal of democracy: five variables have significant relationships to this measure. These are: age, political knowledge, left-right self-placement, evaluation of the country's economy and having voted for a losing candidate. One could argue that Pinochet's dictatorship serves as a clear reference point that grounds Chileans' attitudes towards the concept of democracy. In this sense, the regime debate is primarily framed in terms of democracy versus authoritarianism and because the dichotomy is held in these terms, it could be proposed that Chileans have a more unitary conception of democracy than Venezuelans. In general terms, support for democracy in Chile means one thing: opposition to authoritarianism. This could be a reason why possible explanations gain weight, and we find more independent variables that show statistically significant coefficients in Chile than in Venezuela.

The finding that older Chilean citizens tend to show more support for democracy as an ideal (but not as solid democratic attitudes) confirms the hypothesis that those who experienced Pinochet's regime first-hand would show more democratic support, at least as an abstract concept. But for Chile the most interesting findings regarding support for the ideal of democracy probably have to do with political variables: both left-right self-placement and having voted for a losing candidate in the last presidential election show negative effects to support for the ideal. As expected, Chilean left-wingers are more likely to support the ideal of democracy: after all, they are the ones that have fought for democracy in Chile since the transition period of the eighties and nineties. In that same line, it is not surprising to find that voting for a losing presidential candidate (the right wingers Sebastián Piñera and Joaquín Lavín, in this case) decreases the probabilities of expressing democratic support. Finally, the evaluation of the country's economy shows a positive, significant effect to both support for the ideal of democracy and solid democratic support in Chile: it is not surprising that well-evaluated short-term outputs have a positive relationship to democratic attitudes, in general.

Differences in Venezuela can be found regarding the variables that have effect on solid democratic support. As stated previously, those who give worse evaluations of Chávez have a higher probability of showing solid democratic support. In the same line we find those who evaluate the country's economy the worse and the wealthier citizens, who are, most likely, Chávez´s opposers. What is interesting is to see that a variable like the evaluation of the personal economy has no significant effect (in any of the models, as a matter of fact). In conclusion, those in opposition to Chávez appear to possess more democratic attitudes than the president's supporters. As to the positive effect of political knowledge (also found in Chile), it is not surprising to find that those most knowledgeable in politics have a stronger tendency to support democracy's core principles and institutions (Carlin & Singer, 2011).

Only few relevant explanations for solid democratic support in Chile are found. The only variables that show significant coefficients are political knowledge,

left-right self-placement and evaluation of the country's economy. In line to what was previously proposed, left-wingers have a higher tendency of showing solid democratic attitudes: it is seen that in Chile those citizens who locate themselves towards the left side of the ideological scale do not only have higher esteem for democracy as an ideal, but also higher support for the specific principles of democracy. Finally, it is seen that good evaluations of the country's economy are positively related to this type of support as well.

However, it is worth looking at recent political events, like the Chilean protests of 2019-2020 and the 2021 elections. The profile of most of the protesters, being young people sympathetic to the left, would give as a preliminary conclusion that their actions should be grounded in political attitudes with considerable levels of ideal and solid support for democracy. Nevertheless, there is another factor to consider: they also tended to be dissatisfied with the economic system, to which we attribute a negative effect on both types of support. It would appear that this discontent was building for years, and the result was an abysmal disconnect between the political elite and the citizenry (Luna, 2020). Despite systematically pursuing strategies that could be considered formal, the government of Piñera was unable to act in accordance with the increasingly pressing circumstances of inequality and insecurity in several areas of the country. For these reasons, it would seem coherent to argue that the activities that emerged from the demonstrations are the union of two perspectives that clashed with each other. The violent acts, contrary to the legitimate forms of protest in a democracy, and the demands aimed at detaching the regime from any remaining characteristics of the Pinochet dictatorship, make evident the conformation of a political culture composed of ideas with contrary effects on democratic support, demonstrating once again its relevance and complexity.

As for the 2021 electoral results in Chile, the inclination towards non-traditional parties seems to indicate that although the country's authoritarian past is still relevant, the most striking options for voters no longer follow this cleavage. While one of the main demands was constitutional change –which was approved by a large majority in a referendum in 2020– so was general dissatisfaction with the elites. In addition, concerns about political inequality and the lack of social mobility benefited candidates who politicized this discourse. This demonstrates the permanent relevance of economic perceptions in both ideal and solid democratic support: the hegemonic parties since the return to democracy focused their success on a narrative of development, which, when it lost credibility, led to a political, representative and systemic crisis. The result was the beginning of a cleavage that pitted the elites against the citizenry, although the latter was characterized by its heterogeneity. This heterogeneity resulted in the fact that, once the traditional parties lost ground, the ballot was inclined towards new faces, concentrating on the support for the current president Gabriel Boric and his opponent in the

second round, José Antonio Kast; but also in a great absenteeism: more than half of the population did not turn out to vote.

In summary, in both Chile and Venezuela the variables that focus on attitudes towards the political system and its outputs are the ones that seem to have relationships to citizens' support for democracy. While showing different patterns in the two countries, political knowledge, ideology, and evaluation of the president and of the country's economy demonstrate statistical significance, be it for support for the ideal of democracy or solid democratic support. Few other variables seem to play a role in influencing support for democracy, as modernization and demographic variables do not have any significant relationship to solid support, except for wealth in Venezuela, while only age in Chile and education in Venezuela have significant coefficients in the models of support for the ideal of democracy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Almost fifty years after the "third wave of democratization" (Huntington, 1991) began, democracy is far from being consolidated in many nations throughout the world. The severe problems numerous countries in Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, and Asia are currently facing are examples of why it is still important today to understand the conditions that lead to stronger democratic cultures. This study offers useful insights that can contribute to a better comprehension of citizen support for democratic rule.

Conclusions at various levels are obtained. First, the most evident: assessing support for democracy through the use of an only indicator is a limited approach. As Mishler and Rose (2001) have argued, asking citizens about support for an abstract concept such as democracy will lead to unclear conclusions, as people have different things in mind when thinking about this issue. It is unwise to perform comparative analyses of support for democracy by using only one indicator, as it is necessary to probe deeper into the specific meanings democratic support holds for different citizens to obtain any useful substantive insights on the concept. Multidimensional perspectives for the analysis of citizens' attitudes towards democratic rule will certainly yield more informative conclusions than unidimensional analyses.

Second, the specific meaning that support for democracy adopts can vary depending on the political context. In some places, ideology will play a stronger role, in others, economic evaluations, and so on. In order to understand support for democracy in a particular context, it is necessary to take into account the political history of the country, and the grounds upon which the regime debate has been constructed on. It was seen, for example, that evaluations of the economy had a positive relationship to democratic support in Chile, while having a negative relationship in Venezuela. Performing aggregated region-wide analyses of democratic

support can very likely obscure important substantive findings such as this. Supporting democracy in one place may mean something very different than in another, and only by considering the specificities of the particular context can one achieve a clear understanding of the issue.

Very low levels of solid democratic support were found in both countries. Is this something to be alarmed about? Questions concerning what is in fact important for a democratic regime can be raised. It has been repeatedly argued in the literature that support for democracy is a healthy characteristic for a democratic regime, if not essential to its survival. What, however, should we take as important for the strengthening of democratic cultures: the very high levels found of support for the ideal of democracy, or the much lower levels found of solid support? It is not implausible to hypothesize that a measure of solid support for democracy, such as the one proposed here, could be a stronger indicator of democratic stability than traditional measures of support for the ideal of democracy.

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APPENDIX I. DETAILS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE "SOLID DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT" INDICATOR

Step 1. Recoding of the original questions into binary variables of support for each democratic attribute.

a) 'Contestation' dimension

1) Freedom of organization: "To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting the meetings of any group that criticizes (the country's) political system?" (10-point scale: 1 = strongly disapprove –> 10 = strongly approve) scores 1 -> 4 = "1" (support); scores 5 -> 10 = "0" (non-support)

2) Freedom of press: "To what extent do you approve or disapprove of the government censoring any media that criticized it?" (10-point scale: 1= strongly disapprove –> 10 = strongly approve) scores 1 -> 4 = "1" (support); scores 5 -> 10 = "0" (non-support)

3) Freedom of opposition: "Taking into account the current situation of (the country), I would like you to tell me with which of the following statements do you agree with more? (a) It is necessary for the progress of the country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of the opposition parties, or (b) Our presidents have to permit that the opposition parties enjoy all the liberty to oppose to the president's policies with their voice and vote, even if the opposition parties delay the progress of the country".

Answer 'b' = "1" (support); answer 'a' = "0" (non-support)

b) 'Inclusiveness' dimension

1) Universal right to vote: "There are people who speak negatively of (the country's) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote?" (10-point scale: 1 = strongly disapprove –> 10 = strongly approve) scores 7 -> 10 = "1" (support); scores 1 -> 6 = "0" (non-support)

2) Universal right to run for public office: "There are people who speak negatively of (the country's) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to seek public office?" (10-point scale: 1 = strongly disapprove –> 10 = strongly approve) scores 7 -> 10 = "1" (support); scores 1 -> 6 = "0" (non-support)

c) 'Checks and balances' dimension

1) Respect for legislative: "Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds for the president to close down the Congress or do you think there can never be a sufficient reason to do so?" (yes / no). Answer 'no' = "1" (support); answer 'yes' = "0" (non-support)

2) Respect for judiciary: "Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds to dissolve the Supreme Court of Justice, or do you think that there can never be sufficient grounds to do so?" (yes / no). Answer 'no' = "1" (support); answer 'yes' = "0" (non-support)

Step 2. Aggregation of all the binary variables

All of the binary variables created in the first step were added together to create an aggregated variable of support for democracy's essential attributes, with scores ranging from zero to seven.

Step 3. Recoding of the aggregated variable into the 'solid democratic support' indicator.

The aggregated variable constructed in step two was recoded in the following way: **score 7 = "1" ('solid democratic support'); scores 0 -> 6 = "0" (non-support).**

APPENDIX II. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION MODELS: ORIGINAL QUESTIONS, SCALES, RECODINGS

Age:
Original question: **"**What is your age in years?"

Gender (female):
Original question: "Sex (note down; do not ask): (1) Male (2) Female"
(*Recoded as:* Female = 1; Male = 0).

Education (years):
Original question: "What was the last year of education you passed?"
____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university) =_____ total number of years [Use the table below for the code]

(for CHILE)	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th
None	0							
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Secondary	9	10	11	12				
University	13	14	15	16	17			
Superior (not University) / Technical	11	12	13					
DK / NA	88							

(for VENEZUELA)	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th
None	0					
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secondary ("basic")	7	8	9			
Secondary ("diversified")	10	11				
Superior (not University) / Technical	12	13	14	15		
University	12	13	14	15	16	17+
DK / NA	88					

Religion (catholic):
Original question: "What is your religion? [Don't read options] (1) Catholic (2) Non-Catholic Christian (including the Jehovah Witnesses) (3) Other non-Christian (4) Evangelical (5) None (8) doesn't know or doesn't want to say"
Recoded as: Catholic = 1; All others = 0.

Residence (urban):
Original question: "Code as 1. Urban 2. Rural"
Recoded as: Urban = 1; Rural = 0.

Wealth (quintiles):
The variable of "wealth (quintiles)" was developed based on an index of relative wealth, constructed by using indicators of ownership of the following assets:
Television set, refrigerator, cellular telephone, vehicle(s), washing machine, microwave oven, motorcycle, drinking water indoors, indoor bathroom, computer.
To estimate weights of the different assets for the index of relative wealth, principal components analysis was used. For details on the procedure refer to Filmer & Pritchett (2001), Ghalib (2011) and Vyas & Kumaranayake (2006).

Political interest:
Original question: "How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? 1) A lot 2) Some 3) Little 4) None 8) DK"
Recoded as: None = 1; Little = 2; Some = 3; A lot = 4.

Political knowledge:
Additive index constructed using correct answers to the following questions:

1. "What is the name of the current president of the United States?"
2. "What is the name of the President of Congress in (country)?"
3. "How many provinces does (country) have"
4. "How long is the presidential term in (country)?"
5. "What is the name of the president of Brazil?"

Left-right self-placement:
Original question: "On this sheet there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. Today, when we speak of political tendencies, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political tendency, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position (1=Left; 10=Right).

Evaluation of president:
Original question: "Speaking in general of the incumbent government/ administration, would you say that the work being done by President (NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT) is: [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) DK/NA".
Recoded as: Very bad = 1; Bad = 2; Neither good nor bad = 3; Good = 4; Very good = 5.

Voted for losing candidate:
(for Chile)
Original question 1: "For which candidate did you vote for President in the first round of the last presidential elections? [DON´T READ THE LIST] 0. No one (voted but left ballot blank or annulled their vote); 1. Michelle Bachellet; 2. Sebastián Piñera; 3. Joaquín Lavín; 4. Tomás Hirsch; 77. Other; 88. DK/NA; 99. Did not vote.
Original question 2: "For which candidate did you vote for President in the second round of the last presidential elections? [DON´T READ THE LIST] 0. No one (voted but left ballot blank or annulled their vote) 1. Michelle Bachellet; 2. Sebastián Piñera; 88. DK/NA; 99. Did not vote.
Recoded as: Loser = 1 (voted for a losing candidate on the first round (codes '2', '3', '4' or '77')); all others = 0.

(for Venezuela)
Original question: "For which candidate did you vote for President in the last presidential elections? 0. No one (voted but left ballot blank or annulled their vote) 1. Hugo Chávez; 2. Manuel Rosales; 77. Other; 88. DK/NA; 99. Did not vote.
Recoded as: Loser = 1 (voted for a losing candidate (codes '2' or '77')); all others = 0.

Evaluation of country's economy:
Original question: "How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know".
Recoded as: Very bad = 1; Bad = 2; Neither good nor bad = 3; Good = 4; Very good = 5.

Evaluation of personal economy:
Original question: How would describe your economic situation overall? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know".
Recoded as: Very bad = 1; Bad = 2; Neither good nor bad = 3; Good = 4; Very good = 5.

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CLIENTELIST MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OUTSIDE OF THE ELECTORAL ARENA

Movilización clientelar y participación política fuera de la arena electoral

Mobilização Clientelista e Participação Política Fora da Arena Eleitoral

CLAUDIO A. HOLZNER c.holzner@utah.edu [1]

[1] University of Utah

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Abstract
Scholarship on clientelist mobilization has focused almost exclusively on electoral clientelism, that is efforts by patrons and brokers to encourage turnout and participation in campaign rallies. What is less well understood is the impact of clientelist mobilization on other modes of political participation, like protest activity and citizen claim making. To fill this gap, I use LAPOP survey data from 2010 and 2014 to explore the relationship between vote-buying and nonelectoral forms of political activity. Despite the expectation by many that collective action and clientelist mobilization are incompatible, this study finds a strong relationship between vote-buying efforts and participation in protests in most of Latin America. Similarly, people who receive vote-buying offers are much more likely to engage in claim-making activities. I explore the mechanisms through which clientelism encourages political activism, highlighting ways that clientelist networks work through civic organizations and foster stronger partisan identities and greater political engagement.

Palabras clave:
clientelismo; compra de votos; protestas; reclamo; participación política

Resumen
Los estudios sobre la movilización clientelar se han enfocado casi exclusivamente en el clientelismo electoral, es decir, en los esfuerzos de los partidos y de los intermediarios para fomentar el voto y la participación en los actos de campaña. Lo que ha recibido mucha menos atención es el impacto de la movilización clientelista en las formas de participación política que desafían a las élites, como las protesta y los reclamos ciudadanos. Este estudio utiliza datos de encuestas de LAPOP de 2010 y 2014 para explorar el impacto de la compra de votos en formas no electorales de actividad política. A pesar de la expectativa que la acción colectiva y la movilización clientelar son incompatibles, este estudio demuestra una fuerte relación empírica entre la compra de votos y la participación en protestas en la mayoría de los países de Latinoamérica. Además, el análisis demuestra que es mucho más probable que las personas que reciben ofertas de compra de votos participen en la presentación de reclamos. Exploro los mecanismos a través de los cuales el clientelismo fomenta este activismo político, destacando el papel de organizaciones cívicas y la manera en que la movilización clientelar fomenta identidades partidistas y un mayor interés en asuntos políticos entre los ciudadanos.

Palavras-chave:
Clientelismo; compra de votos; protestos; reivindicações; participação política

Resumo
Os estudos sobre a mobilização do clientelismo têm se concentrado quase que exclusivamente no clientelismo eleitoral, ou seja, nos esforços dos partidos e intermediários para incentivar o voto e a participação em eventos de campanha. O que tem recebido muito menos atenção é o impacto da mobilização clientelista nas formas de participação política que desafiam as elites, como protestos e demandas cidadãs. Este estudo usa dados das pesquisas LAPOP de 2010 e 2014 para explorar o impacto da compra de votos em formas não eleitorais de atividade política. Apesar da expectativa de que ação coletiva e mobilização patronal sejam incompatíveis, este estudo demonstra uma forte relação empírica entre compra de votos e participação em protestos na maioria dos países latino-americanos. Além disso, a análise mostra que as pessoas que recebem ofertas de compra de votos têm muito mais chances de participar das reivindicações. Exploro os mecanismos pelos quais o clientelismo fomenta esse ativismo político, destacando o papel das organizações cívicas e a forma como a mobilização clientelista fomenta identidades partidárias e um maior interesse por questões políticas entre os cidadãos.

INTRODUCTION

Vote buying and other forms of clientelist mobilization are common in many developing countries, including those that have transitioned to democratic rule. The imperative to win elections in young democracies creates strong incentives for candidates and political parties to use patronage and clientelist exchanges to influence vote choice and encourage turnout to the polls. Scores of studies from Latin America and elsewhere make clear that these kinds of exchanges are tried and true strategies for getting individuals out to vote and participate in electoral

activities like campaign rallies (Brusco *et al*., 2004; Nichter, 2008; Szwarcberg, 2015; Stokes, 2005). What is less well understood is the impact of vote buying on nonelectoral forms of political participation like protest activity and citizen claim making.

The overwhelming assumption in the literature is that clientelism inhibits autonomous political participation and is particularly antagonistic to collective action and elite challenging political activity (Auyero *et al*., 2009; Hicken, 2011; Holzner 2004; Scott, 1972; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Clientelist networks are most often described as demobilizing structures based on asymmetrical power relations that allow elites to control and inhibit participation from below. (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980; Roniger, 1990; Scott, 1969, 1972; Stokes, 2005). Clientelism atomizes individuals, fragments organizations, and creates patterns of loyalty and dependence that discourage protest activity and community activism that might pose a challenge to elites (Lapegna, 2013; Price, 2019; Scott, 1972). Instead, elites steer political participation towards party and regime supportive activities but discourage and even suppress political activism in between elections (Wolfinger, 1972). At the individual level, clientelism is thought to inhibit the development of political attitudes and preferences over policy that are important motivators of nonelectoral forms of political participation (Epstein, 2009; Ruth, 2016). Studies of protest movements in Latin America similarly point to clientelism's demobilizing dynamics and emphasize the need for social movements to preserve their autonomy by rejecting clientelist exchanges. According to these studies, for collective mobilization to occur, organizations and social movements must reject and eschew clientelist exchanges (Escobar & Alvarez, 1998).

In contrast to this pessimism, recent studies, many based on case studies and deep ethnographic work, have shown that clientelism is not necessarily incompatible with non-electoral forms of political activity, even elite-challenging activities like protests and citizen claim making. In the case of the Argentinian *Piquetero* movement, for example, Poma (2020) finds that brokers and patrons helped promote citizen mobilization by disseminating information and by mobilizing and coordinating political activity. Similarly, Hilgers (2009) shows that brokers use their leverage over communities and individuals not only to encourage attendance at rallies and other politically supportive events, but also to mobilize participation in protests, demonstrations, and marches in order to make more forceful claims for government assistance. Rather than seeing clientelism and contentious collective action as opposites, Auyero *et al.* (2009) posit a recursive relationship through which "protest can actually emerge from patronage" (p. 7).

This emerging debate raises the question: Can vote buying foster political activism outside of the electoral arena? This article contributes to the literature on clientelist mobilization by analyzing the relationship between vote buying and non-electoral forms of political participation, in particular potentially elite

challenging political activities like protests and citizen claim making. Its main argument is that rather than suppressing political participation, experience with clientelism can motivate non-electoral political activism, making participation in protest activity and direct government contacting more likely. This effect operates through at least two mechanisms. First, although often described as promoting particularistic vertical relationships between patrons and individual clients (Roniger, 1990), modern-day clientelist networks typically operate through local organizations, which give patrons and brokers much of their power to monitor and mobilize individuals, as well as an efficient way to distribute benefits (Auerbach, 2017; Auyero, 1999, 2000; Boulding & Holzner, 2021; Garay *et al.*, 2020; Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Levitsky, 2003; Szwarcberg, 2015). The same organizational strength that allows patrons and brokers to get out the vote and ensure attendance at political rallies can be used to mobilize collective protests and claim making. But mobilization from within clientelist networks is not only a top-down affair. The organizational bases of clientelism may also empower individuals and communities to make claims on elites, for example to demand more assistance and to hold patrons accountable when clientelist exchanges break down (Auer &, 2017; Auerbach & Thachil, 2018; 2016, Nichter & Peress; 2012, Lapegna & Auyero).

Second, experiences with clientelism and the linkages to political parties that come with it may provide individuals with politically relevant experiences that teach them important political skills, piques their interest in public affairs, promotes political engagement, and strengthens party identification, all factors that are strongly correlated with increased political activity of all kinds. Rather than creating passive, apathetic and cynical subjects, experiences with clientelism may foster the attitudes and predispositions that motivate individuals to become more politically active.

Attention to these theoretical mechanisms is not new. A vibrant recent literature based primarily on qualitative evidence and single case studies has shown that clientelism can coexist with and even foster greater political activism among individuals. A principal contribution of this paper is to show that this relationship between vote-buying and political participation is common across Latin America. To do this it uses LAPOP's 2010 and 2014 AmericasBarometer survey data from 18 Latin American countries to examine the empirical relationship between vote buying and nonelectoral forms of political participation, namely protests and political contacting, also referred to as citizen claim making. The analysis shows that individuals who receive vote and participation buying offers are significantly more likely to protest and make demands on government officials, all else equal. The analysis also provides evidence for the hypothesized mechanisms: clientelism often operates through organizations and is positively associated with individual political attitudes that support independent activism.

CLIENTELISM AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The literature on clientelist mobilization is vast and thriving, particularly in Latin America where the transition to democracy failed to do away with political clientelism. Far from undermining clientelism, the return to competitive elections created powerful incentives for elites to use clientelist exchanges to encourage turnout, participation at political rallies, and buy votes in order to win elections. Perhaps because of this interest in elections, the current literature on political clientelism in Latin America focuses primarily on vote-buying and electoral clientelism, that is the exchange of material goods for votes and electoral support during electoral campaigns (Brusco *et al.*, 2004; Hicken, 2011; Nichter, 2008; Szwarcberg, 2015; Weitz Shapiro, 2012). This abundant literature on electoral clientelism contrasts sharply with a dearth of studies that explore the relationship between clientelism and nonelectoral modes of political activity like protesting and citizen claim making (but see Auyero *et al.*, 2009; Boulding & Holzner, 2021; Hilgers, 2009; Lapegna, 2013; Nichter, 2018). This bias toward electoral activity is so pervasive that many recent influential studies define political clientelism narrowly as the exchange of material goods for votes and attendance at political rallies (Brusco *et al.*, 2004; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Nichter, 2018; Hicken, 2011).[1] As a result, the possibility that autonomous political activity like protests or citizen demand making could emerge from within clientelist networks is rarely considered, and when considered typically dismissed (Price, 2019; Ruth, 2016; Scott, 1972; Stokes, 2005; Wolfinger, 1972).

This gap in the literature is rooted in part in the common assumption that clientelism discourages participation outside of the electoral arena (Gay, 1998). Scholarship has identified a long list of perverse dynamics that makes political activity like protests and citizen claim making unlikely when individuals and communities are enmeshed in clientelist networks. On the one hand, patrons have little incentive to mobilize participation that might place demands on them. Instead, patrons and brokers use their control over scarce resources to mobilize citizens into activities that enhance their own power, like political rallies and to the polls, but discourage any activity that challenges or puts pressure on elites (Boulding and Holzner, 2020). Wolfinger observed this difference between campaign and non-campaign activities in a classic analysis of machine-politics in the United States:

1. For example, in their influential study, Kitschelt and Wilkinson define clientelism as "the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services. While acknowledging the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding clientelism, Hicken (2011) also identifies voting as the essential kind of political support clients must provide in order to receive targeted benefits.

> *…the discipline of patronage compels campaign work. There are no such external inducements for most non-campaign political action. Indeed, because such activity usually consists of trying to exert pressure on public official, it is likely to be viewed with apprehension or disfavor by those machine politicians who dispense patronage. (Wolfinger, 1972: 370).*

In addition, virtually all studies agree that political clientelism is characterized by stark power asymmetries between patrons and clients that allow the former to control political participation from below and suppress elite challenging activities. According to Hicken, Scott and others, patrons possess a variety of tools to enforce client's compliance, from social ostracism to withholding of material benefits, and at times the threat of violence (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980; Hicken; 2011; Roniger, 1990; Scott, 1969, 1972). Clients, in contrast, are seen as deprived of meaningful opportunities to exit or exercise their voice, leading to what Stokes referred to as situations of perverse accountability where voters are accountable to politicians, rather than the other way around (Stokes, 2005).

Much of the literature also assumes that clientelism impedes collective action, especially contentious collective action and protests. Clientelist networks atomize communities and individuals, restrict the flow of information, inhibiting citizens' capacity for collective action or for the development of collective identities (Holzner, 2004; Scott, 1972). Patrons also use their access to resources to coopt and demobilize independent organizations and social movements, robbing them of their capacity to organize protests (Lapegna, 2013; Price, 2019). Where autonomous organizations exist, they often enter into clientelist exchanges in order to solve problems for members, but in so doing risk losing their ability to mobilize independently (Palmer-Rubin, 2019).

At the individual level, most studies agree that clientelism creates subjects rather than citizens. Individuals enmeshed in clientelist networks forgo long-term policy preferences and representation because they are primarily interested in securing immediate material resources, and remain uninterested in and unaware of policy implications, party labels or broader ideological debates (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Epstein, 2009; Ruth, 2016). Further, individuals enmeshed in clientelist networks don't need to develop knowledge of politics or of political issues to participate since brokers organize and coordinate their political participation. Some scholars go so far as to argue that clientelist linkages with political parties inhibit the development of political attitudes like an interest in politics or strong ideological views that are necessary for citizens to participate in politics on their own. (Epstein, 2009; Ruth, 2016).

In short, rather than mobilizing participation, patronage networks with their asymmetrical power relations and emphasis on loyalty and political support, are seen as demobilizing structures that inhibit political participation outside of the electoral arena. There is a lot of truth to these claims, and under certain conditions,

particularly authoritarian and monopoly clientelism, clients may have little power or ability to mobilize independently. Yet, a vibrant wave of recent research has emphasized that clientelism in democratic contexts is more complex and dynamic than these traditional depictions (Auerbach, 2016, 2017; Auyero, 1999, 2000; Hilgers, 2009; Garay *et al.*, 2020). Where elections are competitive and elites do not have a monopoly over state resources, clientelist linkages are less oppressive and less coercive than in the past. In such contexts, brokers compete with each other for the support of prospective clients, who in turn have more choice and autonomy in choosing which clientelist networks (if any) to join and which brokers to support (Auerbach & Thachil, 2018; Hilgers, 2012; Gay, 1998). Thus, in democratic contexts like those that exist in much of Latin America, clientelism need not be in opposition to elite-challenging political activism.

For example, with regard to citizen claim making Nichter (2018) argues that individuals, rather than being passive subjects constrained by the power asymmetries of clientelist networks, often *choose* to enter into clientelist exchanges in order to secure valuable resources and solve pressing problems. At election time they willingly attend political rallies and turn out to vote when asked. However, in between elections they will organize to request benefits from governments and political machines as a way to gauge the credibility of patrons' promises and hold them accountable should they fail to deliver the goods. If brokers or local officials are not responsive to petitioners, they risk losing credibility, community support, and ultimately political influence (Levitsky, 2003; Nichter, 2018; Szwarcberg, 2015).

In the case of India, Auerbach showed that local associations, even those linked to clientelist networks, provide a medium for individuals and communities to demand public goods and services, like paved roads, sewers, drainage, streetlights, and more from the state in between elections. (Auerbach, 2016, 2017). Though elites may control valuable and scarce resources, they rarely have a secure monopoly on government patronage and so face competition from rival patrons and rival clientelist networks. In such contexts, petitioning elites for government assistance and services, even if it occurs from within clientelist networks, may still be an autonomous and meaningful way that citizens forge relationships with the state, exert pressure on elites, and hold elites accountable in between elections (Auerbach, 2017; Auerbach and Thachil, 2018; Garay *et al.*, 2020; Nichter & Peress, 2016).

With regards to protests, mostly ethnographic studies have shown that clientelism is sometimes at the root of contentious collective action. This was the case, for example, with the Piquetero movement in Argentina, where protests and citizen claim making were influenced in important ways by clientelist networks and the organizational infrastructure they provided (Auyero, 2007; Auyero *et al.*, 2009; Poma, 2020). Similarly, in Bolivia patronage politics frequently gave rise to contentious collective action as part of the normal democratic process in which political parties fought for supporters and for political power (Lapegna & Auyero, 2012; Lazar,

2004). In Mexico City, Hilgers described ways in which leaders of urban popular organizations used clientelist strategies to mobilize protest and collective claim making activities both to demonstrate their power to political leaders above them, and to signal the relevance of membership to those below. At times protest and claim making activities *preceded* efforts to mobilize turnout and electoral support for political candidates (Hilgers, 2009). The imperative to mobilize protests and claim making activities may be most important when parties and brokers find themselves in the opposition and therefore without direct access to state resources. In such cases mobilizing supporters to make demands on the state is an important way that clientelist leaders demonstrate their ongoing mobilizational power and ability to advocate for supporters even though they do not control political office.

These studies also show that clientelism's grip on individuals, even very poor ones, is contingent on the quality, quantity and frequency with which patrons deliver goods (Auyero, 1999; Hilgers, 2009; Nichter, 2018). In contexts where organizations and patrons compete with each other, clients choose which organizations to join and which patrons to support (Auerbach & Thachil, 2018). If patrons fail to deliver on their promises or prove ineffective at securing goods and services for members, individuals may defect to other organizations or even launch contentious collective activities to demand the goods and services promised to them. In sum, all of this scholarship points to what Auyero, Lapegna, and Poma identify as a strong "recursive relationship" between clientelism and political participation. According to them, rather than suppressing elite challenging political activism, clientelism may lie at the root of collective action and claim making activities (Auyero *et al.*, 2009).

If these studies are correct that clientelism can foster participation in nonelectoral forms of political activism, analysis of LAPOP's AmericasBarometer surveys should reveal a positive relationship between receiving vote-buying offers and participation in protests and government contacting activity. Vote-buying is only one aspect of clientelist exchanges, but it is almost always present where clientelist linkages exist (Nichter, 2018), which makes it a reasonable proxy measure of the prevalence of clientelism in an area. However, using vote-buying to measure clientelistic recruitment might create a difficult test of this expectation since vote buying is closely associated with *electoral* clientelism and not necessarily with participation in nonelectoral activities. Also, receiving a vote-buying offer does not necessarily mean that individuals accepted the offer or that they are enmeshed in a clientelist network. Studies also show that such inducements can backfire, creating distrust in the political process and perhaps inducing apathy rather than activism (Carlin & Moseley, 2022; González Ocantos *et al.*, 2014). As such, if we observe a relationship between receiving vote-buying offers and participation in protests and contacting activity, we can have greater confidence that

clientelism more generally is associated with participation in nonelectoral political activities.

H1a (electoral mobilization): As a baseline expectation, individuals who receive a vote-buying offer should be more likely to report voting in elections and participating in campaign rallies and activities.

H1b (non-electoral mobilization): Individuals who receive a vote-buying offer are more likely to report participating in protests and contacting government officials.

Protests may seem like a threat to patrons whose main goal is to win elections and control political demands from below (Boulding & Holzner, 2020). But in certain contexts, especially where protests are commonplace or parties suddenly find themselves in the opposition, clientelist networks may supply individuals with the organizational support necessary to mobilize collective, even contentious political action (Moseley, 2018). In one of the few quantitative analyses of clientelism and protests, Moseley makes a strong case that clientelism and collective action can coexist in so-called "protest states" like Argentina and Bolivia. According to this argument, in countries where contentious behavior has been normalized as a political tool by both citizens and elites, political elites use the distribution of patronage to mobilize supporters into contentious collective activity in much the same way that they mobilize individuals and groups to the polls or to political rallies, for example through the offer of a material reward, or punishment in the case of non-participation (Moseley, 2018).

Though Moseley makes this argument for protest states like Argentina and Bolivia, there is no reason this dynamic cannot operate elsewhere, especially where clientelism is common and elections are competitive. The existence of competitive elections means that patrons and brokers will periodically lose elections and lack reliable access to state resources. In such situations mobilizing protests may be an effective way for patrons and brokers who are out of power to secure benefits for their members and demonstrate their ongoing relevance to clients. From this perspective, clientelist networks don't just coexist with protests, they may foster them by supplying the key structures and resources for individuals to participate in contentious collective action (Auyero *et al.*, 2009; Moseley, 2018).

H1c (institutional context): We should observe the relationship between vote-buying offers and participation in protests and contacting activity in a wide-range of institutional contexts, not just in contexts where protests are common.

Why would exposure to clientelism be related to participation in non-electoral activities? Recent scholarship, much of it based on detailed qualitative studies and

deep ethnographic work, suggests that experiences with clientelism may foster greater political activism through two causal mechanisms. First, because organizations are critical to both clientelism and participation, clientelist networks may supply individuals with the organizational support necessary to protest and carry out claim-making activities. Second, and somewhat counterintuitively, experiences with clientelism can help individuals develop political skills, political engagement, and strong party affiliations that support all kinds of political activity.

Clientelism, Organizations and Political Participation

Though many studies emphasize the individual and particularistic nature of clientelist exchanges, the reality is that clientelism often operates through both partisan and non-partisan community organizations where organizational leaders serve as brokers in clientelist exchanges (Auerbach, 2017; Auyero, 2000; Cornelius, 1974; Levitsky, 2003; Hilgers, 2009; Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015, Garay *et al.*, 2020). In fact, Holland and Palmer-Rubin find that organizational membership, not poverty or partisan activity, is the strongest predictor of exposure to vote buying in Latin America (2015). This makes sense since organizations increase both the effectiveness and efficiency of clientelist exchanges, giving brokers strong incentives to work through organizations (Boulding & Holzner, 2020, 2021). Organizations can make the distribution of benefits much more cost effective, since benefits are often granted to a group rather than to individuals. Perhaps more importantly, organizations do much of the work of monitoring behavior, distributing selective benefits, and mobilizing participation when necessary –all essential components to ensure the functioning of clientelist exchanges (Garay *et al.*, 2020).

Scholarship has long recognized the importance of *partisan* organizations for encouraging, cajoling, and coercing groups and individuals to participate primarily in *electoral* activities like voting and showing up at campaign rallies (Garay *et al.*, 2020; Stokes, 2005; Szwarcberg, 2015; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). In addition to mobilizing electoral support for candidates, partisan organizations at times also have interests in mobilizing supporters into non-electoral activities like contacting government officials and even protests. Partisan brokers will encourage contacting both to demonstrate their effectiveness in securing resources for supporters, and to signal their mobilizing capacity to party elites (Auyero, 2000; Szwarcberg, 2015). Similarly, Auyero and others have shown that partisan brokers sometimes play key roles in mobilizing clients into contentious collective acts like protests, riots, and even looting (Auyero, 2007; Poma, 2020).

Though much of the emphasis in the literature is on the role that partisan organizations play in mobilizing people into politics, more recently scholarship has

shown that clientelist networks also operate through and are sustained by local organizations which may have only loose connections to political parties (Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Garay *et al.*, 2020; Hilgers, 2009; Levitsky, 2003). Brokers are often not politicians but leaders of community organizations who seek out clientelist relationships in order to secure resources for their members and enhance their own status and legitimacy (Szwarcberg, 2015). In turn, community organizations provide clientelist networks the resources and mobilizational structures necessary to encourage not just voting, but also protest and contacting activity.

Whereas *party* brokers have a primary interest in mobilizing individuals to the polls around election time, *organizational* brokers represent the individual and collective interests of members and so have an interest in demanding and securing benefits on their behalf. In between elections they mobilize ongoing claim-making activities to ensure that promised goods and services are delivered after elections are over. In many cases, mobilizing claim making activities rather than turnout at rallies or polls is the imperative for organizational brokers since it is through contacting activities that they secure the benefits that organizations need to recruit and maintain members (Garay *et al.*, 2020; Palmer-Rubin, 2019). This collective pressure can take the form either of collective demand making, in which a community organization mobilizes members to make claims on local and national governments, or in the form of more contentious protests. As Garay *et al.* note, organizations help empower individuals to demand hard-to-access social policy benefits by helping them exert collective pressure to access such benefits (Garay *et al.*, 2020). Though this type of collective pressure from below may operate from within the logic of clientelism, often this kind of collective mobilization is autonomously organized, is less conditioned on partisan support, and maybe an effective means of holding political elites accountable.

In short, patrons and brokers interested in mobilizing individuals into protests and claim making activity can't do so effectively if they target primarily atomized individuals who do not participate in organizations. Instead, to mobilize individuals and groups efficiently and effectively, clientelist elites must tap into the mobilizational capacities of organizations by finding ways to enmesh whole organizations and their members in clientelist networks. One strategy for doing so is to offer gifts, services, and access to social policy benefits to organizations as a whole rather than to individuals. Thus, if the effect of clientelist recruitment on protest and contacting activity operates through community and partisan organizations, then we should expect that members of such organizations will be more likely to receive vote-buying offers than individuals who do not participate in such organizations.

H2 (organizational recruitment): Members of both partisan and non-partisan organizations should be more likely to receive vote and participation buying offers

than people who do not participate in community organizations. Members of partisan organizations should be the most likely to receive such offers, but vote-buying should also be common among members of non-political and community organizations.

Clientelism and Participatory Attitudes

Exposure to vote and participation buying offers may also have the counterintuitive effect of producing the skills, the interest in politics, and the partisan loyalties that supports higher levels of political activism even in the absence of external mobilization efforts. One of the best predictors of political participation is past political activity, so participation in rallies, meetings, and elections mobilized from within clientelist networks may provide individuals with valuable political experiences that supports further political activism. Canel (2012), Hilgers (2009), and others have documented ways that clientelism has positive effects on collective action and political involvement by providing individuals with important organizational and participatory skills. The experience and perhaps excitement of attending rallies, hearing speeches, and participating in marches can pique people's interest in politics and give them a sense that they can be effective participants in the political process. When clientelist exchanges are less coercive and individual have more choice, experiences within clientelist networks may also teach individuals participatory values and engender an interest in politics that supports further political activism (Hilgers, 2009).

Experiences within clientelist networks may also strengthen partisan identities, since the connections with party brokers and attendance at entertaining political rallies where participants yell party slogans, listen to passionate speeches, and wear the colors of the political party builds a sense of collective and partisan identity (Auyero, 2000; Lazar, 2004). These identities in turn make future political activism more likely, even if it is not mobilized from within clientelist networks.

Thus, if clientelism encourages non-electoral political participation through its effect on political attitudes and engagement, I expect that individuals who are exposed to vote-buying offers will report higher levels of interest in politics, stronger partisan identities, and more political efficacy than those who do not receive such offers. Though it is possible that more engaged individuals seek out clientelist exchanges, ethnographic studies suggest that a more common scenario is one in which individuals join clientelist networks to solve concrete problems and gain access to essential goods and services, not because they have an inherent interest in politics. In my own field research, I saw how individuals with little prior political experience with or interest in politics developed a greater interest in politics and stronger partisan identification as a result of participation in clientelist

politics. Thus, I hypothesize that exposure to vote buying efforts also have an indirect effect on political participation through the development of political attitudes that foster greater political activism.

H3 (Political Attitudes): Individuals who receive vote-buying offers should report a greater interest in politics, a greater sense of political efficacy, and stronger partisan identifications than individuals who do not receive such offers.

DATA AND ANALYSIS

Much of the scholarship reviewed in the prior section is valuable because country studies and deep ethnographic work reveals in detail how clientelist exchanges work in practice to promote political activism. Importantly, they give us clues about how the causal process linking clientelism and participation works. However, most of these studies focus on a single country, and sometimes a single city or neighborhood, so questions remain about the generalizability of their findings. The goal of the rest of the paper is to use survey data to show that experiences with clientelism are important predictors of protesting and contacting activity across many countries in Latin America. The survey data won't allow a direct test all of the proposed mechanisms, nor allow us to make causal claims with confidence, but it can show whether there is a close relationship between clientelism, membership in organizations, and the development of participatory values and attitudes across the region.

This paper uses LAPOP's 2010 and 2014 AmericasBarometer surveys from 18 Latin American countries to examine the effect of vote and participation buying offers on protest and contacting activity.[2] The two main dependent variables of interest are participation in protests and experiences contacting government officials. *Protest* is a dichotomous variable which indicates whether a respondent participated in a protest or march during the last 12 months.[3] *Contactany* is also a dichotomous variable constructed from four questions that ask about respondent's contacting activity:

1) *Contactlocal*: "In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a local public official or local government: for example,

2. The 2012 wave is not used because it only asked questions about experiences with vote buying in a small number of countries.
3. The question does not specify what kind of protest (riots, blockades, etc.), or what the content of the protest demands are. But since the survey asks separate questions about participation in campaign rallies, we can be confident this question is not conflating participation in protest with participation in noncontentious electoral events.

a mayor, municipal council, councilman, provincial official, civil governor or governor?" (AmericasBarometer 2010, 2014)
2) *Petitionlocal*: "Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?" (AmericasBarometer 2010, 2014)
3) *Contactfederal*: "In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from any ministry or minister (federal), state agency, or public agency or institution?" (AmericasBarometer 2010)
4) *Contactcongress*: "In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a member of Congress/Parliament?" (AmericasBarometer 2010)

I recode these four questions into a binary variable (*contactany)* that takes on the value of 1 if respondents report that they have ever participated in any of these contacting activities and 0 if they did not report any kind of contacting activity. In the 2014 wave, only *contactlocal and petitionlocal* were asked of respondents, so only these two questions were used to create *contactany* for 2014.[4]

The key independent variable of interest is exposure to clientelism. The two survey waves ask similar questions about respondent's exposure to vote or participation buying offers. The 2010 survey asks whether a "a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something like a favor, food or any other benefit in return for your vote or support?" and respondents indicate whether they received such an offer "never", "sometimes", or "often." In 2014 the question asks respondents whether any candidate or political party offered them "something, like a favor, gift or any other benefit" in exchange for their support or vote. Unlike the 2010 question, here respondents were asked simply to indicate whether or not they received such a vote or participation buying offer. For consistency, I recoded these questions into a dichotomous variable (*clientelism*) which takes on the value of 1 if respondents were exposed to a vote buying offer "sometimes" or "often" in 2010 and if they were exposed to such an offer in 2014.

All measures of clientelism suffer from social-desirability bias, so most surveys systematically underestimate the actual prevalence of vote-buying practices (Castro Cornejo & Beltrán, 2022; González Ocantos *et al.*, 2012). These concerns are partially attenuated in LAPOP's AmericasBarometer surveys because the question asks respondents whether they were *offered* benefits in exchange for their votes, not whether they *accepted* such offers. Since respondents did not need to admit participating in a clientelist exchange (which is one of the biggest sources

4. Unfortunately, the survey does not provide information about what respondents are demanding, but the questions do make clear that the contacting activity is directed at government officials, whether at the local or national level, and not at organizational or partisan brokers.

of non-response or biased response), social desirability pressures are reduced. Despite worries about underreporting of vote buying in these surveys, the data suggest that clientelism is common across Latin American. Overall, 12 % of respondents from the region reported receiving a vote-buying offer, with average levels of vote-buying ranging from a low of about 5 % in Costa Rica and Uruguay, to a high of 18 % in Honduras and 23 % in the Dominican Republic.

The analysis includes information about respondent's participation in both community and party organizations. *Polparty* is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not a respondent has attended meetings of a political party or political organizations at least once during the past year. The variable *organization* is based on the following prompt: "I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never." Organizations listed are religious organizations, parents' associations at school, community organizations, professional associations (e. g., of merchants or farmers), and women's organizations. I recode these questions into a dichotomous variable (*organization*) to indicate whether or not a respondent attended a meeting of any organization at least once or twice a year. These measures of party and organizational participation do not capture heavy organizational involvement, which is necessary for individuals to develop skills, democratic attitudes, and experience personal transformations that motivate political action in an autonomous way. Therefore, if we do see a relationship between organizational involvement, clientelism, and political activism we can have more confidence that it is not the result of skills or attitudes individuals learned in the organizations, but rather the result of the role that organizations play as nodes of recruitment for political parties and brokers.

I am also interested in the relationship between exposure to clientelist vote buying offers and political attitudes and partisan identities. The models analyzed below contain a 4-point measure of interest in politics (*polinterest*) (where 1 = "none", 2 = "a little, 3 = "some", 4 = "a lot") and a 7-point measure of political efficacy (*efficacy*) that indicates how strongly respondents agree with the statement "You feel like you understand the most important political issues of this country." I also include a dichotomous measure of partisan identification (*partyID*) which indicates whether or not respondents identify with any political party. Finally, the models include a number of common socioeconomic controls, including education levels, age, sex, wealth[5], and urban/rural residence.

5. Instead of self-reported income measure which suffers from nonresponse issues and may not be comparable across countries, I follow the lead of Córdova (2008) and create a 5-point quintile measure of wealth based on questions about ownership of assets.

RESULTS

To test the relationship between clientelism and participation in nonelectoral political activities, I run several multilevel logit regression models with fixed year effects where protest and different kinds of contacting activity are the dependent variables (Models 3-7 in Table 1). For comparison, I run similar models to test the relationship between clientelism and voting and participating in campaign events, the two forms of political activism most closely associated with clientelist mobilization (Models 1-2).[6] The results in Table 1 provide evidence to support the first set of hypotheses: that individuals who receive a vote-buying offer are more likely to report participating in both electoral and nonelectoral political activity. Of most theoretical interest, the results confirm that receiving a vote-buying offer is a strong predictor of participation in protests and in many kinds of government contacting at both the local and federal level. The estimated effects of vote-buying on government contacting is particularly large. An analysis of predicted marginal effects shows that vote buying increases the likelihood of voting, protesting, and participating in campaigns by about 3 %, 3 % and 6 %, respectively. By comparison vote-buying is estimated to increase participation in government contacting activity by nearly 12 %. These results therefore provide support for the main expectation of this paper that clientelist mobilization, namely vote buying efforts, foster participation in non-electoral political activities like protests and citizen claim making.

Table 1. Impact of Clientelism on Political Participation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Vote	Campaign	Protest	Any Contact	Contact Local	Contact federal	Contact congress
Clientelist Offer	0.247***	0.714***	0.372***	0.610***	0.638***	0.525***	0.803***
	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.063)	(0.069)
Education	0.064***	0.026***	0.041***	-0.002	-0.005	0.028***	-0.0159*
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Wealth Quintile	0.003	-0.057***	0.031*	-0.036***	-0.042***	-0.059**	-0.038
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.023)

6. *Vote* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a respondent voted in the last presidential election. *Campaign* is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not a respondent worked for a party or candidate in the last presidential election. This question was not asked in 2014, so the results include only responses from the 2010 surveys.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Vote	Campaign	Protest	Any Contact	Contact Local	Contact federal	Contact congress
Female	0.086***	-0.210***	-0.16***	0.057*	0.0600*	-0.017	0.162**
	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.05)	(0.061)
Age	0.057***	0.005***	-0.01***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0013)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0017)	(0.002)
Community Org.	0.267***	0.180**	0.350***	0.710***	0.712***	0.790***	0.530***
	(0.028)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.074)	(0.09)
Political Party	0.350***	1.550***	0.915***	0.770***	0.772***	0.663***	0.860***
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.060)	(0.070)
Internal Efficacy	0.015*	0.063***	0.060***	0.041***	0.0454***	0.0071	0.056**
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Party ID	0.563***	0.680***	0.260***	0.194***	0.201***	0.150**	0.284***
	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.068)
Interest in Politics	0.185***	0.385***	0.316***	0.132***	0.132***	0.174***	0.131***
	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.02)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.034)
Compulsory Voting	0.690***						
	(0.190)						
Voted in Last Presidential Election			0.003	0.180***	0.220***	0.044	0.270**
			(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.065)	(0.084)
Constant	-2.570***	-4.500***	-4.240***	-2.780***	-2.939***	-4.091***	-4.380***
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.130)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.160)	(0.190)
Observations	50,655	27,237	50,359	50,309	48,106	22,921	22,930

Source: LAPOP 2010, 2014. Results for Models 6 & 7 include only responses from 2010 since those questions were not asked in 2014.

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

An alternative explanation for these results is that the relationship between clientelism and protesting and government contacting activity is spurious –the result of individuals being members of organizations which make both clientelist recruitment and political activity more likely. It might also be possible that the effect of vote-buying operates through prior political activism, namely that clientelist networks mobilize people to the polls and it is this prior experience with political activism that makes it more likely individuals will protest or make claims on governments. Including prior voting experiences along with involvement with civic and party organizations in the models helps rule out these alternative explanations. Moreover, it is encouraging to find that exposure to vote-buying remains a significant predictor of both protest and government contacting activity even after controlling for these other factors. In fact, among respondents who are not members of any type of organizations and *did not* receive a vote-buying offer, only 4 % reported protesting compared to 6 % *who did* receive a vote-buying offer. The effect on contacting was even larger: among those who did not receive a vote-buying offer only 12 % reported contacting a government official compared to 20 % who did receive such an offer. This suggests that clientelist recruitment has a significant effect on political activism independent of whether an individual participates in civic or partisan organizations.

Moseley found similar results in Argentina and Bolivia and argued that in protest states clientelism can foster greater participation in protests and marches. My argument implies that this dynamic should also exist in other contexts where protests are less prevalent (H1c). To test whether vote-buying offers have a significant positive effect on protest and contacting activity across institutional contexts, I run logit models similar to those above for each of the 18 countries included in the LAPOP sample. The top part of Figure 1 reports only the coefficient (and 95 % confidence intervals) of *clientelism* in models predicting the likelihood of protest for each of the countries, and the bottom part does the same for political contacting. The results show that the mobilizing effect of clientelism on protests and contacting activity is not limited to protest states. In fact, exposure to vote-buying offers has a positive and significant effect on protesting in 11 of the 17 countries, including Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay which have strong democratic institutions and where protests are not a normalized parts of politics. The effect of clientelism on contacting is even more consistent: it is positive and significant in 15 of the 17 countries.

One reason scholars are skeptical about the mobilizing capacity of clientelism outside of elections is because of the common presumption that it involves the exchange of particularized benefits between patrons and individual citizens, which divides groups and inhibits collective action (Hicken, 2011; Scott, 1972). I hypothesized instead that clientelism makes participation in protests and government contacting activity more likely precisely because of is its embeddedness in

Figure 1. Effect of Clientelist mobilization on Protest and Citizen Claim Making across Latin American Countries



Source: LAPOP 2010 & 2014; control variables are included in the analysis but omitted from the results.

both partisan and grass-roots organizations. An interesting question to examine is whether clientelism is more likely to operate through partisan organizations, or whether it is more likely to operate through certain kinds of community organizations than others. It is certainly reasonable to expect that participation in partisan organizations would make it more likely that individuals would be exposed to vote-buying offers. What about organizations that are more clearly non-political, like religious groups or parent-teacher organizations?

To explore these issues, I estimate the effect of organizational involvement on the likelihood someone receives a vote-buying offer using mixed-level logit model where the dichotomous variable *clientelism* is the dependent variable. The LAPOP surveys asks questions about membership and participation in a variety of organizations, including parent's organizations (PTAs), religious, women's, professional, community and partisan organizations. The model includes dummy variables for each organization type, in addition to the previously used socio-economic control variables. Figure 2 reports the predicted marginal effects of participation in different kinds of organizations on the likelihood of receiving a vote-buying offer. Not surprisingly, participation in partisan organizations has the largest estimated effect, but participation in any kind of organizations – including religious or parent's organizations – makes it more likely an individual will be exposed to clientelist vote buying offers. The survey analysis cannot determine whether this relationship between organizations and clientelism is the result of brokers reaching out to organizations, or because individuals and community organizations choose to develop linkages to political parties in order to signal party loyalty and gain access to benefits. Both dynamics are likely very common, and for the purposes of my argument the direction of causality does not matter. What matters is that vote-buying offers are commonly made through organizations and to individuals affiliated with organizations, rather than to atomized voters (H2).

Finally, I also expect clientelism to impact protest and contacting activity through its effect on people's partisan identification and taste for politics (H3). To test the impact of experiences with vote-buying on political attitudes and party identification, I estimate three regression models that predict party identification (*partyID)*, levels of political interest (*polinterest)* and levels of political efficacy (*efficacy*). I estimate mixed-effect ordered logit models for *partyID* and *efficacy*, since those are ordinal dependent variables, and a mixed-effect logit model to predict *partyID* since it is a dichotomous variable. Each of the three models include all of the socioeconomic controls from before. In addition, to better isolate the effect of *clientelism* on political attitudes, I include controls for organizational involvement (*organization)*, participation in partisan organizations (*polparty*) and prior voting experiences. The results of these three regression models are summarized in Figure 3, which shows that the coefficient for *clientelism* is a positive and significant predictor of efficacy, political interest and party identification. In other words,

Figure 2. Predicted effect of organizational involvement on likelihood of receiving vote buying offer



Source: LAPOP 2010 & 2014.

people who experience vote-buying offers, and are therefore likely enmeshed in clientelist networks, are more politically engaged and have stronger partisan identification than individuals who do not receive such offers – even after controlling for prior political activity and organizational involvement. In turn, higher levels of political engagement foster more protest and contacting activity, even in the absence of clientelist mobilization (Table 1).

Issues of Causality

The argument developed in this paper assumes that patrons and brokers take the first step in mobilizing individuals into protest and contact activities. However, an alternative explanation for these results is that the causal effects operate in the opposite direction. That is, it is possible that people who are already active in protests and contacting activities become targets for vote-buying efforts by political machines that are trying to secure the support of politically active

Figure 3. Impact of experiences with clientelism on political attitudes and engagement



Source: LAPOP 2010 & 2014.

individuals. Similarly, it is possible that instead of individuals developing participatory and democratic attitudes as a result of participation mobilized through clientelist networks, it is clientelist machines that target individuals with participatory and democratic attitudes. Individuals who are more interested in politics, more efficacious, and have stronger party identifications may seek out clientelist networks in order to signal partisan loyalty, resolve problems and gain access to valuable resources and services. Particularly in contexts where states have little ability to deliver essential services to all citizens equally, politically savvy individuals may join clientelist organizations to secure preferential access to essential goods and services. These issues of causality cannot be definitively resolved with cross-sectional survey data, and in practice political activism and clientelism are likely intertwined in a recursive relationship (Auyero *et al.*, 2009).

Nonetheless, most studies of clientelism agree that it is unlikely that more politically sophisticated citizens seek out vote-buying offers because they tend to have negative views of the practice as undemocratic and corrupt (Carlin and

Moseley, 2022; González Ocantos *et al.*, 2014; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). It is also unlikely that clientelist machines target engaged and democratically inclined individuals since such targeting usually proves costly and inefficient (Carlin and Moseley, 2015, 2022). Other qualitative studies and ethnographic accounts also give us greater confidence that the causal effects operate in the hypothesized direction. These studies have shown that the more common case is one in which clientelist mobilization precedes participation in nonelectoral political activity (Canel, 2012; Gay, 1998; Lazar, 2004; Hilgers, 2009; Poma, 2020). This is especially the case among poor citizens who are both more likely to welcome vote-buying offers and otherwise lack the resources or ability to undertake difficult political acts like contacting and protesting on their own. In this dynamic, individuals join clientelist organizations not because they have an interest in politics or care particularly deeply about partisan politics, but as a problem-solving strategy and to get access to selective benefits (Auyero, 2000). In the process they are exposed to political stimuli and mobilized into political activities that teach them skills and pique their interest in politics. As Hilgers noted, some people who join clientelist organizations for instrumental reasons come "to see the importance of the activities that are required aspects of the exchange bargain", like attendance at associations meetings, political rallies, and community assemblies (Hilgers, 2009: 13). Though many put little thought into these activities, others come "to see activism as personally fulfilling and important for society at large. These erstwhile clients responded to their experiences of clientelism by making the patron's projects their own and actively supporting the party." (Hilgers, 2009: 13)

CONCLUSION

Most research on clientelist mobilization focuses on the impact of vote-buying on electoral activities like voting and participation in campaign rallies. This analysis adds to the existing literature by showing that exposure to vote-buying offers is also strongly correlated with participation in non-electoral political activities like protesting and citizen claim making, even after controlling for many other possible causal factors. The analysis builds on recent case studies and ethnographic accounts that tease out the causal connections between clientelist mobilization and political activity beyond the electoral arena. Based on these studies, I hypothesized that exposure to vote buying offers could have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood individuals will engage in nonelectoral political activity. The organizational basis of clientelism allows elites to use clientelist mobilization strategies to encourage participation in protests and contacting activity in much the same way that they use organizations to increase turnout and participation in political rallies. In addition, clientelist networks may

supply groups of citizens with the organizational support, resources, and structures necessary to mount collective challenges on their own. For example, when elites renege on their promises, clients, especially those who can tap into existing organizational resources, might organize collective acts of resistance to demand the delivery of promised goods and services. I also argue that clientelism may have an indirect effect on political participation by increasing individual's interest in politics, their sense of political efficacy, and strengthening partisan identities. By cultivating these participatory attitudes, clientelist mobilization can boost people's willingness and ability to participate in activities like political demand making and protests on their own, even when not mobilized by elites.

The statistical results provide support for these hypotheses. The analysis revealed a robust region-wide relationship between clientelism, political attitudes and non-electoral modes of political participation. Vote-buying offers were strongly correlated with both protest and government contacting activity in most every country in Latin America. Though studies often emphasize the partisan nature of clientelism and vote-buying, the analysis also showed that being a member of a community organization, even ostensibly nonpolitical ones, makes it much more likely individuals will receive vote-buying offers. People who receive vote-buying offers are also significantly more interested in politics, have stronger partisan identities, and report more political efficacy, all factors that make it more likely they will be politically active.

These results are evidence that clientelism can coexist with collective, even contentious, modes of political participation. However, the study is limited by the cross-sectional nature of the data, and we must be careful not to make claims about causality that the data does not support. The main contribution of this analysis is to show that clientelism is not antithetical to non-electoral modes of political activity, even contentious collective action that seeks to hold parties and elites accountable. Future research should further explore these and other possible causal mechanisms linking clientelism and political participation, ideally by combining qualitative and quantitative research methodologies that complement each other (Auerbach, 2017).

One line of inquiry is to better understand the conditions under which vote buying and clientelist mobilization produces participatory values and attitudes. This connection between clientelism and political engagement is one of the more surprising findings of the analysis, but teasing out exactly who experiences this effect, or what kind of institutional contexts are more likely to foster it, is beyond the scope of this paper. Future studies could explore whether this effect of vote-buying is stronger for poor or more affluent individuals, or perhaps determine whether the effect is mediated by the characteristics of the organization in which individuals are embedded. I also suggested that protest and claim-making activity may be more likely to occur when clientelist machines lose elections and therefore access to state

patronage. In such situations, brokers and parties who lack institutionalized access to government patronage might mobilize their supporters to the streets in attempts to remain relevant and legitimate in the eyes of current and prospective clients. Citizens whose clientelist network lost elections might also take up claim-making or even protest activities on their own out of fear of being excluded from the distribution of public goods. Future studies could further investigate how elections and political competition impact the mobilization strategies used by clientelist machines (Beltrán & Castro Cornejo, 2019).

Finally, the findings presented in this paper contribute to the emerging debate about the benefits and drawbacks of clientelist mobilization for democracy (Hilgers, 2012). Most studies still presume that clientelism harms democracy by breeding apathy rather than activism, especially among poor citizens who make up large pluralities in most Latin American countries. The "patronage trap" is real (Palmer-Rubin, 2019), and very often clientelist exchanges hinder individual and collective capacities to mobilize in an autonomous way. But under certain conditions clientelist networks may educate and activate citizens and allow for a certain amount of political agency. By cultivating stronger partisan identities, clientelist mobilization might also help stabilize and even strengthen parties and party systems, particularly where clientelism operates through grass roots organizations. This also suggests that clientelism might do more than solve people's immediate problems. The organizational basis of many clientelist exchanges may empower citizens to mobilize collective challenges and demand not just particularistic benefits, but also social benefits and rights to which they are entitled (Garay *et al.*, 2020). If clientelism operates through organizations, it may provide individuals and associations with greater capacity to mobilize against elites when they fail to deliver promised benefits. Instead of waiting for the next election cycle to punish parties that renege on their promises, clients who are also members of grass roots organizations, may mobilize autonomously to hold parties accountable in between elections, thus increasing citizen voice rather than silencing it.

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DOES CHINA'S RISE INFLUENCE ANTI-AMERICANISM? EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA

¿El ascenso de China influye en el antiamericanismo? Evidencia de Colombia

A ascensão da China influencia o antiamericanismo? Evidências da Colômbia

GREGG JOHNSON gregg.johnson@valpo.edu [1]
ZHIMIN LIN zhimin.lin@valpo.edu [1]

[1] Valparaiso University

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China; Colombia; anti-Americanism; foreign policy; economics

Abstract
China greatly expanded its presence in Latin America over the last several decades, with most researchers examining China's economic and political efforts. Many U.S.-based researchers, pundits, and policymakers saw China as a potential rival and threat to U. S. hegemony. However, few researchers have examined how average Latin Americans viewed these changes. Building on theories of anti-Americanism, we examine whether views of China are associated with anti-Americanism in Colombia. Drawing on an original survey of Colombians, we find that China's economic model, respondent ideology, and views of Chinese trade and business are weakly associated with anti-Americanism. Other factors have no association. Our findings provide an important early look into the effectiveness of China's soft power in the region and contribute to the field's understanding of anti-Americanism in the region.

Palabras clave:
China; Colombia; antiamericanismo; política exterior; economía

Resumen
China expandió enormemente su presencia en América Latina durante las últimas décadas, y la mayoría de los investigadores examinan los esfuerzos económicos y políticos de China. Muchos investigadores, expertos y legisladores con sede en EE. UU. vieron a China como un rival potencial y una amenaza para la hegemonía de EE. UU. Sin embargo, pocos investigadores han examinado cómo los latinoamericanos promedio vieron estos cambios. Sobre la base de las teorías del antiamericanismo, examinamos si las opiniones sobre China están asociadas con el antiamericanismo en Colombia. Basándonos en una encuesta original de colombianos, encontramos que el modelo económico de China, la ideología de los encuestados y las opiniones sobre el comercio y los negocios chinos están débilmente asociados con el antiamericanismo. Otros factores no tienen asociación. Nuestros hallazgos brindan una importante mirada temprana a la efectividad del poder blando de China en la región y contribuyen a la comprensión del campo del antiamericanismo en la región.

Palavras-chave:
China; Colômbia; antiamericanismo; política externa; economia

Resumo
A China expandiu muito sua presença na América Latina nas últimas décadas, com a maioria dos pesquisadores examinando os esforços econômicos e políticos da China. Muitos pesquisadores, especialistas e formuladores de políticas baseados nos EUA viam a China como um rival em potencial e uma ameaça à hegemonia dos EUA. No entanto, poucos pesquisadores examinaram como os latino-americanos médios viam essas mudanças. Com base nas teorias do antiamericanismo, examinamos se as visões da China estão associadas ao antiamericanismo na Colômbia. Com base em uma pesquisa original com colombianos, descobrimos que o modelo econômico da China, a ideologia do respondente e as visões do comércio e dos negócios chineses estão fracamente associados ao antiamericanismo. Outros fatores não têm associação. Nossas descobertas fornecem uma visão inicial importante da eficácia do poder brando da China na região e contribuem para a compreensão do campo sobre o antiamericanismo na região.

INTRODUCTION*

China greatly expanded its role in Latin America over the last two decades and now forms one of the largest trading partners and investors in the region. Furthermore, the number of high-level state visits, cultural exchanges, and Chinese tourism multiplied many times over. This sea-change in Sino-Latin American relations spurred countless articles and books examining these economic and political

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changes. Consequently, scholars now have a far greater understanding of the political economy of Sino-Latin American relations.

This sea-change in Sino-Latin American relations led some observers to see China's rise as a direct threat to U. S. interests in the region. Elected officials, members of the military, and academics regularly questioned China's professed benign interests Latin America —the region the U. S. considers its backyard. Not surprisingly, congressional hearings, policy white papers, and countless books and articles worried over Chinese ambitions in the region.

Nevertheless, a large gap exists in the literature. With rare exceptions, scholars largely ignore how citizens in Latin America view these changes. It is understandable that prior to 9/11 relatively few scholars examined how citizens viewed other countries and no grand theory of public opinion regarding Great Powers existed. After 9/11, key scholars explored the determinants of anti-Americanism —focusing on whether what the United States is versus what the United States does drives anti-American attitudes in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.[1] We seek to turn this same theoretical lens on Sino-Latin American relations. To what extent does China's political and economic model, or what China is, versus China's political and economic actions, or what China does, drive public views? Specifically, does China's rise threaten how the public views the United States?

We focus on Colombia in order to examine these theories. Colombia occupies an interesting middle-category in Latin America in many ways. Economically, it is not as important to China as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, or Mexico, but its market-size makes developing the relationship worthwhile. Colombia's export profile also occupies a middle ground, being neither as complimentary as Chile or Peru, nor as conflictual as Mexico (Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012). Most importantly, Colombia has been one of the closest allies of the U. S. in the region for decades. Whether it was the fight against drug trade, offsetting the influence of Venezuela, or promoting Colombia as a showcase of democracy and market economics, the U. S. and Colombia shared far more common interests than differences. Whether the rising influence of the United States' chief competitor affects public opinion in a traditionally pro-U. S. state views is in itself a fascinating subject. Consequently, we argue Colombia represents an interesting case to examine whether China's rise influences public opinion regarding the United States.

The paper is laid out in four sections. In the next section, we describe China's expanded role in Latin America and Colombia, as well as our theory regarding the determinants of Great Power public opinion. The third section of the paper outlines our data and methodology. We use an original public opinion survey

1. See Baker and Cupery (2013), Blaydes and Linzer (2012), Carlson and Nelson (2008), Isernia (2006), Jamal *et al.*, (2015), and Katzenstein and Keohane (2006) for examples.

specifically designed to examine both aspects of what China represents—what it is, along with aspects of Chinese actions —what China does. The fourth section presents our analysis and findings. Using ordered logistic regression we find that China's development model, its politics, and views of its trade and business practices are related to views of the United States. The final section concludes and offers suggestions for future research.

CHINA'S NEW ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA

China increased its presence and influence in Latin America in three stages. In the first stage, China simply entered into nascent political and economic relationships with whatever countries in the region that accepted Chinese overtures. Many Latin American countries followed the United States' lead and switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the People's Republic in the 1970s, despite the presence of several anti-communist military dictatorships (Domínguez *et al*., 2006). During this first stage China's domestic economic reforms were predicated on expanded export markets and a steady supply of raw materials. Hence, Latin America's long history as a supplier of primary products led to a slow, but steady increase in Chinese imports of Latin American minerals, energy, and food, combined with exports of inexpensive manufactured goods to the region (Fornés and Butt Philip, 2012; Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010). This first phase lasted nearly thirty years.

The start of the new century coincided with the second phase of Sino-Latin American relations, rapid expansion. The region's primary product exporters enjoyed a Chinese-driven commodities boom, while its manufacturing sectors faced increasingly stiff competition and lost market share to Chinese producers (Álvarez and Claro, 2009; Gallagher, Moreno-Brid and Porzecanski, 2008; Mesquita Moreira, 2007; Sargent and Matthews, 2009). Trade and investment quickly accelerated (Armony and Strauss, 2012), as did Chinese foreign direct investment to Latin America (Dong, 2013; Gao and Meng, 2015). Political relationships also expanded, with more and higher profile state visits, as well as greater Chinese involvement (including membership) in regional institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank. The global economic crisis of 2008-2009 accelerated these trends (Wu, Liu and Cai, 2011, 2012).

The third stage involves deepening Sino-Latin American relations beyond economic ties to encompass greater political and strategic engagement (Campbell *et al*., 2022; Ellis, 2020). President Xi traveled to the region in 2014, 2017, and 2018, with an additional visit to Brazil in 2019 for the BRICS summit. He oversaw the expansion of involvement in regional institutions and the launch of new programs. China led the China-Latin America and the Caribbean International Exposition, was involved in the Pacific Alliance, and expanded its One Belt, One

Road/Belt and Road Initiative to include Latin America (Estevadeordal, 2018; Gao, 2018; Jenkins, 2022). Chinese officials and business leaders promised to increase FDI and investment in infrastructure projects.

These moves engendered concern at home in China, in Latin America itself, as well as in the United States. Domestic actors expressed concerns regarding loans to Venezuela, while others in China note their government still had little tangible political influence in the region (Wang, 2015; Yang, 2015). Chinese firms faced protests due to concerns related to labor issues, the environment, and competition concerns (Ellis, 2014). Rival governments pushed back against growing Chinese influence (Vaillant, 2021). Policymakers, military leaders, and scholars in the U. S. questioned China's motives (Campbell *et al.*, 2022; Ellis, 2020). This third stage in Sino-Latin American relations tested China's ability to move beyond the "cash for resources" approach to a deeper level of political and economic exchange.

That China's third stage coincided with two decades of American focus outside Latin America raised concerns that U. S. regional hegemony might have slipped. Some American political leaders saw China's expansion as a direct threat (Ellis, 2014; Johnson and Wasson, 2011). The rule of left leaning governments in some parts of Latin America and outright pro-Beijing governments in Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba exacerbated concerns in Washington, DC (Berg, 2021). In sum, China's expanded interest in Latin America, regional neglect (Peres Milani, 2021), combined with the Trump administration's anti-China and anti-Latino rhetoric (Scheller, 2017) may influence how Latin Americans viewed these Great Powers.

Sino-Colombian Relations

Colombia delayed recognition of the People's Republic of China until 1980, so it was not one of the first countries in the region to engage with Beijing. However, China viewed Colombia as an important "middle power" in the region, along with countries like Argentina, Chile, and Peru (Wu, 2015). Colombia's extractive industries were attractive to China, but its internal conflicts limited Chinese interest (Defelipe Villa, 2015).

Starting in the 2000s, improved security and involvement in the Pacific Alliance attracted greater Chinese attention. Trade between Colombia and China exploded and Colombia grew in importance to Chinese trade with the region (see Figure 1) (World Bank, 2018). Similarly, Chinese FDI stock grew from less than 7 million (USD) in 2007 to over half a billion by 2015 (Wu, 2011, 2012, and 2016). Despite a long-running civil war against communist guerrillas and consistent rightist governments in the 2000s, Sino-Colombian government relations also improved. For example, the Chinese government sponsored a number of Confucius Institutes at leading Colombian universities and Premier Li visited Colombia

in 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Sino-Colombian relations simply expanded quickly at the start of the new century.

Figure 1. Expansion of Sino-Colombian Trade: 2000-2016



Source: World Bank (2018)

While Sino-Colombian relations expanded, deepening these ties remains difficult. The two governments agreed to discuss a Free Trade Agreement in 2012, but during interviews with members of the executive and legislative branches, as well as academics, no one could cite tangible progress toward a deal as of 2016 (authors' personal interviews).[2] China also views U.S.-Colombian relations as a barrier to closer ties (Ray *et al.*, 2017). Furthermore, while Chinese presidents have visited large trading partners like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, and even smaller partners like Costa Rica, Cuba, Peru, and Uruguay, no Chinese president has visited Colombia (CEPAL, 2011; Myers and Wise, 2016).

2. Note that no tangible progress on a Sino-Colombian FTA has been announced in the past half a decade.

The lack of a presidential state visit is notable given the symbolic value China places on such visits. In short, while China sees Colombia as an important partner in the region, it has yet to move beyond traditional strengths in trade and investment to develop a significant understanding of what distinguishes Colombia from its neighbors. Hence, Colombia offers an important test case of China's "vertical expansion" strategy in Latin America.[3]

From Colombia's point of view, relations with China present significant opportunities and challenges. On the opportunity side, the rapid expansion of exports and high commodities prices buoyed the economy. Academics concerned with Colombia's heavy reliance on ties with the United States, particularly in the age of the Trump administration, see China as a potential counterbalance (Authors' Personal Interviews 2016; Wu, Liu, and Cai 2011, 2012). Chinese investment, particularly in infrastructure and agriculture, hold particular promise (Authors' Personal Interviews, 2016). During one interview with a business consultant, he stated that the cost of shipping a container from China to Colombia is less than the cost of shipping the same container from a Colombian port to Bogota. He hoped that Chinese investment in infrastructure could facilitate development. In short, China's strength may ameliorate some of Colombia's most glaring weaknesses.

On the challenge side, China runs a considerable trade surplus with Colombia and largely imports low value-added commodities from Colombia. Similarly, Colombian presidents have visited Beijing four times in the last 15 years, without a return visit. Only a small number of Colombian elites enjoy access to the Confucius Institutes and anti-China protests led to the banning of Chinese- made vueltiao hats (The Economist, 2013). Similarly, the San Victorino neighborhood of Bogota´ was racked by protests against small Chinese-owned businesses. Colombian-owned businesses claimed the Chinese owners were illegal immigrants and engaged in unfair business practices, while wearing t-shirts that read, "I buy Colombian. Do you?" and carrying signs that read, "Colombia for Colombians" (El Espectador, 2016; Parra, 2016). Some Colombians were clearly skeptical of China's increased presence in their country.

Perhaps the only group more interested in Sino-Colombian relations than Colombian elites are U.S.-based elites. The PRC donated military and police equipment and even sent military personnel to Colombia's special warfare school—worrying security experts (Brands and Berg, 2021; Ellis, 2020). Senator Robert Menendez introduced the U.S.-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act of 2022, explicitly stating it was to counter "…the creeping influences of extra-regional actors like Russia and China (Chairman Menendez Opening Remarks at Full Committee

3. Wu *et al*., 2013 define "vertical expansion" as moving beyond trade and economic deals to incorporate political, cultural, and strategic partnerships. These partnerships are layered on top of investment and trade deals; hence the expansion is vertical.

Hearing, 2022)." Similarly, China's use of soft power such as hosting agricultural trainings, opening Confucius Institutes, investing in the Bogotá metro system all led to concerns that China was weaking the U.S.-Colombian partnership (Ellis, 2022; Laco and Evansky, 2022).

While the extant literature examines Sino-Colombian relations and the ways China may weaken the U.S.-Colombian partnership, few scholars examine whether these macro-level changes influence public opinion.[4] Do Colombians view China as a positive or a negative? More importantly, do attitudes toward China relate to attitudes toward the United States? In the next section we discuss how attitudes towards China may influence attitudes towards the United States.

Theories of Public Opinion and Great Powers: What they are versus what they do

A growing body of literature now examines public opinion of foreign actors. Initially limited to an occasional survey question or two, the post-9/11 world caused researchers to consider the basis of antipathy toward other countries in a far more systematic fashion. Given the context, much of this work explores the causes and varieties of anti-Americanism (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2006). These scholars tend to focus on two interrelated questions: does antipathy reflect what the other country is–its institutions and culture (Carlson and Nelson, 2008; Isernia 2006)many have argued that international perceptions of the United States are growing more negative and that 'anti-Americanism' is going to be a problem for American foreign policy in the decades to come. We examine the debate over anti-Americanism by using survey data collected in more than 26 countries that span East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, with a focus on two empirical questions. First, to what extent do citizens in Asia believe that the United States has a negative (or positive? Or is antipathy toward another country based on what the country does–its foreign policy?

In the post-9/11 era scholars focused on the Middle East. U. S. military actions and friendly relations with autocratic regimes explained anti-Americanism more so than opinions of American democracy and freedom (Jamal *et al.*, 2015; Katzenstein and Keohane 2006). Similarly, pro-American attitudes in Latin America were linked with positive evaluations of both what the United States does and what it represents (Baker and Cupery, 2013). Taken as a whole, what the United States represents, democracy and capitalism, and what it does, military adventures and foreign aid, consistently influence anti-Americanism. We use the logic

4. See Carreras (2017), Morgenstern and Bohigues (2021), Tickner and Botero (2011) for exceptions.

of this literature to examine whether China's emergence as an alternative to the United States affected public opinion in Colombia.

In many ways, China is the economic and political photo negative of the United States. After three decades of neoliberalism (Gallagher 2016; Johnson and Crisp 2003) China has evolved from a poor and mostly rural society into one of the largest economies in the world. As it grew into a major industrial power, it demanded enormous amounts of steel for new factories and cities, copper for electronic wires, petroleum for cars and manufacturing plants, and soybeans and cattle to feed its workers. By the 1990s, many Latin American countries were riding China's coattails and beginning to prosper from the new demand. Ever since China entered the World Trade Organization at the turn of the century, Latin America supplied China with more and more of the primary commodities it needs and more. That in turn has produced one the most impressive periods of economic growth on the continent in fifty years. And it was more evenly spread too - a region infamous for its extreme inequality saw it decline by a couple of percentage points over the course of the era. In The China Triangle, Kevin P. Gallagher traces the development of the China-Latin America trade over time and covers how it has affected the centuries-old (and highly unequal, China's phenomenal economic growth via state-centric capitalism offers an alternative to the Washington Consensus (Ellis, 2014; León-Manríquez *et al.*, 2014). Similarly, China's FDI, infrastructure investment, and multinational corporations like Huawei offered alternatives to American and Western capital (Defelipe Villa 卡米楼 2015; Roy, 2022). Politically, China is a one-party communist state. Given Colombia's long running civil war against the FARC and ELN and the political left's history of electoral futility, China again is the opposite of the United States. The question is whether China's economic model or its political model are related to views of the United States. Does what China is associated with anti-Americanism amongst the Colombian public? Consequently, we hypothesize that attitudes about "What China Is" will affect attitudes in the following ways:

H1a: Positive views of China will be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.
H1b: Positive views of China's economic model be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.
H1c: Positive views of China's political model be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

While views of what China is may be associated with anti-Americanism, attitudes may also be driven by what China does in Latin America in general and in Colombia in particular. Generally speaking, China's influence —essentially, "What China Does"— is viewed positively in the region (Carreras, 2017; Kaplan, 2018). Elites we

interviewed emphasized Chinese trade and investment offered opportunities for development and provided lower income Colombians access to a range of previously unobtainable consumer goods (Authors' Personal Interviews 2016). However, political and economic leaders often claimed China engages in unfair economic practices (Linley, Reilly and Goldsmith, 2012). In Colombia, the controversies surrounding the vueltiaos (The Economist, 2013), unfair trade practices (El Espectador, 2016), or unsafe mining operations represented potential missteps (Symmes Cobb, 2022).

Turning to politics, China's political charm offensive has not gone unnoticed. As previously noted, the opening of Confucius Institutes and sponsorship of study or training in China expanded Chinese soft power (Paradise, 2009; Xu *et al.*, 2020). China's ambassadors, Li Nianping and Lan Hu, engaged in a concerted charm offensive, appearing regularly in national media to promote Sino-Colombian relations (Creutzfeldt, 2022). Based on the fears of U.S.-based elected officials, military leaders, and many academics, positive views of China's influence may threaten American interests in its closest ally. Therefore, we hypothesize that attitudes about "What China Does" will affect attitudes in the following ways:

H2a: Positive views of China's effect on the Colombian economy will be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.
H2b: Positive views of China's political engagement in Colombia and Latin America will be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

In sum, Colombian attitudes relating to the United States will be associated with how respondents view China itself, as well as the effects of China's actions in Latin America and Colombia. In the following section we outline the data and methods used to test these hypotheses.

DATA AND METHODS

The decision to study mass opinions of China in Colombia was motivated by two key factors. One was Colombia's economic profile. As previously noted, Colombia's export profile is not as complimentary as economic partners like Chile, Peru, or Venezuela. Neither is its profile as directly conflictual as Mexico's export profile (Jenkins and Barbosa, 2012). The other factor is that Colombia is a particularly difficult test case given its long pro-U. S. history. In fact, in every interview with Colombian government, business, and academic leader they stated that the U. S. is the single most important Colombian partner and that no other country is even close (Authors' Personal Interviews, 2016). Hence, Colombia represented a tough case in which to test whether views on China were associated with anti-Americanism (Eckstein, 1975; Gerring, 2007; King, Keohane and Verba 2021).

In order to systematically examine opinions, we contracted with Gallup Colombia to conduct a survey of Colombian views of China. Interviews were conducted by phone using random digit dialing methods in five metropolitan areas: Bogota, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla, and Bucaramanga. These are Colombia's five largest cities, represent five distinct regions, and account for over 40 percent of Colombia's population. Interviews lasted about 15 minutes and were conducted in November of 2016. 700 respondents completed the survey.[5] While not representative of all Colombians, Gallup's long history of successful polling in Colombia make it likely that this sample represents urban Colombian well.[6] One set of questions focused both on attitudes related to "What China Is." A second set of questions focused on China's interactions with Latin America and Colombia, which we call "What China Does." To our knowledge this is the most comprehensive survey regarding Colombian views of China to date.

Dependent Variable: Evaluations of China

In order to measure our dependent variable, we asked respondents to evaluate China, as well as Brazil and the United States, early on in the survey. Respondents were asked if they held a very positive, positive, negative, or very negative opinion of each country. We converted their answers into a four-point scale, where higher numbers indicate a more negative evaluations.[7] Perhaps not surprisingly, a little over 60 percent of respondents held positive evaluations of China, while just over 30 percent held negative opinions. This compares with 67 percent positive and 32 percent negative evaluations of the United States. Attitudes toward Brazil were also similar, with just over 60 percent positive views and 27 percent negative evaluations. A direct comparison of evaluations of China and the United States demonstrates that most Colombian's held similar views of both countries (see Figure 2). This figure presents prima facie evidence undermining hypothesis H1a. Similarly, a c^2 test demonstrates a strong statistical relationship between views of China and the United States (c^2=120.80, p<0.001). In sum, Colombian views of China are similar to their views of the largest ally and the largest power on their own continent.

5. A copy of the survey is available as Appendix A.
6. See Gasparini *et al.*, (2013) for an example of researchers and the Inter-American Development Bank using surveys conducted by Gallup in Latin America in general, including data from Colombia.
7. We did not offer a neutral response in the survey, though about 8.6 percent of respondents either said they "didn't know" or refused to evaluate China.

Figure 2. Comparison of Evaluations of China and the United States.



Note: bar height represents number of respondents in each category

Source: Gallup survey

Given we are interested in attitudes toward Great Powers and China's rise, we faced an endogeneity problem. Obviously, we could not use views of What China Is and What China Does to explain overall evaluations of China, as these views were likely endogenous. By using evaluations of the U. S. as our dependent variable we can examine whether nascent views of China were associated with more negative views of Colombia's closest ally and the cornerstone of Colombian foreign policy.

Independent Variables: What China Is

In order to examine whether specific opinions of regarding China's political and economic model influence evaluations of the U.S., we include a series of four variables. First, we asked respondents which country's economic development model represented the best path for Colombia to follow: Brazil, China, the United States. We created a dummy variable that takes a value of "1" when the

respondent believed China represented the best development model.[8] Second, we asked respondents to express their confidence in Chinese businesses.[9] This is a four-point scale where higher scores reflect greater confidence. These two variables allow us to examine the extent to "What China's Economy Is" is associated with variations in Colombian views of the United States.

Apart from China's economic model, we also include variables designed to tap into evaluations of China's politics. First, we asked whether Colombia should adopt China's political model. This was measured using a four-point scale where higher numbers indicate a more support for the Chinese political model. We ordered all four-point scaled variables so that positive coefficient support our hypotheses. Given the ideology of the Chinese government and Colombia's history of ideological conflict, we also include a measure of the respondent's ideology. This is a 0 to 100 scale, where 0=left and 100=right. In sum, we have two variables related to China's economy and two variables related to China's politics.

Independent Variables: What China Does

In order to examine whether specific opinions of regarding China's political and economic relationships with Latin America in general, and Colombia in particular, matter we include five variables. The first three variables ask respondents their opinions related to the effects of China on the Colombian economy. Our first asked respondents their opinion of the growth in trade and investment between China and Colombia. This is a four-point scale where higher values indicate more positive views of this growth. The second variable asked respondents whether growing trade and investment with China increased or decreased employment in Colombia. This is also a four-point scale where higher values indicate more positive views of China's effects on employment. Next, we asked a similar question, asking respondents regarding the effects of China on economic development using the same four-point scale. These represent evaluations of China's effect on Colombia's economy.

Turning to evaluations of China's foreign policy in Colombia we include two questions. The first asked respondents to evaluate the state of Sino-Colombian government-to-government relations. We use the same four-point scale, where higher scores represent more positive views. The second is a simple dichotomous question that asked if the respondent wanted to see a greater Chinese presence

8. Statistical results did not change appreciably when separating the Brazil and the Other categories, so we have combined them for ease of presentation and interpretation.
9. Our survey question did not distinguish between large, international businesses like Huawei and small, Colombian-based, Chinese-owned business like those in the San Victorino neighborhood.

in Latin America. A "1" represents an affirmative response. Again, we ordered all four-point scaled variables so that a positive coefficient support our hypotheses.

Control Variables

While our main foci are whether "What China Is" and "What China Does" are associated with anti-Americanism, we also include a series of standard demographic controls. We have dummy variables for the respondent's sex and whether the respondent identifies as Catholic. Next, we control for the respondent's age. Our fourth variable is a measure of poverty. We asked respondents to evaluate how often they or a member of their household did not have enough to eat, with higher scores indicating more frequent hunger issues in the household. We also included the age at which the individual left formal schooling in order to measure the respondent's level of education.

Models

Given that our dependent variable is limited and ordered, we use ordered logistic regression. We used a Brant Test to determine whether any of the variables in our models violated the parallel regression or proportional odds assumption and found that several of the variables violated assumption (Fullerton and Dixon 2010; Long and Freese 2014; Stoutenborough, Sturgess, and Vedlitz 2013). Consequently, we estimate models using both the familiar ordered logit approach, as well as the generalized ordered logit approach (Williams 2016)the ordered logit model, aka the proportional odds model (ologit/po. Since the generalized order logit models do not alter our main statistical or substantive results, we present the more familiar ordered logit models in the text.[10]

10. The generalized ordered logistic regression models are more complicated to interpret. In our models the dependent variable asks respondents to classify their opinion of the United States on a four-point scale and the method allows us to estimate all levels simultaneously in the model. Level 1 treats the "very positive" category as 0 with all the other categories ("positive", "negative", and "very negative") treated as a 1. Level 2 treats the "very positive" and "positive" categories as 0 and the "negative" and "very negative categories" as 1. Finally, Level 3 treats the "very positive", "positive", and "negative" categories as 0 and the "very negative" as 1. The models then include a distinct logit coefficient for each variable that violated the parallel regression assumption, while presenting a single logit coefficient for variables that did not violate this assumption.

RESULTS

We begin our analysis of anti-Americanism by examining the factors related to "What China Is" (see Table 1, Model 1). We find that three of our four variables are statistically significant, though one in the wrong direction. Respondents that see the Chinese economic model as the proper model for Colombia to follow held more anti-American views, just as some U.S.-based policymakers and scholars feared (see Model 1). Trust in Chinese businesses had no influence on anti-Americanism. Turning to Chinese politics, we find that both variables are significant. As expected, those on the political right are more pro-American, while those on the political left are more anti-American. However, those with more positive views of the Chinese political model are less anti-American. We are not sure why this might be the case, but additional study is merited. Taken together, our model partially supports hypotheses H1b and H1c, meaning that perceptions of What China Is may influence anti-Americanism in Colombians.

Table 1. China's Rise and anti-Americanism in Colombia

	Model 1 Effect of What China Is	Model 2 Effect of What China Does	Model 3 Combined Effects
China's Economic Model	0.680***		0.796***
	(0.191)		(0.205)
Trust in Chinese Business	-0.170		-0.082
	(0.110)		(0.134)
China's Political Model	-0.283*		-0.248#
	(0.116)		(0.129)
Ideology (Rightist)	-0.007*		-0.005
	(0.003)		(0.004)
Effects of Trade & Business		-0.285#	-0.263
		(0.185)	(0.162)
Effect on Jobs		0.069	0.123
		(0.104)	(0.117)
Effect on Development		-0.011	-0.090

	Model 1 Effect of What China Is	Model 2 Effect of What China Does	Model 3 Combined Effects
		(0.107)	(0.117)
Sino-Colombian Government Relations		-0.067	-0.015
		(0.196)	(0.215)
Prefer Greater Chinese Involvement		-0.112	-0.135
in Latin America		(0.212)	(0.218)
Female	0.011	0.001	0.039
	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.192)
Catholic	-0.242	-0.304	-0.268
	(0.191)	(0.187)	(0.201)
Age	0.005	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Poverty	0.118	0.119	0.144
	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.104)
Education	-0.305***	-0.267***	-0.295***
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.068)
cut1	-4.733	-4.276	-4.782
	(0.526)	(0.583)	(0.599)
cut2	-1.588	-1.238	-1.659
	(0.490)	(0.559)	(0.571)
cut3	0.732	1.092	0.658
	(0.498)	(0.587)	(0.595)
N	575	564	516
Chi^2	58.78	35.53	55.46

	Model 1 Effect of What China Is	Model 2 Effect of What China Does	Model 3 Combined Effects
Pseudo R^2	0.048	0.031	0.050
Log Likelihood	-576.134	-574.118	-518.002

Robust standard errors in parentheses, # p<0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Source: authors' analysis

Our second model tests the extent to which attitudes about "What China Does" serve as a basis for anti-Americanism in Colombia (see Model 2). Surprisingly, only one of the five variables is statistically significant. Namely, those that think China's trade and business relationships positively influence Colombia tend to score lower on anti-Americanism. This is precisely the opposite of H2a and undermines pundits and policymakers that think China's increased involvement in Colombia might drive a wedge between the U. S. and its allies.

In our third model we include both our measures of "What China Is" and "What China Does" (see Model 3). Of the nine variables included in this model, only two variables are statistically significant. Positive views of China's economic model continue to be associated with higher levels of anti-Ameri canism. Again, this is consistent with H1b. However, positive views of China's political model also continue to be associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism. Again, this contradicts H1c. Interestingly, none of the measures of What China Does were associated with anti-Americanism. Looking across the three models, our analysis showed limited support for the notion that China's rise poses an immediate threat to U. S. hegemony, at least not in America's closest ally. Nevertheless, that we found any support for the notion that views of China might be associated with anti-Americanism in this crucial case is somewhat surprising. Additional research is warranted.

Table 2. Predicted Probabilities for Anti-Americanism Related to *Development Model and Ideology*

	Views of U.S.			
Chinese model + Ideology	Very Positive	Positive	Negative	Very Negative
Chinese model + Leftist	0.048	0.457	0.395	0.099
Chinese model + Centrist	0.067	0.521	0.340	0.072

	Views of U.S.			
Chinese model + Ideology	Very Positive	Positive	Negative	Very Negative
Other model + Centrist	0.123	0.606	0.233	0.039
Other model + Rightist	0.165	0.625	0.183	0.027

Source: authors' calculations

While our statistical models indicate direction and significance of relationships, they tell us little regarding substantive effects. Consequently, we calculated predicted probabilities to gauge the impact of statistically significant variables using Model 1 to examine What China Is and Model 2 to examine What China Does (Long and Freese 2014). In Table 2 we divided our sample into those that prefer the Chinese economic model and those that preferred another model, and then varied ideology. Here we see that those that liked the Chinese development model and were on the left had the highest rates of anti-Americanism, while those that liked a different development model and were on the right had the lowest rates. Nevertheless, even leftists favoring a Chinese-style economic development model held pro-American views nearly half the time.

Table 3. Predicted Probabilities for Anti-Americanism Related to *Trade and Business*

	Views of U.S.			
Effect of Chinese Trade and Business	Very Positive	Positive	Negative	Very Negative
Very Bad	0.147	0.614	0.209	0.031
Bad	0.115	0.592	0.252	0.041
Good	0.089	0.558	0.299	0.054
Very Good	0.069	0.514	0.347	0.070

Source: authors' calculations.

In Table 3 we calculated predicted probabilities based on the four categories of the effect of Chinese trade and business. Again, we see that those with positive views tend to be the most anti-American. Still, we only see about an 18 percent swing in anti-Americanism between the most positive evaluations of Chinese trade and business to the most negative. Importantly, we see that even the most

pro-China respondents were, on average, more pro-American than anti-American. In sum, we find evidence, albeit limited evidence, that attitudes regarding What China Is and What China does can influence anti-Americanism in the United States' closes South American ally. As such, further study is warranted.

Of the control variables, only one is statistically significant. The effect of education is negative and significant across all three models, meaning increased education reduced anti-Americanism. This is consistent with what we see in the Great Powers literature. A respondent's sex, religion, age, and economic status had no effect on anti-Americanism.

CONCLUSIONS

We began by arguing that two key research areas informed our research. First, Sino-Latin American relations expanded at nearly an exponential rate over the last two decades and that Colombia was a recent recipient of China's attention. Being a close U. S. ally, how the public viewed China's presence and its efforts at influence expansion helps us understand China's potential and limits. Second, the literature on the determinants of pro-and anti-Great Power public opinion is a recent development. Building on theories of anti-Americanism, we use an original survey of Colombians to test whether "What China Is" or "What China Does" are associated with anti-Americanism. We find that Colombians view China much as they view the United States, not necessarily as a counterweight —at least not in Colombia.

In future work we plan to build on this analysis in two important ways. First, we plan to conduct another survey of public opinion in Colombia to reflect on the recent changes in Sino-Colombia relations and how these changes further influenced Colombians' views of China and the United States. In particular, the survey will focus on the latest drive by Chinese to use vaccine diplomacy from the outbreak of the pandemic to the end of 2022 to help solidify its "vertical expansion" in the country. China's sweeping and sophisticated public relations campaign highlighted its contribution to public health in Colombia, in sharp contrast with the limited U. S. response. We hope the survey will provide some clues as to whether the rise of Chinese soft-power, centering on one of the most challenging public health crises in recent times, resulted in observable shifts in how the public views China and the United States.

Secondly, we plan to move beyond Colombia to examine the determinants of pro- and anti-China views in three other Latin American countries –Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. In addition to using the results of similar public opinion surveys conducted in these countries, we plan to incorporate additional information from a series of elite interviews with political, economic, and academic elites to examine

whether elite and mass opinions regarding China differ. The former will allow us to test whether the determinants of anti- or pro-China views differ in countries with different economic and political profiles. The latter will allow us to examine convergence and divergence of how elites and the general public view China. The combination of rapid growth in the Sino-Latin American relations and China's more recent attempts to move beyond traditional trade and investment relations makes this an important avenue for additional research.

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PUBLIC OPINION ON LETHAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN MEXICO. A MISMATCH BETWEEN PREFERENCES AND EXPECTATIONS OF JUSTICE

Opinión pública sobre la violencia letal contra las mujeres en México. Un desajuste entre preferencias y expectativas de justicia

Opinião pública sobre a violência letal contra as mulheres no México: Uma incompatibilidade entre preferências e expectativas de justiça

DANIELA BARBA dbarba@worldjusticeproject.org [1]
NOAM LUPU noam.lupu@vanderbilt.edu [2]
ELIZABETH ZECHMEISTER liz.zechmeister@vanderbilt.edu [2]

[1] World Justice Project
[2] Vanderbilt University

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violence against women; impunity; public opinion; Mexico; conjoint analysis

Abstract
While structural factors help explain the supply of impunity for the murder of women in Latin America, we know less about how much citizens demand stronger responses to cases of lethal violence against women (VAW). What social norms prevail for punishing lethal VAW? What do citizens expect of the state's response? We investigate these questions in Mexico, using a conjoint experiment embedded in a national survey. We causally estimate the degree to which citizens have egalitarian or discriminatory views regarding the

deservingness of justice for homicide victims who are women (vs. men). We find that citizens prefer harsher penalties than they anticipate the state will deliver. Importantly, the public supports comparatively stronger punishment for the murder of women (vs. men) but expects high impunity. And, further, women on average expect a larger difference between their preferences and expectations than men.

Palabras clave:
violencia contra las mujeres; impunidad; opinión pública; México; análisis conjoint

Resumen
Si bien factores estructurales ayudan a explicar la oferta de impunidad por el asesinato de mujeres en América Latina, sabemos menos sobre cuánto demandan los ciudadanos respuestas más severas a los casos de violencia letal contra las mujeres (VCM). ¿Qué normas sociales prevalecen para castigar la VCM letal? ¿Qué esperan los ciudadanos de la respuesta del Estado? Investigamos estas preguntas en México, utilizando un experimento *conjoint* incluido en una encuesta nacional. Estimamos causalmente el grado en que los ciudadanos tienen opiniones igualitarias o discriminatorias con respecto a la justiciabilidad de los homicidios de mujeres (comparados con homicidios de víctimas hombres). Encontramos que las sentencias que prefieren los ciudadanos son más severas que las que anticipan que impondrá el estado. Destaca que el público apoya castigos más fuertes por los asesinatos de mujeres (comparados con los asesinatos de hombres), pero espera una impunidad alta. Y, además, las mujeres en promedio esperan una diferencia mayor entre sus preferencias y expectativas que los hombres.

Palavras-chave:
violência contra as mulheres; impunidade; opinião pública; México; conjoint analysis

Resumo
Embora fatores estruturais ajudem a explicar a impunidade para o assassinato de mulheres na América Latina, sabemos menos sobre o quanto os cidadãos exigem respostas mais duras aos casos de violência letal contra a mulher (VCM). Que normas sociais prevalecem para punir a VCM letal? O que os cidadãos esperam de resposta por parte do Estado? Investigamos essas questões no México, usando um conjoint experiment incluído em uma pesquisa nacional. Estimamos causalmente o grau em que os cidadãos têm visões igualitárias ou discriminatórias em relação ao tratamento da justiça dos homicídios de mulheres (em comparação com vítimas homens). Os resultados indicam que as penas que os cidadãos preferem são mais duras do que aquelas que eles antecipam que o Estado vai impor. É importante notar que o público apoia punições mais fortes para os assassinatos de mulheres (em comparação com os assassinatos de homens), mas espera alta impunidade. Além disso, as mulheres, em média, esperam uma diferença maior entre suas preferências e expectativas do que os homens.

INTRODUCTION*

Violence against women (VAW) is a silent pandemic that directly affects an estimated one in three women (WHO, 2021). In its most egregious form, VAW results in femicide.[1] Both VAW and femicide are fueled by systemic impunity – failure to punish aggression against women (Lagarde y de los Ríos, 2010). To decrease VAW and femicide, it is important to better understand where the locus of impunity resides: in societal norms that tolerate lethal violence against women and/or within institutions whose procedures, laws, and authorities fail to act to prevent and punish such crimes.

We consider this issue by looking at opinion towards lethal violence against women versus men victims. We focus on Mexico because it has a comparatively high and increasing rate of killings involving female victims (UNODC, 2019, 2022). Mexico also stands as an exemplar of impunity: only a scant proportion of murders with women victims are punished by the state (Angel, 2020). Mexico is located in a region, Latin America, that has the second highest region-average femicide rates (UNODC, 2019). The relevance of this issue to Mexico and the Latin American region is evident in the emergence and continuation of a women-led movement calling for action against lethal VAW under the slogan of "*Ni una menos"* ("Not one [woman] less") (Alcoba and McGowan, 2020).

A complex net of factors contributes to systemic impunity for VAW. This includes corruption, ineffective legal frameworks, overburdened justice systems, & resistance to change (see Durán, 2020; Equis, 2019; Frías, 2013; García del Moral & Neumann, 2019; Huacuz, 2011; McWilliams & Aoláin, 2013; Meneghel *et al.*, 2011; Menjívar & Walsh, 2016; Walsh & Menjívar, 2016; Washington Valdes, 2005).[2] Pervasive violence is an accelerant (McWillians & Aoláin, 2013). For example, lethal VAW in Mexico and elsewhere has increased in the context of criminal violence and crackdowns against organized crime (Atuesta & Vela, 2020; Auyero & Berti, 2015; Borde *et al.*, 2020; Hume, 2009; Wilding, 2010).

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* The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this article do not reflect the views of the World Justice Project.

1. Marcela Lagarde y de los Ríos' intrepid work put a spotlight on gender-motivated VAW, especially VAW resulting in murder. She originally intended to term the broader phenomenon "feminicide" – that is, "a genocide against women" (Lagarde y de los Ríos, 2010, pp. xv-xvi). The term came to be used to describe individual cases and translated into English as "femicide." The specific definition of femicide has changed over time as the phenomenon itself has changed, but it is commonly understood as lethal violence against women that is motivated in some way by the victim's gender (see Dawson and Carrigan, 2021; Mujica and Tuesta, 2014; OHCHR / UN Women, 2015).
2. Civil society organizations in Latin America have pushed for institutional reforms, often as part of a larger push to deepen and strengthen democracy (Brysk, 2018; Paxton, Hughes, & Barnes, 2020; Weldon, 2002).

We consider another factor: norms that tolerate VAW. In theory, norms internalized by public officers, the judicial system, and citizens can stymie the system's application of laws meant to protect women from violence and punish those who transgress against those laws (Htun & Jensenius, 2020; Lagarde y de los Ríos, 2010). Yet too little is known about the scope of norms of impunity over lethal VAW. And research on sexism offers contrasting possibilities linked to the duality of hostile and benevolent sexism – the former an objectifying antipathy toward women and the latter a patronizing and protective regard for role-conforming women (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001). On the one hand, both can undergird a culture of impunity to the degree that women victims are demeaned and considered culpable for norms-transgressing behaviors (Abrams *et al.*, 2003). On the other hand, benevolent sexism may provoke a chivalrous response in which the public demands comparatively harsh sentences for men who murder women (Herzog & Oreg, 2008).

Knowing which tendency, if either, predominates can help determine where to place mitigating efforts. If the public expresses weaker demand for the punishment of murders against women, compared to murders against men, this would suggest public opinion plays a role in dynamics around impunity. If instead the public demands equal or greater justice for women victims, then impunity is not a response to public demand but, rather, an issue that must be addressed by doubling down on institutional reforms and efforts to reduce violence.

We address this topic with data from a conjoint experiment conducted via an online study in Mexico in 2020. The design permits us to estimate the degree to which citizens have egalitarian or discriminatory views regarding the deservingness of justice for women (vs. men) homicide victims. We also assess citizens' expectations of justice, meaning their views on the degree to which the judicial system will dispense justice to women (vs. men) homicide victims. We check the robustness of the results by repeating a version of the experiment in a national phone survey conducted in Mexico in February 2021.

We find a mismatch between preferences and expectations of justice: citizens tend to *expect* weak punishment —half of the minimum sentence— for homicides, but *prefer* long sentences. Concerning preferences for justice for killings of women, citizens tend to adopt a paternalistic view towards women. Average preferred sentences for women's killings are longer than those for killings involving victims who are men.

Regardless of the victim's and the respondent's gender, preferred sentences are substantially lower than expected sentences. That said, women (vs. men) perceive a larger gap between the punishment they prefer and those they expect for women's killings. While men expect judicial authorities to reflect their preferred chivalrous treatment towards women as both victims and perpetrators of intentional murders, women do not expect the justice system to provide the special

protection for women that they prefer. As a result, men more often perceive that impunity is less serious in homicides involving victims that are women.

These findings point to an important and gendered gap between public preferences and authorities' performance regarding justice for VAW. Our findings contrast with views suggesting that impunity is (partially) rooted in cultural values upheld by the general population. In addition, this work contributes to a burgeoning literature in political science that studies how subjective perceptions of extralegal factors —like race, gender, and ethnicity— affect views of crime victims' justice deservingness and of the reprehensibility of criminal offenses such as with respect to rape (Schwarz *et al.*, 2022) and terrorism (Huff & Kertzer, 2018).

PUBLIC OPINION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION

Public opinion influences criminal justice policy and outcomes (see Pickett, 2019). One pathway is via the electoral process: in systems with at least some modicum of accountability, candidates' platforms may address issues related to crime and justice and citizens may factor these and their evaluation of the criminal justice system into their electoral choices (Nicholson-Crotty, Peterson & Ramirez, 2009). Yet widely circulating norms matter even beyond election moments. Opinion shapes justice administration even with respect to how authorities deal with egregious offenses such as terrorism (Huff & Kertzer, 2018) and rape (Schwarz *et al.*, 2022).

At the same time, public opinion is shaped by policy making (Nicholson-Crotty *et al.*, 2009; Roberts *et al.*, 2002). Elites send cues through policy that alter attitudes around gender egalitarianism in the sphere of political participation (see Kittilson, 2010; Morgan & Buice, 2013). The decisions by judges and prosecutors establish the parameters of behaviors that merit punishment and those that are acceptable. Gender biases in the application of the law reinforce societal gender norms and identities (Dayan, 2020; Smart, 1989). As such, elite cues hold the potential to shape how individuals value and seek to protect the lives of women and men. In contexts where state institutions do not punish the killing of women and other VAW, they may contribute to normalizing these violations and tacitly send a message that women's lives are "expendable" (Menjívar, 2011).

This raises two questions: what norms prevail in the public regarding the extent to which murders perpetrated against women (vs. men) ought to be punished and what expectations do citizens have of the state's likelihood of enacting a strong punishment? Scholars have shown that extralegal factors (gender, race, and the nature of the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator) shape preferences over sentencing decisions in the United States (e. g., Nooruddin, 2007). And scholars examining the U.S. also have shown that factors such as

the victim's gender and race shape opinion on severity of punishment warranted for rape (Schwarz *et al.*, 2022). We build on this research and turn our eyes to a different setting: Mexico –a country that, compared to the U.S., ranks higher in tolerance for gender-based violence (GBV) and lower on gender development (Pak, 2016; UNDP, 2021). Further, we focus specifically on an issue that is of particular concern in the Latin American region and Mexico in particular: justice for homicides.

GENDER AND VIEWS ON JUSTICE

We focus on gender egalitarianism as expressed in public preferences for justice, as well as expected state actions. Our principal question is whether the public advocates for more or less punishment for perpetrators of murders of women (vs. men), in general and conditional on whether the respondent is a woman or a man. Answering this question provides insight into dynamics around VAW, including femicides–the most egregious expression of VAW. While not all female killings are femicides, justice for femicides has as a necessary condition that there is justice for homicides involving women victims, which allows the investigation and coding of the latter as potential femicides. In contrast, if citizens are biased against taking women's deaths seriously, lower demand of justice for women could thwart efforts to address femicides.

In order to consider lethal acts of violence against women (vs. men) in broad terms, we do not consider reactions to cases labeled "femicide" and we do not focus specifically on markers that might make lethal VAW particularly identifiable as femicide (e.g., an outcome of escalating intimate partner violence or an explicit honor killing).[3] The definition of femicide has changed over time, with the most encompassing interpretations considering any markers that "signal the existence of broader patriarchal systems of oppressing women." (OHCHR / UN Women, 2015, p. 13). We also do not consider whether individuals would label the scenario as a femicide. We do, however, provide a circumstantial factor that presents the victim in an unfavorable light and that could be viewed as a justification. News stories (see Fairbairn & Dawson, 2013; Fuentes, 2020; Mahadeen, 2017; Spies, 2020) often editorialize killings of women by referring to perpetrators' attempts to justify these killings and by focusing on how victims might have challenged traditional norms (Toledo & Lagos, 2014 Wright, 2011).

3. Research suggests that the markers of femicide include a wide range of conditions related to the gendered power imbalance between victim and perpetrator (see Dawson & Carrigan, 2021; OHCHR / UN Women, 2015).

We consider both preferences over punishment and expectations for punishment. For the latter, in general we anticipate the public to expect leniency in the punishment of crime or, in other words, for expected punishment to be less severe than preferred punishment (Roberts *et al.*, 2002). We begin without *a priori* expectations regarding gendered differences in expectations for punishment.

We do theorize over how gender may condition preferences over punishment, though we identify countervailing arguments. Specifically, we consider two distinct cognitive frameworks or schemas that individuals may use in defining their preferences regarding this topic. On the one hand, there is reason to theorize that the public will be more tolerant of VAW, one expression of which could be advocating for comparatively less punishment when women (vs. men) are murder victims. On the other hand, there is an argument to be made for citizens' chivalrous or paternalistic tendencies affecting preferences regarding justice, such that the public prefers more punishment when women (vs. men) are killed. We summarize expectations derived from these cognitive frameworks in Table 1 and, in the text that follows, we provide rationale for each.

Table 1. Gender Traditional Norms and Justice Deservingness Preferences[4]

Circumstantial Factor	Cognitive Framework	
	Normalization of VAW	Chivalry / Paternalism
Victim is a Woman (vs. Man)	H1: Shorter Sentence	H2: Longer Sentence
Perpetrator is a Man (vs. Woman)	H1a: Shorter Sentence	H2a: Longer Sentence
Respondent is a Man (vs. Woman)	H1b: Shorter Sentence	H2b: Longer Sentence

Source: Own elaboration

The first cognitive framework involves a normalization of VAW that could result in lower stated preferences for punishment. In theory, two complementary mechanisms reinforce this type of framework. The first is that traditional gender norms may lead to lower sympathy for women victims (Pavlou & Knowles, 2001).

4. We preregistered Hypotheses 1 and 1b at Open Science Framework prior to the collection of the data for the conjoint design and prior to the collection of a follow-up phone survey (Barba and Zechmeister, 2020; Barba, Lupu and Zechmeister, 2021; also see Appendix 5). The latter document also pre-registered Hypothesis 2 prior to the phone survey. We also pre-registered expectations for how gender norms would condition the treatment; we do not explore that topic here. Finally, we pre-registered a variant of Hypotheses 1a and 2a, which considered cases in which the victim was a woman. However, due to concern about statistical power, we test for the effect of the perpetrator's gender without regard to the gender of the victim.

The second is based in the notion that women victims are more likely to be perceived as causing violence perpetrated against them than men victims (Schneider *et al.*, 1994).

A tendency to express less sympathy for certain female victims can be rooted in the application of stricter social norms for women; this can lead to situations in which (perceived or real) deviance from norms mitigates against the public's view of women as victims (Carey & Torres, 2010). Scholars distinguish between hostile sexism –objectifying antipathy toward women– and benevolent sexism –patronizing and protective inclinations towards women who adhere to role stereotypes (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001). Despite their differences, both may contribute to a culture of impunity by devaluing and failing to protect women who are perceived to transgress norms (Abrams *et al.*, 2003). Studies of sexual violence and intimate partner violence (IPV) find that those adhering to traditional gender norms tend to fault women victims when they have disrespected or cheated on a perpetrator (Taylor and Sorenson, 2005). At the same time, an argumentative line separate from the ambivalent sexism framework holds that VAW is condoned or normalized regardless of whether women victims adhere to gender stereotypes, with individuals finding fault with women victims of assault and sexual violence for displaying attributes traditionally perceived as feminine (carelessness, passivity, and excessive confidence on others) (Howard, 1984; White & Kurpius, 2002).

A subordinate value placed on women's lives may also affect how perpetrators of women's killings are treated. Some studies in criminology expect the justice system to treat male offenders who victimize women with more leniency than those who victimize men (Belknap, 2001; Franklin & Fearn, 2008). Analyses of the Latin American context have shown qualitatively that such biases against women and the normalization of violence can extend to public views of lethal VAW (Carey & Torres, 2010; Menjívar, 2011). Related, the media often normalizes homicidal VAW as reports editorialize the coverage of female killings (Fuentes, 2020; Wright, 2011).

Such dynamics are common in Mexico, where normalization of GBV is common (Htun & Jensenius, 2020). Despite progressive reforms and institutional mechanisms to address VAW in Mexico, there prevail biases in the justice system that discriminate against women victims and make them less likely to access their right to due process (Durán, 2020; Saucedo & Huacuz, 2011). The pervasiveness of this type of gender bias may lead the public to tolerate impunity, or lower levels of punishment, for murders of women compared to murders of men. This line of discussion supports the following hypothesis:

H1. Mean preferred punishment ratings will be lower for killings involving women (vs. men) as victims.

Similarly, if VAW is excused based on the victims' behavior and normalized, we may anticipate that citizens expect the state to impose shorter sentences for women's killings. Thus, we also assess whether mean expected punishment ratings are lower for women vs. men victims.

If a normalization of GBV undergirds public views on punishment for homicides, we ought to be most likely to observe that outcome when the perpetrator is a man. In the Mexican context, violence perpetrated by men against women may be perceived as legitimate when men use it to "discipline" women who fail to fulfill their obligations according to traditional gender norms or when men need to "defend" their power and assumed superiority status (Contreras, 2008; see also Glick & Fiske, 1996). In addition, scholarship on mitigating factors and victim-blaming frequently applies those ideas to dyads with men-as-perpetrators and women-as-victims. There is reason, then, to expect men perpetrators of killings of women to be treated with comparative leniency. Yet, even more generally, scholarship suggests that violence perpetrated by men is relatively more acceptable, as men are conceived as stereotypically more prone to agency and social dominance (Contreras, 2008; see also Glick & Fiske, 1996). Related, when women are the perpetrators, they are more strongly deviating from social norms that expect them to be less aggressive. Along these lines, scholars have found that women who commit violent crimes are perceived to transgress the existing gender hierarchies, and thus can receive harsher or equal treatment than men (see Chesney-Lind, 1977; Rodriguez *et al.*, 2006; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Nooruddin, 2007).

We apply this line of discussion to the public's preferences over the appropriate punishment for a murder. We express the hypothesis as follows:

H1a. Mean punishment ratings will be lower for killings perpetrated by a man (vs. a woman).

Similar norms may shape individuals' expectations of state-administered punishment. Therefore, we also consider whether individuals expect less (or more) punishment by the state for punish men vs. women as perpetrators.

Finally, we consider whether the gender of the person passing judgment (in this case, the respondent) affects punitive attitudes. Previous literature finds women less likely than men to support punitive measures, which might reflect women prioritizing moral considerations (Ramos & Nincic, 2011) as well as gender socialization (Boots & Cochran, 2011). Yet, we may expect the inverse when considering gendered relations between victims and perpetrators of lethal VAW given that men are more likely to uphold traditional gender norms (Yu and Lee, 2013) and to excuse VAW (for a review, see Flood & Pease, 2009). Such a pattern is

found in the Latin American context (Pak, 2016). That could translate to comparatively more tolerance by men of women's killings. We thus test this hypothesis:

H1b. Men (vs. women) will assign lower punishment ratings for killings involving women as victims.

While there are ample reasons to theorize the above hypotheses, a rival cognitive framework yields a different set of expectations. This second framework is based in the notion that there exists a form of paternalism or chivalry, or the generalization of women as having a less violent and blameworthy character (Baumer *et al.*, 2000; Rodriguez *et al.*, 2006; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000; Glick and Fiske, 1996, 2001). Patriarchal chivalrous tendencies may exist in both the public and authorities, and thus motivate a protective and punitive response to murders in which women are the victim. Under this view, society rejects VAW as women are less able to defend themselves (Baumer *et al.*, 2000; Hodell *et al.*, 2014). In contrast, compared to women, men victims may be perceived as more blameworthy since their crime incidence is higher and they are perceived as more able to cause harm (Baumer, *et al.*, 2000; Ragatz & Russell, 2010). Further, in contexts with high levels of homicidal VAW, the public may want to compensate as a reaction to this violence and, as such, may want to provide relatively more protection to women victims. Hence, there are reasons to consider that the public may be more punitive in their attitudes around killings of women compared to murders involving men as victims. This provides justification for asserting a rival hypothesis to H1:

H2 (Rival to H1). Mean punishment ratings will be higher for killings involving women (vs. men) as victims.

With regards to the gender of the perpetrator, the paternalism or chivalry thesis suggests that society acts to protect women criminals from detection and prosecution (Pollack, 1950). Some research posits that women perpetrating certain crimes are considered to be fickle, childlike, and not fully responsible for their acts (Anderson, 1976). More broadly, women perpetrators may be perceived to be more likely to act in self-defense (Cramer, 1999) and to play fundamental roles in their families, which are disrupted by incarceration (Daly, 1989). This provides reason to consider that women (vs. men) perpetrators in these scenarios may be viewed as less culpable and comparatively less deserving of punishment. As a result, we test this rival hypothesis:

H2a. (Rival to H1a). Mean punishment ratings will be higher for killings perpetrated by a man (vs. a woman).

Similarly, gender roles consistent with a paternalistic schema could also influence preferences for justice deservingness. Men are consistently found to favor retributive measures more than women, which reflects men's socialization into valuing order and acting on that basis by holding individuals accountable for their actions (Boots & Cochran, 2011). Correspondingly, studies find that women are more prone to support rehabilitation and less likely to support harsher punishment (Applegate *et al.*, 2002; Blumstein & Cohen, 1980; Ramos and Nincic, 2011), regardless of threat perceptions (Boots & Cochran, 2011; Lizotte, 2016). Thus, we also assess this hypothesis:

H2b (Rival to H1b). Men (vs. women) will assign higher punishment ratings for killings involving women as victims.

A chivalrous view would imply larger moral outrage for the killings of women. As such, we may also anticipate a pattern consistent with views of punitive populism (Roberts *et al.*, 2002), where preferred punishment is more severe than the outcomes people expect from authorities.

In addition to the above expectations, we recognize that the circumstances under which violence occurs may affect opinion about victims' deservingness of justice. Reason and passion play key roles in considerations of culpability and justice deservingness (Warrick, 2011). Stereotypes about the role of the victim in providing a motivation for violence matter for the degree to which society blames perpetrators. Along these lines, victims who appear to have provoked the perpetrator's loss of control in a way that triggers moralized rage may be seen as deserving less justice for a violation (Dawson & Sutton, 2017). We take these factors into consideration in our design and analyses.

CASE SELECTION

To test these hypotheses, we examine public opinion dynamics in contemporary Mexico. We select this case for four reasons. First, Mexico has a comparatively high and increasing rate of killings involving female victims (UNODC, 2019, 2022). Second, Mexico has high levels of impunity for murders with women as victims. Between 2015 and 2018, only 3 percent of murders of women resulted in sentences, versus 11 percent of all homicide cases. Third, the case of Mexico may provide insights into region-relevant dynamics: Latin America has the second highest region-average femicide rates (UNODC, 2019). Regional figures indicate that more than 90 percent of femicides go unpunished (Htun and Jensenius, 2020; see also Brysk, 2018; García del Moral and Neumann, 2019; Menjívar & Walsh, 2016). Fourth, Mexico —along with other countries in

the region— has been the focus of significant grassroots efforts to eliminate femicide. Women in Mexico and across Latin America have created a movement whose slogan is *"Ni una menos"* ("Not one [woman] less") to demand action to address lethal VAW (Alcoba & McGowan, 2020; López, 2020).

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

We use a conjoint analysis to study, on the one hand, the multidimensional factors that may guide the public's preferences for punishing killings, and, on the other hand, respondents' characteristics. This allows us to simultaneously identify the causal effect of several distinct characteristics surrounding a crime and to test the hypotheses posed above (Hainmueller *et al.*, 2014). Moreover, this approach minimizes social desirability bias: respondents are presented with several factors that may justify their rating, which makes it less likely that they refrain from revealing a true preference stemming from a particular attribute that is not viewed favorably by others (Hainmueller *et al.*, 2014). We use linear regression and correct standard errors for within respondent clustering, a standard statistical method to analyze conjoint experiments. We then estimate, holding other attributes constant, the overall effect of a particular attribute, or its average marginal component effect (AMCE), averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes.

In the principal conjoint study, individuals are provided with three scenarios (or tasks) in which a victim is stabbed to death. The set-up for each scenario is the same. The discretely valued attributes around the scenario vary as follows (and see text box). First, in attribute A, the victim of the stabbing is randomly assigned to be either a man or a woman; this allows us to evaluate H1 and H2. Second, in attribute B, the perpetrator of the stabbing is randomly assigned to be either a man or a woman; this allows us to assess H1a and H2a. Third, we consider the average marginal component effect of attribute A conditional on the gender of the respondent, which allows us to evaluate H1b and H2b. The last two discrete attributes (C and D) are randomly assigned to take into account circumstances of the killing that may affect respondents' preferences and expectations of justice: i) the event provoking the stabbing is randomly assigned to be a lie, a situation in which the perpetrator is ridiculed, or a robbery; and ii) the event provoking the stabbing is randomly described as occurring with no one around or in front of the perpetrator's friends.

Textbox 1. Online Experiment Design

TEXT. [A(1) A young man **/ (2)** A young woman] found out that [**B (1)** a young man / **(2)** a young woman] [**C (1)** lied to them / **(2)** ridiculed them / **(3)** robbed them].

[**D (1)** No one else was aware of what happened / **(2)** The person who was [**If C = 1 then** lied to / **If C= 2 then** ridiculed / **If C = 3 then** robbed] was shamed in front of their friends]

Right when this happened, in a rage attack, [**if A = 1 then** "the man"/ **If A = 2 then** "the woman"] fatally stabbed the person who had [**if C = 1 then** "lied to them" / **if C = 2 then** "ridiculed them"/ **if C = 3 then** "robbed them"].)

Source: Own elaboration

We use a rating-based conjoint design, where the main dependent variable is the question that follows immediately after the description of the scenario on justice preferences: In your opinion, in years of prison time, what is the appropriate punishment for this stabbing? The dependent variable ranges from zero to fifty. Fifty years is the maximum sentence for homicide in most Mexican states.[5] A second question follows this one and asks about expected preferences: how many years of punishment the stabbing is likely to actually receive. Responses to this question allow us to describe opinion dynamics around impunity and justice. The survey also records the gender of the respondent.

Our core dataset is from a survey conducted via the internet (programmed in Qualtrics) with a sample of 2,000 Mexican adults drawn from an opt-in panel managed by Netquest. Data collection ran from October 14 to October 23, 2020. Netquest uses a quota-based approach to draw as close to a representative sample as possible from its proprietary panel. We include an adjustment survey weight variable to increase the age, gender, education, and geographic representativeness of the survey. The weighted sample approximates the population on gender and age.[6] As expected for online studies in the Latin American region, even the weighted sample is skewed toward those who are more educated and wealthier (Castorena *et al.*, 2023). Therefore, to assess the robustness of the results with a more representative survey, we conducted a follow-up phone survey experiment from January 27 to February 22, 2021. The phone survey was conducted on a sample of 1,000 Mexican adults by Data-OPM using a random-digit dial (RDD)

5. The corresponding federal maximum sentence is 60 years.
6. As an exception, the oldest population group is underrepresented in the weighted online sample. We include robustness checks for relevant socioeconomic characteristics in Appendix 2.

approach.[7] A version of our instrument was included alongside other modules in an omnibus academic study organized by the firm.[8] This study succeeded in achieving a sample that is more reflective of the broader population: according to data from 2019, 60 percent of the Mexican population has an educational level below 10th grade (OECD, 2019) and, in the weighted phone survey data, this figure is 53.7 percent (versus 36.6 percent for the weighted online study). The design of the phone survey varied slightly: we included one scenario describing a stabbing very similar to the online survey. In this scenario, the varying attributes are only the gender of the victim and the gender of the perpetrator (randomly assigned to be either a woman or a man). In turn, we fix the third and fourth attributes to describe a person who has been ridiculed in front of their friends, and in a fit of rage that ridiculed person murders the person who ridiculed them. See Appendix 2 for more details on both surveys.

FINDINGS

Looking at views on punishment for homicides overall, we find that citizens on average expect authorities to underperform in the dispensing of justice. The average expected sentence is not only half of the legal minimum sentence for aggravated homicide, it is also ten years shorter than the average sentence respondents prefer. Concerning our hypotheses, we find citizens tend to adopt a paternalistic view in their preferences regarding the punishment of women's murders. We also find a noteworthy mismatch between the preferences and the expectations of women citizens. While men perceive that the state acts in congruence with their chivalrous expectations, women perceive that the judicial authorities' responses equally permit impunity for men and women victims.

Preferences vs. Expectations of Justice

First, we observe a tendency to prefer punitive measures and yet to expect impunity for homicides (see Figure 1). The average preferred sentence, while not

7. The sampling design relied on a dual frame including lists of both cell phone and landline numbers provided by Mexican telecom authorities. 93 percent of the population has a landline or a cell phone.
8. The measurement of the dependent variable (preferred and expected sentence) in the phone survey has a relatively high missingness: 20.8 percent of respondents failed to express a preferred sentence and 17.2 percent did not reveal the sentence they expected authorities to impose, which compares to around 1 percent missingness in the online survey measurements. The patterns of missingness are not robustly correlated with the variables of interest in either case. However, those who fail to respond are significantly more likely to be less educated. See Table 3 and 4 in Appendix 2.

taking any of the conjoint experiment attributes into account, is 27 years (SD = 17). Meanwhile, on average the expected actual sentence is 15 years (SD = 14), with a median of ten years.[9] Thirty two percent of respondents prefer a sentence of forty years or longer, while 62.4 percent expect a sentence of fifteen years or shorter. More descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix 3.

Figure 1. Distribution of the Dependent Variable (Weighted).



Note: The figure at the top plots the frequency distributions of the preferred sentences for homicides, and the figure at the bottom plots the frequency distributions of the expected sentences for homicides. Both are based on an online survey with a sample of 2,000 Mexican adults drawn from an opt-in panel in 2020. Both variables are measured after the vignette text of the conjoint experiment (see text for wording) The preferred sentences for homicides presented at the top are measured by asking, "In your opinion, in years of prison time, what is the appropriate punishment for this stabbing?" The plot at the bottom is based on answers to the question: "And how long do you think the sentence for this stabbing will actually be?" Response options were provided to respondents on a sliding scale from 0 to 50.

Source: Own elaboration

9. The phone survey results show a similar pattern: the average preferred sentence is 28 (SD = 18) with a median of 25 years, while the mean expected sentence is 19 (SD = 16), with a median of 15 years.

Hypothesis Tests

The first column of graphs in Figure 2 summarizes the findings resulting from our analysis of Hypothesis (H) 1 and H1a and their rivals, H2 and H2a. In short, we find support for H2 and H2a. Killings involving women (vs. men) victims receive higher average preferred sentences (as stated in H2), and the public prefers longer sentences for homicides perpetrated by men (vs. women) (as in H2a). Specifically, average preferred sentences are roughly four years longer for stabbings involving women victims and for those involving men as perpetrators. These findings reveal that, concerning justice for lethal VAW, society at large operates under a paternalistic cognitive framework and/or one marked by a patronizing bent found within benevolent sexism. We do not find support for H1 and H1a (see plots A-D in Figure 2). Further, panels A and B within Figure 3 show that these results are consistent across survey mode –online and phone.[10,11]

We next test the conditioning effects of respondent gender on preferred punishment levels, as stated H1b and H2b. We do not support for either H1b or H2b. The results presented in Figure 2 (A-D) and in Figure 1 in Appendix 3 show that there are no significant differences in the average preferred punishment ratings of men and women respondents.

We now turn to an exploratory look at expected (as opposed to preferred) punishment ratings. By comparing Plots A-D to Plots E-H in Figure 2, we see that citizens expect the state to impose sentences that are on average shorter than they prefer. That said, the public on average perceives that the state's response will match their paternalistic preferences: the average individual expects authorities to make a distinction in favor of women victims and women perpetrators. For the pooled sample analyzed in Figure 2, respondents expect longer sentences for killings involving women (vs. men) victims and shorter sentences for those involving women perpetrators (see Plots E-H in Figure 2). Specifically, citizens expect the judicial system to impose sentences around one year longer for homicides involving women victims and for those in which the perpetrator is a man. These results are generally consistent results across survey mode: although in the phone survey the AMCE for women victimization is not statistically significant,

10. Figure 3 reveals an additional noteworthy result in the findings: respondents prefer lower sanctions for perpetrators who were robbed —as opposed to those who were lied to or ridiculed— such that the latter honor-based defense is not a comparatively more attenuating circumstance.
11. We find that carryover effects from one task to the next in the conjoint analysis are not a significant concern. We present the results of the diagnostic tests for conjoint experiments in Appendix 4.

Figure 2. Summary of Findings



Note: The figure shows the average preferred and expected sentences for homicide. Square-shaped estimates depict averages for the overall population, triangle-shaped estimates symbolize averages for men respondents, and circle-shaped estimates for women respondents. Average preferred and expected sentences are based on the online survey questions described in Figure 1 (as well as in the Methodology section and the Appendix 1). The respondent's gender is measured by asking, "For statistical purposes, could you please indicate your gender?" Response options were Man, Woman, and Other. "Other" is excluded from this analysis due to statistical power considerations.

Source: Own elaboration

the direction of the coefficient is positive and the AMCE of man as perpetrator reflects a paternalistic tendency[12] (see Figure 3, panels C and D).

Turning to the potential conditioning effect of respondent gender, we find that both women and men expect authorities to impose sentences for the killings of women that are shorter than they prefer (see panels B and F in Figure 2). Nevertheless, we find gendered differences in the sentences men and women anticipate will be imposed by the justice system: in analyses that consider the conditional effect of respondent gender (see results in panels C and D in Appendix 3 Figure 1), we find that men expect sentences around three years longer for stabbings involving women victims (although for the phone survey, this result tends in this direction but is not significant). That is, men prefer *and* often expect authorities to impose significantly longer sentences for stabbings involving women victims than for those involving men victims (see the triangle-shaped estimates in Figure 2). At the same time, men expect justice for women killings to still be insufficient with respect to their preferred punishment ratings. By contrast, women expect authorities to treat women victims with the same impunity that they treat men victims (see the circle-shaped estimates in Figure 2). Considering that women respondents *prefer* larger punishment ratings for women killings, this implies that women would prefer a chivalrous justice system but do not expect this to be reflected in actual sentencing, which they expect will be the minimum on average.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study adds to our understanding of the factors contributing to high impunity rates for killings of women, impunity that fails to mitigate against femicide. Recognizing that structural factors help explain the supply of impunity for the murder of women in Latin America, we turn attention to public demand for punishment of lethal violence against women (VAW). We focus on preferences and expectations for punishment of lethal VAW, without labeling the murder as femicide, because justice for lethal VAW is a critical precursor to justice for femicide and because the definition of femicide varies across individuals and places. We focus our study on Mexico, where murder rates of women and impunity levels for those acts are especially high, where citizens hold relatively more traditional gender norms than they do in other settings where gendered attitudes towards justice have been studied, and where a movement to eliminate femicide has attracted the attention of policymakers and others.

12. We note that the results from the phone survey might minimize the AMCE of victim's gender since the circumstantial factors describing the publicness and the offense preceding the stabbing are fixed to the conditions that minimize the effect of the victim's gender.

Figure 3. Average Marginal Component Effects of Homicide Circumstances on Punishment Ratings



Note: This figure shows the AMCEs of circumstantial factors on preferred (panels A and B) and on expected (panels C and D) sentence lengths for stabbings. Results in panels A) and C) are based on the analysis of a conjoint experiment included in a national online survey, and those in panel B) and D) are based on a vignette experiment included in a phone survey. Results in panels A and C are from analyses of the 2020 online survey. Results in panels B and D are based on a phone survey conducted with a sample of 1,006 Mexican adults in 2021. The preferred and expected sentences are measured by asking the same questions as in the online conjoint experiment, with the added phrase "You can choose any sentence length between 0 and 50 years of prison." The phone survey questions are read after a vignette experiment in which victim and perpetrator gender is varied (see Appendix 1 for wording). Estimates are based on regression results shown in Tables 3 and 4 of Appendix 3.

Source: Own elaboration

Our analysis of two conjoint experiments reveals that public attitudes and expectations regarding justice for murders of women reflect certain traditional gender norms held by society. However, these norms motivate the public *not* to condone higher impunity for lethal violence against women but rather to demand

longer sentences for murders involving women victims and for men as perpetrators. In our study, citizens on average prefer a type of paternalistic protection issued towards women victims and perpetrators. And, overall they expect the judicial system to reflect these preferences —i.e., to impose sentences that are "chivalrous" and give women preferential treatment. That said, when looking at the gendered differences in the attitudes held by those issuing judgments (respondents in our survey), women expect no special treatment to be made for women victims and perpetrators. Instead, they expect the same low levels of impunity for the murder of women as they do for men who are murdered.

These findings imply that, in contexts of high impunity for lethal VAW, where states *de facto* send the message that women's lives are "expendable" (Menjívar, 2011), the average member of the public nonetheless may prefer comparatively high punishments for perpetrators, instead of normalizing or condoning violence. At the same time, perceptions of impunity —as reflected in low expectations for state punishment— may affect behavior, leading, for example, to the underreporting of GBV (see Palermo *et al.*, 2014). On the whole the results provide evidence that continued impunity is not a matter of lack of public demand; rather, efforts to decrease impunity should double down on implementing institutional changes and improving the capacity of the judicial system. Specific reforms could include recognizing femicide as a separate crime that is addressed by specialized judges and prosecutors who are sensitive to the nuances involved in this type of violence, professionalizing the police and justice system, and trying to identify, prevent, and punish cases of GBV that may go underreported. As a caveat, our findings and these prescriptions may apply specifically to contexts with high levels of lethal VAW and relatively more traditional gender norms.

Academics might consider our findings with respect to the ambivalent —benevolent and hostile— sexism framework offered by social psychology (Glick and Fiske, 1996). This research indicates that while society treats women who abide by gender norms regulating their behavior with paternalism or benevolence, it treats those who break those rules with hostility. Conversely, we find that society does not treat women victims of homicide with comparative hostility, even when their homicide follows an event where their behavior runs contrary to an ideal —lying, ridiculing, or stealing. A limitation of this study, which future research should address, is that we do not assess whether this dynamic holds at the individual level via analyses of individual benevolent and hostile sexism measures. For now, we conclude that women victims of homicide —as well as women perpetrators of homicide— may often be treated with a type of paternalism (benevolent sexism) that demands comparatively greater punishment for men who murder women.

It is important to recognize that our research considers public opinion on average. It may be that attitudes vary significantly across local contexts. Research on

attitudes and behaviors in proximity to women's police stations provides important insight. For example, Perova and Reynolds (2017) find that establishing a women's police station in metropolitan Brazil locations reduced incidents of murders with women victims. And Córdova and Kras (2022) find that men in Brazil are more likely to condemn VAW in municipalities with women's police stations. This line of research suggests the caveat that conclusions about average opinion dynamics may not travel to all locales while, at the same time, it highlights the need for more research that investigates heterogeneity in opinion at the sub-national level.

Concerning women perpetrators of homicidal violence, further research could look more closely at the conditions that moderate the display of paternalistic attitudes towards women perpetrators of homicide. For instance, future causal analyses could compare the extent to which a society shows paternalistic tendencies towards women perpetrators who were victims of IPV (Nooruddin, 2007), women perpetrators who defended themselves from an attacker on the streets, and/or women perpetrators in other situations not examined here.

Similarly, researchers might ask whether benevolent sexism or paternalism is applicable only to victims of lethal VAW, as opposed to victims of other types of VAW. This work could consider how the tendencies identified here are compatible with the high rates of normalization of IPV in the region and the neglect suffered by victims of sexual violence and IPV. That is, future research could explore public preferences regarding protection of victims and punishment of perpetrators in cases of nonlethal VAW. Analyzing prevailing gender norms concerning the continuum of behaviors that constitute GBV may help design policies that go beyond punitive measures to restore the rule of law and focus on preventing violence, rehabilitating perpetrators and transforming their social relations, and protecting victims and providing restitution.

Interestingly, our study indicates that men expect the judicial authorities to give comparatively more preferential treatment to women. Men expect the justice system to impose shorter sentences on women perpetrators of homicidal violence (when compared to men perpetrators), and they expect harsher punishments for perpetrators of homicides involving women (as opposed to men) victims. It is plausible that these expectations affect the degree to which men demand justice for VAW since men, on average, already expect the justice system to favor women. Exploring this notion, and its implications for *Ni una menos* and related movements, is another germane avenue for future research.

Declarations: Funding and/or Conflicts of interests/Competing interests

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ONLINE APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. SURVEY EXPERIMENT

I. Online Survey Experiment

(Original Spanish version)

TEXT. [A(1) Un hombre / **(2)** Una mujer] adulto(a) joven se enteró de que **[B (1)** un hombre / **(2)** una mujer] adulto(a) joven **[C (1)** le mintió / **(2)** lo/la puso en ridículo / **(3)** le robó]**.**

[D (1) Nadie más estaba al tanto de lo que sucedió / **(2)** Quien sufrió **[If C = 1 then** "la mentira" / **If C= 2 then** "el ridículo" / **If C = 3 then** "el robo"**]** fue avergonzada(o) delante de sus amigos**]**

En el momento de lo sucedido, en un ataque de rabia, **[if A = 1 then** "el hombre"/ **If A = 2 then** "la mujer"**]** apuñaló mortalmente a quien le había **[if C = 1 then** "mentido" / **if C = 2 then** "ridiculizado"/ **if C = 3 then** "robado"**].**

- En su opinión, en años de prisión, ¿cuál es una condena apropiada para este apuñalamiento?
  (0-50) **[Sliding scale]**
- **¿Y cuántos años de prisión cree usted que efectivamente recibirá este apuñalamiento?**
  (0-50) **[Sliding scale]**

(English translation):

TEXT. [A(1) A young man / **(2)** A young woman**]** found out that **[B (1)** a young man / **(2)** a young woman**] [C (1)** lied to them / **(2)** ridiculed them / **(3)** robbed them**].**

[D (1) No one else was aware of what happened / **(2)** The person who was **[If C = 1 then** lied to / **If C= 2 then** ridiculed / **If C = 3 then** robbed**]** was shamed in front of their friends**]**

Right when this happened, in a rage attack, **[if A = 1 then** "the man"/ **If A = 2 then** "the woman"**]** fatally stabbed the person who had **[if C = 1 then** "lied to them" / **if C = 2 then** "ridiculed them"/ **if C = 3 then** "robbed them"**].)**

- In your opinion, in years of prison time, what is the appropriate punishment for this stabbing?
  (0-50) **[Sliding scale]**
- And how long do you think the sentence for this stabbing will actually be?
  (0-50) **[Sliding scale]**

II. Phone Survey Experiment

(Original Spanish version)

Ahora le voy a describir el siguiente escenario:

CUESTIONARIO A
TVIOLPA_TEXT. Un hombre adulto joven se enteró de que una mujer adulta joven le robó. El hombre que sufrió el robo fue avergonzado delante de sus amigos. En el momento de lo sucedido, en un ataque de rabia, el hombre apuñaló mortalmente a quien le había robado.

CUESTIONARIO B
TVIOLPB_TEXT. Un hombre adulto joven se enteró de que un hombre adulto joven le robó. El hombre que sufrió el robo fue avergonzado delante de sus amigos. En el momento de lo sucedido, en un ataque de rabia, el hombre apuñaló mortalmente a quien le había robado.

CUESTIONARIO C
TVIOLPC_TEXT. Una mujer adulta joven se enteró de que un hombre adulto joven le robó. La mujer que sufrió el robo fue avergonzada delante de sus amigos. En el momento de lo sucedido, en un ataque de rabia, la mujer apuñaló mortalmente a quien le había robado.

CUESTIONARIO D
TVIOLPD_TEXT. Una mujer adulta joven se enteró de que una mujer adulta joven le robó. La mujer que sufrió el robo fue avergonzada delante de sus amigos. En el momento de lo sucedido, en un ataque de rabia, la mujer apuñaló mortalmente a quien le había robado.

TVIOLP1. En su opinión, en años de prisión, ¿cuál es una condena apropiada para este apuñalamiento? Puede escoger cualquier condena entre 0 y 50 años de prisión. ____ (número entre 0 y 50)

TVIOLP2. ¿Y cuántos años de prisión cree usted que efectivamente recibirá este apuñalamiento? Puede escoger cualquier condena entre 0 y 50 años de prisión. ____ (número entre 0 y 50)

(English translation)

Now I am going to describe to you the following scenario:

Questionnaire A
TVIOLPA_TEXT. A young man found out that a young woman robbed him. The man who was robbed was shamed in front of his friends.

Right when this happened, in a rage attack, the man fatally stabbed the person who robbed him.

Questionnaire B

TVIOLPB_TEXT. A young man found out that a(nother) young man robbed him.

The man who was robbed was shamed in front of his friends.

Right when this happened, in a rage attack, the man fatally stabbed the person who robbed him.

Questionnaire C

TVIOLPC_TEXT. A young woman found out that a young man robbed her.

The woman who was robbed was shamed in front of her friends.

Right when this happened, in a rage attack, the woman fatally stabbed the person who robbed her.

Questionnaire D

TVIOLPD_TEXT. A young woman found out that a(nother) young woman robbed her.

The woman who was robbed was shamed in front of her friends.

Right when this happened, in a rage attack, the woman fatally stabbed the person who robbed her.

In your opinion, in years of prison time, what is the appropriate punishment for this stabbing? You can choose any sentence between 0 and 50 prison years. __ Number between 0 and 50.

And how long do you think the sentence for this stabbing will actually be? You can choose any sentence between 0 and 50 prison years. __ Number between 0 and 50.

APPENDIX 2. SURVEY MODE AND POPULATION REPRESENTATIVENESS

I. Education

The education attainment of 60% of the Mexican population was below 10th grade (upper secondary education) in 2019 (OECD, 2019). Primary and lower secondary education groups (grades 1st–9th) are underrepresented in the online survey sample. However, in the phone survey sample 33.56% have education lower than 10th grade. This is compared to 14.46% in the online sample. In the weighted sample of the phone survey, 53.7% have educational attainment between the 1st and the 9th grade, which is closer to the proportion of the population with this educational attainment (See Figure 1).

Figures 2 and 3 show the estimates of the dependent variables—preferred sentences and expected sentences—for the subsamples at or below and above the median level of education.[1] The estimates are based on the weighted online survey sample (panels A and C in Figures 2 and 3) and the phone survey samples (panels B in Figures 2 and 3). Subsamples used for estimations shown in panels B and C are selected by splitting the sample at the population median (OECD, 2019)–lower secondary or grades 7th-9th. Panels marked by A in Figures 2 and 3 present estimates for subsamples selected taking as a threshold the online survey sample median education. We observe no significant difference driven by education in the punishment ratings for stabbings involving women victims and men perpetrators. The coefficients by education group are fairly close to each other by looking at the phone survey and the online survey data, and at subsamples based on different possible educational thresholds.

1. In the phone sample, the median category is *secundaria* (7th-9th grade). In the online survey, the median value in the continuous measurement of education is 12th grade, with 34.39% of the sample reporting exactly 12 years of educational attainment.

Figure 1. Survey Representativeness of Population with Low Educational Attainment

A) Unweighted Online Survey



B) Unweighted Phone Survey



C) Weighted Online Survey



D) Weighted Phone Survey



Figure 2. Preferred Punishment Ratings by Educational Attainment

A) Online Survey: Results below and above survey survey and median education



B) Phone Survey: Results below and above population median education

C) Online survey: Results below and above population median education



This figure shows the ACIEs of circumstantial factors on preferred sentence lengths by respondent's educational attainment. Average preferred sentences for respondents with lower educational attainment are depicted in blue and in purple for those with relatively higher attainment. Results in panels A and C are based on the analysis of a conjoint experiment included in the national online survey, and results in panel B are based on a vignette experiment included in the phone survey.

Figure 3. Expected Punishment Ratings by Educational Attainment

A) Online Survey: Results below and above survey survey and median education



B) Phone Survey: Results below and above population median education



C) Online survey: Results below and above population median education



This figure shows the ACIEs of circumstantial factors on expected sentence lengths for stabbings by respondent's educational attainment. Average preferred sentences for respondents with lower educational attainment are depicted in blue and in purple for those with relatively higher attainment. Results in panels A and C are based on the analysis of a conjoint experiment included in the national online survey, and results in panel B are based on a vignette experiment included in the phone survey.

II. Socioeconomic Status

To look at the survey representativeness by socioeconomic status, Figure 4 shows the income quartiles and levels of socioeconomic difficulty in the online survey, and home internet access in the phone survey.[2] We chose these particular indicators of socioeconomic status because of their availability and correlation with educational attainment.[3] Population with home internet access in Mexico as of 2020 was estimated at 72 percent.[4] The phone survey, when weighted, approximates this level: 63% report home internet access.

Although the income quartile variable is more correlated with education than the perception of economic difficulty, Figure 4 presents the distribution of the online survey sample across levels of economic difficulty. The closest point of reference for the economic difficulty variable is the poverty measurement taken by the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL). In comparison with CONEVAL's indicators, people in the lowest wealth categories were underrepresented in the online weighted sample. In the online weighted sample, 7.55% reported that their salary and total home income was not enough and that they faced large economic difficulty—which is lower than CONEVAL's 17.2% food poverty estimate for 2020. Meanwhile, in the weighted online sample 38.64% reported that their salary was insufficient and that they experienced some difficulty, with a cumulative of 46.19% reporting some level of difficulty. This cumulative percentage is smaller than CONEVAL's 2020 cumulative estimate of 52.8% living in food or goods and services poverty.[5]

2. The text of the question on economic difficulty in the online survey reads: "The wage or salary you receive and your total household income: (1) Covers your needs and you can save money; (2) Is just enough to cover your needs without great difficulties; (3) It is not enough and you have difficulties; (4) It is not enough and you have great difficulties; (988888) Doesn't wish to answer" ("Q10D. *El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar*: *(1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar; (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades; (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades; (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades; (988888) No desea responder")*

The text of the online survey reads: "Do you have Internet at home?" ("*¿Tiene usted Internet en su casa?*")

3. In the online survey, the income variable is more correlated with education than the perception of economic difficulty. Number of lightbulbs and internet access are the only R-series measures included in the phone survey. The former shows a very low correlation with educational attainment; thus, we chose internet access as an indicator.

4. INEGI (2021). Encuesta nacional sobre disponibilidad y uso de tecnologías de la Información en los hogares (ENDUTIH) 2020. INEGI.

5. CONEVAL.2021, "CONEVAL presenta las estimaciones de pobreza multidimensional 2018 y 2020". Comunicado 9. From https://www.coneval.org.mx/SalaPrensa/Comunicadosprensa/Documents/2021/COMUNICADO_009_MEDICION_POBREZA_2020.pdf

Figure 4. Income Quartile (R-Series) / Internet Access

A) Online survey (Weighted)





C) Phone Survey (Weighted)



Figure 5 shows the estimated preferred and expected sentences by socioeconomic status, based on the online and the phone weighted survey samples. Regardless of the variables we use to measure socioeconomic status, we observe no significant difference in the gendered punishment preferences and expectations of those with higher socioeconomic status, when compared to those with higher SES.

Figure 5. Punishment Ratings by Socioeconomic Status

Preferred sentences

A) Online survey – Income quartiles



B) Online survey – Economic Difficulty



C) Phone Survey



Expected Sentences

D) Online survey – Income quartiles



E) Online survey – Economic difficulty



Figure 5. Punishment Ratings by Socioeconomic Status (continued)

F) Phone Survey



This figure shows the ACIEs of circumstantial factors on preferred and expected sentence lengths for stabbings by respondent's socioeconomic status. Average preferred sentences for respondents with lower socioeconomic status are depicted in blue and in red for those with relatively higher attainment.

III. Age

When compared to the most recent census data, the weighted online sample seems representative of the population age groups, except for those older than 60 years. Figure 6 below shows the age group distribution in the online and phone surveys.[6] While the oldest population group was underrepresented in the online survey, the youngest was underrepresented in the phone survey. Nevertheless, controlling for age group (vs. not) in both surveys, we observe virtually no difference in the expected and preferred punishment ratings for women victims and men perpetrators. This is the case even considering that the oldest population group would expect lower average impunity or higher average punishment ratings (see Tables 1 and 2 below).

6. We compared the following age groups: 18 -29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60 and more.

Figure 6. Age Categories Distribution

A) Online survey (Weighted)



B) Phone survey (Weighted)



Table 1. Preferred and Expected Sentences and Age (Online Survey)

	Preferred Sentences		Expected Sentences	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Victim=woman	4.15***	4.15***	1.27***	1.27***
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Perpetrator=man	4.01***	4.01***	0.92**	0.93**
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Perpetrator lied to	7.35***	7.34***	0.70	0.73
	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Perpetrator robbed	7.10***	7.10***	0.98*	1.00*
	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.52)	(0.52)
No witnesses	-1.50***	-1.51***	-0.61	-0.61
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Between 30 and 49 years old		0.16		0.61
		(0.83)		(0.66)
Older than 50 years old		-0.46		2.40*
		(1.46)		(1.37)

	Preferred Sentences		Expected Sentences	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	18.45***	18.40***	14.11***	13.52***
	(0.68)	(0.88)	(0.54)	(0.71)
Observations	6218	6218	6202	6202

Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the respondent level. Baseline levels are *Victim = man*, *Perpetrator = woman*, *Ridicule* as the offense preceding the stabbing, *In Public*, and *Respondent's age =18 to 29 years old*.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2. Preferred and Expected Sentences and Age (Phone Survey)

	Preferred Sentences		Expected Sentences	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Victim=woman	4.96***	4.86***	0.70	0.78
	(1.38)	(1.38)	(1.21)	(1.20)
Perpetrator=man	9.27***	9.28***	2.44**	2.41**
	(1.38)	(1.38)	(1.21)	(1.21)
Between 30 and 49 years old		-0.07		0.42
		(1.63)		(1.40)
Older than 50 years old		-2.07		2.85*
		(1.75)		(1.60)
Constant	21.10***	21.85***	17.71***	16.57***
	(1.18)	(1.51)	(1.00)	(1.32)
Observations	829	829	862	862

Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline levels are *Victim = man*, *Perpetrator = woman*, and *Respondent's age =18 to 29 years old*. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3. Patterns of Missingness in Dependent Variables (Online Survey)

Nonresponse in:	(1) Preferred sentence q.	(2) Expected sentence q.
Victim = woman	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Perpetrator = man	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Man respondent	-0.01*	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
7 – 9 years of education	-0.07***	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)
10 - 12 years of education	-0.07***	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)
13 + years of education	-0.07***	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Second income quintile	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Third income quintile	0.01	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Fourth income quintile	0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	0.08***	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)
N	6285	6285

Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline levels are *Victim = man*, *Perpetrator = woman*, *Woman respondent*, *Elementary school or less* and *First income quartile*.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.05$

Table 4. Patterns of Missingness in Dependent Variables (Phone Survey)

Nonresponse in:	(1) Preferred sentence q.	(2) Expected sentence q.
Victim = woman	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Perpetrator = man	-0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Man respondent	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)
7 – 9 years of education	-0.08*	-0.12***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
10 – 12 years of education	-0.12***	-0.15***
	(0.05)	(0.04)
13 + years of education	-0.18***	-0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Has Internet service	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	0.34***	0.29***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	999	999

Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline levels are *Victim = man*, *Perpetrator = woman*, *Woman respondent*, *Does not have Internet* and *First income quartile*.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.05$

APPENDIX 3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MAIN ESTIMATIONS

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Online Survey

			Unweighted Means		Weighted Means	
	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Preferred sentences	0	50	26.89	17.18	26.56	17.09
Expected sentences	0	50	15.15	13.89	15.45	13.99
Man respondent	0	1	0.43	0.49	0.48	0.50
Educational level	1	4	3.33	0.75	3.10	0.74
Income Quartile	1	4	2.59	1.12	2.47	1.11

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Phone Survey

			Unweighted Means		Weighted Means	
	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Preferred sentences	0	50	28.14	18.11	28.24	18.41
Expected sentences	0	50	18.84	15.67	19.26	15.92
Man respondent	0	1	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.50
Educational level	1	4	2.90	1.10	2.42	1.10
Has internet	0	1	0.72	0.45	0.63	0.48

Table 3. Preferred and Expected Sentences Given Circumstantial Characteristics (Online Survey)

Sentences=	(1) Preferred	(2) Expected
Victim=woman	4.15***	1.27***
	(0.47)	(0.43)
Perpetrator=man	4.01***	0.92**
	(0.48)	(0.42)

Sentences=	(1) Preferred	(2) Expected
Perpetrator lied to	0.25	-0.28
	(0.58)	(0.50)
Perpetrator robbed	-7.10***	-0.98*
	(0.63)	(0.52)
No witnesses	1.50***	0.61
	(0.48)	(0.41)
Constant	24.05***	14.48***
	(0.68)	(0.56)
Observations	6218	6202

Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the respondent level. Baseline levels are *Victim = man*, *Perpetrator = woman*, *Ridicule* as the offense preceding the stabbing, and with *In Public*. Online survey data used for these estimations, which are depicted in Figure 1.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4. Preferred and Expected Sentences (Phone Survey)

Sentences=	(1) Preferred	(2) Expected
Victim=woman	4.96***	0.70
	(1.38)	(1.21)
Perpetrator=man	9.27***	2.44**
	(1.38)	(1.21)
Constant	21.10***	17.71***
	(1.18)	(1.00)
Observations	829	862

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline levels are *Victim=man* and *Perpetrator=woman*. Data are from the 2021 phone survey.

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Figure 3. Average Marginal Component Effects of Homicide Circumstances on Punishment Ratings



Note: This figure shows the AMCEs of circumstantial factors on preferred (panels A and B) and on expected (panels C and D) sentence lengths for stabbings. Results in panels A) and C) are based on the analysis of a conjoint experiment included in a national online survey, and those in panel B) and D) are based on a vignette experiment included in a phone survey. Results in panels A and C are from analyses of the 2020 online survey. Results in panels B and D are based on a phone survey conducted with a sample of 1,006 Mexican adults in 2021. The preferred and expected sentences are measured by asking the same questions as in the online conjoint experiment, with the added phrase "You can choose any sentence length between 0 and 50 years of prison." The phone survey questions are read after a vignette experiment in which victim and perpetrator gender is varied (see Appendix 1 for wording). Estimates are based on regression results shown in Tables 3 and 4 of Appendix 3.

Source: Own elaboration

Figure 1. Average Component Interaction Effects of Respondent's Gender and Homicide Circumstances on Punishment Ratings



Note: This figure shows the ACIEs of circumstantial factors on preferred (panels A and B) and on expected (panels C and D) sentence lengths for stabbings by respondent's gender. Average preferred and expected sentences for men respondents are depicted by triangles and by circles for women respondents. Results in panels A and C are based on the analysis of the conjoint experiment included in the 2020 online survey, and those in panel B and D are based on the vignette experiment included in the 2021 phone survey. In the phone survey, the enumerator codes respondent gender according to their voice. Estimates are based on regression results shown in Tables 5 and 6 below.

Table 5. Preferred and Expected Sentences by Respondent Gender (Online Survey)

Sentences=	Preferred		Expected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Respondents=	Men	Women	Men	Women
Victim=woman	4.30***	4.00***	2.70***	-0.05
	(0.72)	(0.62)	(0.67)	(0.55)
Perpetrator=man	4.19***	3.86***	2.48***	-0.52
	(0.75)	(0.61)	(0.63)	(0.56)
Perpetrator lied to	0.70	-0.16	0.00	-0.37
	(0.86)	(0.77)	(0.75)	(0.68)
Perpetrator robbed	-7.18***	-7.09***	-0.69	-1.10*
	(0.98)	(0.80)	(0.82)	(0.66)
No witnesses	1.88**	1.18*	1.07*	0.19
	(0.75)	(0.62)	(0.63)	(0.53)
Constant	23.23***	24.80***	12.56***	16.16***
	(1.05)	(0.89)	(0.84)	(0.74)
Observations	2666	3549	2660	3539

Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the respondent level. Baseline levels are *Victim=man*, *Perpetrator=woman*, *Ridicule* as the offense preceding the stabbing, and with *In Public*. Data are from 2020 online survey data.

*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01

Table 6. Preferred and Expected Sentences by Respondent Gender (Phone Survey)

Sentences=	Preferred		Expected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Respondents=	Men	Women	Men	Women
Victim=woman	5.45***	4.56**	-0.07	1.76
	(1.95)	(1.94)	(1.71)	(1.70)
Perpetrator=man	7.93***	10.57***	-0.42	5.34***
	(1.96)	(1.94)	(1.70)	(1.71)
Constant	22.26***	19.95***	20.27***	15.03***
	(1.70)	(1.64)	(1.42)	(1.37)
Observations	406	423	427	435

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline categories are *Victim=man* and *Perpetrator=woman*. Data are from the 2021 phone survey.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

APPENDIX 4. SURVEY DIAGNOSTICS IN CONJOINT EXPERIMENT

Carryover Effects: Although we observe carryover effects when comparing the estimates for the first, second, and third tasks, these only potentially affect the size but not the direction of the coefficients. Respondents prefer lower sentences for stabbings involving women victims in the second and third tasks compared to the average in the first task. That said, estimated preferred sentences are significantly higher for stabbings involving women victims and those involving men perpetrators, regardless of the task number.

As for expected sentences, the coefficients' size and direction for women victims are stable across tasks. The AMCEs of men perpetrator are positive and larger in tasks 2 and 3 compared to task 1. That said, the coefficient sizes are not significantly different from each other.

Following the advice of Hainmueller *et al.* (2014), we present the results while looking only at the first task (See panel a in Figure 10 and panel a in Figure 11). We observe that the average preferred sentences in the first task are as expected in our hypotheses within the paternalistic cognitive framework. In terms of expected

sentences, average responses based on the first task are significantly higher for women victims but not for men perpetrators.

Figure 1. Average Marginal Component Effects of Homicide Circumstances on Preferred Punishment Ratings (By Conjoint Experiment Task)



This figure shows the AMCEs of circumstantial factors on preferred sentence lengths for stabbings. Results in each panel are based on the analysis of each task of the conjoint experiment included in the online national survey.

Figure 2. Average Marginal Component Effects of Homicide Circumstances on Expected Punishment Ratings (By Conjoint Experiment Task)



This figure shows the AMCEs of circumstantial factors on expected sentence lengths for stabbings. Results in each panel are based on the analysis of each task of the conjoint experiment included in the online national survey.

That said, average responses to the first task by respondent gender follow patterns similar to those observed in the averages for the three tasks. Specifically, despite a relatively smaller statistical power, we observe that women respondents expect lower average sentences for stabbings involving women victims and for those perpetrated by men.

Figure 3. Average Component Interaction Effects of Respondent's Gender and Homicide Circumstances on Punishment Ratings (Task 1)



This figure shows the ACIEs of circumstantial factors on preferred (panel A) and on expected (panel B) sentence lengths for stabbings by respondent's gender according to the first task in the conjoint analysis.

APPENDIX 5. PRE-REGISTRATION DOCUMENTS

Pre-Registration of Online Experiment on Punitive Attitudes toward Femicide

October 28th, 2020

I. Motivation

Over the last five years, women across Latin America have mobilized to the call of *"Ni una menos"* ("Not one [woman] less") to protest against government inaction in the face to rising numbers of femicides.[7] Regional figures indicate that

7. Óscar López. (2020, March 7th) Factbox: Where Latin America women are fighting the world's highest murder rates. Reuters. Retrieved from https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-latam-women-protests/factbox-where-latin-america-women-are-fighting-the-worlds-highest-murder-rates-idUSKBN20U095. Natalia Alcoba and Charis McGowan. 2020, June 4th. #NiUnaMenos five years on: Latin America as deadly as ever for women, say activists. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jun/04/niunamenos-five-years-on-latin-america-as-deadly-as-ever-for-women-say-activists

around 92 percent of femicides go unpunished (Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights, cited in Htun and Jensenius, 2020) In brief, impunity around violence against women, including femicides, is a significant challenge (Menjívar and Walsh 2016; García del Moral and Neumann 2019). Mexico stands out as an unfortunate exemplar of these dynamics: out of the 12,378 female intentional killings that took place from 2015 to 2018 in Mexico, there were only 407 sentences (a 97% impunity rate).[8]

What factors fuel high levels of impunity? On the one hand, structural factors matter, such as corruption and resistance to change within the political and bureaucratic structures in charge of implementing violence against women regulations (Morrison et al, 2007; Ghosh and Choudhuri, 2011, Meneghel *et al*., 2011; Kiss *et al*., 2012; Frías, 2013; Menjívar and Walsh, 2016; Walsh and Menjívar, 2016; Baragatti, *et al*., 2018; García del Moral and Neumann, 2019; Equis, Justicia para las Mujeres, 2019; García del Moral, 2020). Yet, on the other hand, conditions that fuel impunity are rooted in norms that tolerate, or condone, violence against women (Htun and Jensenius, 2020). Yet, while there is consensus that norms matter, there is room to advance understandings of public opinion regarding victims' deservingness of justice.

Gender norms influence the public's demand for justice for gender-based violence. Women are subject to stricter social norms and the public is prone to consider deviance from norms as factors mitigating against their portrayal as victims (Carey and Torres, 2010). Likewise, studies of sexual violence and intimate partner violence find that certain conditions associated with traditional gender norms decrease the reprehensibility of these behaviors in the eyes of the population. Those adhering to traditional gender norms tend to fault victims when they disrespect or cheat on the perpetrator (Taylor and Sorensen, 2006). Similarly, gender stereotypes affect evaluations of victims of assault and sexual violence, with female victims being blamed for displaying attributes traditionally perceived as feminine (carelessness, passivity and excessive confidence on others) and male victims being blamed for failing to display behaviors traditionally perceived as masculine (able to fight back, escape, in control, and unemotional) (Coxell and King, 1996; Krulewitz, 1981; Howard, 1984; White and Kurpius, 2002). Overall, female victims are more likely to be perceived as causing sexual violence perpetrated against them than male victims (Schneider, Ee, and Aronson, 1994).

The prevalence of gender bias may lead the public to tolerate impunity, or lower levels of punishment, for femicides compared to homicides in which a man is the victim. To the extent that there are extenuating circumstances that connect

8. Arturo Ángel, 2020, February 20th. Subir las penas de cárcel no ha reducido los feminicidios en ningún estado. Animal Político. Retrieved from: https://www.animalpolitico.com/2020/02/penas-carcel-feminicidios-estados/

to these biases, this tendency may be elevated. And, further, it may be accentuated among those who hold higher levels of gender bias.

In addition, elite cues may shape how individuals value and seek to protect the lives of women and men. Elite cues sent through policy have been found to alter the attitudes around egalitarianism in the sphere of political participation (Kittilson, 2010 and Morgan and Buice, 2013). Similarly, public opinion on punitive measures to fight crime acts as an input into, and likewise is influenced by, policy making (Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur, and Hough, 2002). Along these lines, then, we may expect that individuals' perceptions of state institutions' action around homicide and femicide shape the degree to which individuals advocate for harsher punishment for those committing murders. Yet, the nature of this dynamic is difficult to anticipate a priori. For example, it may be that individuals who perceive the state to be weakly committed to punishment of femicides follow the cue and likewise express a preference for comparatively lower levels of punishment for femicides (vs. murders in which a man is the victim), or it may be that individuals who perceive the state to be weakly committed react against that deficit by advocating for stronger punishment. We expect heterogeneity here; for example, the latter dynamic may be more prevalent among those with low levels of gender bias.

This project examines public opinion in Mexico toward impunity with respect to the most extreme form of violence against women, femicide. The first objective is to test the extent to which individuals advocate for less punishment when the victim of a homicide is a woman (and when the perpetrator is a man). The second objective is to test a set of conditional relationships; for instance, the study permits us to assess conditional hypotheses related to the circumstances under which the homicide occurs, the gender norms that an individual holds, and the individuals' expectations regarding how the state would react to the murder.

II. Sample

The sample is 2,000 Mexican adults drawn from an opt-in online panel managed by Netquest.

III. Experiment

The experiment takes the form of a conjoint study. Individuals are provided with three scenarios in which a victim is stabbed to death. The set-up for each scenario is the same. The attributes around the scenario vary as follows (and as presented in the textbox). First, the perpetrator of the stabbing is randomly assigned to be either male or female. Second, the victim of the stabbing is randomly

assigned to be either male or female. Third, the event provoking the stabbing is randomly assigned to be a lie, a situation in which the perpetrator is ridiculed, or a robbery. Finally, the event provoking the stabbing is randomly described as occurring with no one around, or in front of the perpetrator's friends.

Figure 1 (pre-registration 1). Experiment Design

TVIOLC_TEXT. [TVIOL4C (1) Un hombre / **(2)** Una mujer**]** adulto(a) joven se enteró de que **[TVIOL6C (1)** un hombre / **(2)** una mujer**]** adulto(a) joven **[TVIOL8C (1)** le mintió / **(2)** lo/la puso en ridículo / **(3)** le robó**].**

[TVIOL9C (1) Nadie más estaba al tanto de lo que sucedió / **(2)** Quien sufrió **[If TVIOL8C = 1 then** "la mentira" / **If TVIOL8C = 2 then** "el ridículo" / **If TVIOL8C = 3 then** "el robo"**]** fue avergonzada(o) delante de sus amigos**]**

The main dependent variable is the question that follows immediately after the description of the scenario: In your opinion, in years of prison time, what is the appropriate punishment for this stabbing? (*En su opinión, en años de prisión, ¿cuál es una condena apropiada para este apuñalamiento?*). The dependent variable ranges from 0-50, as 50 years is the maximum sentence in the Mexican judicial system.

A second question follows this one, and asks how many years of punishment the stabbing is likely to actually receive. We will analyze responses to this question in order to describe public opinion dynamics around impunity and justice and, as well, we will be able to use this measure to consider how expectations of punishment by the state connect to individuals' punitive attitudes.

IV. Hypotheses and Expectations

The core hypotheses test the notion that there is a culture of tolerance toward femicide (which is typically a male vs. female crime).

H1. Mean punishment ratings will be lower for stabbings involving women as victims. H1a. Mean punishment ratings will be lower for stabbings involving women as victims when the perpetrator is a male.

In addition, we test a set of conditioning relationships. Two conditioning relationships we test are the following:

H2. The gender of the respondent will condition H1 and H1a: men will be more tolerant (lower punishment ratings).

H3. The gender norms held by an individual will condition H1a: those with more adherence to gender norms that capture bias against women will be more tolerant (lower punishment ratings).

In addition to these expectations, we will analyze the data to assess other predictors of greater tolerance of femicides.

Circumstantial Factors. The conjoint is designed to permit a test of whether circumstantial factors related to the honor of the perpetrator may mitigate attitudes toward their punishment. Especially with respect to situations in which a man is the perpetrator of the murder, and a woman is the victim, we expect that if the perpetrator was publicly harmed by the victim, this may reduce punishment recommendations. We will likewise assess the data to see if there are differences in punitiveness according to the type of harm the victim engaged in (lying, ridiculing, or stealing).

As with the core hypotheses, we will also consider how the gender of the respondent and gender norms condition these relationships.

Elite cues. We expect that elite cues regarding the authorities expected punishment of the homicide may be correlated with the degree to which individuals are willing to punish the perpetrator. We measure elite cues by looking at the degree of punishment that the respondent expects the authorities will impose on the perpetrator. Again, we are predominantly interested in cases that are exemplars of femicide (perpetrator = man, victim = woman). We will explore the direction of this relationship, and whether it is conditioned by other factors (e.g., gender norms, gender of the respondent).

We may test additional conditional relationships. To that end, we will indicate in any subsequent write-up the extent to which these are informed by extant scholarship or purely exploratory.

V. Analysis

Pre-analysis processing. We have included a set of attention checks in the survey and also timing variables. We will assess the quality of the data prior to analyzing it. If there are notable deficiencies in the quality of the data, we will report hypothesis tests for the full dataset and, as well, for the subset who passed the

quality control assessment. We would expect more precise tests from the latter dataset.

Dependent variable. The dependent variable ranges from 0-50.

Independent variable. The main independent variable for H1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the victim is described as a woman.

Conditioning variables. To assess H1a, we interact the victim-gender dummy variable with a second one, which records whether the perpetrator is a man. To assess H2, we add to the test of H1 and H1a another conditioning factor - an indicator of whether the respondent is a woman, or not.

To test H3 (and all other expectations involving gender bias norms), we will create a measure of gender norms from questions included in the survey. We anticipate using one of two approaches. The first is to create a gender norms factor using principal component analysis, transformed from the following questions included in the survey: the degree of agreement with the statements that it is a woman's duty to obey her partner, that women need their partner's permission to see their friends, and that intimate partner violence is a private matter. We expect to find a factor on which, at the least, the former two questions load highly and we would score that factor as an indicator of gender bias that captures, specifically, belief that women must defer to men.

We also have an experimental instrument on the survey, which takes the form of a conjoint experiment designed to assess the value that individuals place on girls vs. boys. We will analyze these data to see if it is reasonable to create estimates of gender bias indicating a pro-male bias. If so, we will analyze these data as a second measure of gender bias, capturing the belief that men are more valued than women.

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PRE-REGISTRATION OF PHONE EXPERIMENT ON PUNITIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD FEMICIDE IN NATIONAL SAMPLE OF THE ADULT MEXICAN POPULATION

I. Motivation

Over the last five years, women across Latin America have mobilized to the call of *"Ni una menos"* ("Not one [woman] less") to protest against government inaction in the face to rising numbers of femicides.[9] Regional figures indicate that around 92 percent of femicides go unpunished (Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights, cited in Htun and Jensenius, 2020) In brief, impunity around violence against women, including femicides, is a significant challenge (Menjívar and Walsh 2016; García del Moral and Neumann 2019). Mexico stands out as an unfortunate exemplar of these dynamics: out of the 12,378 female intentional killings that took place from 2015 to 2018 in Mexico, there were only 407 sentences (a 97% impunity rate).[10]

What factors fuel high levels of impunity? On the one hand, structural factors matter, such as corruption and resistance to change within the political and bureaucratic structures in charge of implementing violence against women regulations (Morrison et al, 2007; Ghosh and Choudhuri, 2011, Meneghel *et al.*, 2011; Kiss *et al.*, 2012; Frías, 2013; Menjívar and Walsh, 2016; Walsh and Menjívar, 2016; Baragatti, *et al.*, 2018; García del Moral and Neumann, 2019; Equis, Justicia para las Mujeres, 2019; García del Moral, 2020). Yet, on the other hand, conditions that fuel impunity are rooted in norms that tolerate, or condone, violence against women (Htun and Jensenius, 2020). While there is consensus that norms matter, there is room to advance understandings of public opinion regarding victims' deservingness of justice. Thus, we ask: To what extent does the public vary in its preferences over punitive outcomes conditional on the gender of a homicide victim?

Gender norms influence the public's demand for justice for gender-based violence. Women are subject to stricter social norms and the public is prone

9. Óscar López. (2020, March 7th) Factbox: Where Latin America women are fighting the world's highest murder rates. Reuters. Retrieved from https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-latam-women-protests/factbox-where-latin-america-women-are-fighting-the-worlds-highest-murder-rates-idUSKBN20U095. Natalia Alcoba and Charis McGowan. 2020, June 4th. #NiUnaMenos five years on: Latin America as deadly as ever for women, say activists. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jun/04/niunamenos-five-years-on-latin- america-as-deadly-as-ever-for-women-say-activists

10. Ángel, A. 2020, February 20th. Subir las penas de cárcel no ha reducido los feminicidios en ningún estado. Animal Político. Retrieved from: https://www.animalpolitico.com/2020/02/penas-carcel-feminicidios-estados/

to consider deviance from norms as factors mitigating against their portrayal as victims (Carey and Torres, 2010). Likewise, studies of sexual violence and intimate partner violence find that certain conditions associated with traditional gender norms decrease the reprehensibility of these behaviors in the eyes of the population. Those adhering to traditional gender norms tend to fault victims when they disrespect or cheat on the perpetrator (Taylor and Sorenson, 2006). Similarly, gender stereotypes affect evaluations of victims of assault and sexual violence, with women victims being blamed for displaying attributes traditionally perceived as feminine (carelessness, passivity and excessive confidence on others) and male victims being blamed for failing to display behaviors traditionally perceived as masculine (able to fight back, escape, in control, and unemotional) (Coxell and King, 1996; Krulewitz, 1981; Howard, 1984; White and Kurpius, 2002). Overall, women victims are more likely to be perceived as causing sexual violence perpetrated against them than when victims are men (Schneider, Ee, and Aronson, 1994).

This type of gender bias may lead the public to tolerate impunity, or lower levels of punishment, for femicides compared to homicides in which a man is the victim (H1). Yet, at the same time, there are reasons to consider that the public may be more punitive in their attitudes around femicides compared to murders involving men as victims (H2, a rival to H1). In the first place, the public may perceive lax state commitment to punitive approaches to femicide and issue a corrective of sorts in their own assessments: asserting a more punitive response than that they expect from the state (Simon, 2007). In the second place, there may exist a form of paternalism or chivalry, or the generalization of women as having a less violent and blameworthy character (Baumer, Messner, and Felson 2000; Beaulieu and Messner 1999; Rodriguez, Curry, and Lee, 2004; Glaeser and Sacerdote 2000), which motivates a protective and punitive response to murders in which women are the victim. For either or both reasons, we could find the public to be comparatively more punitive when considering instances of femicide (vs. homicides involving in male victims).

The gender of the perpetrator may matter as well, and here we state another open expectation. One the one hand, a paternalism or chivalry thesis in criminology literature, according to which women perpetrating non-violent crimes are considered to be fickle, childlike, not fully responsible for their acts (Rodriguez, Curry, and Lee, 2006; Noorudin, 2007), provides reason to consider that women perpetrators in these scenarios may be viewed as less culpable and deserving of punishment. Yet, on the other hand, women who commit violent crimes are perceived to transgress the existing gender hierarchies, and thus receive harsher or equal treatment than men (Boritch, 1992; Chesney-Lind, 1977; Crew, 1991; Farnworth and Teske, 1995; Spohn, 1999; Rodriguez,

Curry, and Lee, 2006; Nooruddin, 2007; Franklin, 2008; Glick, Fiske *et al.*, 2000).[11]

This study examines public opinion in Mexico toward impunity with respect to the most extreme form of violence against women, femicide. The first objective is to test the extent to which individuals advocate (or not) for less punishment when the victim of a homicide is a woman (in general and conditional on the gender of the perpetrator). The second objective is to test a set of conditional relationships; for instance, the study permits us to assess conditional hypotheses, in particular the role of socio-economic status in conditioning responses.

II. Sample

The sample is a national sample of 1,000 Mexican adults drawn via random digit dial of cell

III. Experiment

The experiment takes the form of a conjoint study. Individuals are provided with one scenario in which a victim is stabbed to death. The set-up for each scenario is the same: "Now I am going to describe to you the following scenario" *("Ahora le voy a describir el siguiente escenario.").* In each case, the scenario describes a person who has been ridiculed in front of their friends, and in a fit of rage that ridiculed person murders the person who ridiculed them.

The attributes around the scenario vary as follows (and as presented below). First, the perpetrator of the stabbing is randomly assigned to be either a man or a woman. Second, the victim of the stabbing is randomly assigned to be either a man or a woman. The below scenarios, A-D, are the four treatment conditions that result from this 2x2 design.

11. This hypothesis, the selective paternalistic hypothesis, goes along the same line as the hostile sexism phenomenon observed in social psychology, according to which women who transgress traditional gender norms lose the favor of men and, instead of being treated with benevolent sexism, are sanctioned with hostile sexism (Glick, Fiske *et al.*, 2000).

CUESTIONARIO A
TVIOLPA_TEXT. Un hombre adulto joven se enteró de que una mujer adulta joven le robó. El hombre que sufrió el robo fue avergonzado delante de sus amigos. En el momento de lo sucedido, en un ataque de rabia, el hombre apuñaló mortalmente a quien le había robado.

CUESTIONARIO B
TVIOLPB_TEXT. Un hombre adulto joven se enteró de que un hombre adulto joven le robó. El hombre que sufrió el robo fue avergonzado delante de sus amigos. En el momento de lo sucedido, en un ataque de rabia, el hombre apuñaló mortalmente a quien le había robado.

CUESTIONARIO C
TVIOLPC_TEXT. Una mujer adulta joven se enteró de que un hombre adulto joven le robó. La mujer que sufrió el robo fue avergonzada delante de sus amigos. En el momento de lo sucedido, en un ataque de rabia, la mujer apuñaló mortalmente a quien le había robado.

CUESTIONARIO D
TVIOLPD_TEXT. Una mujer adulta joven se enteró de que una mujer adulta joven le robó. La mujer que sufrió el robo fue avergonzada delante de sus amigos. En el momento de lo sucedido, en un ataque de rabia, la mujer apuñaló mortalmente a quien le había robado.

The main dependent variable is the question that follows immediately after the description of the scenario: In your opinion, in years of prison time, what is the appropriate punishment for this stabbing? (*En su opinión, en años de prisión, ¿cuál es una condena apropiada para este apuñalamiento?*). The dependent variable ranges from 0-50, as 50 years is the maximum sentence in the Mexican judicial system.

A second question follows this one, and asks how many years of punishment the stabbing is likely to actually receive. We will analyze responses to this question in order to describe public opinion dynamics around impunity and justice and, as well, we will be able to use this measure to consider how expectations of punishment by the state connect to individuals' punitive attitudes.

IV. Hypotheses and Expectations

The core hypotheses test the notion that there is a culture of tolerance toward femicide (which is typically a man vs. woman crime).

H1. Mean punishment ratings will be lower for stabbings involving women as victims.

H1a. Mean punishment ratings will be lower for stabbings involving women as victims when the perpetrator is a male.

Yet, we also test the rival hypothesis: the public prefers *greater* punishment when women (vs. men) are victims. The mechanism, as described above, may be paternalism and/or a desire to counter what might be perceived as lax anti-femicide efforts by the state.

H2 (rival to H1). Mean punishment ratings will be higher for stabbings involving women as victims.

H2a (rival to H1a). Mean punishment ratings will be higher for stabbings involving women as victims when the perpetrator is a male.

In addition, the data can be used to explore at least two additional relationships. First, we consider whether punishment preferences vary conditional on the gender of the perpetrator; as we describe above, we do not have an *a priori* expectation.

Second, we will be able to consider whether H1-H2a are conditional by the respondents' SES. We do not know in advance of the study, which is being included as part of an omnibus organized by the local firm, what will be the full suite of available indicators of SES (e.g., education and wealth), but ideally it will be possible to explore whether attitudes vary according to this concept.

Finally, the design permits us to examine the second dependent variable to assess whether the public views the state as more or less permissive (that is, less punitive) when it comes to femicides versus homicides with male victims.

V. Analysis

Dependent variable. The dependent variables range from 0-50.

Independent variable. The main independent variable for H1 and H2 is a dummy variable indicating whether the victim is described as a woman.

Conditioning variables. To assess H1a and H2a, we interact the victim-gender dummy variable with a second one, which records whether the perpetrator is a man.

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THE POWER OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION: UNCOVERING THE INFLUENCE OF NETWORKS ON VOTE CHOICE AND ITS MECHANISMS. EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA

El poder de la discusión política: revelando la influencia de las redes en el voto y sus mecanismos. Evidencia de Colombia

O poder do debate político: Descobrindo a influência das redes na votação e seus mecanismos. Evidências da Colômbia

MIGUEL GARCÍA SÁNCHEZ m.garcia268@uniandes.edu.co [1]
FELIPE BOTERO fbotero@uniandes.edu.co [1]

[1] Universidad de los Andes, Colombia

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Abstract
This paper explores the influence of political discussion networks on vote choice. We ask two questions: What type of discussion networks influence vote choice? And, what are the mechanisms through which discussion networks influence voting behavior? We argue that discussing politics with others affects electoral decisions when citizens are surrounded by discussants whose political views are homogeneous and that this influence can operate through two mechanisms: information and social pressure. Using data from a two-wave panel study conducted in Bogotá before and after the 2011 local elections, we find evidence of the effects of social networks on voter behavior. The homogeneity of discussion networks is correlated with a change in vote choice, and this link appears to be driven both by information and social pressure.

Palabras clave:
redes de discusión; decisión electoral; información; presión social; Colombia

Resumen
Este trabajo explora la influencia de las redes de discusión política en las decisiones electorales. Las siguientes preguntas guían nuestra investigación: ¿qué tipo de redes de discusión afectan las decisiones electorales?, y ¿a través de qué mecanismos se da esta influencia? Argumentamos que discutir de política con otros afecta las decisiones de voto cuando las personas están rodeadas por interlocutores cuyas visiones políticas son homogéneas. Esta influencia puede darse a través de dos mecanismos, uno de información, y otro de presión social. Usando datos de panel de un estudio llevado a cabo en Bogotá antes y después de las elecciones locales de 2011 encontramos evidencia sobre los efectos electorales de las redes de discusión. La homogeneidad de las redes de discusión está correlacionada con cambios en la decisión de voto y ese vínculo parece darse tanto a través de la provisión de información como vía la presión social.

Palavras-chave:
redes de discussão; decisões eleitorais; informação; pressão social; Colômbia

Resumo
Este artigo explora a influência das redes de discussão política nas decisões eleitorais. As seguintes questões orientam a nossa investigação: que tipo de redes de discussão afetam as decisões eleitorais e através de que mecanismos ocorre essa influência? Defendemos que discutir política com outros afeta as decisões de voto quando as pessoas estão rodeadas de interlocutores cujas opiniões políticas são homogéneas. Esta influência pode ocorrer através de dois mecanismos, um informativo e outro de pressão social. Utilizando dados de painel de um estudo realizado em Bogotá antes e depois das eleições locais de 2011, encontramos provas dos efeitos eleitorais das redes de discussão. A homogeneidade das redes de discussão está correlacionada com alterações nas decisões de voto, e esta ligação parece ocorrer tanto através do fornecimento de informação como através de pressão social.

INTRODUCTION*

Political choices rarely occur in a social vacuum. "Voting is essentially a group experience. People who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the same candidates" (Lazarsfeld *et al.*, 1948: 131). Despite the centrality of social influences on voting, traditional theories of electoral behavior have emphasized the explanatory power of variables such as personal traits, partisanship, or evaluations of the economy (Bartels, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007). Research

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focused on the Global South has indicated that, on average, there is both partisan-ideological and economic voting in regions such as Latin America, and Africa (Carlin, Singer, and Zechmeister, 2015; Ishiyama and Fox, 2006). However, there is also evidence of tremendous variation in the influence of partisanship and evaluations of the economy on vote choice (Gélineau and Singer, 2015). For instance, while 80 % of Uruguayans who identify with a party voted for their party, this percentage is less than 40 % in Colombia (Lupu, 2015). On the other hand, the influence of citizen perceptions of the economy on voting behavior are strong in countries such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Uruguay while they are quite weak in Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador (Gélineau & Singer, 2015).

The Latin American literature on the effects of social networks has reinforced the idea that individual level factors such as partisanship, social identities, and evaluations of the economy, do not fully explain electoral decisions, particularly in contexts of low partisanship (Ames, García-Sánchez & Smith, 2012; Baker, Ames & Renno, 2020), and where economic issues are superseded by other concerns, such as public safety. However, such conclusions are derived from the study of only two cases: Brazil and Mexico. Therefore, expanding the study of the electoral effects of discussion networks to other cases is much needed if we want to make claims about the social logic of voting in a region so politically diverse as Latin America. In addition, there is weak evidence on the mechanism that drive the effect of discussing politics with others on the electoral decisions of Latin-Americans. Baker, Ames and Renno (2020) suggest that in the region such mechanism is informational; unfortunately, they support their conclusion using anecdotal evidence.

Thus, using evidence from Colombia –a case never studied by scholars devoted to exploring the sociological logic of voting–, we ask the following two questions. What type of discussion networks influence voting choice? And, what are the mechanisms through which such discussion networks influence voting behavior? We argue that discussing politics with others affects electoral decisions when citizens are surrounded by discussants whose political views are homogeneous. In other words, people are more likely to vote for a given candidate when most of their discussion network favors that candidate. We are agnostic as to the mechanism through which networks may influence electoral decisions, so we explore two alternatives: information and social pressure.

To test our claims, we use a two-wave panel study conducted in Bogotá, Colombia, before and after the 2011 local election. This data allows us to test the influence of discussion networks on vote choice by modeling two outcome variables: vote decisions reported in wave two and changes in electoral choice from wave one to wave two. Our data show that people were more likely to report having voted for the winning candidate when a high percentage of the discussants they reported in the first wave had favored that candidate. We also provide evidence that discussion networks influence changes in voting preferences. More

specifically, as the percentage of discussants in a voter's network who support a particular candidate increases, so does the likelihood of the voter changing their vote from wave one to wave two, away from other candidates and towards the candidate supported by most discussants in their network. Therefore, discussion networks may persuade people to change their electoral preference during the last weeks of the electoral campaign. Finally, we find consistent evidence that the influence of political discussion networks on vote choice is driven by information. We also find that there is a social pressure mechanism operating. However, compared to the informational mechanism, the role of the social pressure is modest.

Consequently, this paper adds to the existing Latin American literature by expanding the analysis of the of social logic of voting to a novel case, and by conducting a rigorous test of the mechanisms behind the electoral effects of social networks.

Our paper proceeds as follows. The first section presents our analytical framework and expectations. The second section describes our case selection. Then, the third section presents the data and analytical strategy we employ. In the fourth section, we lay out our analysis and present results. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings.

CONTEXTS, POLITICAL DISCUSSION NETWORKS, AND VOTE CHOICE

One of the most important contributions of the sociological approach to the analysis of electoral behavior, dating back to the seminal work of Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1948), is that citizens form their political attitudes and make their electoral decisions under the influence of social contexts that expose them to social and political structures, political events, and interpersonal interactions (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). In other words, individual characteristics such as partisanship, social identity, or evaluations of the economy cannot fully elucidate people's political actions and opinions (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987; Zuckerman, 2005; Sinclair, 2012; Baker, Ames & Renno, 2020).

Social contexts affect electoral behavior through various routes. First, social and political events and institutions may influence electoral behavior by structuring and limiting people's experiences and choices (Huckfeldt, 1986). Second, social networks may influence electoral behavior (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987) insofar as interactions with other individuals shape the context in which they make political decisions (Burt 2000). The contextual influence in this case depends primarily on the existence of interpersonal communication and contacts (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Campbell, 2013). In this paper we focus on the second route of contextual influence, in particular on political discussion networks.

Previous research has offered evidence that political discussion networks have different political effects. They contribute to the diffusion of political information (Kitts, 2000), motivate people's participation in social movements (Passy, 2003), and political networks also model electoral behavior (Zuckerman, 2005; Sinclair, 2012; Campbell, 2013). Concretely, discussing politics with others increases the chance of voting (Kotler-Berkowitz, 2005; Knoke, 1990; Huckfeldt Mendez & Osborn, 2004; Nir, 2011; Sinclair, 2012) and it influences electoral decisions (Beck *et al.*, 2002; Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004; Kenny, 1998; Levine, 2005; Sinclair, 2012).

In Latin America, the political effects of discussion networks have been studied mainly for the cases of Brazil and Mexico. This research demonstrated that social networks contributed to the diffusion of information that allowed citizens to learn about candidates (Ames, Baker & Smith, 2016), and that helped the political coordination of voters (Arias *et al.*, 2019). In terms of electoral decisions, research focused on the case of Brazil showed that political discussion networks are a major force promoting stability and change in voting decisions (Ames, García-Sánchez & Smith, 2012). More specifically, a recent work by Baker, Ames & Renno (2020) offered evidence that the propensity to switch vote intentions during a campaign is a positive function of network disagreement. Specifically, the likelihood of changing vote preference between the early stages of the campaign and the election was higher among those surrounded by disagreeing political discussion partners.

Following prior research on the behavioral effects of political discussion networks in Latin America, we argue that discussion networks exert an influence on people's vote choices when such networks are politically homogeneous (Baker, Ames & Renno, 2020). This is when most or all political discussion partners share the same political or electoral preferences. In this type of discussion networks citizens are more likely to be exposed to a single political view, so individuals will align their electoral decisions with the dominant political preference in their discussion network. Such alignment may imply changing preferences, when there is divergence between one's (ego) preference and the preference of the discussion partners (alters) (Baker, Ames & Renno, 2020). On the other hand, there will be a reinforcing of an existing political view when there is preference convergence within the network. In contrast, people surrounded by politically heterogeneous discussants are exposed to contrasting political views or "cross-pressures" (Mutz, 2002). So, discussion networks may have no influence on vote choices given the lack of a dominant political preference with which to align.

Unlike those works that focus on modeling the impact of social networks on the change in electoral decisions, regardless of the direction of this change (Baker, Ames &Renno, 2020), the aim of this paper is to incorporate the role of discussion partners into an electoral choice model. Consequently, we formulate our argument in relation to a specific electoral decision. Thus, we claim that *when most or all of an individual's discussion partners express a preference for candidate A, or as the*

homogeneity of the discussion network increases, there is also an increase in the probability that such a person will vote for candidate A (Hypothesis 1).

What is the process through which politically homogenous networks affect electoral decisions? First, we must consider that political conversation is an easy and effective way to obtain information about politics because people believe in their peers more than other sources (Ross & Nisbett, 2011). By discussing politics with others, individuals may acquire relevant information about the political system, the competing candidates, and their proposals (Burt, 2000). Such information can be very valuable when making an electoral decision. Furthermore, political discussion networks also inform people about the political tendencies, opinions, and possible electoral decisions of their peers. Consequently, by talking politics with others, people get to know the prevailing social and political norms within the group of discussants.

Then, we explore two routes through which homogeneous networks affect electoral decisions. The first one is based on the idea that political networks are avenues of information. The second one relies on the notion that discussion networks channel social pressure (Sinclair, 2012). The informational mechanism assumes that an electoral decision is a time-consuming process that requires gathering and sorting information about the candidates and their proposals. Political discussion networks facilitate this process because people can aggregate information through conversations, as an efficient substitute for individually gathering information about the candidates and the electoral process to make an informed decision. Thus, political networks are important in reducing the informational costs associated with voting.

If this is the mechanism by which discussions networks exert their influence, then "individuals who experience higher cost of cognition should have larger social network effects" (Sinclair, 2012: 105). This is the case, for instance, of less sophisticated voters. Our hypothesis here will be that *the effect of homogeneous discussion networks on vote choice should be stronger among those individuals who have lower levels of political information* (Hypothesis 2), as they are more likely to benefit from the information that is aggregated through the network of political discussants.[1]

On the other hand, the social pressure mechanism relies on the idea that individuals are strongly motivated to conform to social norms existing in their immediate contexts (Cialdini, 2007; Ross & Nisbett, 2011). Political behaviors tend

1. Alternatively, politically informed citizens may be driven to obtain information due to factors such as their interest in politics or access to resources like time and education. As a result, these individuals may be more susceptible to the impact of political discussion networks. However, our data shows no significant relationship between political interest and sophistication, and those with lower levels of political sophistication tend to have lower levels of education. Therefore, we consider it unlikely that this is the driving force behind the relationship between political information and voting behavior.

to be very contagious within discussion networks as individuals want to maintain their social identity with their peers. For this social contagion to occur, discussants must express a political preference that turns into a political norm when most of the discussants share such point of view. However, exposure to a social norm may not be sufficient for this mechanism to materialize, as it is also necessary that some social pressure be exerted. Following Sinclair (2012), individuals are exposed to social pressure through repeated interactions with peers or intimate network ties. In other words, individuals are more susceptible to social pressure when people interact frequently with others or when such interactions occur with close peers (i.e., close friends or family members) rather than when they talk to strangers. We hypothesize that *among those who have repeated interactions or intimate ties with their political peers, the effect of a homogeneous political discussion network on their vote decisions is expected to increase* (Hypothesis 3).

Which of these two mechanisms is expected to be dominant? Evidence from the United States suggests that social pressure is the mechanism driving the political networks effect (Sinclair, 2012). However, Ames, Baker & Renno (2020) argue that the mechanism of peer influence is informational, because social pressure to conform is often implicit, so it does not necessarily involve the intentional exchange of relevant content through conversation. However, they offer only anecdotal evidence to support such a claim. Therefore, due to the large political and social differences between our case and the United States, and the lack of strong empirical evidence to support one mechanism over the other in the context of Latin America, we remail agnostic about the dominant mechanism.

CASE SELECTION

Bogotá is an interesting case in which to explore the role of discussion networks on electoral behavior for a few reasons. First, in 2011 only 26.4 % of Bogotanos identified themselves with a political party, and political identities seem to be very volatile. Furthermore, in Bogotá there seems to be a stronger influence of candidate preference on party preference than the other way around (Angulo, 2016). Second, one of the candidates with the greatest chances of winning, Gustavo Petro, ran with no partisan support.[2] Third, according to our survey, in 2011 the economy was not the main concern for people in the city. Most citizens considered public safety to

2. Prior to running for mayor of Bogotá, Gustavo Petro was a member of Congress (representative and senator) from 1991 until 2010. In the 2011 local election Petro ran on a leftist platform with no official support from *Polo Democrático*, the most prominent leftist party by that time. On the other hand, Enrique Peñalosa was running for a second term as mayor of Bogotá, as he held this position from 1998 to 2000. Peñalosa a center-right politician, ran with the support of the Green Party in 2011.

be the city's main problem, followed by basic services and the economy.[3] Fourth, unlike previous races, the 2011 election was extremely competitive as it featured several candidates with strong chances to win. It was a true toss-up and the winner, Gustavo Petro, claimed victory with just 32 % of the vote, seven percentage points more than Enrique Peñalosa, the runner-up (Resultados Finales Alcaldía, 2011). Fifth, during the last weeks of the campaign one of the four candidates with the most support in the polls (Antanas Mockus) resigned his candidacy. Therefore, the political dynamics of the election led many voters to readjust their preferences during the last part of the race. In summary, the 2011 mayoral election in Bogotá was volatile, highly competitive, and took place in a context in which partisan identities were weak and evaluations of the economy had a relatively minor influence on voter preferences. Considering these conditions, we believe that the case of Bogotá offers a likely scenario in which citizens looked to their discussion networks for guidance when deciding who to vote for. This type of electoral context is common in the region, so results from this paper may be applicable to cases, local or national, that share the political characteristics of Bogotá.

In addition, this analysis of Bogotá may offer a window into understanding the political behavior of Colombians and Latin Americans more broadly –in particular those who live in large cities. First, by sheer size Bogotá is a microcosm of the whole country. Inhabitants of the capital city comprise about 16 % of the country's total population. Second, Bogotá, similarly to other large Latin American cities such as Lima, Mexico City or São Paulo, constantly receives an influx of migrants from every corner of the country; and people of different social strata frequently relocate to the capital to seek economic opportunities and to access better public services. In sum, our case offers a valuable opportunity to explore the role of discussion networks on vote decisions in a politically and socially diverse context.

DATA AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

To test our hypotheses, we use data from a two-wave panel study of voters conducted during the 2011 local elections in Bogotá. In the first wave, we asked participants about their vote intention in the local election, whether they discussed politics with other people, and about the characteristics of their discussion networks. In the second wave, we gathered data on whether they participated in local elections and about their vote decisions. The first wave took place about

Given the prior political trajectories of both candidates and that they represented opposite political projects, these candidates enjoyed of a high visibility among voters.

3. Forty-six percent of respondents were concern about public safety, 20 % about basic services and 13 % about the economy.

four weeks before the election, and the second set of surveys was administered a week following the election. We were able to interview 713 individuals in the first wave and 601 in the second one; the mortality rate was therefore about 15 %.[4] Information was gathered using a self-weighted stratified probability sample, representative of adults residing in the city. All interviews were face-to-face.[5]

In order to explore the effects of discussion networks on individual decisions, we included a network generator in the first wave of the panel. We asked interviewees the number of people with whom they frequently talked about politics. We also asked them to give us the first names or initials of up to four of said discussants.[6] For each of the people in their network, we included a series of questions about the political views of their peers, the frequency of contacts with each member of the network, if discussants were friends or family members, and the level of agreement they had when discussing politics. We were thus able to measure different aspects of the individuals' discussion networks.[7] Many studies on the influence of social networks use network generators that measure conversation partners with whom people discuss important matters (Small, 2017). However, since our objective is to capture the influence of discussing politics with others on political behavior, we think a network generator of political discussion partners is preferable to a more generic one.

The network generator indicated that 60.1 % of participants reported discussing politics with others and that the average number of discussants is two. But this mean value may be misleading in the sense that the number of discussants declines considerably. While almost a quarter of respondents confirmed that they talk about politics with one other person, the percentage of people talking about politics with two people is 11.4 %, 7 % for those talking with three people and 10.1 % for those talking with four peers. We observe a deep decline between talking to just one other person and talking with more than one person, but the

4. We imputed missing data on the independent variables and only gained about 25-30 observations which did not affect the results of our estimations. Thus, we decided to keep the simpler, unimputed data.
5. See appendix for a discussion of the representativeness of the sample, descriptive statistics, and more details about the survey.
6. We asked for up to four discussants because there is evidence that political discussion networks tend not to be very large. Only 18 % of survey respondents in the US could name four political discussants (Sinclair, 2012). By gathering up to four political interlocutors we go deep enough into the discussion network to pick up discussants with weaker ties (Granovetter, 1978).
7. Although this is a common form of measuring discussion networks (Klofstad, McClurg & Rolfe, 2009), it is not free of limitations, one being its reliance on people's recollection about their discussants and their opinions. However, prior evidence indicates that approximately 80 % of all respondents were able to correctly identify the political preferences of their discussants (Fowler *et al.*, 2011), and that people tend to discuss politics with individuals with whom they have strong social ties and talk about "important matters" (family and very close friends) (Klofstad, McClurg & Rolfe, 2009; Sinclair, 2012). These are individuals available in people's memory. Therefore, there are reasons to think that there should be an important coincidence between memory recall of peer networks and the actual peer networks.

percentages remain relatively stable for the other number of discussants. In turn, 47.2 % of all participants discuss politics exclusively with family members, 42.8 % of the sample only discuss politics with friends, and the remaining 9.8 % have discussion networks composed of both relatives and friends.

A key variable to consider when attempting to measure the influence of peer effects on individuals' political attitudes and decisions is homophily, or people's tendency to associate with others who resemble them (Small, 2017). Individuals choose their social networks based on shared traits, including many common socioeconomic or demographic characteristics such as race, ethnicity, age, religion, education, occupation, and gender (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). Prior research has demonstrated that political characteristics correlate with these factors, so they are also likely to be shared among members of a network (Lazer *et al.*, 2008). However, many social ties emerge from random factors beyond personal selection, so homophily fails to characterize all of individual's social relationships (Fowler *et al.*, 2011).

The challenge of capturing the impact of political discussion networks on vote choices due to homophily is to identify the factors that drive the relationship between changes in political preferences that result from political discussions with others. In the absence of random assignment of individuals to their discussion networks, any association between discussing politics with others and vote choice could be equally explained by either the causal effect of peer influence or by the selection process that drove people to establish a relationship with their discussants (Molano & Jones, 2014).

There are various empirical strategies that can be used to capture the influence of political discussion networks on electoral decisions (Fowler *et al.*, 2011; Sinclair, 2012) without overestimating this causal relationship. First, since homophily is most likely to occur among those who share socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001) accounting for these factors enable us to control for the selection of networks. If network variables remain significant after accounting for these shared characteristics that generate homophily, there is observational evidence of peer influence. Second, analyses should use panel data so that it is possible to model change in respondents' electoral preferences over time. If there was peer influence, over time individuals converge towards the preferences of their political discussion networks.[8]

In this paper we use the two strategies described above. Specifically, we model voting decisions and changes in electoral preferences. Both the vote and change models include sociodemographic controls that account for homophily; also, we take advantage of panel data, so the "treatment" and outcome variables

8. Sinclair (2012) suggests using randomized field experiments to test the influence of "others" on electoral decisions.

are observed at different moments in time. Finally, the change model allows us to test preference convergence due to peer influence.

For the vote models our dependent variable is a measure of whether a respondent voted for the winning candidate in the mayoral election as reported in wave two, that is, reporting to have voted for Petro.[9] In the change models, we use two dependent variables that capture whether a respondent changed her electoral preference from wave one to wave two. The dummy variable *changed to Petro* indicates whether someone who had stated in wave one the intention to vote for other candidates (or not knowing for whom to vote), then reported in wave two having voted for Petro. Likewise, *changed to Peñalosa* captures those who did vote for Peñalosa but had stated a different vote intention in wave one. We use binomial logistic models to evaluate both voting decision and change of electoral preferences. The appendix includes the survey questions used to build our dependent variables.

In both types of estimations, the main independent variables are measures of the percentage of discussants supporting either of the top two contenders in the election. One variable indicates the percentage of people in an individual's network that were going to vote for Petro (*network support for Petro*). Similarly, we use a variable that measures the percentage of people in the network supporting the candidate that finished in second place (*network support for Peñalosa*).

To account for the factors that drive the selection of personal relationships (Fowler *et al.*, 2011), our models include the following sociodemographic controls: gender, socioeconomic status (SES), age, marital status, employment status and having offspring.[10] We also include other controls that the literature on vote choice has found to have an impact on voting decisions. These variables are partisanship, closeness to leftist and closeness to rightist parties,[11] and sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations of the economy. All these variables were measured in wave one.

9. Overreport of voting for the winning candidate was of about 12 points. This distortion may increase the importance of independent variables that are related in the same direction to both overreporting and voting and decrease the importance of independent variables related in opposing directions to those two variables (Bernstein, Chadha and Motjoy, 2001). We don't think this may affect the effect of discussion networks on vote choice as there is no reason to believe that discussing politics with others is correlated to overreporting. Evidence from the US case shows that overreporting is correlated to socioeconomic factors.

10. Gender, marital status, employment status and having offspring are dichotomous variables that take the value of one for: males, married and employed people, and respondents with children. Age is a continuous variable that ranges from 18 to 89 years of age. Socioeconomic status is an index of individuals' ownership of nine consumption goods. These goods are television, refrigerator, conventional telephone, cellular telephone, automobile, washing machine, microwave, indoor running water, indoor bathroom, and personal computer. This index is measured on a 0 to 100 scale.

11. Despite that closeness to parties is not a direct measure of partisanship, we use it as a proxy of partisan identity because only 26 % of our sample identifies as members of a political party. By measuring

To evaluate the mechanisms behind the potential influence of political peers on people's vote choices our models include various interactions. We assess the informational mechanism with interactive terms between the network variables and political sophistication. If information drives the influence of peers on people's vote decisions, the network effect should be larger among the less politically informed individuals (Sinclair, 2012). In turn, the social pressure mechanism operates through repetitive interactions or intimate ties (Sinclair, 2012). Thus, if social pressure moves the influence of peers on political decisions, the network effects should be larger among those who have either frequent contact with their discussion partners or those who have a larger share of close ties in their network. We are aware that getting at social pressure is challenging as it operates through different ways that may depend on the type of information discussed in the network or its tone. However, we did not measure such characteristics as it would have made the survey too complicated. Instead, we relied on frequency of contact, which is a prerequisite for the social pressure to be exerted. We realize this may not be the best way to assess social pressure, but it is one that allows us to move in the appropriate direction.

To measure the effect of *political sophistication*, we use an index based on the correct answers given by respondents to six questions about general and specific political knowledge. For ease of interpretation, we recoded the variable so that it ranges from 0 (no correct answers) to 100 (all answers correct). In turn, *frequency of contact* measures how often respondents talked about politics with the people in their network. Our measure of frequency of contact is based on a wave one survey question that asked respondents how often they talked about politics with each reported member of their network. The answers were collected using a five-point scale that ranged from "almost daily" to "less than once a year". We recoded the variable to range from 0-100, with zero being minimum contact and 100 being maximum contact. To capture the share of close ties we use the variable *Family members* in the discussion network, which measures the percentage of discussion partners comprised by members of the respondent's family.[12] This variable was constructed using a question that asked respondents if discussants were: "spouse or permanent partner", "family member" or "friend". We coded as family members the first two options. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics.[13]

closeness or sympathy towards parties, we have a proxy of partisanship for our entire sample.

12. We assume that in the context of Latin American societies, people tend to have close ties with their families, and families are a source of social pressure. However, we are aware that people can develop very close ties with individuals outside their families.

13. The varying number of observations from one variable to another are explained by: (i) the wave in which the variable was measured. Variables measured in wave 2 have at least 15 % less observations due to attrition. And (ii) whether the variable measures an attribute of discussion networks. About 40 % of respondents did not report discussion partners.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	N
Voted for Petro	0.44	0.50	0	1	344
Network support for Petro	0.16	0.32	0	1	380
Network support for Peñalosa	0.13	0.28	0	1	380
Changed to Petro	0.16	0.37	0	1	629
Changed to Peñalosa	0.04	0.21	0	1	638
Percentage of network supporting Petro	0.16	0.32	0	1	380
Percentage of network supporting Peñalosa	0.13	0.28	0	1	380
Partisanship	0.27	0.44	0	1	710
Closeness to rightist parties	40.89	32.12	0	100	689
Closeness to leftist parties	29.86	27.71	0	100	684
Sociotropic evaluation	43.98	21.53	0	100	710
Pocketbook evaluation	56.87	18.39	0	100	710
Political sophistication	48.20	21.73	0	100	666
Frequency of contact with network	63.80	22.77	0	100	380
Percentage of family members in network	37.20	41.65	0	100	380
Age	42.91	17.54	18	89	712
Education	10.97	5.18	0	22	712
Employed (yes=1)	0.52	0.50	0	1	712
SES	62.9	19.1	0	100	713
Married (yes=1)	0.55	0.50	0	1	711
Has offspring (yes=1)	0.73	0.44	0	1	698

Source: Own elaboration.

RESULTS

Vote decision

The first column of table 2 displays a base model without interaction terms. To test the informational mechanism, models 2 and 3 include interactions between network variables (percentage of network that supports Petro and percentage of network that supports Peñalosa) and political sophistication. Models 4 to 7 include interactions between the measurements of network homogeneity and frequency of contact with political discussants, and the percentage of family members in the discussion network.

Recall that our theoretical expectation is that the percentage of discussants favoring the winner ought to be positively correlated with the decision of voting for this candidate. Results from the base model support our first hypothesis. As the percentage of the network that supports Petro increases, so does the likelihood of voting for him. Similarly, as the percentage of the network that supports Peñalosa increases, the probability of voting for Petro decreases significantly. Since the model controls for the variables that drive the selection of personal relationships, it is possible that the observed significant effects of political discussion networks on vote choice exist beyond those resulting from correlations based on selection into the network (Sinclair, 2012). Of course, such effect may be due to an unobserved characteristic (Fowler *et al.*, 2011).

The remaining models (4 to 7) include the interaction terms that test the proposed mechanisms through which discussing politics may have an influence on vote choices. To facilitate the interpretation of interactions, we estimate the average marginal effects of the homogeneity of the network at different levels of the three variables used in the different interactive terms (see figures 1, 2 and 3).

As can be seen in figure 1, we find evidence to support the informational mechanism (H2). As expected, the positive effect of the network variables is larger among less sophisticated individuals and decreases as people's sophistication increases. In other words, for those respondents who are more informed about politics, the effect of their discussion network on their vote decision is negligible, but there is an important effect for those who are less savvy about politics. The effect on the probability of voting for Petro (left panel) is positive and statistically undistinguishable from zero for sophistication levels ranging between 0 and 82 out of 100. The average marginal effect on the probability of voting for decreases about 20 points, from 0.45 when sophistication is reported at 0 to 0.24 when it is reported at 82 and above. Thus, networks are more persuasive for those individuals with lower levels of political knowledge. On the other hand, the informational mechanisms do not appear to influence *peñalosistas* as the effect of the network is not different from zero for any value of political sophistication, as the confidence interval in the right panel shows.

Table 2. Logistic models of vote choice (1/4)

	Informational mechanism			Social pressure mechanism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Base model	Network support Petro x political sophistication	Network support Peñalosa x political sophistication	Network support Petro x frequency of contact	Network support Peñalosa x frequency of contact	Network support Petro x family members in network	Network support Peñalosa x family members in network
Percentage of network supporting Petro	1.862***	2.911	1.871***	0.599	2.006***	2.663***	1.959***
	(0.512)	(1.650)	(0.529)	(1.590)	(0.533)	(0.727)	(0.532)
Percentage of network supporting Peñalosa	-2.609*	-2.263*	-0.252	-2.679*	-3.079		-2.191
	(1.040)	(1.021)	(2.019)	(1.068)	(3.781)		(1.368)
Partisanship	-0.033	0.113	0.142	0.003	0.016	0.036	0.027
	(0.377)	(0.389)	(0.391)	(0.382)	(0.380)	(0.384)	(0.383)
Closeness to rightist parties	-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.030***	-0.027***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Closeness to leftist parties	0.015*	0.014*	0.014*	0.014*	0.015*	0.017**	0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Sociotropic evaluation	-0.008	-0.006	-0.006	-0.008	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Pocketbook evaluation	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Gender (male=1)	0.312	0.486	0.454	0.294	0.297	0.370	0.301
	(0.352)	(0.372)	(0.369)	(0.354)	(0.353)	(0.352)	(0.361)

Table 2. Logistic models of vote choice (2/4)

	Informational mechanism			Social pressure mechanism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Base model	Network support Petro x political sophistication	Network support Peñalosa x political sophistication	Network support Petro x frequency of contact	Network support Peñalosa x frequency of contact	Network support Petro x family members in network	Network support Peñalosa x family members in network
SES	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)
Age	0.000 (0.014)	0.001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)
Education	-0.018 (0.040)	-0.002 (0.042)	-0.001 (0.042)	-0.022 (0.040)	-0.023 (0.040)	-0.043 (0.041)	-0.029 (0.041)
Married (yes=1)	0.336 (0.455)	0.500 (0.473)	0.522 (0.469)	0.470 (0.469)	0.414 (0.463)	0.324 (0.463)	0.516 (0.469)
Employed (yes=1)	0.529 (0.406)	0.641 (0.421)	0.612 (0.425)	0.598 (0.411)	0.569 (0.410)	0.536 (0.410)	0.618 (0.416)
Has offspring (yes=1)	-0.246 (0.547)	-0.554 (0.564)	-0.567 (0.566)	-0.386 (0.559)	-0.363 (0.556)	-0.244 (0.545)	-0.422 (0.561)
Political sophistication		-0.010 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.011)				
Percentage of network supporting Petro × Political sophistication		-0.018 (0.026)					

Table 2. Logistic models of vote choice (3/4)

	Informational mechanism				Social pressure mechanism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Base model	Network support Petro x political sophistication	Network support Peñalosa x political sophistication	Network support Petro x frequency of contact	Network support Peñalosa x frequency of contact	Network support Petro x family members in network	Network support Peñalosa x family members in network
Percentage of network supporting Peñalosa × Political sophistication			-0.036 (0.034)				
Frequency of contact with network				-0.014 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.008)		
Percentage of network supporting Petro × Frequency of contact with network				0.021 (0.023)			
Percentage of network supporting Peñalosa × Frequency of contact with network					0.007 (0.054)		
Percentage family member in network						0.012** (0.005)	0.010* (0.004)
Percentage of network supporting Petro × Percentage family member in network						-0.013 (0.012)	

Table 2. Logistic models of vote choice (4/4)

	Informational mechanism			Social pressure mechanism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Base model	Network support Petro x political sophistication	Network support Peñalosa x political sophistication	Network support Petro x frequency of contact	Network support Peñalosa x frequency of contact	Network support Petro x family members in network	Network support Peñalosa x family members in network
Percentage of network supporting Peñalosa × Percentage family member in network							-0.010 (0.031)
Constant	0.631 (0.969)	1.078 (1.079)	1.121 (1.055)	1.412 (1.096)	1.192 (1.069)	0.397 (0.976)	0.504 (0.974)
Observations	214	202	202	214	214	214	214
Log likelihood	-107.274	-101.149	-100.923	-106.017	-106.419	-107.862	-104.754
Pseudo R^2	0.269	0.267	0.269	0.278	0.275	0.265	0.286

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 1. Average Marginal Effects of Network Support for Petro/Peñalosa



Source: Own elaboration.

In turn, figure 2 plots the test of the social pressure mechanism (H2) as estimated in models 4 and 5 in table 1. If this mechanism is behind the relationship between political discussion networks and vote choice, the positive effect of the network variables on vote choice would have to be larger among those who have frequent contact with their discussants, compared to those having sporadic contacts with them. As can be seen in figure 2, the positive network effect is statistically significant for higher levels of frequency of contact with discussants (left panel). Such an effect increases as individuals report higher frequency of contact with their network. The coefficient capturing the effect of the network variable becomes statistically significant after frequency is higher than 40 on a 100-point scale. The average marginal effects on the probability of voting Petro increases about 16 points, from 0.24 when frequency is reported at 40 to 0.39 when it is reported at 100. This result suggests that people need to be in constant contact with their peers to discuss politics with others to have an impact on their political choices. That is, the persuasiveness of the network kicks in after increased interaction with one's peers.

The effect of the variable that captures the percentage of discussants favoring Peñalosa on voting for Petro (right panel) seems to have positive slope that increases slightly as the frequency of contact increases. This effect is negative throughout the range. That is, individuals who have a network that supports Peñalosa have a negative effect on their probability of voting for Petro which increases slightly as they interact more with their peers.

Figure 2. Average Marginal Effects of Network Support for Petro/Peñalosa



Source: Own elaboration.

Finally, figure 3 shows our additional test of the social pressure mechanism. We expected that the presence of a larger percentage of family members in a respondent's network should increase the network effect on vote choice. However, results show the opposite: the network effect on the probability of voting for Petro decreases as the percentage of family members increases. In turn, the effect of the variable that captures the percentage of discussants favoring Peñalosa on voting for Petro is negative and only significant in part of the range. We take from this result that, at least in the Colombian case, the social pressure mechanism

operates in a clearer fashion through the frequency of contact with the network than through the characteristics of its membership.[14]

Figure 3. Average Marginal Effects of Network Support for Petro/Peñalosa



Source: Own elaboration.

Beyond the network variables, closeness to political parties on the right or left of the political spectrum are the only two variables that are statistically significant in all the models presented in table 2.[15] As explained earlier, this election was ideologically charged as the top two contenders represented opposing political views. Because the leftist candidate won the election, closeness to leftist parties is positively related to voting for Petro, while closeness to rightist parties is negatively related to voting for him. Other than partisan identity, none of the other factors considered in the literature seem to explain vote choice, in particular

14. In the discussion section we explore a possible explanation for this atypical result.
15. To discard the possibility that the inclusion of both party identification and closeness to parties in the same model renders one of them insignificant, we run the models with only one measures. The results do not change. Results available upon request.

evaluations of the economy. Earlier we pointed out that variations in partisanship are not as strong in a context such as the Colombian one. Even though these results point to their importance in explaining vote choices, it should be noted that only about 26 % of survey respondents professed sympathy to a political party. Thus, we do not negate their relevance, but we believe that Colombians have a distant relationship with political parties and may need to complement their vote choice decision process with additional information such as that provided by discussion networks.

The results presented so far meet our expectations. Now we move on to present the results from the change models.

Change in vote choices

Our empirical strategy to test the influence of peers on vote choice, in the absence of random assignment of individuals to their discussion networks, includes change in people's electoral preferences over time. The panel structure of our data allows us to do just that, which is what we report in table 3. As our dependent variables, we used two dummy variables that recorded change in electoral preferences between waves one and two, as described earlier. We estimated a series of logistic models that contain the same independent variables included in previous models (models 8 and 9). To test the mechanisms through which networks influence individual's behavior, we estimated a series of models using *change to Petro* as the dependent variable and included interactions between the network variables and the same variables used in the previous set of models: political sophistication (models 10-11), frequency of contact (models 12-13) and percentage of family members in the network (models 14-15).

Results presented in models 8 and 9 support our first hypothesis (H1). As the percentage of discussants favoring either candidate increases the likelihood of people switching to vote for the candidate preferred by their discussion networks also increases. Similarly, the likelihood of changing to a given candidate decreases as the percentage of discussants that favor a different candidate increases. In terms of marginal effects (figure 4), the likelihood of changing to vote for Petro increases slightly more than 20 points, from 0.15 to 0.36, as the percentage of political discussants supporting Petro increases from zero to 100 %. Similarly, the probability of changing to vote for Petro decreases rapidly as the percentage of Peñalosa supporters increases. It drops from about 0.20 to about 0.0. This effect ceases to be statistically significant when the percentage of *peñalosistas* reaches 66 %. This may be an intriguing result because a more homogeneous network should have a stronger effect on its members. We believe that two things might explain the loss of significance. The probability of changing the vote in favor of

Table 3. Logistic model of change in vote decision (1/6)

	Information mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)				Social pressure mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)			
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	DV = Change to Petro	DV = Change to Peñalosa	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network
Percentage of network supporting Petro	1.280*	-1.047	4.804*		-0.070		1.258	
	(0.540)	(1.421)	(2.191)		(1.398)		(0.702)	
Percentage of network supporting Peñalosa	-1.865*	1.613*	-1.746	-0.931	-1.976*	-4.118	-1.901*	-1.029
	(0.950)	(0.801)	(0.952)	(2.375)	(0.973)	(2.913)	(0.950)	(1.113)
Partisanship	-0.103	0.625	-0.157	-0.135	-0.061	-0.082	-0.081	-0.114
	(0.389)	(0.564)	(0.405)	(0.398)	(0.393)	(0.386)	(0.395)	(0.387)
Closeness to rightist parties	-0.015**	0.020*	-0.013*	-0.015*	-0.017**	-0.017**	-0.015**	-0.016**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Closeness to leftist parties	0.002	-0.037**	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)

Table 3. Logistic model of change in vote decision (2/6)

	Information mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)				Social pressure mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)			
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	DV = Change to Petro	DV = Change to Peñalosa	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network
Sociotropic evaluation	-0.013	-0.004	-0.010	-0.011	-0.012	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Pocketbook evaluation	-0.001	0.005	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Gender (male=1)	0.311	-0.604	0.431	0.421	0.233	0.370	0.272	0.390
	(0.359)	(0.591)	(0.385)	(0.370)	(0.362)	(0.356)	(0.362)	(0.356)
Wealth	0.004	0.035	-0.001	0.000	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Age	-0.010	0.041	-0.008	-0.010	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education	0.028	-0.122	0.034	0.036	0.035	0.040	0.026	0.031
	(0.039)	(0.070)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Married (yes=1)	0.588	0.834	0.827	0.779	0.700	0.644	0.674	0.674
	(0.453)	(0.813)	(0.492)	(0.478)	(0.462)	(0.452)	(0.459)	(0.453)

Table 3. Logistic model of change in vote decision (3/6)

			Information mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)			Social pressure mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)			
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	DV = Change to Petro	DV = Change to Peñalosa	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network
Employed (yes=1)	-0.249 (0.364)	-0.739 (0.611)	-0.181 (0.379)	-0.238 (0.368)	-0.157 (0.366)	-0.289 (0.360)	-0.257 (0.367)	-0.330 (0.363)
Has offspring (yes=1)	0.077 (0.567)	-1.594 (0.923)	-0.220 (0.595)	-0.074 (0.576)	-0.060 (0.575)	0.054 (0.562)	-0.006 (0.573)	0.094 (0.562)
Political sophistication			0.006 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)				
Percentage of network supporting Petro × Political sophistication			-0.060 (0.037)					
Percentage of network supporting Peñalosa × Political sophistication				-0.016 (0.039)				

Table 3. Logistic model of change in vote decision (4/6)

			Information mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)			Social pressure mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)				
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)		
	DV = Change to Petro	DV = Change to Peñalosa	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network		
Frequency of contact with network					-0.016	-0.013				
					(0.008)	(0.007)				
Percentage of network supporting Petro × Frequency of contact with network					0.024					
					(0.022)					
Percentage of network supporting Peñalosa × Frequency of contact with network						0.033				
						(0.040)				

Table 3. Logistic model of change in vote decision (5/6)

	Information mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)					Social pressure mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)				
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)		
	DV = Change to Petro	DV = Change to Peñalosa	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network		
Percentage family member in network							0.005	0.006		
							(0.004)	(0.004)		
Percentage of network supporting Petro × Percentage family member in network							0.002			
							(0.013)			
Percentage of network supporting Peñalosa × Percentage family member in network								-0.029		
								(0.028)		

Table 3. Logistic model of change in vote decision (6/6)

	Information mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)				Social pressure mechanism (DV = Change to Petro)			
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	DV = Change to Petro	DV = Change to Peñalosa	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and political sophistication	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and frequency of contact	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network	Interaction network support for Petro and percentage of family members in network
Constant	-0.997 (0.906)	-4.831** (1.725)	-1.370 (0.992)	-1.079 (0.945)	-0.181 (0.989)	-0.439 (0.950)	-1.195 (0.934)	-1.403 (0.926)
Observations	300	306	285	285	300	300	300	300
Log likelihood	-121.384	-48.803	-112.599	-117.390	-119.453	-122.315	-120.372	-122.572
Pseudo R2	0.123	0.287	0.129	0.091	0.137	0.116	0.130	0.114

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: Own elaboration.

Petro is rather small to begin with. So, it doesn't require many people reinforcing the message of not changing the vote for it to have an effect. Also, there are probably very few people in our sample who considered changing the vote for Petro and were in a network where everyone was a *peñalosista*, which may explain the increased width of the significance interval for higher levels of homogeneity. Nevertheless, both for Petro and Peñalosa networks, we observe persuasiveness reflected in changes in voting behavior.

Figure 4. Average Marginal Effect of Changing Vote Decision



Source: Own elaboration.

These results show that, in the case of Bogotá, a more homogenous network was more persuasive as respondents were more likely to change their initial preference towards that candidate. Thus, homogenous political discussion networks incited voters to revise their vote choices in favor of those of their peers, although the effect is stronger for those respondents whose network favored Petro.

Additionally, as expected, closeness to leftist parties decreases the likelihood of changing the vote for Peñalosa. Closeness to rightist parties increases the likelihood of changing to vote for Peñalosa and decreases the likelihood of changing to vote for Petro.

Models 10-15 in table 3 explore the interactions between the network variables and political sophistication, frequency of contact with political peers and percentage of family members in the network. We estimated the marginal effects of the interaction terms and produced graphs to ease the interpretation of our results. These results are shown in figures 5-7.

Figure 5 shows our test of the informational mechanism (H2) by assessing the effect of the network variables on the probability of changing the vote to Petro for varying levels of political sophistication. The effect of a network more homogeneously in favor of Petro on the probability of changing to vote for him is clearly conditioned by political sophistication. As in the models of voting decision, the effects are larger for those with lower levels of political sophistication, and it loses statistical significance, for those more informed about politics. Substantively, the conditional effect is quite large, it falls about 33 points, from a high of 0.48 when people score zero on political sophistication to about 0.15 when sophistication reaches 61, beyond this sophistication level the effect ceases to be significantly different from zero. More sophisticated voters are likelier to know who they support and do not seem to be affected by their network to change their vote in support of Petro. Again, networks have more power of persuasion for those people who have little political knowledge.

On the other hand, regardless of the level of political sophistication, a *peñalosista* network does not explain the decision to change the vote for Petro. This makes sense, people surrounded by peers supporting Peñalosa are unlikely to change their vote for the opposing candidate.

As discussed earlier, we believe discussion networks may also operate through a social pressure mechanism as well (H3). Figure 6 presents evidence that seems to support our claim: the effect of a network that becomes more homogeneously in favor of Petro on the probability of changing the vote to him is statistically significant only for those individuals with higher frequency of contact with their political discussants. The effect becomes significant after the frequency of contact reaches 50 on a 100-point scale ranging from minimum to maximum contact. The magnitude of this effect is rather modest, going from 0.15 to 0.20 in the range for which it achieves statistical significance. Unsurprisingly, a *peñalosista* network does not influence the decision to change the vote to Petro.

Finally, figure 7 shows the effect of discussion networks conditioned by the percentage of family members in such networks. Results from this interaction do not support the idea that the effect of a discussion network on the likelihood of changing vote decision increases for those whose networks are largely composed of family members. In fact, the effect of a network that more homogenously supports Petro on the dependent variable is almost flat, and it ceases to be significant when the percentage of family members in the network is about 70. For

Figure 5. Average Marginal Effects of Changing Vote Decision



Source: Own elaboration.

the *peñalosista* network the conditional effect is not statistically significant. In the discussion section, we explain why this may be the case.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Aware that nobody makes political decisions in an informational vacuum, in this paper we studied the influence of others on people's electoral decisions. More specifically we explored what type of discussion networks may have shaped those decisions and the mechanisms through which individuals' vote choices were influenced by others. We set out to study the influence of discussion networks on vote decisions using panel data from the 2011 local elections in Bogotá. That is, we modeled the influence of discussion networks on vote choice, as reported in wave one, and change of electoral preferences from wave one to wave two of our panel.

Figure 6. Average Marginal Effects of Changing Vote Decision



Source: Own elaboration.

Results from both the vote choice and change models gave us evidence that politically homogeneous discussions networks have significant effects on people's electoral decisions (H1). Concretely, having a greater percentage of political discussants that support a particular candidate increases: (i) the likelihood that a person votes for the candidate preferred by her discussion network, and (ii) the probability of changing her electoral preference from a different candidate to the candidate preferred by most of her peers.

We also found evidence that discussion networks operate through both informational and social pressure mechanisms (and H3). First, we showed strong evidence that networks work as information disseminators, particularly for individuals with lower political knowledge. Our results showed a large gap between the less and more informed in terms of the magnitude of the network effect on electoral decisions. In other words, those who are more likely to pay high informational costs associated with voting are largely benefited from the information that is aggregated and disseminated through the network of political discussants. In contrast, the highly informed are "immune" to the influence of their peers.

Figure 7. Average Marginal Effects of Changing Vote Decision



Source: Own elaboration.

Second, our data also gave us evidence that social networks influence voters through social pressure. However, compared to information the role of social pressure seems modest, at least for the case of residents of Bogotá in this election. Since the social pressure mechanism operates through repetitive contacts or intimate ties with political peers, we ran interactions between the network variables and measures of intensity of contact with peers and the percentage of family members in the network. Respondents who were in greater contact with their networks exhibited a higher chance of voting for Petro or changing their electoral preference, in favor of this candidate, when their network was more homogeneously in favor of this candidate. In contrast, we did not find the same effect when the percentage of family members in the network increased. We even found an atypical result as the effect of the network variable on the probability of voting for Petro decreased as the percentage of family members in the network increased.

Results from the test of the different mechanisms through which networks operate deserve further discussion due to their implications. In the first place, our data indicate that, unlike other cases such as the United States (Sinclair, 2012),

networks in Colombia operate more via the aggregation of information than via social pressure. The relevance of this mechanism may indicate that in Bogotá discussion networks compensate, more than in other contexts, for a deficit of political information. Prior research has demonstrated significant variation in sophistication levels across countries, and that such differences are caused by factors such as the proliferation of parties, or large income and education gaps (Gordon & Segura, 1997; Grönlund & Milner, 2006). We think some of the conditions that decrease citizens' levels of political sophistication may be present in Bogotá as well as in many Latin American nations: more and unstable political parties, large income gaps and poor educational systems. In these types of contexts, one can expect comparatively lower levels of political sophistication and more widespread scores of this indicator.[16] Therefore, the informational costs that citizens must pay, especially those in the lower extreme of the distribution, when making electoral decisions, are comparatively higher than in countries with higher sophistication averages, so the role of discussion networks as channels of information is more relevant, as we demonstrated in this paper. More studies are needed on this matter.

The atypical result of the one test of the social pressure mechanism deserves further discussion. Against our expectation, the network effect decreased or remained flat as the percentage of family members in the network increased. What might be driving this result? One possibility is that family members should not be regarded as more intimate than friends, and therefore closer and more influential. On the other hand, the influence of family members on individuals may be conditioned by age. A recent study conducted by *Observatorio de la Democracia* of *Universidad de los Andes* revealed that 58.4 % Colombians between the ages of 18 and 25 disagree on political issues with their parents. Therefore, the atypical result we observe may be driven by young respondents and their resistance to complying with the opinions of their relatives. To test for this possibility, we repeated the vote and change models excluding those between 18 and 25. Results that are presented in the appendix support our claim. For those older than 25 the effect of the network variable on vote choice ceased to be negative, and now is flat. In the case of the change model, after excluding young respondents, we observed a positive and significant effect of the network variable as the percentage of family members in the network increases. The social pressure exerted by

16. The contrast between the sophistication levels of our sample versus those of the United States is illustrative. We estimated a simplified measure of sophistication using two questions that were included in the 2010 LAPOP study for the United States and in our panel. Such questions were the length of the presidential term and the number of states / departments. The average sophistication level in the United States was 88.36 (in a 0 to 100 scale) with a standard deviation of 24.9; in our sample the average was 75.1 with a standard deviation of 26.2.

family members on vote decisions seems to work, in the expected direction, only for older voters, while for young individuals the effect of more family members among their political peers seems to trigger a process of resistance. This extension of our results highlights the necessity to explore the factors, scenarios, and situations in which a negative to comply with the electoral preference of peers is activated, particularly among young voters.

Thus, along with Baker, Ames, and Renno (2020) we can also claim that, in Latin America, the mechanism that drives the effects of political networks is informational. However, evidence presented in this paper contradicts the claim of these same authors, that the electoral influence of discussion networks does not occur via a social pressure mechanism. Our evidence indicates that in the region network effects seem to work through both the informational and social pressure mechanisms. Further tests in other cases are needed to generalize this claim to the region.

Our results also showed that, among the usual suspects that traditionally have explained vote decisions, in our case, only partisan identity played a significant role; evaluations of the economy appeared to be irrelevant. They highlight the necessity to consider multiple factors to explain vote choice. Along with the "the fundamentals" we need to continue exploring other factors to understand vote decision, especially in contexts in which party identities are very fluid and decreasing, and people's concerns go beyond the economy.

Finally, we must mention that our results apply to the case of Bogotá and may be also apply to Colombia and political scenarios like Bogotá. They showed clear differences with research conducted in the Global North, in the way discussion networks affect electoral decisions. To have more solid conclusions on the link between discussion networks and voting behavior in Latin America –beyond the most studied cases of Brazil, Mexico and now Colombia–, we need to continue accumulating new data and knowledge on a topic that is still in an early stage of development in the region.

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APPENDIX

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF SAMPLE

Table 1 and Table 2 below compare our sample with that of a much larger official study conducted by Colombia's National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). This is a household survey and the units of analysis are the household and the people that inhabit it.

Our study reflects quite well the distribution of the population with regards to gender and age, but not concerning education. The Living Standards study codes education as a categorical variable such that 0=no schooling, 1=some primary, 2=completed primary, 3=some secondary, 4=completed secondary, 5=one or more years of vocational education, 6=completed vocational education, 7=some college, 8=completed college, 9=graduate school. In contrast, in our survey we asked for the number of years of education received. Thus, the mean values of education in the Living Standards study suggest that household fathers and mothers were educated beyond primary. This would translate to slightly more than 5 years of formal education. In contrast, in our sample, people received on average almost 11 years of formal education. That is, the average respondent almost finished high school.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key demographic variables in Living Standards Measurement Study Bogotá

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender	54614	0.53	0.49	0	1
Age	39243	41.60	16.76	18	99
Education level of father	33493	2.84	2.35	1	10
Education level of mother	27553	2.33	2.02	1	10

Source: Encuesta Multipropósito para Bogotá Distrito Capital - EMB – 201. http://formularios.dane.gov.co/Anda_4_1/index.php/catalog/189/study-description

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of key demographic variables in our survey

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender	712	0.48	0.50	0	1
Age	712	42.90	17.53	18	89
Education	712	10.97	5.18	0	22

SURVEY QUESTIONS

Here are the questions that we use as our dependent variables in the model. We provide in brackets the actual Spanish language version of the question that was presented to respondents. For the models about participation, we used the following question from the first wave:

COLVBLOC.

Do you think you are going to vote in the local elections next October?

[*¿Piensa votar en las elecciones locales de octubre próximo?*]

(1)Yes (2)No (88) DK (98) NA

For the models about voting we used the following question from the second wave:

VB3_2.

Did you vote on the **elections of the past October 30, 2011 for Bogotá's Mayor**?

[*¿Votó usted en las* ***elecciones del pasado 30 de octubre de 2011 para alcalde*** *de Bogotá?*]

(1) Did vote (2) Did not vote (88) DK (98) NA

Here is the question used as dependent variable for the models about voting:

COLVBLOC1B_2.

For which **candidate** did you vote in the elections of the past October 30, 2011? **{Do not read list; accept answer if just a party is mentioned}**

[**¿Por qué *candidato*** *votó en las elecciones de Alcalde de Bogotá del pasado 30 de octubre?* ***{NO LEER LISTA, Aceptar si mencionan un partido}***]

(802) Aurelio Suárez (Polo Democrático Alternativo)
(803) Carlos Fernando Galán (Cambio Radical)
(804) Carlos Guevara (MIRA)
(805) David Luna (Partido Liberal)
(807) Enrique Peñalosa (Partido Verde / Partido de la U)
(808) Gina Parody (Gina Parody Alcaldesa)
(809) Gustavo Alonso Páez (Partido de Integración Nacional / PIN)
(810) Gustavo Petro (Progresistas)
(811) Jaime Castro (Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia / AICO)
(77) Other
(88) DK
(98) NA
(99) VOID

EXTENSIONS

Figure A1. Average Marginal Effects of Voting for Petro for Respondents 25 Years of Age and Older



Figure A2. Average Marginal Effects of Changing Vote Decision to Petro for Respondents 25 Years of Age and Older



RESEÑAS

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Andy Baker, Barry Ames, and Lúcio Rennó. *Persuasive Peers: Social Communication and Voting in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. 369 pages. ISBN 9780691205786.

Paul A. BECK
The Ohio State University

Persuasive Peers is an outstanding contribution to the study of voting behavior. From a base of panel surveys in Brazilian and Mexican presidential elections, it studies changes in vote preferences across election campaigns. Heavily influenced by stable preferences in electorates with strong party identifications, especially in the United States, most research on voting behavior focuses on the ultimate vote rather than the dynamics of voter opinion to reach that final choice. *Persuasive Peers* recognizes that changing preferences invite an expanded explanation: of vote preferences that are influenced by information from social networks, by **horizontal** rather than **vertical** forces.

This "peer persuasion" proves to be more significant in tracking the ebbs and flows of preferences than such frequently credited factors as media exposure, party contacts and clientelism, and strategic voting. It is particularly appropriate in accounting for outcomes in runoff elections necessitated by no majority winner in multi-candidate first round contests, such as in Brazil. With multiparty-ism and traditional-party fragmentation becoming more prominent throughout the democratic world, a focus on switching preferences and their roots in interpersonal discussion seems increasingly appropriate.

The book's most significant contributions are two-fold.

First, its Chapter 2 directs attention to candidate preference changes (i.e., volatility or vote switching) through nine multi-wave panel surveys of at least twice-opinionated respondents in 10 Brazilian, Mexican, and Argentinian presidential elections Such changes in preferences are common in Latin American elections and warrant a focus *per se*. In Brazil's 2014 election, for example, "at least 40% of the electorate shifted their vote intentions across party lines at some point of the campaign" (5). They are particularly prominent in elections requiring a majority winner, such as the Brazilian presidential contests. Vote volatility as a dependent

variable rarely has been investigated systematically in voting studies. This book demonstrates that it deserves considerably more attention.

Second, in Chapter 3 Baker, Ames, and Rennó focus on a social network explanation for voting preference changes. They examine peer influences on vote preferences using measures of respondents' (ego's) political discussion networks to account for vote volatility. Survey respondents were asked to name their major discussants (alters) and the candidates they support. The authors convincingly justify how such measures can capture peer vote preferences reliably, even when based on respondent perceptions. The authors criticize the reliance on what they term "vertical" intermediation, top-down communications from elites (parties, candidates, media, secondary organizations) to voters that have characterized previous research on intermediation in Latin America (and elsewhere). In their view, even media influence, the most commonly studied intermediary, is translated through horizontal discussions in a two-step flow via peers. They conclude that "the top-down flows of persuasive political information that occur through direct vertical ties … represent just a small share of political communications in Latin America" (9) and "assumes a level of trust toward elites that is often lacking" (11) there. They show that peer discussion of politics is frequent throughout the continent. Emphasizing it is an important new approach for explaining Latin American voting behavior and, more generally, in advancing social network research.

Chapter 4 is the key chapter in the volume, connecting horizontal peer networks to the dependent variable of vote volatility/instability. At the individual level, voters embedded in discussion networks entirely agreeing with them are less likely to change during the campaign than those in networks of discussants at least partly disagreeing with them. This analysis nicely differentiates between the too often conflated network disagreement (ego-alter differences) that heighten the probably of vote switching vs. network heterogeneity (differences among alters) that may mute it. In dyadic analysis, alters' opinions strongly affect vote choices of egos. Moreover, candidates whose supporters face high rates of disagreement in their networks are the ones who are less likely to maintain that support through election day.

The chapter tackles methodological challenges effectively through tests for robustness, omitted variables, and the accuracy of perceptions of alters. It shows especially strong alter effects in runoff elections, where voters for defeated candidates must change preferences if they are to participate in the second round. The primary mechanism of social influence is shown to be informational rather than normative modeling, with less knowledgeable people, who are more likely to change their preferences, turning to their more knowledgeable peers for guidance.

Persuasive Peers provides other important insights into voting behavior through the "window" of discussant networks. Relying on intensive studies of two different cities in Brazil, Chapter 5 contains an especially ingenious explanation

of how neighborhood effects are carried by the partisanship of peer networks within homogeneously partisan neighborhoods but are absent in more heterogeneous neighborhoods or a less partisan city. "Where neighborhoods have strong political leanings, political discussion during campaigns exerts a gravitational pull on their residents, assimilating many … to their neighborhoods' partisan tendencies" … In contrast, no similar process unfolded … where neighborhoods lacked stable partisan learnings." (227) Chapter 6 extends this analysis to connect the distribution of homogeneously partisan networks to the state and regional level in Brazil and Mexico in accounting for the broader effects of context. Chapter 7 addresses the frequent clientelist explanation for voting in Latin American countries. In their contacts with voters, political operatives do not just target party loyalists, but rather are shown to concentrate their attention on the "network hubs" with large discussant networks and a commitment to persuading their peers to vote a certain way. Through this selective focus on social networks, party contacting can multiply its reach.

Chapter 8 considers the important question of the consequences of peer influence. It focuses on two topics: whether there are inherent biases by SES (wealth and education), race, and gender in political discussion as well as whether discussion fosters "correct" voting (votes in line with issue preferences). Using data from 12 elections in 6 Latin American countries, it finds greater SES than racial or gender biases in political discussion, with wealth and education promoting more political talk. Propensities for contacting and being paid off by party benefits, by contrast, are much less likely to be stratified by SES. Women are less likely than men to discuss politics but generally do not have smaller networks. The results for correct voting are less definitive. The politically talkative and politically knowledgeable are more likely to vote correctly for president. By contrast, neither media exposure nor contacts from party operatives promote correct voting. Nor are people increasingly likely to vote correctly over the course of the campaign.

The study's results are most convincing when they focus on first to second round changes in runoff elections (covered in pp. 113-115 especially). Though still important, the research is less convincing when it documents changes within the election campaign, especially if as the authors concede "… election-day vote tallies … did not diverge significantly from the distribution of vote intentions prevailing at the campaign's onset. In other words, momentum runs by outsider candidates were short-lived" (226). Additional evidence of peer effects might be found for the nine countries in Latin America where run-offs are required if no candidates surpass the majority threshold (or 40-45% in three more, including Argentina) in the first round. Cross-sectional data from Comparative National Election Project surveys in Chile 1994 and 2000 and Colombia 2014 and 2018 could be mined in this fashion to expand the empirical base in runoff elections. Not only are such runoffs common in Latin America, but they also occur in more than

a dozen European democracies, many of them (most notably France and Poland) where numerous longitudinal election surveys have been conducted. *Persuasive Peers* has paved the way for additional studies of social influence, both within campaigns and in runoff elections, and one hopes that their lead will be followed.

Persuasive Peers is distinguished by its methodological rigor. It employs the appropriate techniques in its quantitative analyses and meticulously documents what it has done either in the main text or the appendices — and why. It relies on multiple panel surveys, taking advantage of discussion network measures where they are available to support its conclusions. Its hypothesis testing often is ingenious, making and then empirically documenting logical connections and ruling out alternative explanations. In addition, it nicely illustrates some of its quantitative results with in-depth voter interviews.

Primarily following the lead of *The American Voter* (Campbell *et al*. 1960) rather than the Columbia School (Berelson *et al.* 1954; Lazarsfeld *et al.* 1944), the study of voting behavior has been dominated by a concentration on final vote choices and explanatory variables for them that are commonly included in surveys – party loyalties, voter demographic characteristics that capture social cleavages in the society, personal and societal economic conditions, and social identities. The field of voting behavior has flourished under this approach. Yet overlooked has been the Columbia School focus on the campaign and social influences within it.

Persuasive Peers resuscitates this alternative path, relying on more modern measures of discussion networks to make promising advances in the study of both voting behavior and social influence. Research on American elections, where there is little change over the course of the campaign and even between elections, undoubtedly underestimates peer influence on voting preferences. This American "exceptionalism" limited the scope of the Columbia studies just as it has limited American voting studies ever since. Many democracies, however, lack the stabilizing force of longstanding party identifications and experience considerable volatility and instability in voting preferences across the election campaign and even between elections. Multiparty systems, often debuting new "flash" parties under the pressure of fragmenting traditional parties, foster volatility in voting outcomes and even voting preferences in the heat of the campaign. Presidential elections that require majority winners necessarily force switching by many voters. Underdeveloped media systems and lack of trust in elite political messaging put a premium on person-to-person communications in guiding vote choices. These are common features of Latin American electoral politics, so it is natural for a study of voting there to address them. Yet, Latin American elections are not alone in possessing these characteristics. Parties are many and often fleeting in fledgling democracies, and volatility has heightened even in long-standing democracies. Many presidential elections require majority or near-majority winners, thus necessitating runoffs between the top two vote-getters in the first round. For example,

almost half of French voters in 2022 supported candidates for president who did not survive into the second round. *Persuasive Peers* demonstrates that citizens in such circumstances may look for guidance in choosing candidates to their networks of political discussants, particularly their most knowledgeable peers.

The book is an exemplary guide to broadening the focus on voter preferences beyond final votes and to more fully capturing the sources of voting behavior by including peer influences. It is an impressive book that should be widely read by scholars of voting behavior well beyond the Latin American continent.

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Shane P. Singh. *Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 225 pages. ISBN: 9780198832928. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.001.0001.

Fernando Feitosa
Université Libre de Bruxelles

Should voting in elections be compulsory? For quite some time now, scholars have been debating this issue: for instance, an article published more than a century ago (in 1891) by Frederick W. Holls called for the adoption of compulsory voting in the United States. Two years later (in 1893), John M. Broomall published another article defending compulsory voting, too.

A long time has passed since the publication of these two studies. But, as with several other debates in political science, researchers have not yet reached a consensus about whether voting should be compulsory or not. This is because compulsory voting has been shown to lead to both positive and negative political consequences: for instance, while compulsory voting has been shown to foster electoral participation (e.g., Panagopoulos, 2008; Kostelka *et al.*, 2022), it is also likely to reduce the "quality" of the vote (Dassonneville *et al.*, 2018; Selb & Lachat, 2009) and people's satisfaction with democracy (Singh, 2018), as well as to increase invalid and blank balloting (Barnes & Rangel, 2018; Singh, 2019).

Shane Singh's new book on compulsory voting —the focus of this review— makes a consensus on the adoption of compulsory voting even harder to be reached, as it shows that compulsory voting actually has a double-sided effect on citizens and parties. For instance, compulsory voting, especially when strictly enforced, is shown to amplify "the negative relationship between dissatisfaction with democracy and support for authorities" (169). Moreover, non-mainstream parties are shown to "take more extreme positions" when voting is compulsory than when it is not (170).

This review – a non-exhaustive account of Singh's new book – is divided in two parts: first, I present some of the book's keys findings. Then, using Singh's book as the point of departure, I discuss potential avenues for future research.

THEORIES, HYPOTHESES, AND RESULTS

Singh's book proposes two main theories: first, compulsory voting exacerbates the negative effects of anti-democratic orientations "on attitudes toward political actors and levels of political engagement" (58). Second, compulsory voting reduces parties' efforts to mobilize turnout, especially for (but not limited to) those of the political mainstream; as a result, mainstream parties "moderate their messages under compulsory voting" (133), while non-mainstream parties "make more appeals to the fringes" under this voting system (134).

The first theory (on individuals) leads to four testable hypotheses. **Hypothesis 1** is that "individuals who are more negatively oriented toward electoral democracy are less likely to support compulsory voting" (65). **Hypothesis 2** is that "compulsory voting enhances the negative relationship between negative orientations toward democracy and support for political authorities" (65). **Hypothesis 3** is that "compulsory voting enhances the positive relationship between negative orientations toward democracy and support for extremist and outsider parties" (65). And **Hypothesis 4** is that "compulsory voting enhances the negative relationship between negative orientations toward democracy and political sophistication" (65). These hypotheses are believed to hold especially in places where compulsory voting is strictly enforced and where it includes significant sanctions for abstention.

Hypothesis 1 is tested by means of multiple multivariate regressions with data from six compulsory voting countries (Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay) (see Table 4.1 in page 72 for a detailed description of the studies used). The results are overall supportive of Hypothesis 1 as they suggest – most importantly – a positive association between satisfaction with democracy and support for compulsory voting. Singh interprets this finding as evidence that a "belief in and commitment to the value of all citizens' participation in democracy" explains support of compulsory voting (79), though he does not exclude that citizens may be actually driven by a desire to preserve the "legal ability to signal discontent via abstention" (79).

Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 are tested by means of multivariate regressions with data from the AmericasBarometer and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), as well as regression-discontinuity analyses of data from Swiss Election Studies from 1971 to 2015 and from an original study conducted in Argentina, in 2019. The results provide some support for Hypotheses 2 and 4, and full support for Hypothesis 3. More precisely, Hypothesis 2 (on support for political authorities) is disconfirmed by the cross-country analyses but confirmed by the regression-discontinuity analyses in Switzerland and Argentina. Hypothesis 3 (on extremity of vote choice) is confirmed by the cross-country analyses and by the regression-discontinuity analyses in Switzerland (this hypothesis is not tested in Argentina). Hypothesis 4 (on political sophistication) is partly confirmed by the

cross-country analyses and by the regression-discontinuity analyses in Switzerland (an effect is observed for political interest and, in the case of the cross-country analyses, for understanding of political issues too, but not for perceived parties' positions). Conversely, the exact opposite of Hypothesis 4 is observed in Argentina: compulsory voting actually engenders "political interest among young citizens who are democratically disaffected, while lessening interest among those who are satisfied with democracy" (132). Note that a cautious interpretation of the regression estimates is, however, needed given the large amount of imprecision in those estimates.

The second theory (on parties) leads to three testable hypothesis. **Hypothesis 5** is that "compulsory voting reduces the extent to which parties make efforts to mobilize turnout, especially if they are of the political mainstream" (140). **Hypothesis 6a** is that "compulsory voting curtails the relationship between mainstream parties' ideological orientations and their emphasis of policies fundamental to their ideologies" (141). And **Hypothesis 6b** is that "compulsory voting enhances the relationship between non-mainstream parties' ideological orientations and their emphasis of policies fundamental to their ideologies" (141). As with the previous hypotheses, Hypotheses 5, 6a, and 6b are believed to hold especially in places where compulsory voting is strictly enforced and where it includes significant sanctions for abstention.

Hypothesis 5 is tested by means of descriptive analyses of cross-national data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), as well as regression-discontinuity analyses of Argentinian data. These analyses offer weak evidence in support of Hypothesis 5. First, the results of the descriptive analyses suggest that party-citizen contact is indeed lower in compulsory systems with strong penalties and routine enforcement. However, the only country classified as such is Peru, which means that the observed differences may be due to characteristics that are specific to this country. Second, the results from Argentina suggest that compulsory voting actually leads to a higher contact by a candidate or party among those just above 18 years old (who are required to vote), though it indeed leads to a lower contact among those just below 70 years old (who are required to vote). Compulsory voting does not lead to a higher contact by a candidate or party among those just above 18 years old when information on individuals' ideology (a proxy for whether the candidate or party is mainstream or not) is added to the analysis. Still, Singh concludes that "the widely believed pattern by which parties do less to mobilize turnout and focus more on conversion under compulsory voting, although very plausible in theory, has little empirical support" (165).

Hypotheses 6a and 6b are tested by means of multivariate regressions with data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) containing information on parties' policy positions from 38 countries. Despite Hypothesis 5 not being confirmed by the analyses, the results are still taken as overall supportive of

Hypotheses 6a and 6b as mainstream parties' general left-right position is found not to be associated with their emphasis on patriotism/nationalism, equality, and pro-law-and-order positions where voting is compulsory, and rules are strictly enforced. In contrast, under strong compulsory voting rules, non-mainstream parties give extra prominence or further downplay such issues, depending on their ideology. Different results are observed, however, for environmental protection: no such a dynamic is observed across different voting rules.

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

With these findings, Singh's book offers compelling evidence that compulsory voting can be beneficial and detrimental to politics at the same time. For instance, as observed in Switzerland and Argentina but not cross-nationally, while compulsory voting may increase support for authorities among the democratically satisfied, it may actually reduce such a support among the democratically dissatisfied. As such, Singh's book likely makes it even harder for researchers to arrive at a consensus about the use of compulsory voting.

To complicate things further, Singh's approach to compulsory voting (i.e., that its effect is likely conditional on one's predispositions) raises several questions. For instance, could it be that compulsory voting leads to a greater knowledge of political affairs (beyond parties' ideological position) among those who are satisfied with democracy, but not so among those who are dissatisfied with it? Singh's book suggests that *yes*. In addition, could the advantages of compulsory voting, especially the reduction of inequalities in who votes, be achieved by means of initiatives that would not lead to the same disadvantages of compulsory voting? The answer to this question seems to be *yes* too. Indeed, building on Aldrich *et al.* (2011) but focusing instead on a habit to vote that includes voting in primary, midterm, and European elections, I regress electoral participation on political interest (a key determinant of electoral participation, and, consequently, a key gap in who votes), habit to vote (measured by frequency of voting in three adjacent elections, including primary, midterm, and European elections), and their interaction in the United States and Sweden. As shown on Appendix A, political interest is unlikely to drive the electoral participation of habitual voters, while it is likely to influence the electoral participation of non-habitual voters. Based on these (very) preliminary findings as well as Aldrich *et al.*'s work, it seems that there are indeed other (but not necessarily easier) ways of arriving at the same positive political consequences of compulsory voting, especially the reduction of inequalities in who votes, without suffering from the negative ones.

To conclude, Singh's book stands as a unique source of information about the potential consequences of compulsory voting for politics. In offering new ways

of approaching compulsory voting, this book should be a must-read to scholars and practitioners who are interested in compulsory voting and its political consequences.

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APPENDIX A

Figure 1. Average marginal effect of political interest on participation in the 2014 U.S. midterm elections among habitual and non-habitual voters



Note: Estimates correspond to average marginal effects, which are calculated by means of OLS regressions (see results in table format on Table 1 below and descriptive statistics on Table 3). The baseline model includes age, gender, and education as controls. The saturated model includes these variables, as well as partisanship, marital status, frequency of church attendance, ethnicity, and income as controls. All models include state fixed effects. Validated voters in the 2014 U.S. midterm election are coded as "1", while validated abstainers are coded as "0". Political interest is measured by the question: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs?". "4" stands for individuals who are most interested in politics, while "1" stands for those who are least interested in politics. Habitual voters (also validated) are those who either participated in three adjacent elections (the 2014 U.S. primaries, the 2012 U.S. presidential election, and the 2012 U.S. primaries) or four adjacent elections (the 2014 U.S. primaries, the 2012 U.S. presidential election, the 2012 U.S. primaries, and the 2010 U.S. midterm elections). Non-habitual voters are those who abstained in any of these elections. Results are consistent with Aldrich *et al.* (2011) as they indicate that political interest does not affect habitual voters' decision to vote, while it affects non-habitual voters' decision.

Source: 2010-2014 Cooperative Election Study (CES).

Figure 2. Average marginal effect of political interest on participation in the 2002 and the 2010 Swedish parliamentary elections among habitual and non-habitual voters



Note: Estimates correspond to average marginal effects, which are calculated by means of OLS regressions (see results in table format on Table 2 below and descriptive statistics on Table 3). Models include age, gender, and education as controls. Validated voters in the 2002 and 2010 Swedish parliamentary elections are coded as "1", while validated abstainers are coded as "0". Political interest is measured by the question: "Generally speaking, how interested in politics are you?". "4" stands for individuals who are most interested in politics, while "1" stands for those who are least interested in politics. Habitual voters (also validated) are those who either participated in the 1994 and 1998 elections for the Swedish Parliament, as well as the 1999 election for the European Parliament, or in the 2002 and 2006 elections for the Swedish Parliament, as well as the 2009 election for the European Parliament. Non-habitual voters are those who abstained in any of these elections. Results are consistent with Aldrich *et al.* (2011) as they indicate that political interest does not affect habitual voters' decision to vote, while it affects non-habitual voters' decision.

Source: 1998-2002 and 2006-2010 Swedish National Election Studies (SNES).

Table 1. Association between political interest and participation in the 2014 U.S. midterm elections moderated by habit to vote

	DV: Vote in the 2014 U.S. midterm elections		
	3 elections	4 elections	Saturated model
Political Interest	0.181***	0.179***	0.163***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Habit to Vote	0.931***	0.918***	0.864***
	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.078)
Political Interest*	-0.179***	-0.180***	-0.163***
Habit to Vote	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender	-0.077***	-0.080***	-0.078***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Education	0.013	0.010	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Partisanship			0.031**
Strength			(0.011)
Marital Status			-0.017
			(0.026)
Church			-0.001
Attendance			(0.007)
Ethnicity			0.028
			(0.031)
Income			0.006
			(0.004)
Constant	0.054	0.078	0.048
	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.133)
N	7,076	6,764	6,060

Note: Entries correspond to linear estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. All models contain state fixed effects and post-stratification weights (available in the CES data). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Source: 2010-2014 Cooperative Election Study (CES).

Table 2. Association between political interest and participation in the 2002 and 2010 Swedish parliamentary elections moderated by habit to vote

	DV: Vote in the 2002 Swedish parliamentary election	DV: Vote in the 2010 Swedish parliamentary election
Political Interest	0.103***	0.079***
	(0.019)	(0.014)
Habit to Vote	0.378***	0.307***
	(0.079)	(0.052)
Political Interest*	-0.107***	-0.073***
Habit to Vote	(0.028)	(0.019)
Age	0.009	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.015)
Gender	0.023**	-0.007
	(0.008)	(0.005)
Education	0.021	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.011)
Constant	0.454***	0.680***
	(0.065)	(0.047)
N	727	1,198

Note: Entries correspond to linear estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Source: 1998-2002 and 2006-2010 Swedish National Election Studies (SNES).

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of variables in the analyses

Cooperative Election Study (CES):	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N
Validated Voting in the 2014 Election (0=No; 1=Yes)	0.72	0.45	0.00	1.00	8,168
Validated Habit to Vote (3 elections) (0=No; 1=Yes)	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00	7,097
Validated Habit to Vote (4 elections) (0=No; 1=Yes)	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00	6,782
Political Interest (1=Not interested at all; 2=Not very interested; 3=Somewhat interested; 4=Very interested)	3.33	0.91	1.00	4.00	9,463
Age	48.10	16.19	18.00	91.00	9,500
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	9,500
Education (1=No high school; 2=High school; 3=College; 4=Postgraduation)	2.69	0.76	1.00	4.00	9,500
Partisanship (1=Independent; 2=Leaner; 3=Not very strong partisan; 4=Strong partisan)	2.90	1.09	1.00	4.00	9,417
Marital Status (0=Not married; 1=Married)	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00	9,500
Church Attendance (1=Never; 2=Seldom; 3=A few times a year; 4=Once or twice a month; 5=Once a week; 6=More than once a week)	2.96	1.78	1.00	6.00	9,439
Ethnicity (0=Not white; 1=White)	0.74	0.44	0.00	1.00	9,500

Cooperative Election Study (CES):	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N
Income (1=Less than $10,000; 2=$10,000–$19,999; 3=$20,000–$29,999; 4=$30,000–$39,999; 5=$40,000–$49,999; 6=$50,000–$59,999; 7=$60,000–$69,999; 8=$70,000–$79,999; 9=$80,000–$99,999; 10=$100,000–$139,999; 11=$140,000–$149,999; 12=$150,000–$199,999; 13=$200,000–$249,999; 14=$250,000–$349,999; 15=$350,000–$499,999; 16=$500,000 or more)	6.17	3.16	1.00	16.00	8,236
Swedish National Election Studies (SNES):	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N
Validated Voting in the 2002 Election (0=No; 1=Yes)	0.83	0.37	0.00	1.00	3,778
Validated Voting in the 2010 Election (0=No; 1=Yes)	0.87	0.33	0.00	1.00	3,961
Validated Habit to Vote (1998-2002) (0=No; 1=Yes)	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00	1,113
Validated Habit to Vote (2006-2010) (0=No; 1=Yes)	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00	1,619
Political Interest (1=Not interested at all; 2=Not very interested; 3=Somewhat interested; 4=Very interested)	2.54	0.80	1.00	4.00	5,969
Age (1=18–20; 2=21–30; 3=31–40; 4=41–50; 5=51–60; 6=61–70; 7=71–80)	3.97	1.80	1.00	7.00	8,164
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	8,164

Cooperative Election Study (CES):	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N
Education	2.07	0.77	1.00	3.00	4,954
(1=Primary; 2=Secondary; 3=Tertiary)					

Sources: 2010-2014 Cooperative Election Study (CES); 1998-2002 and 2006-2010 Swedish National Election Studies (SNES).

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