RLOP

Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública

WAPOR
LATINOAMÉRICA

Ediciones Universidad
Salamanca

El Consejo Editorial decidirá la publicación o no de los trabajos recibidos, sobre los cuales no se compromete a mantener correspondencia. Los artículos serán sometidos a evaluación de expertos mediante el sistema de doble ciego. Los artículos firmados son de exclusiva responsabilidad de los autores y no representan necesariamente la opinión de la revista.

Ediciones Universidad
Salamanca

Texto impreso diponible bajo demanda en:
https://www.amazon.es/

Maquetación: Intergraf

Índice

ARTÍCULOS

NOTAS DE INVESTIGACIÓN

RESEÑAS

ARTÍCULOS

A (IN)SATISFAÇÃO COM OS SERVIÇOS PÚBLICOS: UM MODELO DINÂMICO

(Dis)satisfaction with Public Services: A Dynamic Model

La (in)satisfacción con los servicios públicos: un modelo dinámico

ANDRÉ BELLO andrebellosa@gmail.com [1]

[1] Laboratório de Pesquisa em Comportamento Político, Instituições e Políticas Públicas (LAPCIPP)

Palavras-chave:
qualidade da democracia; satisfação; macro política; serviços públicos; opinião pública

Resumo
Este artigo avalia o efeito da economia na satisfação da população com os serviços públicos. A contribuição empírica central é um índice nacional de satisfação com os serviços básicos do governo – saúde, educação, segurança, habitação, transporte, emprego, meio ambiente e Bolsa Família – de 1989 a 2017, estimado com o algoritmo de díades. Os resultados mostram que as taxas de desemprego, o crescimento do PIB e as avaliações prospectivas egotrópicas da economia impactam a satisfação com os serviços públicos. Como tal, este estudo conecta duas agendas de pesquisa principais: a qualidade da democracia e a política macro.

Keywords:
quality of democracy; satisfaction; macro policy; public services; public opinion

Abstract
This article assesses the effect of the economy on citizens' satisfaction with public services. Its central empirical contribution is a national index of satisfaction with basic government services – health, education, security, housing, transportation, employment, environment, and Bolsa Família – from 1989 to 2017 estimated with the dyad-ratios algorithm. Results show that unemployment rates, GDP growth and the prospective egotropic assessments of the economy impact satisfaction with public services. As such, this study connects two major research agendas – the quality of democracy and the macro polity.

Palabras clave:
calidad de la
democracia,
satisfacción,
macropolítica,
servicios
públicos; opinión
pública

Resumen
Este artículo evalúa el efecto de la economía sobre la satisfacción de los ciudadanos con los servicios públicos. Su contribución empírica central es un índice nacional de satisfacción con los servicios gubernamentales básicos –salud, educación, seguridad, vivienda, transporte, empleo, medio ambiente y Bolsa Família– de 1989 a 2017 estimado con el algoritmo de ratios de díadas. Los resultados muestran que las tasas de desempleo, el crecimiento del PIB y las evaluaciones egotrópicas prospectivas de la economía tienen un impacto en la satisfacción con los servicios públicos. Como tal, este estudio conecta dos grandes agendas de investigación: la calidad de la democracia y la política macroeconómica.

INTRODUÇÃO

A eficiência e acessibilidade dos serviços públicos constituem exigência cada vez maior da sociedade em face de um Estado visto como lento, burocrático e ineficiente. Em razão do descompasso entre a atuação do Estado e o desejo da sociedade, as pessoas frequentemente protestam por melhores serviços públicos em meio a um processo no qual o Estado é historicamente criticado por não ser capaz de prover serviços básicos. Na última década, uma onda de protestos explodiu ao redor do mundo, notadamente as manifestações de junho de 2013 no Brasil, o movimento dos coletes-amarelos na França e as manifestações no Chile em 2019. Em comum, esses protestos reivindicaram mais qualidade dos serviços prestados e geraram graves crises institucionais ao expor essa deficiência do Estado.

Essas crises colocam luz sobre a qualidade da democracia. Diamond e Morlino (2005) definem três dimensões para analisar a qualidade democrática: procedimento, conteúdo e resultado. Este artigo analisa especificamente a dimensão de resultado em termos da satisfação dos cidadãos acerca dos serviços públicos ofertados pelo Estado. A premissa é de que os políticos são eleitos para trabalhar em função dos interesses dos cidadãos (Pitkin, 1969) e, como consequência, para executar políticas públicas que visam melhorar a qualidade de vida das pessoas. Os serviços públicos são a face do governo mais transparente para avaliar se os governantes são responsivos a esse compromisso mais geral de produzir bem-estar e se os cidadãos aprovam as ações dos governantes.

A satisfação com os serviços públicos ainda não foi explorada pelos estudos sobre a qualidade da democracia, que utilizam principalmente conceitos relacionados à participação e competição (dimensão de procedimento) e à liberdade e igualdade (dimensão de conteúdo). Quanto à dimensão de resultados, o indicador de confiança da democracia é o mais comum entre os estudos. Esse artigo busca inserir a satisfação com os serviços públicos nessa agenda de pesquisa em consonância com a ideia de que, em uma democracia com qualidade, os cidadãos

precisam aprovar os resultados entregues pelos governantes, medidos aqui pelo grau de satisfação com os serviços públicos.

O primeiro passo é construir para o Brasil uma medida nacional de satisfação com os serviços públicos possível de acompanhar ao longo do tempo. Essa é uma medida macro, fundamentada conceitualmente e empiricamente no *Policy Mood* (Stimson, 1991) e que usou 26 perguntas sobre a percepção dos cidadãos acerca dos serviços públicos, de 1989 a 2017. Outros estudos já analisaram a qualidade dos serviços públicos (Bonifácio e Schelegel, 2012; 2013), porém, este estudo inova no jeito de mensurar a satisfação dos serviços públicos e ao convergir com o debate sobre a qualidade da democracia. Visto que os estudos sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos analisaram somente alguns estados isoladamente ou um determinado período no tempo (Figueiredo et al., 2006; Bonifácio e Schlegel, 2012), a proposta aqui é analisar a satisfação com os serviços públicos ao longo do tempo no âmbito do Brasil, utilizando dados de série temporal.

Sendo assim, a satisfação com os serviços públicos é uma variável dinâmica: pode diminuir e aumentar, recuar e avançar ao longo do tempo, dependendo das circunstâncias exógenas. O segundo objetivo desse artigo é investigar as causas das mudanças temporais da satisfação com os serviços públicos. Fatores econômicos podem afetar o grau de satisfação com os serviços públicos e, por isso, serão incorporados ao modelo estatístico. Todas as variáveis usadas nesse estudo são macros, oriundas de dados de série temporal. Uma exigência dos modelos dinâmicos.

Os resultados mostraram que o brasileiro ficou extremamente insatisfeito com os serviços públicos ao longo do tempo, especialmente na área da saúde e segurança pública. Em relação às causas das mudanças da variável dependente, notou-se que a economia impacta o nível de satisfação com os serviços públicos. Os indicadores objetivos (PIB e taxas de desemprego) e subjetivos da economia (avaliação prospectiva nacional e pessoal) influenciam os sentimentos dos indivíduos acerca dos serviços públicos.

Além da introdução, este artigo está dividido em mais 6 seções. A próxima seção discute a qualidade da democracia pelo ângulo da satisfação com os serviços públicos, incorporada agora na dimensão de resultados. A terceira seção apresenta a discussão acerca da macro política. A quarta seção aborda as possíveis causas das mudanças temporais da satisfação com os serviços públicos e apresenta as hipóteses do estudo. A quinta seção faz uma discussão detalhada acerca do método "*dyad ratios*", usado na construção das variáveis macro, e detalha os dados utilizados aqui. A sexta seção mostra os resultados encontrados e, por fim, a última seção realiza uma discussão final, apontando uma agenda futura de pesquisa.

QUALIDADE DA DEMOCRACIA: A SATISFAÇÃO COM OS SERVIÇOS PÚBLICOS

O Brasil vive um regime democrático há mais de três décadas e durante este período, o mais longo de toda a história, houve momentos de graves crises institucionais, como o impeachment de Dilma, os escândalos de corrupção e as manifestações de junho. Houve, também, o fortalecimento da democracia através de eleições livres e competitivas, maior independência das agências de controle e introdução de políticas para combater às desigualdades sociais. Essa dualidade no regime democrático exige uma reflexão sobre a qualidade da democracia no Brasil, sobretudo nesse momento em que existem vozes cada vez mais audíveis questionando se a democracia está em perigo (Abranches, 2019).

A falta de funcionalidade da democracia, de acordo com Mainwaring (2006), está relacionada com a insatisfação acerca dos mecanismos de representação política, concretamente notada pelas altas taxas de cidadãos que dizem não ter preferência pelo regime democrático (Moisés e Meneguello, 2013). Mais especificamente, a natureza do problema é o "estado deficiente" em que os governantes apresentam baixo desempenho na solução de problemas básicos (Mainwaring, 2006, p. 20). Rennó et al. (2011) defendem que o estado disfuncional contamina gradativamente a legitimidade da democracia, produzindo crises institucionais.

Essas ideias estão fundamentadas nos conceitos de apoio difuso e apoio específico que analisam o apoio dos cidadãos ao regime democrático (Easton, 1975). Por apoio específico, a dimensão que importa para este artigo de fato, entende-se a aprovação dos cidadãos ao desempenho dos governantes. Esse tipo de avaliação específica está vinculado às respostas dos representantes às demandas e preferências dos representados, de modo que se cruza com a responsividade, elemento chave para determinar a qualidade da democracia (Diamon e Morlino, 2005).

Um sistema responsivo aumenta o apoio específico ao regime democrático uma vez que o Estado – representado pelas instituições e pelos atores políticos – amplia a sua funcionalidade e melhora o desempenho aos olhos dos cidadãos. Quando o governo formula e implementa políticas públicas que a população deseja, a responsividade está assegurada e, consequentemente, a qualidade da democracia aumenta (Powell, 2005). No entanto, a responsividade é um conceito difícil de mensurar. Para mensurar esse conceito, especialistas geralmente perguntam em que medida as pessoas acreditam que o governo é responsivo ou, então, o grau de satisfação das pessoas com a democracia. Uma outra medida é avaliar as preferências dos cidadãos e as políticas públicas implementadas pelos governantes para saber o grau de convergência (Soroka e Wlezien, 2010). A proposta deste artigo é inserir a medida de satisfação com os serviços públicos

como um indicador de apoio específico (Easton, 1975), isto é, avaliar se os representados aprovam o desempenho dos representantes quanto aos serviços públicos. Quanto mais satisfeitos com os resultados, presume-se o bom funcionamento da democracia, pelo menos no que tange às políticas públicas. Nesse sentido, considera-se o grau de satisfação com os serviços públicos como um indicador que mede também a responsividade do Estado e, em última instância, da qualidade da democracia.

Usando indicadores de satisfação e confiança com a democracia, bem como variáveis que medem o nível de participação, Diamond e Morlino (2005) analisaram a qualidade da democracia pela perspectiva da dimensão de resultado para o caso brasileiro. O resultado, segundo os autores, é que a democracia brasileira melhorou significativa de 1985 até 2004, pois as instituições foram mais responsivas e participativas. Rennó et al. (2011) analisaram a responsividade na América Latina pelo ângulo da percepção do cidadão baseado em três variáveis: nível informacional, partidarismo e a avaliação das instituições. Os resultados são mistos, mas pode-se dizer que o Brasil, em comparação a outros países latinos, está mal posicionado no quesito responsividade. Usar um indicador mais específico, como é o caso da satisfação com os serviços públicos, pode aperfeiçoar o modelo explicativo acerca da qualidade da democracia. Essa é a proposta central desse estudo.

As análises sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos são escassas na ciência política, salvo algumas raras exceções (Del Porto, 2016; Bonifácio e Schlegel, 2013; Kampen et al. 2006). Os estudos já realizados sobre satisfação com os serviços públicos estão concentrados em áreas específicas, como saúde e cultura, e não são de âmbito nacional (Figueiredo et al.,2006; Moimaz et al., 2010; Netto, 2015). Outros estudos focam em um determinado momento, usando dados de corte transversal e, portanto, não apresentam a perspectiva histórica e dinâmica da satisfação com os serviços públicos (Bonifácio e Schlegel, 2013). Nesse sentido, Bonifácio e Schlegel (2013) revelaram que a percepção das pessoas é majoritariamente negativa quanto aos serviços públicos. Além disso, os cidadãos com maior renda e escolaridade são mais críticos ao avaliarem os serviços públicos. Sobre a natureza da satisfação com o funcionamento da democracia, Del Porto (2016) descreve, usando dados do Eseb de 2010 e 2014, que os cidadãos avaliam negativamente os serviços públicos gerenciados pelo Estado.

Ao focar em um indicador macro de satisfação com os serviços públicos, esse artigo analisa a qualidade da democracia em uma perspectiva histórica e dinâmica. Além disso, realiza-se uma conexão teórica entre duas áreas da ciência política que, até então, não estavam relacionadas: as agendas da macro política e da qualidade da democracia (Stimson, 1991; Erikson, Mackuen e Stimson, 2002; Page e Shapiro, 1992; Diamond e Morlino, 2005). Esse é um aspecto, portanto, que representa algum tipo de inovação teórica e metodológica.

MACRO POLÍTICA: MODELO DINÂMICO DA SATISFAÇÃO COM OS SERVIÇOS PÚBLICOS

A abordagem da macro política se origina de questionamentos sobre a capacidade cognitiva do eleitor, presentes na teoria da democracia (Schumpeter, 1975). As opiniões e crenças dos eleitores são incoerentes, ambivalentes e, além disso, há desigualdade informacional entre as pessoas (Converse, 1964; Carpini e Keeter, 1997; Rennó, 2007). Refutando essa ideia inicial do comportamento político, autores descobriram que os eleitores têm atitudes coerentes por meio do uso dos atalhos informativos e, por isso, são capazes de até votarem corretamente em novas e tradicionais democracias (Lupia, 1994; Lau e Redlawsk, 2006; Bello, 2016). Outras teorias também foram formuladas com o objetivo de mostrar que os eleitores podem ter atitudes racionais.

De acordo com Page e Shapiro (1992), a opinião pública é estável, coerente e racional se for agregada. Essa tese, conhecida como o "milagre da agregação", consiste em somar ou combinar as respostas dos indivíduos, formando uma opinião macro e eliminando os efeitos dos erros randômicos. A soma das opiniões cancela tecnicamente os efeitos aleatórios das respostas dos indivíduos. Os erros de mensuração, conforme Ansolabehere et al. (2008), são sentidos nas pesquisas quando há uma única pergunta para medir um item, aumentando as chances de respostas erradas ou ambivalentes por parte dos respondentes. A opinião pública torna-se mais estável quando um item é mensurado por múltiplas perguntas no tempo.

Aplicando as ideias de agregar as respostas dos indivíduos por meio de múltiplas perguntas sobre o mesmo item, Stimson (1991) criou o *Policy Mood* que é uma medida macro de opinião pública baseada nas preferências das pessoas em relação a diversos temas políticos, como assistência social, papel do estado, economia e valores. O *Mood* representa "a preferência global por um governo federal maior e mais ativo em oposição a um governo menor e mais passivo em toda a esfera de todas as controvérsias da política interna" (Stimson, 1995, p. 548). Muitos pesquisadores utilizam o *Mood* como um indicador de ideologia que não faz inferência direta acerca do auto-posicionamento ideológico das pessoas, mas sim ao posicionamento sobre uma grande variedade de temas políticos. Ampliando a agenda da macro política, Wlezien (1995) desenvolveu o modelo termostático em que a opinião pública se move em resposta às ações dos governantes e vice-versa. Quando os investimentos aumentam (diminuem), a preferência por mais política diminui (aumenta). Essas medidas examinam a representação dinâmica em que as preferências dos representados e as ações dos representantes são capturadas e monitoradas ao longo do tempo, desenhando um modelo de opinião-política dinâmico.

Os estudos empíricos têm demonstrado apoio a ideia da representação dinâmica com evidências de que o sistema democrático é regido por responsividade (Brooks e Manza, 2007; Erikson et al., 2002). Dito isso, observou-se uma explosão

de estudos com esta perspectiva, usando como base o Policy Mood e o modelo termostático: na Itália (Bellucci e Pellegata, 2017), na França (Stimson et al., 2012), na Espanha (Bartle, Bosch e Orriols, 2014; 2020), Grã Bretanha (Bartle, Delle-piane-Avellaneda e Stimson, 2011), México (Baker et al., 2015) e Brasil (Bello, 2019). O conceito do *Policy Mood* extrapolou a área da opinião pública e foi usado para avaliar o apoio macro à democracia (*democratic mood*), ao judiciário, e o nível de partidarismo e ideologia (Claassen, 2020; Ura, 2014; Ellis e Stimson, 2012).

Usando essa estrutura conceitual e metodológica, pretende-se examinar a qualidade da democracia com base na satisfação dinâmica com os serviços públicos ao longo do tempo. Em seguida, investiga-se o que causa as mudanças temporais no nível da satisfação das pessoas a respeito dos serviços públicos. Baseado em outros estudos, avalia-se especificamente os efeitos da economia. Para essa finalidade, criou-se as variáveis macro de satisfação com os serviços públicos e da economia. As variáveis econômicas estão agrupadas em indicadores objetivos (PIB, inflação e desemprego) e subjetivos (retrospectivo pessoal; retrospectivo nacional; prospectivo pessoal; prospectivo nacional). Estas últimas fundamentadas nas percepções retrospectivas e prospectivas das pessoas com base nas finanças pessoal e nacional (Lewis-Beck e Paldam, 2020).

AS CAUSAS DAS MUDANÇAS DA SATISFAÇÃO COM OS SERVIÇOS PÚBLICOS

O nível de satisfação com os serviços públicos é móvel, com idas e vindas ao longo do tempo por fatores ainda desconhecidos. Com base nas evidências da literatura, esse estudo testa se as situações econômicas produzem mudanças temporais na satisfação com os serviços públicos. O que move a satisfação com os serviços públicos? Fatores objetivos e subjetivos da economia causam mudanças temporais no grau de satisfação com os serviços públicos dos brasileiros? Essa seção busca responder principalmente a essas duas perguntas.

A literatura já documentou amplamente a importância da economia para a decisão do voto e para as mudanças da opinião pública com base no princípio da premiação ou punição (Lewis-Beck e Stegmaier, 2019; Durr, 1993; Erikson, Mackuen e Stimson, 2002). Aumentam as chances do eleitor escolher o incumbente se a avaliação da economia melhorou nos últimos anos. Por outro lado, se a percepção é que a economia piorou, aumentam as chances do candidato concorrente (Lewis-Beck e Stegmaier, 2007; Fiorina, 1978). Ainda há a premissa da expectativa futura em relação à economia. Os eleitores imaginam o melhor candidato que poderia executar um bom governo para decidir o voto (Downs, 1957).

As avaliações econômicas retrospectivas e prospectivas, articuladas com as experiências econômicas pessoais (*pocketbook voting*) e as expectativas econômicas

nacionais (*sociotropic voting)*, influenciam o comportamento das pessoas (Lewis--Beck e Paldam, 2000), mas esse impacto não é uniforme, dependendo do contexto político-institucional. A avaliação retrospectiva é levemente mais relevante nos Estados Unidos (Lewis-Beck e Paldam, 2000; Wlezien, 2015). Já no Reino Unido e na França, países que operam outros sistemas políticos, as avaliações retrospectivas e prospectivas são equivalentes (Lewis-Beck e Stegmaier, 2019). Ademais, os eleitores enfatizam muito mais a economia nacional do que a condição econômica individual (Lewis-Beck e Stegmaier, 2007). A partir dos inúmeros estudos da relação entre economia e voto, formou-se a seguinte tipologia: 1) avaliação retrospectiva pessoal; 2) avaliação retrospectiva nacional; 3) avaliação prospectiva pessoal; 4) avaliação prospectiva nacional.

Além destes fatores econômicos subjetivos, os indicadores objetivos da economia importam também para o voto e a opinião pública. Os eleitores punem o incumbente quando a inflação está alta e o premia quando existe crescimento e oferta de emprego (Lewis-Beck e Stegmaier, 2019).

Essas variáveis econômicas foram aplicadas também nos estudos da macro política. Nesse sentido, Mackuen et al. (1992) afirmaram que os eleitores parecem mais com os banqueiros, os que julgam o governo a partir das expectativas futuras nacionais da economia, do que com os camponeses, os quais ponderam sobre o governo com base nas experiências retrospectivas pessoais. Observando o efeito da economia sobre o voto no tempo, Wlezien (2015) descobriu que os eleitores são míopes: as avaliações do incumbente quanto à economia acontecem somente nos dois últimos anos de governo.

A opinião pública é influenciada igualmente pelos indicadores subjetivos e objetivos da economia. Quando a expectativa da economia é ruim, a opinião pública torna-se mais conservadora. E quando o público se sente confiante em relação ao futuro, a opinião pública inclina-se mais à esquerda. A opinião responde dinamicamente às expectativas acerca da economia (Durr, 1993). Investigando os efeitos da macroeconomia, Erikson, Mackuen e Stimson (2002) descobriram que as pessoas exigem mais austeridade quando a inflação está alta. Ao contrário disso, o público inclina-se mais à esquerda, pedindo um Estado mais ativo, quando a taxa de desemprego está alta. Esses resultados são generalizados para a Europa ocidental, de modo que a inflação e o desemprego influenciam a opinião pública macro mesmo em países com instituições, culturas e perspectivas históricas diferentes em relação aos Estados Unidos (Stevenson, 2001).

O papel da economia vai além da decisão do voto e da opinião pública, influenciando inclusive a democracia; no entanto, os resultados são contraditórios. Enquanto Magalhães (2014) mostra que a avaliação do desempenho dos governantes melhora quando há crescimento econômico, Graham e Sukhtankar (2004) propõem que as crises econômicas aumentaram o apoio à democracia na América

Latina. Chu et al. (2008) apresentam um resultado intermediário. A economia importa para a democracia, porém, somente em países mais ricos.

A economia se mostra vital para a análise sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos porque pode restringir ou ampliar a oferta de políticas públicas e, por consequência, impactar a avaliação dos serviços públicos. Além disso, como já demonstrado, a economia influencia a decisão do voto, a opinião pública e a democracia. Do mesmo modo, a economia pode ter algum tipo de efeito dinâmico sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos. Diante desse cenário, postula-se aqui quatro hipóteses:

- H1: A satisfação com os serviços públicos é baixa ao longo do período em análise. Os estudos realizados até aqui, bem como as manifestações de 2013, mostraram pontualmente que os brasileiros desaprovam os resultados entregues pelos governantes no que tange aos serviços públicos;
- H2: Quando a inflação e o desemprego estão em alta, a satisfação com os serviços públicos tende a diminuir, visto que essa situação econômica impõe restrições aos cidadãos e limita a sensação de bem-estar. Por outro lado, quando a inflação e o desemprego estão em queda, a satisfação com os serviços público tende a aumentar;
- H3: O crescimento do PIB aumenta a satisfação com os serviços públicos, pois os governantes podem aumentar a oferta de serviços públicos visto que o Estado dispõe de mais recurso para investir em serviços públicos. E quando o PIB está em queda, o nível de satisfação com os serviços públicos tende a diminuir;
- H4: Existe uma relação dinâmica entre os indicadores subjetivos da economia e a satisfação com os serviços públicos. Quando a avaliação retrospectiva pessoal e a avaliação retrospectiva nacional e, também, a avaliação prospectiva pessoal e a avaliação prospectiva nacional aumentam, a satisfação com os serviços públicos tende a crescer. Inversamente, visões retrospectivas negativas e baixa expectativa com a economia contribuem com a diminuição da satisfação com os serviços públicos.

DADOS E MÉTODO

Segundo Bonifácio e Schlegel, a satisfação com os serviços públicos é pouco estudada por acadêmicos em face da dificuldade em coletar informações uma vez que "o número de *surveys* que preenchem os pré-requisitos (...) mostrou-se reduzido" (2012, p. 414). Parte desse problema encontra uma solução no método do *Policy Mood*, cuja técnica consiste em atribuir valores aos anos ausentes a partir da agregação das respostas dos anos existentes. A variável dependente usada neste

artigo é a satisfação com os serviços públicos, uma extensão dos estudos do *Policy Mood* (Stimson, 1991).

O índice de satisfação com os serviços públicos captura a percepção, expectativa e experiência das pessoas sobre um conjunto de serviços, implementado pelo Estado, que estão em mais evidência na sociedade. Assim, esse índice é formado por 8 itens: saúde, educação, segurança, habitação, transporte, combate ao desemprego, meio ambiente e Bolsa Família. Usou-se o algoritmo do *Policy Mood* que emprega uma abordagem de análise fatorial para estimar uma métrica comum entre os itens da série. As respostas das múltiplas perguntas dos itens foram agregadas a fim de eliminar os erros de mensuração (Page e Shapiro, 1992; Ansolabehere et al., 2008) e capturar o valor final do índice. Essa estimativa reflete a satisfação com os serviços públicos a nível agregado.

Somente perguntas sem menção a políticos e partidos políticos foram incluídas, bem como perguntas exatamente do mesmo formato pelo menos duas vezes em anos distintos para o mesmo item. Outra característica dessas perguntas diz respeito aos enunciados. Atribuiu-se como opções de respostas escalas de 0 a 10, de ótimo à péssimo ou graduações de satisfação. Algumas perguntas são retrospectivas, inquirindo aos respondentes se o serviço público melhorou, piorou ou ficou igual. As perguntas usadas são relativas ao grau de satisfação dos cidadãos acerca dos serviços públicos.

O processo de estimação inicia com a compilação da frequência de respostas para cada pergunta selecionada de cada item e ano. No total, usou-se 26 perguntas[1] únicas que foram administradas 183 vezes para os oito itens que compõem o índice durante o período temporal, de 1989 a 2017. O banco de dados é composto por perguntas selecionadas dos seguintes Institutos ou organizações de pesquisa: Latinobarômetro, Secom, Eseb, Lapop, Datafolha e Ibope.

Após reunir essas informações, aplicou-se o algoritmo "*dyad ratios*" que determina um valor para cada ano da série, mesmo para os anos ausentes de dados. O "*dyad ratios*" calcula todos os valores a partir da covariação de duas respostas da série respeitando o número total de respondentes de cada pesquisa e a quantidade de vezes em que o item está disponível (Stimson, 1991). Deste modo, o índice não é uma simples média das respostas. O meio operacional para transformar essas respostas individuais em um índice macro de satisfação com os serviços públicos é através da seguinte fórmula:

Satisfação = 100 X {Avaliações Positivas / (Avaliações Positivas + Avaliações Negativas)}

---

1. As perguntas utilizadas para construir o índice de Satisfação estão disponíveis no Apêndice I.

Essa fórmula produz os valores sumarizados do índice, variando de 0 a 100, considerando que 100 é altamente positivo e 0 consiste em avaliações completamente negativas. Cabe ainda frisar que as respostas neutras são consideradas apenas para o número total de respondentes, sendo omitidas desta fórmula. O algoritmo "*dayd ratios*" é imputado pelo programa *Wcalc* que empilha os dados por nome da variável, data da pesquisa, valores sumarizados e o número total de respondentes.

As variáveis independentes relativas à percepção econômica passaram também pelo mesmo processo de construção. Tais variáveis estão divididas em dois blocos: indicadores objetivos e subjetivos. Para o primeiro bloco, usou-se as taxas de inflação, desemprego e o índice percentual de crescimento do PIB. Todos os valores foram coletados da série histórica do Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). Já os indicadores subjetivos da economia são relativos às avaliações retrospectivas e prospectivas com base nas finanças pessoal e nacional: 1) avaliação retrospectiva pessoal; 2) avaliação retrospectiva nacional; 3) avaliação prospectiva pessoal; 4) avaliação prospectiva nacional.

A construção das variáveis subjetivas da economia seguiu o critério do *Policy Mood* (Stimson, 1991), o que significa que o processo de estimação inicia com a seleção das perguntas[2] nos diversos questionários disponíveis dos Institutos de pesquisa (Lapop, Ibope, Datafolha, Secom e Latinobarômetro) e, em seguida, compilou-se as respostas dos indivíduos de cada pergunta selecionada. O terceiro passo foi construir os índices agregados, aplicando o algoritmo "*dyad ratios*".

Para obter-se os índices macros das variáveis subjetivas, usou-se uma fórmula para capturar a avaliação retrospectiva pessoal e nacional e outra fórmula para calcular a avaliação prospectiva pessoal e nacional. Novamente, os valores variam de 0 a 100, onde 0 indica que todas as pessoas avaliam negativamente a economia e 100 significa que todas as pessoas avaliam positivamente a economia. Nesse sentido, as fórmulas usadas são as seguintes:

Retrospectiva Pessoal = 100 X {Melhorou / (Melhorou + Piorou)}

Prospectiva Pessoal = 100 X {Vai Melhorar / (Vai Melhorar + Vai Piorar)}

Para determinar as mudanças dinâmicas de uma variável temporal, adotou-se o modelo de correção de erros (ECM)[3], pois afere a relação dinâmica dos efeitos de curto e longo prazo entre duas ou mais variáveis temporais (Gujarati, 2006). Enquanto os efeitos de curto prazo produzem uma mudança imediata na variável

---

2. As perguntas utilizadas para construir os índices dos indicadores subjetivos da economia estão disponíveis no Apêndice II.
3. Todos os testes de estacionaridade e co-integração estão disponíveis a pedido.

dependente, os efeitos de longo prazo mostram que o valor passado influencia as mudanças atuais e futuras por meio de uma relação de equilíbrio. Assim, o modelo de correção de erros postula que as mudanças em uma variável X depende de mudanças em uma variável Y e do termo de erro de equilíbrio (Gujarati, 2006). No contexto desta análise, significa que a satisfação com os serviços públicos se movimenta junto com as mudanças dos indicadores econômicos. Esse modelo, no entanto, exige que todas as variáveis sejam estacionárias e co-integradas (De Boef e Keele, 2008). Nesse sentido, primeiro executou-se o teste ADF, confirmando que todas as variáveis são estacionárias para a primeira diferença. No segundo momento, aplicou-se o teste de cointegração, fenômeno do qual compreende uma relação de equilíbrio ou de longo prazo (Gujarati, 2006). O primeiro passo foi executar a regressão de mínimos quadrados ordinários para se obter os resíduos e, em seguida, realizou-se o teste de raiz unitária (ADF) exclusivamente para os valores de resíduos. Os testes confirmaram que as variáveis são cointegradas entre si. Neste caso, o modelo de correção de erros é recomendável.

RESULTADOS

O brasileiro tornou-se extremamente insatisfeito com os serviços públicos ao longo da mais recente fase democrática do país. Conforme o gráfico 1, o nível de satisfação com os serviços públicos era de 49 % em 1989 e desabou para 16 % em 2017, uma queda de 33 pontos. Contudo, esse declínio não foi linear. Existiu um ciclo positivo dos serviços públicos entre 2002 e 2006, período no qual a satisfação com os serviços públicos oscilou entre 46 % e 58 %. Depois desse curto período, novamente a satisfação recuou e essa queda se acentuou a cada ano. Olhando para a série completa, constatou-se que o brasileiro não aprova os serviços públicos oferecidos pelo Estado. O maior valor da satisfação com os serviços públicos foi de 58 %, em 2006; no entanto, somente 8 pontos acima de 50 %

Em relação aos ciclos políticos, Fernando Henrique Cardoso e Michel Temer estavam à frente da presidência nos dois momentos mais críticos da satisfação com os serviços públicos, respectivamente 21 % em 2001 e 16 % em 2017. Em comum entre os dois governos havia a fragilidade da economia, apesar do controle da inflação. O presidente Temer, em particular, diminuiu o percentual de investimento público com uma forte agenda de austeridade, inclusive com a aprovação do Teto dos Gastos. Destaca-se, ainda, a crise energética de 2001 enfrentada por FHC e que afetou a distribuição de energia em todo o país. O período do ciclo virtuoso, digamos assim, da satisfação com os serviços públicos (2002-2006) foi marcado pela eleição de Lula desbancando o PSDB da presidência, escândalos de corrupção, criação do Bolsa Família e forte crescimento econômico, o que permitiu aos cidadãos acesso à bens materiais e de serviços.

Gráfico 1. Grau de Satisfação com os Serviços Públicos, 1989 a 2017

Fonte: Agregação das respostas sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos usando a medida "dyad ratios" a partir de um conjunto de pesquisas: Lapop, Ibope, Datafolha, Secom e Latinobarômetro

A satisfação com os serviços públicos foi desagregada para mostrar o grau de satisfação separadamente de cada item que compõe o índice nacional. Esses itens apresentam uma boa covariância compartilhada visto que o resultado do teste de *Cronbach's alpha* foi de 0,8. Valores próximos de 1 indicam confiabilidade ou consistência internada da escala. Dito isso, o gráfico 2 mostra que a avaliação dos serviços de transportes, política que foi o estopim para as manifestações de junho, era de 59 % em 2006, primeiro ano da série, e terminou em 39 % em 2015, último ano da série. Entre os anos de 2013 e 2014, no entanto, a política de transporte registrou uma satisfação de 35 %, os menores níveis da série. Exatamente os anos em que as manifestações populares eclodiram no país.

Os setores de segurança pública, saúde e educação sempre são apontados por pesquisas de opinião pública e especialistas como problemas graves do país. E, de fato, as flutuações de satisfação dessas três políticas corroboram com esse sentimento. A satisfação da segurança pública sempre esteve abaixo de 50 %, iniciando

em um nível de 44 % em 1989 e terminando com o percentual de 17 % em 2017. Uma diminuição de 27 pontos ao longo do tempo. Além disso, a satisfação da segurança registrou o menor nível de satisfação entre os oitos itens, oscilando de 0 a 4 pontos percentuais entre 1998 e 2002, período do segundo governo FHC.

A área da saúde igualmente nunca ultrapassou níveis de satisfação acima de 50 %. Esse resultado pode ser reflexo dos problemas enfrentados pela população, como filas nos hospitais, falta de leitos e médicos e a longa espera por cirurgias. O nível de satisfação da educação é um pouco melhor em comparação às políticas de saúde e segurança, porém, nada que pudesse alterar a trajetória de queda do nível agregado de satisfação com os serviços públicos. Em 1995, a satisfação era de 33 % e, em 2017, a satisfação assinalou 28 %. O resultado final é de 22 pontos abaixo do valor médio (50 %), mas houve um curto período no qual a satisfação oscilou acima de 50 %. Observou-se que o nível de satisfação da educação teve uma elevação a partir de 1998 e se prologou até 2002 quando a satisfação anotou 67 %, o melhor nível da série.

Importante ainda registrar o nível de satisfação com o Bolsa Família, programa de transferência direta de renda que beneficia famílias em situação de pobreza e de extrema pobreza respeitando algumas condicionalidades. O nível de satisfação variou sempre acima de 50 % entre os anos de 2011 a 2016, demonstrando que o Bolsa Família recebeu o apoio dos brasileiros. Esse apoio talvez seja derivado de um sentimento de dívida social. No entanto, a tendência no nível de satisfação foi de queda até 2015.

Por fim, o gráfico 2 mostra ainda o nível de satisfação com os serviços atinentes ao meio ambiente, habitação e combate ao desemprego. No geral, os brasileiros avaliam mal essas três áreas com valores quase sempre abaixo de 50 % (linha vermelha), com exceção da habitação para os anos 2011 e 2014. Em 2009, o governo federal lançou o programa Minha Casa Minha Vida para facilitar o acesso à moradia e combater a crise econômica de 2008, o que deve ter impactado positivamente na percepção e expectativa dos brasileiros sobre esse serviço. Consequentemente, o nível de satisfação para habitação cresceu um pouco em anos imediatos ao lançamento desse programa habitacional.

O modelo de correção de erros foi usado para o teste formal das hipóteses. A tabela 1 mostra que a relação dinâmica da economia com a satisfação com os serviços públicos é significativa. O primeiro resultado a se destacar é o valor do erro de correção (0,41), pois estima a velocidade com que o equilíbrio entre as variáveis se ajusta novamente. Valores próximos de zero indicam o retorno ao equilíbrio mais lento. O desemprego, como esperado, apresentou um impacto negativo de curto prazo de 0,05 % sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos. Quando o desemprego aumenta, o sentimento das pessoas em relação aos serviços prestados pelos governantes diminui. O PIB apontou um efeito de curto prazo estatisticamente significativo. O crescimento de uma unidade percentual do PIB

Gráfico 2. Grau de Satisfação com os Serviços Públicos por cada item.

Fonte: Agregação das respostas sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos usando a medida "dyad ratios" a partir de um conjunto de pesquisas: Lapop, Ibope, Datafolha, Secom e Latinobarômetro

aumentou em 0,13 % o nível de satisfação com os serviços públicos, sugerindo que os governantes investem mais em serviços públicos quando há crescimento econômico. Dentro dos indicadores objetivos da economia investigados, a inflação não mostrou nenhum efeito sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos.

Consistente com as expectativas, os resultados ainda revelaram que a avaliação com o futuro da economia apresentou efeitos significativos de curto prazo. Uma mudança de um ponto percentual da avaliação prospectiva nacional produziu um aumento imediato de 0,25 % sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos. Já a avaliação prospectiva pessoal determinou uma mudança imediata de 0,27 %. Quando a expectativa sobre a economia é boa, os cidadãos ficam mais satisfeitos com os serviços executados pelo Estado.

Esses resultados mostraram que os desequilíbrios de ajuste no curto prazo tendem a serem corrigidos lentamente em cada período. A velocidade de 0,05 das taxas de desemprego é a menor velocidade, enquanto a maior velocidade é da

avaliação prospectiva pessoal (0,27 %). Isso significa que os efeitos sobre a satisfação com os serviços públicos demoram a dissipar.

Tabela 1. Efeitos da Economia sobre a Satisfação com os Serviços Público

Variáveis	Resultados
Índice de Correção de Erro	-0,417*** (0,082)
Efeitos de Curto Prazo	
Δ Inflação	0,033 (0,052)
Δ Desemprego	-0,057*** (0,016)
Δ PIB	0,136** (0,044)
Δ Prospectivo Nacional	0,258* (0,121)
Δ Prospectivo Pessoal	0,275*** (0,065)
Δ Retrospectivo Nacional	-0,119 (0,108)
Δ Retrospectivo Pessoal	0,010 (0,123)
Efeitos de Longo Prazo	
Inflação $_{t-1}$	-0,021 (0,041)
Desemprego $_{t-1}$	0,017 (0,015)
PIB $_{t-1}$	-0,049 (0,029)
Prospectivo Nacional $_{t-1}$	-0,170* (0,083)
Prospectivo Pessoal $_{t-1}$	-0,158** (0,049)

Variáveis	Resultados
Retrospectivo Nacional $_{t-1}$	0,098 (0,092)
Retrospectivo Pessoal $_{t-1}$	0,017 (0,093)
N	21

Nota: Valores de Desvio Padrão estão dentro dos parênteses.
$^*p < ,05; ^{**}p < ,01; ^{***}p<,001$.
Fonte: Elaboração própria

Em relação aos efeitos de longo prazo, os resultados mostraram que as mudanças da satisfação com os serviços públicos ocorrem em razão das mudanças da avaliação econômica. Sendo assim, um movimento de um ponto da avaliação prospectiva nacional e pessoal da economia impactam, respectivamente, 0,17 % e 0,15 % a satisfação com os serviços públicos. Em essência, os indivíduos com baixa expectativa com o futuro da economia avaliam negativamente a qualidade dos serviços públicos ofertados pelos governantes.

DISCUSSÃO

Esse estudo investigou a qualidade da democracia pela perspectiva da satisfação com os serviços públicos. Deste modo, o índice de satisfação com os serviços públicos insere-se na dimensão de resultado (Diamond e Morlino, 2005), um aspecto possível para avaliar o funcionamento da democracia. Usando o *dyad ratios*, uma técnica nova empregada no Brasil, que permite encontrar valores para cada ano da série, esse índice apresenta uma abrangência nacional, dinâmica e histórica. Ou seja, é possível aferir a percepção das pessoas acerca dos serviços oferecidos pelos governantes ao longo de toda trajetória democrática do Brasil e, além disso, investigar os motivos pelos quais o nível de satisfação flutua no tempo. Destaca-se, ainda, a ponte teórica entre duas agendas importantes da ciência política – macro política e qualidade da democracia – ao incorporar o índice macro da satisfação com os serviços públicos à dimensão de resultados. Esse é um estudo inicial, mas que mostra um campo fértil em que indicadores macros podem contribuir com as análises sobre a qualidade democrática.

Conforme os resultados demonstraram, a qualidade da democracia no Brasil é insatisfatória, pelo menos no que diz respeito a dimensão de resultado. Os brasileiros não aprovam o desempenho dos governantes acerca dos serviços públicos

empregados pelo Estado. Esse resultado pode gerar implicações para a representação política e a legitimidade política, produzindo crises institucionais e manifestações de ruas reivindicando mais qualidade dos serviços públicos. Os resultados encontrados aqui mostraram claramente que a avaliação sobre os serviços públicos era baixa quando estourou a Jornada de junho, manifestação popular ocorrida entre 2013 e 2014, desencadeando uma profunda crise institucional no país. Em particular, a avaliação do transporte público, o estopim daquela crise, estava muito abaixo de 50 %, um valor médio razoável para aferir a qualidade das políticas públicas.

Em uma agenda futura de pesquisa, cabe pesquisar de forma direta se a satisfação com os serviços públicos causa algum grau de disfuncionalidade à democracia, usando os indicadores do V-Dem, por exemplo (Neto e Coppedge, 2015). Outro ponto tem a ver com a responsividade dos governantes. As chances eleitorais de um governante responsivo, cujos serviços públicos estão bem avaliados, aumentam? Esse resultado ilumina uma futura agenda de pesquisa que envolve a relação dinâmica entre a satisfação com os serviços públicos e os resultados das eleições presidenciais.

A segunda parte desse artigo analisa os impactos sobre as mudanças temporais da satisfação com os serviços públicos. Nesse ponto, especificamente, destaca-se a relação dinâmica entre os indicadores objetivos e subjetivos da economia com a satisfação com os serviços públicos. Primeiro, o índice de correção do erro mostrou que existe um movimento simultâneo entre a satisfação com os serviços públicos e as mudanças da economia, determinando um efeito dinâmico. Ou seja, quando a satisfação com os serviços pública muda, as avaliações sobre a economia mudam também e vice-versa. As variáveis são cointegradas e dinâmicas.

Como foi visto, a população reage imediatamente ao desemprego e crescimento econômico, cujos fatores principais podem contribuir com o aumento de investimento em políticas públicas e, como consequência, melhorar a percepção dos indivíduos sobre a qualidade dos serviços públicos. Em um contexto de desemprego, o Estado pode adotar políticas de investimento para estimular o mercado de trabalho. Os indicadores subjetivos da economia também se mostraram importantes para as mudanças da satisfação com os serviços públicos, sendo que as reações da população são de curto e longo prazo. A expectativa futura da economia está dinamicamente relacionada com as avaliações sobre os serviços públicos.

REFERÊNCIAS

Abranches, S. (2019). Polarização radicalizada e ruptura eleitoral. *Democracia em risco*, *22*, 11-34.

Ansolabehere, S., Rodden, J., e Snyder, J. M. (2008). The strength of issues: Using multiple measures to gauge preference stability, ideological constraint, and issue voting. *American Political Science Review*, *102*(2), 215-232.

Baker, A., Dominguez, I. J. I., Greene, K. F., Lawson, C., e Moreno, A. (2015). Public mood and presidential election outcomes in Mexico. *Mexico's Evolving Democracy: A Comparative Study of the 2012 Elections*, 107-127.

Bartle, J., Bosch, A., e Orriols, L. (2014). The Spanish policy mood, 1978-2012. In *8th ECPR General Conference. University of Glasgow*.

Bartle, J., Bosch, A., e Orriols, L. (2020). The policy mood in Spain: the thermostat in a warm climate, 1978–2017. *European Political Science Review*, *12*(2), 133-153.

Bartle, J., Dellepiane-Avellaneda, S., e Stimson, J. (2011). The moving centre: Preferences for government activity in Britain, 1950–2005. *British Journal of Political Science*, *41*(2), 259-285.

Bello, A. (2016). A lógica social do voto correto no Brasil. *Opinião Pública*, *22*(2), 466-491.

Bello, A. (2019). *Origem, Causas e Consequências da Polarização Política*. Tese de Doutorado, Universidade de Brasília.

Bellucci, P., e Pellegata, A. (2017). Citizens' policy mood, policies and election outcomes in Italy. *Contemporary Italian Politics*, *9*(1), 8-29.

Bonifácio, R., e Schlegel, R. (2013). Serviços públicos: o papel do contato direto e do cidadão crítico nas avaliações das instituições. Em J. A. Moisés, e R. Meneguello (orgs.), *A desconfiança política e os seus impactos na qualidade da democracia* (pp. 341-357). Editora da Universidade de São Paulo-EDUSP.

Bonifácio, R., e Schlegel, R. (2014). Panorama e determinantes da satisfação com os serviços públicos no Brasil. *Revista Do Serviço Público*, *63*(4), 413-434. https://doi.org/10.21874/rsp.v63i4.105

Brooks, C., e Manza, J. (2007). *Why Welfare States Persist: Public Opinion and the Future of Social Provision*. University of Chicago Press.

Carpini, D. Michael X., e Scott Keeter. (1996). *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*. Yale University Press.

Chu, Y. H., Bratton, M., Lagos, M., Shastri, S., e Tessler, M. (2008). Public opinion and democratic legitimacy. *Journal of Democracy*, *19*(2), 74-87.

Claassen, C. (2020). In the Mood for Democracy? Democratic Support as Thermostatic Opinion. *American Political Science Review*, *114*(1), 36-53.

Converse, P. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Public. Em D. Apter (Ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (pp. 1-74). Free Press.

De Boef, S., e Keele, L. (2008). Taking time seriously. *American Journal of Political Science*, *52*(1), 184-200.

Del Porto, F. B. (2016). Satisfação com a democracia entre os brasileiros no cenário recente (2002-2014). *Revista Debates*, *10*(3), 83-106. https://doi.org/10.22456/1982-5269.68002.

Diamond, L., e Morlino, L. (Eds.). (2005). *Assessing the quality of democracy*. JHU Press.

Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. Harper

Durr, R. H. (1993). What moves policy sentiment?. *American Political Science Review*, *87*(1), 158-170.

Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British Journal of Political Science*, *5*(4), 435-457.

Ellis, C., e Stimson, J. A. (2012). *Ideology in America*. Cambridge University Press.

Erikson, R. S., MacKuen, M. B., e Stimson, J. A. (2002). *The macro polity*. Cambridge University Press.

Figueiredo, A. C., Torres, H. D. G., e Bichir, R. M. (2006). A conjuntura social brasileira revisitada. *Novos estudos CEBRAP*, (75), 173-183.

Fiorina, M. P. (1978). Economic retrospective voting in American national elections: A microanalysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 426-443.

Graham, C., e Sukhtankar, S. (2004). Does economic crisis reduce support for markets and democracy in Latin America? Some evidence from surveys of public opinion and well being. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, *36*(2), 349-377.

Gujarati, D. (2006). Econometria básica. *Campus Elsevier*.

Kampen, J. K., De Walle, S. V., e Bouckaert, G. (2006). Assessing the relation between satisfaction with public service delivery and trust in Government. The impact of the predisposition of citizens toward Government on evalutations of its performance. *Public Performance e Management Review*, *29*(4), 387-404.

Lau, R. R., e Redlawsk, D. P. (2006). *How voters decide: Information processing in election campaigns*. Cambridge University Press.

Lewis-Beck, M. S., e Paldam, M. (2000). Economic voting: an introduction. *Electoral studies*, *19*(2-3), 113-121.

Lewis⁻Beck, M. S., e Stegmaier, M. (2007). Economic models of voting. In RJ Dalton and HD Klingemann (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. Oxford University Press.

Lewis-Beck, M. S., e Stegmaier, M. (2019). Economic Voting. Em R. Congleton, B. Grofman e S. Voigt (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume I* (pp. 247-265). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lupia, A. (1994). Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections. *American Political Science Review*, *88*(1), 63-76.

MacKuen, M. B., Erikson, R. S., e Stimson, J. A. (1992). Peasants or bankers? The American electorate and the US economy. *American Political Science Review*, *86*(3), 597-611.

Magalhães, P. C. (2014). Government effectiveness and support for democracy. *European Journal of Political Research*, *53*(1), 77-97.

Mainwaring, S. (2006). The crisis of representation in the Andes. *Journal of democracy*, *17*(3), 13-27.

Moimaz, S. A. S., Marques, J. A. M., Saliba, O., Garbin, C. A. S., Zina, L. G., e Saliba, N. A. (2010). Satisfação e percepção do usuário do SUS sobre o serviço público de saúde. *Physis: Revista de Saúde Coletiva*, *20*, 1419-1440.

Moisés, J. Á. e Meneguello, R. (2013). *A Desconfiança Política e seus Impactos na Qualidade da Democracia – o caso do Brasil*. EDUSP.

Neto, F. B., e Coppedge, M. (2015). O Brasil na perspectiva do Projeto Variedades da Democracia. *Varieties of Democracy, Working Paper*, Series 2015:14.

Netto, J. V. R. (2015). Gestão de políticas de cultura e qualidade da democracia: São Paulo, 10 anos de um modelo ainda em construção. *Revista de Administração* Pública,*49*(4), 1011-1038.

Page, B. I., e Shapiro, R. Y. (1983). Effects of public opinion on policy. *American political science review*, *77*(1), 175-190.

Page, B. I., e Shapiro, R. Y. (1992). *The rational public: Fifty years of trends in Americans' policy preferences*. University of Chicago Press.

Pitkin, H. F. (Ed.). (1969). *Representation*. Atherton Press.

Powell Jr., G. B. (2005). The quality of democracy: The chain of responsiveness. *Journal of Democracy*, *15*(4), 91-105.

Rennó, L., Smith, A. E., Layton, M. L., e Pereira, F. B. (2011). *Legitimidade e qualidade da democracia no Brasil: uma visão da cidadania*. Intermeios.

Rennó, L. (2007). Desigualdade e informação política: as eleições brasileiras de 2002. *Dados*, *50*(4), 721-755.

Schumpeter, J. A. (1975) [1942]. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. *Journal of Economic Literature*, *20*, 1463.

Soroka, S. N., e Wlezien, C. (2010). *Degrees of democracy: Politics, public opinion, and policy*. Cambridge University Press.

Stevenson, R. T. (2001). The economy and policy mood: A fundamental dynamic of democratic politics? *American Journal of Political Science*, *45*, 620-633.

Stimson, J. (1991). *Public opinion in America: Moods, cycles, and swings*. Routledge.

Stimson, J. A., MacKuen, M. B., e Erikson, R. S. (1995). Dynamic representation. *American Political Science Review*, *89*(3), 543-565.

Ura, J. D. (2014). Backlash and legitimation: Macro political responses to Supreme Court decisions. *American Journal of Political Science*, *58*(1), 110-126.

Wlezien, C. (1995). The public as thermostat: Dynamics of preferences for spending. *American Journal of Political Science*, *39*(4), 981-1000. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111666

APÊNDICE 1. SATISFAÇÃO COM OS SERVIÇOS PÚBLICOS

As questões abaixo foram usadas para criar a medida de satisfação acerca das políticas públicas para o Brasil. Depois de cada questão, nós listamos o Instituto de Pesquisa, o número de vezes que a questão foi usada, e a série de anos em que a questão foi perguntada.

Educação

1. Would you say that in [country], in the last 5 years, the quality of the education has gone down, gone up or stayed the same? (Latinobarómetro; 3, 1995-1997)
2. Would you say that in [country], in the last 12 months, the quality of (public schools) has gone down, gone up or stayed the same? (Latinobarómetro; 2, 1998; 2000)

3. Would you say that you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way the following institution works...[Education]? (Latinobarómetro; 9, 2003-2011-2015)

4. Agora eu vou ler uma série de áreas de atuação do Governo Federal e gostaria que o(a) sr(a) me dissesse se aprova ou desaprova o desempenho do governo em cada uma dessas áreas (Secom; 3, 2016-2017)

5. E pensando agora na EDUCAÇÃO PÚBLICA no Brasil de modo geral, usando a mesma escala de 0 a 10, que nota o(a) sr(a) daria, de modo geral, para a educação pública no Brasil neste momento? (Secom; 8, 2013-2015)

6. Pelo o que o(a) sr(a) sabe ou ouviu falar, nos últimos doze meses, a educação no Brasil melhorou, piorou ou não mudou? (Secom; 6, 2013-2015)

7. Como o(a) sr(a) avalia a atuação do Governo Federal na área da EDUCAÇÃO. O (a) sr(a) diria que está sendo: ótima, boa, regular, ruim ou péssima? (Secom; 8, 2013-2015)

8. Nessa cidade onde o sr./sra. vive, o sr./sra. está satisfeito(a) ou insatisfeito(a) com...[A qualidade das escolas públicas]? (Lapop; 3, 2008-2010-2014)

9. Vou citar algumas políticas e gostaria que você utilizasse essa escala (MOSTRAR) para me dizer o quanto está satisfeito com cada uma delas: EDUCAÇÃO? (ESEB; 4, 2002-2014)

Saúde

1. Would you say that in [country], in the last 5 years, the quality of health has gone down, gone up or stayed the same? (Latinobarômetro; 3, 1995-1997)

2. Would you say that you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, very satisfied or not at all satisfied with... [PUBLIC HOSPITAL] (Latinobarômetro; 4, 2009-2010-2011-2015)

3. Would you say that in [country], in the last 12 months, the quality of PUBLIC HOSPITALS has gone down, gone up or stayed the same? (Latinobarômetro; 2, 1998-2000)

4. Would you say that you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with...your acces to health? (Latinobarómetro, 5, 2003-2007)

5. E pensando agora especificamente na SAÚDE PÚBLICA no Brasil de modo geral, usando a mesma escala de 0 a 10, que nota o(a) sr(a) daria, de modo geral, para a saúde pública no Brasil neste momento? (Secom; 8, 2013-2015)

6. Pelo o que o(a) sr(a) sabe ou ouviu falar, nos últimos 12 meses, a SAÚDE PÚBLICA no Brasil melhorou, piorou ou não mudou? (Secom; 6, 2013-2015)

7. Como o(a) sr(a) avalia a atuação do Governo Federal na (SAÚDE)? O(a) sr(a) diria que está sendo: ótima, boa, regular, ruim ou péssima? (Secom; 8, 2011-2014)

8. Agora eu vou ler uma série de áreas de atuação do Governo Federal e gostaria que o(a) sr(a) me dissesse se aprova ou desaprova o desempenho do governo em cada uma dessas áreas (Secom, 3,2016-2017)

9. Nessa cidade onde o sr./sra. vive, o sr./sra. está satisfeito(a) ou insatisfeito(a) com...A qualidade dos serviços médicos e de saúde pública? (Lapop; 3, 2008-2012-2014)

10. Vou citar alguns serviços públicos e gostaria que o (a) Sr. (a) desse uma nota de 0 a 10 para dizer o quanto está satisfeito com cada um deles. De 0 a 10, que nota o (a) Sr(a) dá para: SAÚDE (Eseb; 4, 2002-2014)

11. De um modo geral, você acha que é ótimo, bom, regular, ruim ou péssimo: Centros de Saúde (Datafolha, 2, 1989-1990)

Segurança

1. Na sua opinião, no último ano a criminalidade no Brasil: aumentou, diminuiu ou continua igual (Pesb; 1, 2002; IBOPE; 1, 2008)

2. Até que ponto o sr./sra. diria que o governo federal atual melhora a segurança do cidadão [Escala de 1 a 7 pontos] (Lapop; 5, 2006-2014)

3. De modo geral, usando uma escala de 0 a 10, em que 0 significa que o(a) sr(a) está totalmente insatisfeito, e 10 significa que o(a) sr(a) está totalmente satisfeito, que nota o(a) sr(a) daria, de modo geral, para a segurança pública no Brasil neste momento? (Secom; 6, 2013-2015)

4. Pelo o que o(a) sr(a) sabe ou ouviu falar, nos últimos 12 meses, a SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA no Brasil melhorou, piorou ou não mudou? (Secom; 7, 2013-2015)

5. Como o(a) sr(a) avalia a atuação do Governo Federal _____(LEIA ITEM)? O(a) sr(a) diria que está sendo: ótima, boa, regular, ruim ou péssima? [na segurança pública] (Secom, 2, 2013-2014)

6. Agora eu vou ler uma série de áreas de atuação do Governo Federal e gostaria que o(a) sr(a) me dissesse se aprova ou desaprova o desempenho do governo em cada uma dessas áreas (Secom, 3, 2016-2017)

7. Would you say that you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, very satisfied or not at all satisfied with POLICE? " (Latinobarômetro; 4, 2009-2015)

8. How would you rate public security in the country. Would you say that it is very good, good, average, bad or very bad? (Latinobarômetro; 4, 2010-2015)
9. From the list of issues that I am going to read out to you do you think they have increased a lot or a little, or have decreased a lot or a little or have remained the same in the last 12 months? [CRIME] (Latinobarômetro; 3, 1998-2000-2001)
10. Que nota de 0 a 10 você dá para a sua satisfação em relação: CONTROLE DA CRIMINALIDADE? (Eseb, 2, 2010-2014)

Transporte Público

1. Nessa cidade onde sr/sra. vive, você está satisfeito(a) ou insatisfeito(a) com a qualidade do sistema de transporte público? (Lapop; 2, 2008-2014)
2. Would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with PUBLIC TRANSPORT? (Latinobarómetro; 7, 2006-2015)

Meio Ambiente

1. Que nota de 0 a 10 você dá para a sua satisfação em relação: PROTEÇÃO AO MEIO AMBIENTE? (Eseb, 2, 2010-2014)
2. Como o(a) sr(a) avalia a atuação do Governo Federal nos últimos quatros anos na área do meio ambiente)? O(A) sr(a) diria que está sendo: ótima, boa, regular, ruim ou péssima? (Secom; 3, 2011-2014)
3. Agora eu vou ler uma série de áreas de atuação do Governo Federal e gostaria que o(a) sr(a) me dissesse se aprova ou desaprova o desempenho do governo em cada uma dessas áreas (Secom, 3, 2016-2017)

Habitação

1. Would you say that in [country], in the last 12 months, the quality of HOUSING has gone down, gone up or stayed the same? (Latinobarómetro; 2; 1998-2000)
2. Would you say that in [nation], in the last 5 years, the quality of access of housing has gone down, gone up or stayed the same? (Latinobarómetro; 3, 1995-1997)

3. Como o(a) sr(a) avalia a atuação do Governo Federal (na área da HABITA-ÇÃO)? O(a) sr(a) diria que está sendo: ótima, boa, regular, ruim ou péssima? (Secom; 3, 2011-2014)

Bolsa Família

1. Como o(a) sr(a) avalia o programa Bolsa Família? Na sua opinião, o Bolsa Família é um programa: ótimo, bom, regular, ruim ou péssimo (Secom, 6, 2011-2015)
2. Agora eu vou ler uma lista de programas ou políticas de inclusão social do Governo Federal e gostaria que o(a) sr(a) desse uma nota de 0 a 10 para cada um deles. Lembrando que 0 significa que o(a) sr(a) está totalmente insatisfeito, e 10 significa que o(a) sr(a) está totalmente satisfeito com o programa ou política (Secom, 2, 2015)

Combate ao Desemprego

1. Até que ponto o sr./sra. diria que o governo federal atual combate ao desemprego (Lapop, 3, 2006-2008-2010)
2. Vou citar algumas políticas e gostaria que o(a) sr(a) utilizasse essa escala para me dizer o quanto está satisfeito com cada uma delas: Diminuição do Desemprego (Eseb, 2, 2010-2014)
3. Como o(a) sr(a) avalia a atuação do Governo Federal no combate ao desemprego? O(a) sr(a) diria que está sendo: ótima, boa, regular, ruim ou péssima? (Secom, 5, 2013-2014)
4. Agora eu vou ler uma série de áreas de atuação do Governo Federal e gostaria que o(a) sr(a) me dissesse se aprova ou desaprova o desempenho do governo em cada uma dessas áreas: Combate ao Desemprego (Secom, 3, 2016-2017)

APÊNDICE 2. ECONOMIA

As questões abaixo foram usadas para criar os índices subjetivos da economia: 1) retrospectiva pessoal; 2) retrospectiva nacional; 3) prospectiva pessoal; 4) prospectiva nacional. Depois de cada questão, nós listamos o Instituto de Pesquisa, o número de vezes que a questão foi usada, e a série de anos em que a questão foi perguntada.

Retrospectivo Pessoal

1. sr/sra acha que sua atual situação econômica está melhor, igual ou pior que a de há doze meses? (Lapop; 6, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016).
2. Pensando na sua situação financeira atual, o(a) sr(a) diria que ela é melhor, pior, ou igual do que há três meses atrás? (Ibope; 4, 2004-2006).
3. E no seu caso pessoal, você acha que a situação econômica melhorou, piorou ou ficou como estava? (Datafolha; 4, 2017).
4. Pensando na sua situação econômica neste momento, o(a) diria que ele é melhor, igual ou pior, do que há doze meses atrás? (Secom; 4, 2013-2014-2015)
5. Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be better, the same, or worse than 12 months ago? (Latinobarômetro; 18, 1995-2015)

Retrospectivo Nacional

1. sr/sra. considera que a situação econômica atual do país está melhor, igual, ou pior que há doze meses? (Lapop; 4, 2006, 2012, 2014, 2016)
2. Do ano passado para cá, o (a) sr (a) acha que a situação econômica do Brasil melhorou, piorou ou ficou igual? (Lapop; 2, 2008-2010)
3. Na sua opinião, nos últimos meses, a situação econômica do país melhorou, piorou ou ficou como estava? (Datafolha; 5, 2016-2017)
4. Pensando na situação econômica atual do Brasil, o(a) sr(a) diria que ela está melhor, igual ou pior do que há doze meses atrás? (Secom; 6, 2013-2015)
5. Do you consider the country's present economic situation to be better, a little better, the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago? (Latinobarômetro; 20; 1995-2017).

Prospectivo Pessoal

1. E no seu caso pessoal, você acha que a sua situação econômica vai melhorar, vai piorar ou vai ficar como está? (Datafolha; 23, 1998-2017).
2. E daqui a doze meses, o(a) sr(a) acredita que a sua situação econômica pessoal será melhor, igual ou pior do que a situação econômica de hoje? (Secom; 7, 2013-2015).
3. In the next 12 months, do you think your economic situation and that of your family will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than now? (Latinobarômetro; 2, 2016-2017).

Prospectivo Nacional

1. Na sua opinião, nos próximos meses, a situação econômica do país vai melhorar, vai piorar ou vai ficar como está? (Datafolha, 23; 1998-2017)
2. E daqui a doze meses, o(a) sr(a) acredita que a situação econômica do Brasil estará melhor, igual ou pior, do que a situação econômica de hoje? (Secom; 3, 2013-2015)
3. And in the next 12 months do you think that, in general, the economic situation of your country will be much better, a little better, the same, a little worse or much worse than now? (Latinobarômetro; 21, 1995-2017).

WHEN INMIGRATION IS A NEW ISSUE: EVIDENCE FROM CHILE 2003 AND 2017

Cuando la inmigración es un fenómeno reciente: evidencia de Chile en 2003 y 2017

Quando a imigração é um fenômeno recente: Evidências do Chile em 2003 e 2017

GONZALO ESPINOZA BIANCHINI ⓘ gonzalo.espinozab@mail.udp.cl [1]

PATRICIO DANIEL NAVIA ⓘ pdn200@nyu.edu [1][2]

RENATA CIRANO ⓘ renata.cirano@mail.udp.cl [1]

FRANCISCA JARA NANCUENTE ⓘ francisca.jaran@mail.udp.cl [1]

[1] Universidad Diego Portales
[2] New York University

Abstract
In countries where parties have not adopted strong policy positions on immigration–and where the immigrant population is not large–popular perceptions of immigrants might not reflect the ideological divides reported in the literature for countries where immigration is a politically salient issue. We assess the association of ideological identification with the perceptions of immigrants in Chile using two comparable national polls, one from 2003, before the recent immigration wave, and one from 2017, in the middle of an immigration wave, but before parties formally adopted policy positions on immigration. With OLS estimations, we find that, as expected, leftists had more positive views than the rest, but contrary to expectations, those on the right also had more positive views, especially in 2017. Views were more prominent in 2017 than in 2003, with those in the extreme left and extreme right displaying positive views.

Palabras clave:
percepción de inmigrantes; olas migratorias; identificación ideológica; posiciones partidistas; opinión pública; Chile

Resumen

En países donde los países no han adoptado posturas políticas claras sobre inmigración –y donde la población migrante no es muy grande– las percepciones populares sobre inmigrantes pudieran no reflejar las divisiones ideológicas reportadas en estudios anteriores en países donde la inmigración es un tema políticamente sensible. Evaluamos la asociación entre la identificación ideológica con las percepciones de inmigrantes en Chile usando dos encuestas comparables, una de 2003, antes de la ola migratoria reciente, y otra de 2017, en el medio de la ola migratoria, pero antes de que los partidos adoptaran formalmente posiciones políticas sobre la inmigración. Con estimaciones de modelos MCO, reportamos que, como esperábamos, las personas de izquierda tienen posturas más positivas hacia los inmigrantes que el resto, pero los de derecha también tienen una visión positiva, especialmente en 2017. Las percepciones eran más marcadas en 2017 que en 2003, con aquellos en ambos extremos reportando visiones más positivas sobre los inmigrantes.

Palavras-chave:
percepção dos imigrantes; ondas migratórias; identificação ideológica; posições partidárias; opinião pública; Chile

Resumo

Em países onde os partidos não adotaram fortes posições sobre políticas de imigração – e onde a população migrante não é muito grande – as percepções dos imigrantes podem não refletir as divisões ideológicas encontradas em estudos anteriores, realizados em países onde a imigração é uma questão politicamente sensível. Testamos a associação entre identificação ideológica e percepções de imigrantes no Chile usando duas pesquisas comparáveis. Uma de 2003, antes da onda migratória recente, e a outra de 2017, em meio à onda migratória, mas antes que os partidos adotassem posições políticas formalmente sobre imigração. Com as estimativas do modelos MQO relatamos que, como esperado, as pessoas da esquerda têm uma visão mais positiva em relação aos imigrantes do que as demais, mas as da direita também têm uma visão mais positiva, especialmente em 2017. As percepções foram mais fortes em 2017 do que em 2003, com aqueles em ambas as extremidades relatando visões positivas dos imigrantes.

INTRODUCTION

In countries with a sizable immigrant population and where political parties have formally adopted policy positions on immigration—with leftwing parties advocating for pro-immigration policies and rightwing parties embracing more anti-immigration policies—people's perception of immigrants is often consistent with their ideological identification (Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen, 2005; Dennison and Goodwin 2015; Damstra, et al., 2019). Positive views on immigrants are more prevalent among those who identify on the left while those on the right tend to have more negative views (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). However, in countries where parties have not formally adopted policy positions on immigration—and where immigration has not yet been a campaign issues—people's perceptions of immigrants might not reflect an ideological divide. Unfortunately, since public opinion

polls normally only ask about salient issues, in countries where immigration is not a recurrent concern for the population, polls seldomly ask related questions. In this paper, we explore that issue using two national polls in Chile, one from 2017, a year of record immigration, and another from 2003, long before the immigration wave and before immigration became a campaign issue.

In Latin America, after decades of outmigration, intra-regional immigration has increased drastically, with the more developed countries receiving large waves of immigrants. Since 2014, Chile, one of the most developed countries in Latin America, has seen the sharpest increase in immigration in its recent history (United Nations, 2017:30). The growing presence of immigrants made immigration a socially prominent issue in Chile and eventually, it also became political salient, as the rightwing multiparty coalition government introduced a bill to curb immigration. Yet, as we show below, in 2017, when the country held a presidential election, migration was not yet a campaign issue. Here, we analyze if the views on immigrants in Chile in 2003 were ideologically consistent with the views eventually adopted by the different parties.

After discussing the determinants of the perception of immigrants, we postulate three hypotheses on the effect of ideological identification on those perceptions. First, we expect those on the left to have more positive perceptions of immigrants. Second, those who identify with the right should have a more negative perception of immigrants. Third, perceptions of immigrants should become more ideologically prominent when the issue gains salience in society, even before parties formally adopt policy positions. After discussing our methodology and presenting the case of Chile, we test the hypotheses using public opinion polls from 2003 and 2017. We conclude by discussing how these results contribute to our understanding of change in the perceptions on immigration before parties adopt policy positions.

THE DETERMINANTS OF PERCEPTIONS ON IMMIGRATION

Perceptions on immigration are based on previous cultural, socio-economic, political, and religious judgements (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). Some activities in which immigrants engage can negatively affect the assessments of the local population (Muste, 2013). The geographical concentration of immigrants affects perceptions and stereotypes that reinforce negative views (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2009). Border regions and cities with high supply of labor normally perceive immigration in a more negative light (Cea D'Ancona, 2002). When there is strong demand for labor, people are more likely to be receptive to the arrival of immigrants (Fussell, 2014). Views are more positive when respondents are first cued on the contributions made by immigrants (Segovia and Defever, 2010).

People have more positive views when immigrants are already in the country (Muste, 2013:408-409), have a work contract before migrating, and show respect to national norms (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Immigrants with higher educational levels and more reputable jobs generate better perceptions. Having frequent contact with immigrants, associated with positive emotional experiences, induces better assessments (Cea D'Ancona, 2016). In fact, concerns over the effect of immigrants on the culture might weigh more than concerns over their economic impact (Fussell, 2014). People can also develop anti-immigrant sentiments based on negative experiences (Pérez, 2010; Laurence and Bentley, 2018).

The respondent's socio-demographic traits also affect perceptions on immigration. Younger people are more tolerant and more likely to have positive views on cultural heterogeneity (Schalk-Soekar, Van de Vijver and Hoogsteder, 2004; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Those with more education show lower levels of ethnocentrism, displaying higher appreciation of cultural diversity (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). The correlation between education and support for immigration does not respond to salary considerations but to differences in cultural values and in beliefs on the socio-tropic impact of immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). People of lower socio-economic status tend to display negative views of immigrants given their higher vulnerability (d'Hombres and Nunziata, 2016; Muste, 2013). In general, xenophobic attitudes are more likely to be present in lower socioeconomic strata—those more likely to interact with immigrants as potential competitors for jobs (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Also, the higher the perception of a threat, the worse the perception of immigrants (Cea D'Ancona, 2016; Stephan et al., 2005; Shin and Dovidio, 2016; Ward and Masgoret, 2008). Women are more tolerant of multiculturalism (Burns and Gimpel, 2000), but they are not more likely to have a positive perception of immigrants (Haubert and Fussell, 2006).

In countries with large or growing migrant populations, the mass media feeds a negative perception (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008; Igartúa and Cheng, 2009). When the media frames migrants in a negative light, more people associate migrants to violence, crime, and other illegal activities (Igartúa and Cheng, 2009; Ortega and Polavieja, 2012; Burscher, Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). Media coverage of immigration has contributed to the rise of antimigrant groups (Doña-Reveco and Mullan, 2014).

Ideology is associated with views on immigration, especially in countries where a political party exerts issue ownership over immigration policies (Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen, 2005; Dennison and Goodwin, 2015; Damstra et al., 2019). However, ideology does not automatically impact how views on immigration translate into electoral behavior. For example, In Latin American countries where there is class-based voting, there must be a previous political activation of issues that trigger such behavior (Mainwaring, Torcal and Somma, 2015: 98). That political activation

does not necessarily mean that the issues trigger equivalent opposite attitudes and views on the extremes of the left-right scale. Some issues might trigger a strong response among those on the left but might have little importance for those on the right. The salience of issues might be the same for the entire ideological spectrum or might differ for people depending on their own ideological and policy priorities (Givens and Luedtke, 2005, Meyer and Wagner, 2020). Thus, we will not automatically expect that if people on the right of the ideological spectrum adopt a strong position on an issue, those on the left will adopt equally strong views on the other extreme. For example, in countries with a history of human rights violations by a rightwing dictatorship, those on the left might have strong views on bringing human rights violators to justice while those with ideological views like the government that violated human rights might not be as concerned with righting the wrongs of the past (Manzi et al, 2003: 200-203).

Views on immigration tend to be different depending on people's ideological leaning. Those who identify with the right are more likely to have negative views on immigrants, while those on the left are neither more nor less likely to see them in a negative light (Stockemer, 2016). Those identified with the right tend to believe that the state should earmark social programs to natives rather than immigrants (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012). Moreover, since immigration increases competition for collective goods, when people perceive threats to the social equilibrium, there is a corresponding increase in racist attitudes and a worse perception towards immigrants among those identified with the right (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012). Saxton and Benson (2003) report that Europeans with more prejudice and hostile attitudes toward immigrants tend to be more conservative. Thus, we should expect that people identified with the right would be more likely to have negative perceptions on immigration while those who identify with the left would have the opposite views.

The views people have on immigration and the policy positions political parties adopt are closely correlated. As immigration becomes a more prominent issue, rightwing parties find fertile ground for their anti-immigrant views. More than the growth of anti-immigrant views, the salience of immigration is what explains an increase in support for rightwing parties (Dennison and Geddes, 2018). Kiehne and Ayón (2016) find that conservatives see undocumented immigration as a law-and-order issue, while liberals see it from the prism of human rights and social and economic inequality—not surprisingly, those are the positions adopted by main parties in the United States on the issue (Kiehne and Ayón, 2016). More negative views on immigrants and on their impact—like crime—feed support for radical rightwing parties (Stockemer, 2016; Cohrs and Stelzl, 2010). Leftwing parties hold more positive views on immigration and adopt more inclusive policies towards immigrants, but rightwing parties tend to make immigration a more salient issue in their platforms, adopting more negative views (Carvalho and Ruedin, 2018). Haterveld, Kokkonen

and Dahlberg (2017) find that voters update their views on immigration to reflect the views of the parties they vote for, especially in the case of conservative voters. When parties adopt more prominent positions on immigrations, voters follow suit.

Consequently, we postulate two hypotheses on the effect of ideological identification on the perceptions of immigrants in countries where the debate on immigration has not yet become a priority for political parties:

H1: People who identify with the left on the ideological scale compared to those who report no ideological identification have a more positive perception of immigrants.

H2: People who identify with the right on the ideological scale compared to those who report no ideological identification have a more negative perception of immigrants.

Though parties induce public opinion perceptions (Zaller, 1992), party positions are also based on the viewpoints of the citizens they seek to represent (Shapiro, 2011; Slothuus, 2016). Still, as Moreno argues, "in order for values to become sources of durable political cleavages, value conflicts need to be organized in ideological terms by political, intellectual or social elites, and ideological appeals must be articulated by a political party as a mobilizing strategy for electoral support" (2016: 99). That mobilization often generates electoral consequences. If the growth of the immigrant population coincides with an economic crisis, candidates that call for tough policies against immigration benefit from electoral windfalls (Golder, 2003; Creighton, Jamal and Malancu, 2015). Far right parties use the consequences of migration to justify their antimigrant positions and, consequently, all rightwing parties are pressed to adopt more radical positions against immigrants (Givens, 2012). The policy positions of moderate parties are also influenced by the positions taken by radical anti-immigrant parties (Van Spanje, 2010). The positions brokered by the parties' internal factions are based on the popular perceptions that are dominant among their likely voters (Ceron, 2012), though some have questioned the effect of position-taking by radical rightwing parties on the positions of moderate rightwing parties (Alonso and Fonseca, 2012; Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015).

Yet, as the two things normally go hand and hand, it is difficult to establish if parties adopt positions on immigration to respond to their supporters' views or if the positions adopted by parties influence the views of their sympathizers. Assessing the views on immigrants before parties formally adopt policy positions can help elucidate which comes first: the policy positions by parties or the political views by party sympathizers. To test whether the former follows the latter, following Shapiro (2011), we expect that views on immigrants by those in the extremes of

the ideological scale should be more prominent than those with more moderate positions. When those in the extremes of the ideological scale have stronger views on immigrants, parties might want to adopt strong immigration policy positions to differentiate themselves. Thus, the positions parties adopt would be driven by the views of those at the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum rather than the other way around. Consequently, our third hypothesis postulates that:

> **H3**: People on the extreme of the ideological scale have more prominent views on immigrants than those in more moderate positions.

THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION SALIENCE IN CHILE

Though Chile experienced significant government-sponsored immigration in the second half of the 19th century and an influx of immigrants from Europe and the Middle East in the early 20th century, during most of the second half of the 20th century there was limited immigration. In 1982, immigrants comprised only 0.7% of the population (Bravo Acevedo and Norambuena Carrasco, 2018; Urzúa, Leiva and Caqueo-Urízar, 2020). In 2010, that figure was less than 2% (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2017). As Figure 1 shows, immigration has grown from 1.3% of the population in 2005 to 4.25% in 2017. The rapid influx of immigrants responds to economic development (Arias, Moreno, and Nuñez, 2010)—with immigrants coming from neighboring countries and other Latin American countries in economic distress, like Haiti and Venezuela—and it tops what happens elsewhere in Latin America (United Nations, 2017). Though it is still smaller than neighbors,' Chile's immigrant population has grown faster in recent years. Before the 2014-2017 migration wave, migration had not been a campaign issue or one that captured media attention. From 1990 to 2011, the WVS polls included a question on whether, when jobs were scarce, employers should give priority when hiring new employees to Chileans over immigrants. As Figure 2 shows, an overwhelming majority agreed with favoring Chileans over foreigners and there was little variance over time.

Preliminary recent evidence points to some resistance by Chileans to accept the influx of immigrants (Sirlopú et al., 2015). But older studies highlight a more welcoming attitude towards immigrants, though they warn that, as the immigrant population increases, "the relationship between ideological configuration and attitudes toward foreigners" might become stronger "because of the consolidation of migration groups living in the country" (Carvacho, 2010: 230). In Chile, people are also more welcoming of immigrants who have attained higher levels of education (Lawrence, 2015). As shown in Figure 3, a poll conducted in 2008 and 2014 showed that, on a scale from 0 to 4, Chileans had positive views on immigrants, but those

Figure 1. Foreign-born population in Chile as a percentage of national population, 1982-2017

Source: Authors with data from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Chile (INE): http://www.censo2017.cl/descargue-aqui-resultados-de-comunas/

Figure 2. WVS: Employers should give priority to Chileans over immigrants?

■ Agree

Source: Authors with data from World Value Survey polls.

on the left had more positive views in 2008 than in 2014 while those on the right had more positive views in 2014 than in 2008. Thus, in addition to having positive views on immigrants, Chileans were less ideologically aligned in their views on immigrants in 2014 than in 2008.

Since 2014, the influx of immigrants became more notorious, with a rapid rise of Haitians who fled deteriorating economic conditions and Venezuelans who left their country for political and economic reasons. Shortly after taking office, the rightwing government of Sebastián Piñera (2018-2022) introduced a migration reform bill to curb immigration. The bill represented a drastic departure from the traditional lax immigration policies. The leftwing opposition accused the government of discriminating on national origin and ethnicity—as the bill allows for discretionary restrictions to be imposed by the government on Haitians and people from other lesser developed countries. Lack of a comprehensive road to legalization for undocumented migrants and for tourists who overstayed their visas stalled progress on the bill. The president threatened to veto it if congress excluded tougher regulations. The debate evolved on party lines, with the government and rightwing legislators advocating for stricter regulations and leftwing legislators advocating for more lenient policies. A compromise bill eventually passed Congress in mid-2021. With the ascension to power of the leftwing Gabriel Boric administration in early 2022, the issue of immigration has become increasingly associated to rising levels of crime, especially in northern Chile, but the government has not announced any meaningful change in immigration policies.

Public opinion polls—including the widely cited national poll by Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP)—now also include questions on perceptions on immigration. Recent public opinion polls also show that people's views on immigrants are aligning on the same pro-anti views on the left-right scale observed in other countries. Figure 4 shows the result of the 2020 Latinobarómetro poll on whether people believe that the arrival of immigrants favors or hurts the country. Those on the left were more likely than those on the right to have positive views on immigration.

Figure 3. Perception of immigrants in Chile, 2008 and 2014

Source: Las Américas y el Mundo project in Mexico, 2008 and 2014.

Figure 4. Do you believe the arrival of immigrants benefits or hurts the country? Chile, Latinobarómetro, 2020

Source: Latinobarómetro poll for 2020

VIEWS ON IMMIGRANTS IN CHILE BEFORE AND AFTER IMMIGRATION BECAME A SALIENT ISSUE

In 2017, when immigration was at its historical peak and the issue was increasingly relevant in the media, a national CEP poll included several questions on immigration that had been also asked fourteen years earlier, in 2003, when immigration was not an issue. Unfortunately, CEP did not include the same set of questions in any polls in between those years. Fortunately, we can compare the extent to which ideological identification determined views on immigration in 2003 and in 2017.

To confirm that media gave different relevance to immigration both years, we reviewed articles in the two leading national newspapers (*El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*) for the same number of days before the fieldwork began for the 2003 and 2017 CEP polls. We reviewed articles from January 1st to April 26th, 2017—the day the CEP field work began—for 116 days and for the same number of days before fieldwork for the 2003 poll began. We found 9 reports in the two newspapers in 2017, but none in 2003. There were additional media reports on immigration in online news media in 2017, but since there was no comparable massive online media in 2003, we cannot use that information for comparison.

To verify whether immigration was not a salient campaign issue until 2017, we used a publicly available dataset to review the platforms of all presidential candidates since 1999 who received at least 10% of the vote (Navia and Verdugo, 2020). In 1999, neither Ricardo Lagos of the center-left Concertación coalition nor Joaquín Lavín of the center-right Alianza coalition mentioned migration. In 2005, Concertación's Michelle Bachelet program called (p. 88), on eradicating discrimination against immigrants and promised a law to promote the integration of immigrants (p. 90). Neither Alianza candidate, Sebastián Piñera and Joaquín Lavín, who ended up in second and third place respectively, mentioned immigration. In 2009, Election-winner Piñera proposed a policy to attract foreign scientists (p. 30), called for political dialogue with Europe on migration issues (p. 120), presumably to address the arrival of economic migrants from Spain, and expressed a commitment to equal opportunities for immigrants (p. 153). Concertación's Eduardo Frei did not mention immigration. Alternative leftwing presidential candidate Marco Enríquez-Ominami called for respect for immigrant rights (p. 34). In 2013, only winning candidate Bachelet, mentioned immigrants, suggesting that immigration should be promoted in regions outside the capital and associated to labor needs and academic opportunities (p. 117). She also proposed social inclusion and effective integration (p. 155).

Though the number of immigrants was increasing rapidly in the previous years and the issue was becoming relevant in media coverage, immigration was not a salient campaign issue in the 2017 presidential campaign. The Nueva Mayoría (formerly Concertación) candidate, Alejandro Guillier, included only a section on immigration (p. 66) on his platform, proposing a national migration service and a

new immigration law focused on rights, inclusion, and multiculturalism. Rightwing election winner Piñera called for the integration of law-abiding migrants (p. 31), modernizing migration legislation, creating visa programs for high human capital migrants, provisions for inclusion of migrants in the private pension fund scheme and simplifying the deportation of unlawful migrants.

Immigration became a salient political issue starting in 2018 (Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero, 2020). At the start of his term, the Piñera administration issued executive orders to halt the arrival of Haitian immigrants and limit the arrival of refugees from Venezuela (Stang, Lara Edwards and Andrade Moreno, 2020). The decision not to sign the United Nations Global Migration Pact in late 2018 signaled a strong stance against immigration. Thus, while migration did not capture media or political attention in 2003, by 2018 it was a policy priority for the government. A clear ideological divide emerged between the rightwing government that sought to curb immigration and the leftwing opposition that advocated for a more humanitarian approach.

Since previous studies have shown that ideology is an important predictor for electoral decisions of Chileans, even when there is discontent with democracy, political parties, and the elites (Visconti, 2021), as migration has become increasingly politicized, we would voters to express views consistent with those adopted by their likeminded parties. However, since we can also assess people's views before parties adopted policy positions, we can verify whether the party' positions were in line with those previously held by their traditional electoral base.

METHODOLOGY

To evaluate our hypotheses, we use polls from *Centro del Estudios Públicos* (CEP), Chile's most widely cited public opinion poll. CEP polls are nationally representative of adult population, with a +-3% margin of error and 95% confidence interval. The poll has probabilistic and stratified samples and has been widely used for studies on the references and electoral behavior of Chileans (Plumb, 1998; Navia and Osorio, 2017, Enns and Sánchez-Gómez, 2019).

In 2003, the CEP poll included—for the first time in its series dating back to the 1980s—6 questions on the perception of immigrants. Unfortunately, no such questions were included again until 2017, when the CEP poll asked the same 6 questions used in 2003. After 2017, CEP polls have not included those questions again. Thus, we used those two CEP polls, from December 2003 (#46) and April-May 2017 (#79). For sampling procedures, response rates and other methodological issues, please review the CEP poll reports (CEP, 2003, 2017).

Other national polls that have inquired about perceptions on immigration have not systematically used the same questions. Latin American Public Opinion Project

(LAPOP) polls included different questions on perception of immigrants in 2004 and 2016. The wording in the questions used in Latinobarómetro and the World Value Survey (WVS) changed overtime. WVS asked a recurrent question in 1990, 2006 and 2012, but not in recent years, when the influx of immigrants has drastically increased. The *Las Américas y el Mundo* project organized by CIDE in Mexico conducted national polls in Chile and other countries only in 2008 and 2014 (Morandé et al., 2009).

The dependent variable is the perception of immigrants. The questions in the two CEP polls offer 5 answers, from full agreement (1) to full disagreement (5), including a neutral response. Three questions are worded in a way that present immigrants in a positive light and the other 3 are worded negatively. The three questions that have a positive take are 'immigrants are generally good for the economy,' 'immigrants improve society with their new ideas and cultures,' and 'non-citizen legal immigrants should have the same rights as Chilean citizens.' The 3 statements with a negative take are 'immigrants increase crime levels,' 'immigrants take jobs from those born in Chile,' and 'Chile should adopt tougher policies to exclude illegal immigrants.'

Similar questions have been used in comparable research projects elsewhere. Cea D'Ancona (2002) used questions from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) survey to assess the perception of immigration among Spaniards. Some questions were also used in the 2000 and 2001 Eurobarometer polls. The questions were 'Do you believe that, in general terms, immigration is more positive or negative?" and 'Thinking about foreign workers in Spain that come from lesser developed countries, tell me if you agree or disagree with the following opinions [...] immigrants take jobs away from Spaniards, the increase in the number of immigrants feeds higher crime in the country' (Cea D'Ancona, 2002).

To standardize the answers, and since other studies underline the need to distinguish between questions worded positively and those worded negatively (Carvacho, 2010)—we use a 5-point scale from 0 to 4 and recoded all responses so that lower values report negative views on immigrants and higher values report positive views. This way, we can identify those with positive views of immigrants, either because they disagree with a question that has a negative wording (negative scale) or because they agree with a question that has a positive wording (positive scale).

Still, because the wording of the original questions was different, with some attributing high values to negative views and others attributing high values to positive views, the wording of the question might have triggered respondents. For that reason, we conducted exploratory factor analysis to verify the internal consistency of the responses to the six questions. Factor analysis can be used to create an index based on variables that conceptually measure the same. We standardized the recoded answers around their means for each of the six questions and estimated the factors. The factor indicator is a variable that ranges from negative to positive values. The analysis produced two factors, shown in Table 1, one that groups the

positive scale questions and the other that groups the negative scale questions. The factor analysis justifies our decision to separately analyze the association of the independent variables on the negative scale group of questions and the positive scale group of questions.

We estimate separate OLS models on the 3 questions with a negative opinion scale and the 3 questions with a positive opinion scale. To check the robustness of our results, we also estimated the models using two alternative indicators for the dependent variable: the factors and an indicator with the average value, from negative to positive views, for the responses to the six questions. Those models are shown in the appendix in Tables A2 and A3, respectively. The results are consistent with the results we discuss in our analysis below.

Table 1. Scoring coefficients of the factor analysis for perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017

Variable	Original wording	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique-ness	Stand-ardized Mean	Mean
Immigrants increase crime levels	Negative	0.161	0.694	0.491	-0.010	2.994
Immigrants take jobs from those born in Chile	Negative	0.221	0.763	0.368	0.004	2.623
Chile should adopt tougher policies to exclude illegal immigrants	Negative	-0.068	0.733	0.456	0.008	2.334
Immigrants are generally good for the Chilean economy	Positive	0.768	0.105	0.398	0.001	3.009
Immigrants improve society with their new ideas and cultures	Positive	0.787	0.156	0.355	-0.004	3.051
Non-citizen legal immigrants should have same rights as Chileans*	Positive	0.647	-0.002	0.580	0.003	3.335

We conducted the factor analysis after recoding the answers so that negative views have lower values and positive views have the higher values.

Based on varimax rotated factors. Values > 0.6 are highlighted.

The appendix shows the scoring coefficients for the factor analysis separately for 2003 and 2017.

Source: authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the answers to the 6 questions and the averages for the positive and negative opinion scale questions, respectively. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the average answers for the 3 positive scale questions and the 3 negative scale questions for the 2003 and 2017 polls. Both indicators are normally distributed. There were changes in the views on immigrants between 2003 and 2017, with Chileans displaying more positive views on immigrants in 2017 than in 2003.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for questions on the perceptions of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017

Variable	Year	N	Mean	StdDev	Min (negative)	Max (positive)
Immigrants increase crime levels***	2003	1288	3.067	1.121	0	4
	2017	1406	2.948	1.100	0	4
Immigrants take jobs from those born in Chile***	2003	1328	2.304	1.075	0	4
	2017	1435	2.914	1.079	0	4
Chile should adopt tougher policies to exclude illegal immigrants***	2003	1330	2.155	1.009	0	4
	2017	1416	2.495	1.038	0	4
Immigrants are generally good for the Chilean economy	2003	1285	3.002	0.971	0	4
	2017	1379	3.008	0.944	0	4
Immigrants improve society with their new ideas and cultures	2003	1302	3.065	0.998	0	4
	2017	1406	3.041	0.934	0	4
Non-citizen legal immigrants should have the same rights as Chileans*	2003	1323	3.352	1.163	0	4
	2017	1424	3.311	0.945	0	4
Mean: Negative opinion scale questions	-	2502	0.0001	0.743	-2.146	1.891
Mean: Positive opinion scale questions		2502	0.0008	0.739	-1.510	2.169

Difference of means (T Student) at *90%, **95% and ***99%.

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Figure 5. Normalized distribution of questions on the perception of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017 CEP polls

Negative opinion scale questions

Positive opinion scale questions

We recoded all answers so that lower values reflect negative views and higher values reflect positive views.

The distribution combines the responses for 2003 and 2017.

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

The independent variable of interest is identification on the left-right ideological scale. We follow the coding in the CEP poll in 2003 that used a 6-point scale: left, center-left, center, center-right, right, and none (the reference category). We build dummy variables for each category. In 2017, CEP used a 10-point (1-10, left-to-right) scale for identification on the ideological scale. To make the two questions comparable, we coded values 1 and 2 into 'left', 3 and 4 into 'center-left", 5 into 'center', 6, 7 and 8 into 'center-right' and 9 and 10 into 'right'. To check for robustness, we also used alternative coding for center-left (3), center (4-6), center-right (7-8) and right (9-10) and estimated the models, obtaining equivalent results.

Figure 6 shows the distribution of identification on the left-right scale in 2003 and 2017. The number of those who did not identify on the scale was similar in both polls, around 40%. Because fewer people identified with the extreme values for left and right in 2017 than in 2003, we are confident that the results that show differences in perceptions of immigrants between 2003 and 2017 in the extreme values of ideological identification are robust.

Figure 6. Ideological identification in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017

N=1198 (2003) and 1305 (2017).

Source: Authors, with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

As control variables, we include socio-demographic indicators sex, socioeconomic status, education, and area of residency—for which we create four groups: the Santiago Metropolitan Region (our reference category), Northern (from Arica to Coquimbo in the north), Central (from Valparaíso to Concepción, excluding Santiago) and the South (from Araucanía to Magallanes). Most of the immigrant population lives in the Northern area and in Santiago—the regions with the highest share of immigrants and the highest number of immigrants, respectively.

Table 3 shows the corresponding descriptive statistics. Given a possible multicollinearity between schooling and socio-economic status (correlations of 0.53 and 0.48 in 2003 and 2017 respectively), we use years of schooling—a more widely used variable in this kind of studies—as a control variable. We also control for media consumption. Media consumption combines two CEP poll questions, on television consumption and on newspaper readership. Responses for each question ranged from 0 to 2 (none, some, a lot). We added both questions to create a media

consumption variable. That variable ranges from 0 to 4 (with those who watch a lot of television and read lots of newspapers having the highest value).

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for independent variables on perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017

Variable	N	Media	SD	Min	Max
Women	2502	0.588	0.492	0	1
Age[1]	2502	27.82	17.107	0	78
Years of schooling[2]	2502	11.23	4.237	0	20
2017 dummy	2502	0.521	0.499	0	1
Media consumption[3]	2502	1.340	1.25	0	4

Area of residency	N	%	Socio-tropic retrospective	N	%
Metropolitan Region	1006	40.19	Worse	939	37.51
North	317	12.66	Same	1189	47.50
Center	845	33.76	Better	375	14.98
South	335	13.38	-	-	-
Total	2502	100.0	-	2502	100.0

[1]Age: Continuous variable from 0 (18 years) to 78 (96 years); [2]Schooling's Years: Continuous variable from 0 (Not schooling) to 20 (20 years of schooling); [3]Media consumption: Continuous variable from 0 (Not consumption) to 4 (High consumption).

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We first present OLS estimates and show two figures with the coefficient plots for the relevant variables to graphically show the effects. Table 4 shows six OLS estimations. The indicators for the dependent variable are the means of the responses to the 3 positive and negative opinion scale questions, respectively, for the 2003 poll, the 2017 poll, and for both polls combined.

Some results of the models confirm our expectations. Those on the left had more negative perceptions of immigrants in 2003 than the reference category, but only responding to the negative opinion scale questions. In 2017, those on the left

had more positive perceptions of immigrants than the reference category for negative and positive scale questions. Those in the center-left had more positive perceptions of immigrants only for positive scale questions and only in the model that combines both survey years. The findings are consistent with the expectations of hypothesis 1, but only for those on the left in 2017 (not for those in the center-left). In 2003, those on the left had a worse perception on immigrants when responding to negative scale questions.

Those in the center-right had more positive perceptions of immigrants in the negative scale questions in 2003, but they showed no difference from the reference category on both scales in 2017. Contrary to the expectations of hypothesis 2, those on the right had more positive perceptions of immigrants in negative scale questions in 2017—that is, they had better perceptions of immigrants when the questions asked about negative traits of immigrants. Those who identify as rightists did not display more negative views of immigrants in either year.

Those in the center were no different than the reference category in both polls in answering positive and negative scale questions. Those in the ideological poles are more likely to display stronger perceptions of immigrants. Consistent with hypothesis 1, those on the left tend to have more positive views (except in 2003, for negative scale questions) and, contrary to the expectations of hypothesis 2, those on the right also had more positive views of immigrants in 2017 when responding to negative scale questions.

Additionally, to check for the robustness of the effect of ideological identification, in models not shown here, we estimated the association of ideology on a 1-5 left-right scale and as the distance from the center in both directions—excluding the 41.8% in 2003 and 40.0% in 2017 who did not identify ideologically. The association of left-right ideological identification with views on immigrants is not statistically significant. Those at both poles of the ideological scale are more likely to have positive views on immigrants, in line with the results shown in Table 4.

Since immigration became a socially relevant issue in the second half of the decade, it should not be surprising that those on the left did not have a more positive perception of immigrants in 2003—though the reason why leftists had more negative views on immigrants that year merits further research. Yet, in 2017, when immigration was already high, ideological identification triggered a more positive perception of immigrants among leftists. Consistent with the pro-immigrant policy positions by leftwing parties in recent years, leftists have signaled positive feelings towards immigrants.

Though some rightwing politicians, including the Piñera government (2018-2022), have taken hostile positions towards immigrants, rightwing respondents did not display more negative views towards immigrants than the rest of Chileans in 2017, when immigration was socially prominent but not a salient presidential campaign issue.

Hypothesis 3 suggests that people in the ideological extremes have more prominent views on immigration. The models consistently show this for 2017—with those on the left and on the right converging on more positive views of immigrants than those with more centrist positions—than in 2003. Although the data is consistent with our third hypotheses, it is not consistent in the direction we expected. By 2017, when immigration was socially prominent, those in the extremes of the left-right continuum displayed more intense views. Those views were more positive than those of the ideologically non-identified. The models in the appendix, with the alternative indicators for the dependent variable, and using the weights included in the original poll dataset, display results that are consistent with those shown in Table 4.

The discrepancy between the positions embraced by rightwing politicians—and reflected in the harsh anti-immigrant policies of the Piñera administration—and the more positive views displayed by those who identified with the right, especially in 2017, might respond to two phenomena. First, since part of the immigration wave was comprised of Venezuelans, those on the right might report pro-immigrant views reflecting sympathy for Venezuelan immigrants who fled a far-left regime. In fact, the Piñera administration took a strong stance in favor of accepting Venezuelan refugees in mid-2019. Later, in February 2020, Piñera traveled to the Colombian-Venezuelan border to drive support for the protests against the government of Nicolás Maduro and reiterated Chile's commitment to open its borders to Venezuelan refugees. That discourse allowed right-wingers to perceive the arrival of Venezuelan immigrants as evidence of the failure of leftwing economic policies rather than as a potential threat to the national economy.

Second, there might be a growing liberal/conservative divide on moral issues among those on the right. While many right-wingers espouse liberal economic views—which should point to more positive perceptions of immigrants—those who adopt strongly conservative views—especially on abortion, same sex marriage or LGBTQ+ rights—might in turn espouse negative perceptions of immigrants. The Piñera administration adopted some liberal policies on moral issues—for example, by sponsoring a same sex marriage bill in 2021—but it advocated for immigrant unfriendly policies. This tension is reminiscent of the reference to ideologically conflicted persons among conservatives in the U.S. (Ellis and Stimson, 2012).

As for the control variables, women tend to report more positive views of immigrants when responding to positive scale questions in 2017. Those who reside in northern regions have a more positive perception than those in Santiago when responding to negative scale questions in 2017. Those in the center and southern regions—where the presence of immigrants is lowest—tended to have more positive views of immigrants than residents of Santiago when responding to both type of scale questions. Not surprisingly, the worst views of immigrants are found in the northern region, where immigrants comprise a larger share of the population,

while the views in central and southern Chile are more positive than the views in Santiago, the city with the largest influx of immigrants in absolute numbers.

The effect of age was positive in 2003 and more strongly negative in 2017 when responding to negative scale questions. People with more years of schooling had more positive attitudes views of immigrants when responding to positive scale questions in 2003 and 2017. Socio-tropic economic perceptions behave as expected, with those with better perceptions having more positive views of immigrants in both scale questions.

Media consumption of political news is positively associated with the perception of immigrants in both years for both scale questions. While other studies have shown that media consumption intensifies the views people already have, especially among groups in the extremes (Shapiro, 2011), our model shows that those who consume more news tend to have more positive views on immigrants. This might respond to the type of coverage immigration received in Chile in both years. Future research should assess if media consumption interacts with ideological positioning to influence people's views on immigrants. In general, the control variables show the expected signs, though the effects are stronger and more significant for the positive scale questions.

Figure 6 shows the OLS coefficients plots for the effects of identification on the ideological scale on the perception of immigrants. Leftists went from having negative views in negative scale questions in 2003 to having positive views in both scale questions in 2017. In turn, those on the right displayed positive views on immigrants in negative scale questions.

In sum, when there was little immigration in 2003, there were no significant ideological differences between those on the left and right on their views on immigrants. When immigration was on the rise, but it was not a salient campaign issue in 2017, those on the left had more positive views on immigrants, but so did those on the right. In fact, while those in the ideological poles have more prominent views than the rest of the population, those on the left displayed positive views on positive scale questions and those on the right displayed positive views on negative scale questions in 2017 in Chile. That defies the expectations that the ideological divide informs views on immigrants.

After the 2017 presidential election, political parties began to adopt immigration policy positions along the ideological divide observed in industrialized countries, with leftwing parties adopting more welcoming policies towards immigrants and those in right adopting more restrictive immigration policies. The adoption of anti-immigration policies on the part of rightwing parties starting in 2018 was not consistent with the views held in previous years by their ideological support base. Since immigration continues to be a growing phenomenon in Chile and rightwing parties have adopted positions that have turned immigration policy into an ideological battleground, perceptions of immigrants might have already evolved

to reflect the battlefield positions taken by political parties—just it happens elsewhere in countries where immigration policy is a political divide between the left and right.

Table 4. OLS regression on perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
	Positive opinion scale			Negative opinion scale (reversed)		
Ideological id: Left (2003)	-0.006 (0.073)		-0.020 (0.072)	-0.218*** (0.075)		-0.233*** (0.131)
Left (2017)		0.298*** (0.110)	0.288** 0.132)		0.181* (0.110)	0.422*** (0.131)
Center Left (2003)	0.034 (0.065)		0.004 (0.066)	-0.133* (0.080)		-0.125 (0.079)
Center Left (2017)		0.056 (0.080)	0.054 (0.102)		0.090 (0.079)	0.229** (0.111)
Center (2003)	0.067 (0.073)		0.031 (0.074)	0.058 (0.078)		0.059 (0.076)
Center (2017)		0.030 (0.059)	-0.001 (0.093)		0.011 (0.058)	-0.030 (0.094)
Center Right (2003)	0.107 (0.084)		0.107 (0.085)	-0.085 (0.096)		-0.082 (0.096)
Center Right (2017)		0.082 (0.064)	-0.028 (0.105)		0.017 (0.063)	0.101 (0.114)
Right (2003)	-0.028 (0.061)	-0.002 (0.097)	-0.055 (0.061)	-0.040 (0.070)		-0.047 (0.068)
Right (2017)			0.044 (0.112)		0.242*** (0.096)	0.296*** (0.115)
Woman	0.006 (0.042)	0.146*** (0.044)	0.086*** (0.031)	0.007 (0.047)	0.002 (0.044)	0.005 (0.032)
Area of Residency: North	-0.103 (0.073)	-0.364*** (0.066)	-0.249*** (0.050)	-0.059 (0.074)	-0.057 (0.067)	-0.070 (0.049)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
Center	-0.115** (0.046)	0.137*** (0.053)	0.015 (0.035)	0.047 (0.055)	0.128** (0.052)	0.082** (0.038)
South	0.090 (0.074)	0.051 (0.073)	0.071 (0.052)	0.223*** (0.071)	0.160** (0.068)	0.182*** (0.049)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.0009)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Years of Schooling	0.033*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.004)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.004)
Sociotropic retrosp perception: Same	0.073 (0.046)	0.256*** (0.049)	0.170*** (0.034)	0.158*** (0.052)	0.107** (0.048)	0.128*** (0.035)
Better	0.152** (0.068)	0.342*** (0.068)	0.270*** (0.049)	0.149** (0.075)	0.197*** (0.068)	0.169*** (0.050)
Media Consumption	0.039** (0.019)	0.054*** (0.020)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.047** (0.022)	0.034* (0.019)	0.040*** (0.014)
2017 Dummy			0.197*** (0.048)			-0.096* (0.049)
Constant	-0.627*** (0.093)	-0.412*** (0.109)	-0.614*** (0.073)	-0.115 (0.104)	-0.150 (0.111)	-0.051 (0.078)
N	1197	1305	2502	1197	1305	2502
R Square	0.082	0.112	0.104	0.037	0.045	0.031

We use the weighted values in the polls. The estimations with the unweighted values are in the appendix.

Reference categories are 'none' for ideological identification, 'Metropolitan Region' for area of residency, and 'worse' for socio-tropic retrospective perception.
Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Figure 6. OLS coefficients plot for the effects of ideology on the perception of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

CONCLUSION

For years, immigration has been a contested political issue in industrialized countries with a large influx of immigrants. In recent years, some middle-income countries—like Chile—have also become destinations for immigrants from lesser developed countries in search of economic opportunities or for those escaping political oppression.

The implications of this study go beyond Chile. As immigration becomes an increasingly salient campaign issue in middle-income countries, political parties will growingly use immigration policy as a campaign issue. Research for European countries has shown that when negative views on immigration increase, support for far-right parties also increases (Stockemer, 2016)—especially when the rise in

immigration is associated to an uptick in crime (Cohrs and Stelzl, 2010)—and that, consequently, rightwing parties prime the issue of immigration in their campaigns (Carvalho and Ruedin, 2018) and influence the views of immigrants prevalent among voters (Harteveld, Kokkonen and Dahlberg, 2017). Yet, the case of Chile shows that rightwing parties' advocacy for more restrictive immigration policies does not necessarily respond to a demand from their electoral base. Rightwing voters expressed more favorable views of immigrants than the positions adopted by rightwing parties.

For that reason, we challenge the widely held believe that when rightwing parties adopt stronger anti-immigrant positions, rightwing voters also end up adopting more negative views of immigrants. That is not an automatic or inevitable result. In fact, the political activation of immigration as an electoral and campaign issue, as argued by Mainwaring y otros (2015:98), requires that parties adopt positions on issues that can resonate with their electoral bases. As some issues provoke stronger reactions on one end of the spectrum than on the other, the political activation of issues might not occur concurrently across political parties.

In the case of Chile, there was a stronger pro-immigrant support base on the left than an anti-immigrant support base on the right. Yet, precisely because the left might be more inclined to support immigrants, rightwing parties can turn immigration into an issue that helps polarize the electorate and define identities in a negative light—as the Piñera administration might have done by promoting a bill that sought to strictly regulate immigration. Or, in turn, the political activation of the immigrant issue might result from the negative reaction of leftwing parties to the proposed bill by the Piñera administration. As they had an electoral base that was friendlier to immigration, leftwing parties might have used that bill as an opportunity to polarize its base against the administration. Thus, not surprisingly, after the leftwing administration of Gabriel Boric took office, the issue of immigration did not immediately become a priority issue for the government or the opposition, as it did not resonate as a polarizing issue with voters as much as other issues, like crime or inflation.

To be sure, immigration might become a more relevant issue in future electoral campaigns in Chile. The 2021 presidential election began to show the growing importance of immigration, as a far-right candidate sought to make a strong anti-immigrant stance central to his electoral platform. The fact that José Antonio Kast lost his 2021 presidential bid does not imply, however, that immigration was not a relevant factor in the election. But for that to happen, people must associate the immigration issue with those issues that stand as top popular priorities, like crime, employment, or inflation. If the general perception about immigrants is positive—and right wingers see the rise of immigration as a confirmation or their ideological priors—like the negative effect of leftwing policies on a country's economy as it happened in Venezuela—the issue of immigration might be politically activated in

a different way—with the views on the causes that lead people to abandon their country taking precedence over the impact those newly arrived immigrants will have on the national economy.

REFERENCES

Alonso, Sonia, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. (2015). "Spain: No country for the populist radical right?" *South European Society and Politics* 20 (1): 21-45.

Alonso, Sonia, and Sara Claro da Fonseca. (2012). "Immigration, left and right." *Party Politics* 18 (6): 865-884.

Arias, Gonzalo, Rodrigo Moreno, and Dafne Nuñez. (2010). "Inmigración latinoamericana en Chile: Analizando perfiles y patrones de localización de la comunidad peruana en el área metropolitana de Santiago (AMS)". *Tiempo y Espacio* 25.

Brader, Ted, Nicholas Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. (2008). "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4): 959-978.

Bravo Acevedo, Guillermo and Carmen Norambuena Carrasco. (2018). *Procesos migratorios en Chile: Una mirada histórica-normativa*. ANEPE #43. Santiago: Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos.

Burns, Peter, and James Gimpel. (2000). "Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (2): 201-225.

Burscher, Bjorn, Joost Van Spanje, and Claes De Vreese. (2015). "Owning the Issues of Crime and Immigration: The Relation Between Immigration and Crime News and Anti-Immigrant Voting in 11 Countries." *Electoral Studies* 38: 59-69.

Carvacho, Héctor. 2010. "Ideological configurations and prediction of attitudes toward immigrants in Chile and Germany." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* (IJCV) 4.2: 220-233.

Carvalho, J., and Ruedin, D. 2020. The positions mainstream left parties adopt on immigration: A cross-cutting cleavage? *Party Politics* 26(4), 379-389.

Cea D'Ancona, María A. 2016. "Immigration as a threat: Explaining the changing pattern of xenophobia in Spain". *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 17(2): 569-591.

Cea D'Ancona, María Á. 2002. "La medición de las actitudes ante la inmigración: evaluación de los indicadores tradicionales del racismo." *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas* 99: 87-111.

CEP (Centro de Estudios Públicos). 2003. *Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N° 46. Diciembre 2003*. Santiago: Centro de Estudios Públicos. https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/encuestas-cep/encuestas-2010-2019/estudio-nacional-de-opinion-publica-abril-mayo-2017 (accessed on February 2, 2022).

CEP (Centro de Estudios Públicos). 2017. *Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N°79, Abril-Mayo 2017*. Santiago: Centro de Estudios Públicos.
 https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/encuestas-cep/encuestas-2010-2019/estudio-nacional-de-opinion-publica-abril-mayo-2017 (accessed on February 2, 2022)

Ceron, Andrea. 2012. "Bounded oligarchy: How and when factions constrain leaders in party position taking." *Electoral Studies* 31: 689-701.

Cohrs, J. C., and Stelzl, M. 2010. How ideological attitudes predict host society members' attitudes toward immigrants: Exploring cross-national differences. *Journal of Social Issues*, 66(4), 673-694.

Creighton, Mathew J., Amaney Jamal, and Natalia C. Malancu. 2015. "Has opposition to immigration increased in the United States after the economic crisis? An experimental approach" *International Migration Review* 49 (3): 727-756.

Damstra, Alyt, Laura Jacobs, Mark Boukes and Rens Vliegenthart. 2021. "The impact of immigration news on anti-immigrant party support: unpacking agenda-setting and issue ownership effects over time". *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 31:1, 97-118, DOI:10.1080/17457289.2019.1607863.

Dennison, J., and Geddes, A. 2019. A rising tide? The salience of immigration and the rise of anti-immigration political parties in Western Europe. *The political quarterly* 90(1), 107-116.

Dennison, James, and Matthew Goodwin. 2015. "Immigration, issue ownership and the rise of UKIP." *Parliamentary Affairs* 68 (1): 168-187.

d'Hombres, Béatrice, and Luca Nunziata. 2016. "Wish you were here? Quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of education on self-reported attitude toward immigrants." *European Economic Review* 90: 201-224.

Doña-Reveco, Cristián, and Brendan Mullan. 2014. "Migration Policy and Development in Chile." *International Migration* 52 (5): 1-14.

Harteveld, Eelco, Andrej Kokkonen and Stefan Dahlberg. 2017. "Adapting to party lines: the effect of party affiliation on attitudes to immigration" *West European Politics* 40(6): 1177-1197, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2017.1328889.

Ellis, Christopher, and James A. Stimson. 2012. *Ideology in America*. Cambridge University Press.

Enns, Peter K., and José T. Sanchez Gomez, 2019. "The Polls—Trends Economic Evaluations and Political Change in Chile, 1966 to 2018." *Public Opinion Quarterl*y 83(3): 627-639.

Finn, Victoria, and Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero. 2020. "Inclusive Language for Exclusive Policies: Restrictive Migration Governance in Chile, 2018" *Latin American Policy* 11(1): 42–61. https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12176.

Fussell, Elizabeth. 2014. "Warmth of the Welcome: Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy in the United States." *Annual Review of Sociology* 40: 479-498.

Givens, Terri E. 2012. "Effects of Migration: Political Parties." In Marc Rosenblum and Daniel Tichenor (eds) *Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*. Oxford University Press, pp 153-170.

Givens, Terri, and Adam Luedtke. 2005. "European immigration policies in comparative perspective: Issue salience, partisanship and immigrant rights." *Comparative European Politics* 3 (1): 1-22.

Golder, Matt. 2003. "Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe" *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (4): 432-466.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel Hopkins. 2014. "Public Attitudes Toward Immigration". *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (1): 225-249.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel Hopkins. 2015. "The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants". *American Journal of Political Science* (3): 529-548.

Hainmueller, Jens, and M.J. Hiscox. 2010. "Attitudes toward highly skilled ad low-skilled immigration: evidence from a survey experiment." *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 61-84.

Haubert, Jeannie, and Elizabeth Fussell. 2006. "Explaining Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in the U.S.: Social Class, Cosmopolitanism, and Perceptions of Immigrants". *International Migration Review* 40 (3): 489-507.

Igartúa, Juan José, and Lifen Cheng. 2009. "Moderating Effect of Group Cue while Processing News on Immigration: Is the Framing Effect a Heuristic Process?" *Journal of Communication* 59 (4): 726-749.

Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 2017. *Chile: Proyecciones y Estimaciones de Población. Total País: 1950-2050.* Santiago: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas.

Kiehne, E., and Ayon, C. 2016. Friends or Foes: The Impact of Political Ideology and Immigrant Friends on Anti-Immigrant Sentiment. *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare* 43:135–54.

Laurence, James, and Lee Bentley. 2018. "Countervailing contact: Community ethnic diversity, antiimmigrant attitudes and mediating pathways of positive and negative inter-ethnic contact in European societies". *Social Science Research* 69: 83-110.

Lawrence, Duncan. 2015. "Crossing the Cordillera: immigrant attributes and Chilean attitudes." *Latin American Research Review* 50,4: 154-177.

Lucassen, Geertje, and Marcel Lubbers. 2012. "Who fears what? Explaining far-right-wing preference in Europe by distinguishing perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats." *Comparative Political Studies* 45.5: 547-574.

Mainwaring, Scott, Mariano Torcal and Nicolás Somma. 2015. "The Left and the Mobilization of Class Voting in Latin America" in Ryan E. Carlin, Matthew M. Singer, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, eds. *The Latin American voter: Pursuing representation and accountability in challenging contexts*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 68-98.

Manzi, Jorge, Ellen Helsper, Soledad Ruiz, Mariane Krause, and Edmundo Kronmüller. 2003. "El pasado que nos pesa: la memoria colectiva del 11 de Septiembre de 1973" *Revista de ciencia política* 23,2: 177-214.

Meuleman, Bart, Eldad Davidov, and Jaak Billiet. 2009. "Changing attitudes toward immigration in Europe, 2002-2007: A dynamic group conflict theory approach". *Social Science Research* 38 (2): 352-365.

Meyer, Thomas M., and Markus Wagner. 2020. "Perceptions of parties' left-right positions: The impact of salience strategies." *Party Politics* 26,5: 664-674.

Morandé Lavín, José, Miguel Angel López, Peter Murphy Lewis, Roberto Durán Sepúlveda, Lorena Oyarzún Serrano, Juan Pablo Luna. 2009. *Chile, las Américas y el mundo: opinión pública y política exterior 2008*. Santiago: Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad de Chile. DOI: https://doi.org/10.34720/7myd-f570.

Moreno, Alejandro. 2016. "Value cleavage revisited" in Richard Gunther, Paul A. Beck, Pedro Magalhães and Alejandro Moreno, eds. *Voting in Old and New Democracies*. New York: Routledge, pp. 99-149.

Muste, Christopher. 2013. "The Dynamics of Immigration Opinion in the United States, 1992-2012". *Public Opinion Quarterly* 77(1): 398-416.

Navia, Patricio, and Rodrigo Osorio. 2019. "Attitudes toward democracy and authoritarianism before, during and after military rule. The case of Chile, 1972–2013." *Contemporary Politics* 25 (2): 190-212.

Navia, Patricio and Sergio Verdugo. 2020. "Chilean Presidential Candidates Platforms 1989-2017". *Harvard Dataverse, V1*. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NPQYLD

O'Rourke, Kevin, and Richard Sinnott. 2006. "The determinants of individual attitudes toward immigration". *European Journal of Political Economy* 22 (4): 838-861.

Ortega, Francesc, and Javier Polavieja. 2012. "Labor-Market Exposure as a Determinant of Attitudes toward Immigration". *Labour Economics* 19 (3): 298-311.

Pérez, Efrén O. 2010. "Explicit Evidence on the Import of Implicit Attitudes: The IAT and Immigration Policy Judgments." *Political Behavior* 32 (4): 517-545.

Petrocik, John R., William L. Benoit, and Glenn J. Hansen. 2005. "Issue ownership and presidential campaigning, 1952-2000". *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (4): 599-626.

Plumb, David. "El Partido por la Democracia: The birth of Chile's postmaterialist catch-all left." 1998. *Party Politics* 4(1): 93-106.

Saxton, Gregory, and Michelle Benson. 2003. "The Origins of Socially and Politically Hostile Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Outgroups: Economics, Ideology, or National Context?". *Journal of Political Science* 31: 101-137.

Schalk-Soekar, S. R., F. J. Van de Vijver, and M. Hoogsteder. 2004. "Migrants' and majority members' orientations toward multiculturalism in the Netherlands". *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 28: 533-550.

Segovia, Francine, and Renatta Defever. 2010. "American Public Opinion on Immigrants and Immigration Policy". *Public Opinion Quarterly* 75 (2): 375-394.

Shapiro, R. 2011. "Public opinion and American democracy." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 75 (5): 982-1017.

Shin, Hyeyoung, and John Dovidio. 2016. "Cultural Differences in the Role of Economic Competitiveness in Prejudice toward Immigrants ad Foreing Workers". *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 17 (1): 8-32.

Sirlopú, David, Roberto Melipillán, Alejandro Sánchez, and Cristián Valdés. 2015. "¿Malos Para Aceptar la Diversidad? Predictores Socio-Demográficos y Psicológicos de las Actitudes Hacia el Multiculturalismo en Chile". *Psykhe* 24 (2): 1-13.

Slothuus, Rune. 2016. "Assessing the Influence of Political Parties on Public Opinion: The Challenge from Pretreatment Effects". *Political Communication* 33: 302-327.

Stang, María Fernanda, Antonia Lara Edwards and Marcos Andrade Moreno. 2020. "Retórica humanitaria y expulsabilidad: migrantes haitianos y gobernabilidad migratoria en Chile" *Si Somos Americanos. Revista de Estudios Transfronterizos* 20(1), 176–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0719-09482020000100176

Stephan, Walter, Lausanne Renfro, Victoria Esses, Cookie Stephan, and Tim Martin. 2005. "The effects of feeling threatened on attitudes toward immigrants". *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 29: 1-19.

Stockemer, D. 2016. Structural data on immigration or immigration perceptions? What accounts for the electoral success of the radical right in Europe? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 54(4): 999-1016.

Stockemer, Daniel. 2016. "Structural data on immigration or immigration perceptions? What accounts for the electoral success of the radical right in Europe?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54 (4): 999-1016.

United Nations. 2017. *International Migration Report 2017* (ST/ESA/SER.A/404). New York: United States.

Urzúa, Alfonso, José Leiva and Alejandra Caqueo-Urízar. 2020. "Effect of Positive Social Interaction on the Psychological Well-being in South American Immigrants in Chile". *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 21(1): 295-306.

Van Spanje, Joost. 2010. "Contagious parties: Anti-immigration parties and their impact on other parties' immigration stances in contemporary Western Europe". *Party Politics* 16 (5): 563-586.

Visconti, Giancarlo. 2021. "Reevaluating the Role of Ideology in Chile." Latin American Politics and Society 63(2): 1-25.

Ward, Colleen, and Anne-Marie Masgoret. 2008. "Attitudes toward Immigrants, Immigration, and Multiculturalism in New Zealand: A Social Psychological Analysis". *International Migration Review* 42 (1): 227-248.

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge University Press.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Descriptive statistics for the exploratory principal component factor (PCF) analysis

Variable	Wording	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Factor of perception on 6 questions on immigration	Positive	2503	-1.92	1	-2.039	2.901
	Negative	2.503	-6.60	1	-2.845	2.549

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table A2. Scoring coefficients of the factor analysis for perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls separately for 2003 and 2017

Variable	Original wording	Factor 1		Factor 2		Uniqueness	
		2003	2017	2003	2017	2003	2017
Immigrants increase crime levels	Negative	0.717	0.745	0.025	0.199	0.483	0.404
Immigrants take jobs from those born in Chile	Negative	0.781	0.751	0.195	0.245	0.350	0.374
Chile should adopt tougher policies to exclude illegal immigrants	Negative	0.634	0.753	-0.034	-0.079	0.595	0.425
Immigrants are generally good for the Chilean economy	Positive	0.067	0.141	0.805	0.734	0.347	0.440
Immigrants improve society with their new ideas and cultures	Positive	0.073	0.221	0.820	0.761	0.322	0.370
Non-citizen legal immigrants should have same rights as Chileans*	Positive	0.115	-0.029	0.561	0.708	0.671	0.496

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Figure A1. Distribution of factor analysis indexes on perception of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017

3 positive scale questions

3 negative scale questions

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table A3. OLS models on perception of immigrants. DV: Cronbach's Alpha (factor analysis)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
	Positive opinion scale			Negative opinion scale (reversed)		
Ideological Id: Left (2003)	0.049 (0.094)		0.037 (0.092)	-0.228** (0.101)		-0.255** (0.100)
Left (2017)		0.394*** (0.137)	0.328** (0.164)		0.319** (0.134)	0.592*** (0.165)
Center Left (2003)	-0.014 (0.084)		-0.046 (0.084)	-0.140 (0.100)		-0.134 (0.099)
Center Left (2017)		0.084 (0.096)	0.126 (0.126)		0.083 (0.091)	0.237* (0.133)
Center (2003)	0.119 (0.097)		0.083 (0.097)	0.093 (0.101)		0.088 (0.099)
Center (2017)		0.028 (0.071)	-0.067 (0.119)		-0.028 (0.069)	-0.093 (0.119)
Center Right (2003)	0.115 (0.105)		0.127 (0.106)	-0.137 (0.124)		-0.136 (0.124)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
Center Right (2017)		0.129 (0.080)	-0.001 (0.130)		0.0003 (0.080)	0.150 (0.146)
Right (2003)	-0.019 (0.082)		0.127 (0.106)	-0.086 (0.087)		-0.098 (0.086)
Right (2017)		-0.085 (0.116)	-0.061 (0.138)		0.282** (0.126)	0.395*** (0.151)
Woman	-0.005 (0.056)	0.159*** (0.055)	0.093** (0.040)	-0.001 (0.063)	0.026 (0.053)	0.011 (0.041)
Area of Residence: North	-0.150* (0.091)	-0.493*** (0.081)	-0.350*** (0.060)	-0.127 (0.093)	-0.127 (0.080)	-0.144** (0.060)
Center	-0.152** (0.060)	0.164** (0.066)	0.017 (0.045)	0.048 (0.071)	0.167*** (0.064)	0.100** (0.048)
South	0.093 (0.096)	0.023 (0.084)	0.051 (0.063)	0.281*** (0.093)	0.182** (0.082)	0.216*** (0.061)
Age	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.00003 (0.001)	0.009* (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Years of Schooling	0.043*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.005)	-0.011 (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.005)
Sociotropic retrosp perception: Same[3]	0.981* (0.059)	0.286*** (0.059)	0.200*** (0.042)	0.189*** (0.067)	0.138** (0.058)	0.160*** (0.044)
Better	0.187** (0.087)	0.423*** (0.085)	0.337*** (0.061)	0.198** (0.098)	0.252*** (0.082)	0.221*** (0.063)
Media Consumption	0.058** (0.025)	0.056** (0.025)	0.055*** (0.017)	0.059** (0.028)	0.050** (0.023)	0.051*** (0.018)
2017 Dummy			0.305*** (0.061)			-0.123** (0.062)
Constant	-0.824*** (0.119)	-0.463*** (0.136)	-0.794*** (0.091)	-0.112 (0.137)	-0.183 (0.134)	-0.047 (0.099)
N	1.197	1.305	2.502	1.197	1.305	2.502
R Square	0.079	0.104	0.103	0.034	0.051	0.032

Reference categories are 'none' for ideological identification, 'Metropolitan Region' for area of residency, and 'worse' for socio-tropic retrospective perception.

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table A4. OLS models on perception of immigrants in Chile

DV: Average of the responses to the 6 questions recoded from negative to positive answers

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years
Ideological Id: Left (2003)	-0.064 (0.060)		-0.078 (0.059)
Left (2017)		0.260*** (0.080)	0.333*** (0.099)
Center Left (2003)	-0.057 (0.053)		-0.065 (0.053)
Center Left (2017)		0.063 (0.056)	0.134* (0.077)
Center (2003)	0.075 (0.055)		0.060 (0.054)
Center (2017)		-0.002 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.068)
Center Right (2003)	-0.009 (0.067)		-0.004 (0.068)
Center Right (2017)		0.047 (0.046)	0.055 (0.081)
Right (2003)	-0.042 (0.048)		-0.055 (0.048)
Right (2017)		0.066 (0.071)	0.120 (0.084)
Woman	0.0007 (0.035)	0.072** (0.032)	0.042* (0.023)
Area of Residence: North	-0.098* (0.054)	-0.227*** (0.049)	-0.181 (0.036)
Center	-0.040 (0.038)	0.132*** (0.038)	0.047* (0.027)
South	0.138*** (0.051)	0.087* (0.051)	0.105*** (0.036)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years
Age	0.002* (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.0009)	-0.0007 (0.0007)
Years of Schooling	0.011*** (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.003)
Sociotropic retrosp perception: Same[3]	0.106*** (0.036)	0.152*** (0.035)	0.130*** (0.025)
Better	0.145*** (0.055)	0.248*** (0.051)	0.207*** (0.038)
Media Consumption	0.042*** (0.015)	0.037** (0.014)	0.039*** (0.010)
2017 Dummy			0.062* (0.035)
Constant	-0.343*** (0.075)	-0.240*** (0.078)	-0.307*** (0.055)
N	1197	1305	2502
R Square	0.051	0.102	0.073

Reference categories are 'none' for ideological identification, 'Metropolitan Region' for area of residency, and 'worse' for socio-tropic retrospective perception.

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table A5. Table 4. OLS regression on perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017 (unweighted values)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
	Positive opinion scale			Negative opinion scale (reversed)		
Ideological id: Left (2003)	0.041 (0.070)		0.037 (0.068)	-0.169** (0.075)		-0.189** (0.075)
Left (2017)		0.292*** (0.102)	0.239** (0.122)		0.228** (0.098)	0.427*** (0.121)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
Center Left (2003)	-0.006 (0.062)		-0.030 (0.063)	-0.108 (0.075)		-0.101 (0.074)
Center Left (2017)		0.061 (0.071)	0.089 (0.093)		0.064 (0.067)	0.178* (0.100)
Center (2003)	0.085 (0.071)		0.057 (0.072)	0.065 (0.075)		0.063 (0.074)
Center (2017)		0.021 (0.052)	-0.045 (0.088)		-0.026 (0.051)	-0.072 (0.089)
Center Right (2003)	0.087 (0.078)		0.095 (0.078)	-0.105 (0.092)		-0.104 (0.092)
Center Right (2017)		0.098* (0.059)	0.001 (0.096)		-0.004 (0.059)	0.110 (0.108)
Right (2003)	-0.015 (0.060)		-0.032 (0.059)	-0.068 (0.065)		-0.078 (0.063)
Right (2017)		-0.067 (0.086)	-0.046 (0.102)		0.199** (0.093)	0.287*** (0.112)
Woman	-0.0008 (0.042)	0.124*** (0.041)	0.074** (0.029)	0.002 (0.047)	0.020 (0.039)	0.010 (0.030)
Area of Residency: North	-0.105 (0.067)	-0.373*** (0.060)	-0.261*** (0.045)	-0.092 (0.069)	-0.081 (0.059)	-0.100** (0.045)
Center	-0.106 (0.044)	0.126*** (0.049)	0.018 (0.033)	0.025 (0.053)	0.138*** (0.048)	0.076** (0.035)
South	0.072 (0.071)	0.020 (0.062)	0.041 (0.046)	0.205*** (0.069)	0.154** (0.061)	0.169*** (0.045)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.0009)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.0009)
Years of Schooling	0.031*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)
Sociotropic retrosp perception: Same	0.068 (0.044)	0.209*** (0.044)	0.144*** (0.031)	0.144*** (0.050)	0.095** (0.043)	0.117*** (0.032)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
Better	0.137** (0.065)	0.315*** (0.063)	0.250*** (0.045)	0.154** (0.074)	0.181*** (0.060)	0.164*** (0.047)
Media Consumption	0.040** (0.018)	0.039 (0.018)	0.038*** (0.013)	0.044** (0.021)	0.035** (0.017)	0.039*** (0.013)
2017 Dummy			0.218*** (0.045)			-0.096** (0.046)
Constant	-0.598*** (0.088)	-0.347*** (0.100)	-0.581*** (0.067)	-0.087 (0.102)	-0.132 (0.099)	-0.033 (0.074)
N	1.197	1.305	2.502	1.197	1.305	2.502
R Square	0.076	0.105	0.100	0.034	0.051	0.031

Reference categories are 'none' for ideological identification, 'Metropolitan Region' for area of residency, and 'worse' for socio-tropic retrospective perception.

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Figure A2. OLS coefficients plot for the effects of ideology on the perception of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017 (unweighted values)

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

DO (PERCEPTIONS OF) ELECTORAL POLLING AFFECT THE VOTE? CAMPAIGN EFFECTS, PARTISAN BIAS, AND STRATEGIC VOTING IN MEXICO

¿Las (percepciones de las) encuestas electorales afectan al voto? Efectos de campaña, sesgo partidista y voto estratégico en México

As (percepções de) pesquisas eleitorais afetam o voto? Efeitos de campanha, viés partidário e votação estratégica no México

RODRIGO CASTRO CORNEJO (iD) rodrigo.castro@cide.edu [1]

[1] CIDE

Abstract
The manuscript highlights the major role that partisanship plays in moderating voters' interpretation of polling information and incentives to behave strategically. While prior studies highlight that partisans are less likely to vote strategically as the expressive costs of defection increase, this study sheds light on the conditions in which voters—even partisans—behave strategically and which contribute to an increase in the proportion of voters who change their vote intention during campaigns. Only partisans informed about polls are able to overcome their partisan bias and engage in strategic voting. By taking strategic voting into account in the study of campaigns, the present work builds a bridge between the campaigns effects literature and studies on strategic voting.

Palabras clave:
encuestas; voto estratégico; campañas; opinión pública; América Latina

Resumen

Este artículo subraya el importante papel de la identidad partidista al moderar las percepciones que hacen los votantes de la información proveniente de encuestas electorales así como los incentivos que los votantes tienen para comportarse estratégicamente. Mientras que estudios anteriores argumentaban que los votantes partidistas tenían menor probabilidad de votar estratégicamente dado que los costos expresivos de defección se incrementan, este estudio estudia las condiciones por las cuales los votantes —inclusos los partidistas— se comportan estratégicamente, lo que contribuye a incrementar la proporción de votantes que cambian de intención de voto durante las campañas. Sólo aquellos partidistas informados acerca de las encuestas electorales son capaces de superar su sesgo partidista y votar de manera estratégica. Al tomar en cuenta el voto estratégico en el estudio de las campañas electorales, el presente trabajo crea un puente entre la literatura de efectos de campañas y voto estratégico.

Palavras-chave:
votação; votação estratégica; campanhas; opinião pública; América latina

Resumo

Este artigo destaca o importante papel da identidade partidária na moderação das percepções dos eleitores sobre os dados das pesquisas, bem como os incentivos que os eleitores têm para se comportar estrategicamente. Considerando que estudos anteriores argumentaram que os eleitores partidários eram menos propensos a votar estrategicamente à medida que os custos de deserção expressiva aumentavam, este estudo explora as condições sob as quais os eleitores — incluindo os partidários — se comportam estrategicamente, o que contribui para aumentar a proporção de eleitores que mudam sua intenção de voto durante as campanhas . Somente os partidários informados sobre as pesquisas eleitorais conseguem superar seu viés partidário e votar estrategicamente. Ao levar em consideração o voto estratégico no estudo de campanhas eleitorais, este artigo estabelece uma ponte entre a literatura sobre efeitos de campanha e o voto estratégico.

1. INTRODUCTION

Research in Latin American political behavior has focused on persuasion (Greene, 2011), the interpersonal social networks (Baker, Ames, and Renno, 2020), and priming (Hart, 2013) as major mechanisms of campaign influence. This study argues that vote shifts in young democracies are also driven by voters' strategic behavior. Based on the Mexican case—a country where partisanship is considered to be weak (Greene, 2011) but which recent studies suggest is stronger than previously considered (Castro Cornejo, 2021)—, this research focuses on electoral polls' effects on voters' behavior. Specifically, it studies the role that partisanship plays in moderating voters' responsiveness to polling information, which, in turn, ultimately shapes voters' expectations about the outcome of the election and their incentives to defect from or remain loyal to their co-partisan candidate. While most of the campaigns literature has characterized voters supporting candidates against their

pre-campaign political predispositions as a product of persuasion, this study argues for an alternative mechanism: voters' strategic behavior. By taking strategic voting into account in the study of campaigns, the present work builds a bridge between the campaigns effects literature and studies on strategic voting and provides a complete picture of the reasons why so many voters change their vote preference throughout presidential elections campaigns in Latin America.

In particular, this study identifies the role that partisanship plays by shaping voters' incentives to abandon or remain loyal to their candidate. Unlike independents who have more incentives to defect since—by definition—they do not have partisan attachments to their candidate, this study focuses on why some partisans who support candidates trailing in the polls turn into strategic voters. Based on a survey conducted during the 2006 presidential election in Mexico, this study finds that only partisans informed about polls are able to overcome their partisan bias and engage in strategic voting. While prior studies highlight that partisans are less likely to vote strategically as the expressive costs of defection increase (Gschwend, 2007; Plescia, 2017), this study sheds light on the conditions under which voters—even partisans—behave strategically and contribute to an increase in the proportion of voters who change their vote intention during campaigns. This is why, contrary to the theoretical expectation that the connection between partisanship and vote choice becomes stronger as election day draws near (Gelman and King, 1993), this connection weakens as voters become aware that their co-partisan candidate is not likely to win the election. The second part of this research presents evidence from an original survey experiment conducted during the 2015 gubernatorial elections in Mexico in order to identify a causal relationship between polling information and voting behavior.

The findings of this paper contribute to the literature on campaigns by identifying a different mechanism that makes campaigns matter in young democracies. Some voters are willing to abandon their co-partisan candidate as a result of strategic considerations. Polling information does not affect voters' partisanship; voters still self-identify with their party but decide to behave strategically given the electoral context a few days before election day.

2. DO POLLS INFLUENCE VOTERS' ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR?

Campaigns are consequential in Latin America. To understand the important number of voters who report changing their vote intention throughout campaigns, the literature has highlighted the persuasive role interpersonal social networks (Baker, Ames, and Renno, 2006 and 2020) and mass media (Lawson, 2012; Lawson and McCann, 2005) play in vote choice, as well as campaign effects like persuasion (Greene, 2011), activation (Castro Cornejo, 2021), and priming (Hart,

2013). In contrast, this study focuses on voters' reactions to electoral polls, which can affect voters' behavior as election day approaches—a topic understudied by the campaigns literature.

As Cox suggests in his seminal research (1997), voters anticipate the likely outcome of the election, and polls provide valuable information about how the parties and candidates are doing. Polling information enables voters to engage in strategic voting (Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte, 2006; Merolla, 2009; Meffert *et al.*, 2011) when their preferred candidate is unlikely to win the election. Voters ultimately support a party or a candidate that is not their preferred choice to avoid wasting their vote and to affect the election's outcome (Cox, 1997; Abramson *et al.*, 1992; Aldrich *et al.*, 2018). In comparative politics, a range of studies have highlighted the importance of voters' strategic behavior, particularly in institutional settings that offer voters the possibility to cast their ballots strategically (e.g. United Kingdom: Alvarez and Nagler, 2000; Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler, 2006; Canada: Merolla and Stephenson, 2007; Blais, Young, and Turcotte, 2005; France: Blais, 2004; Daoust, 2015; among others). In general terms, the literature has found that between 4 % and 8 % of the electorate are able to vote strategically (Aldrich *et al.*, 2018; Daoust and Bol, 2018). This number is, in fact, not small since only a subset of the electorate—those who support non-viable candidates or parties—finds themselves in a situation in which they have incentives to behave strategically (Alvarez *et al.*, 2006; Daoust and Bol, 2018).

As far as polling information influencing voters' behavior is concerned, prior studies have found polling effects on candidates' viability (Bartels, 1988), the salience of candidates' attributes (Hardy and Jamieson, 2005), and voters' knowledge (Boudreau and McCubbins, 2010), a «bandwagon» effect, where voters rally to leading candidates (Nadeau, Cloutier, and Guay, 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994; Morton *et al.*, 2015), an «underdog» effect, where vote intention changes in the direction of the trailing candidate (Ceci and Kain, 1982; Chatterjee and Kamal, 2019) and, relevant for the purposes of this paper, strategic voting (Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte, 2006; Rickershauser and Aldrich, 2007; Merolla, 2009; Blais *et al.*, 2018). For example, Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte (2006) find that voters in the 1988 Canadian election responded to the information provided by the polls by engaging in strategic voting. In fact, voters' expectations, vote intentions, and evaluations were correlated with variations in the information provided by polls. Merolla's (2009) study in the U.S. finds that respondents were more likely to switch their vote when provided with some information about the competitive context of the election. The polling effects were particularly strong when respondents were exposed to explicit coordination signals.

More recently, Blais *et al.* (2018) used an experimental design similar to the one explained in the following sections to analyze whether voters are more likely to vote strategically when provided with objective information about candidates'

and parties' standing in the 2015 Canadian Federal election. This election included two center-left parties (the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party) and several smaller parties that competed for the position of principal challenger to the incumbent Conservative Party. The study randomly assigned respondents to receive information on candidates' vote shares and finds, however, that polling information did not significantly affect voters' behavior. In addition to the different context in which the Canadian election took place (e.g. a well-established Westminster-style democratic regime) compared to Latin American context of this paper, one potential explanation about their null results relates to the moderating effect of partisanship. While their analysis controls for partisanship, they do not explore potential differences on partisan subgroups and independents, which, as this paper argues, have different incentives to engage in strategic voting.

Partisanship is known to affect individuals' proclivity to vote strategically. Several studies have demonstrated that partisanship affects voters' expectations about who is likely to win the election (Lewis-Beck and Tien, 1999; Blais and Bodet, 2006; Meffert *et al.*, 2011) and find that partisans are less likely to behave strategically (Gschwend, 2007; Niemi *et al.*, 1992; Plescia, 2019). Partisans have both instrumental and expressive concerns: they mainly care about supporting their preferred party or their co-partisan candidate. The benefit of doing so stems from the intrinsic rewards of casting a vote for their candidate/party (Hamlin and Jennings, 2011): voting expresses some aspect of voters' beliefs, values or partisan identity. Therefore, even though some literature finds third-party voting as striking (Raymond and Tromborg, 2016), campaign studies—consistent with the expressive voting literature—expect a strong connection between partisanship and vote choice as election day gets closer (Gelman and King, 1993). Particularly in a context of party polarization, partisans tend to develop an in-group favoritism and an out-group hostility that make partisan identities stronger (e.g. an 'us' versus 'them' attitude, Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018)**.** This context makes some partisans likely to support their co-partisan candidate, even if voters' rational calculations do not follow such an expectation. In some cases, partisans will support their co-partisan candidate, even one they do not view favorably, in order to avoid having another party win the election. A possible exception to this behavior would be partisans with a strong negative partisanship—i.e., loathing of the opposing party and its candidates (Abramowitz and Weber, 2018)—who, given the chance, would be willing to defect from their co-partisan candidate in order to avoid a very disliked party or candidate winning the election.

Theories of partisanship, thus, allow for some partisans to defect from their party and vote for an alternative candidate. In the end, party identification is not defined in terms of voting behavior; rather, it constitutes an exogenous variable that helps citizens make sense of the political world and strongly affects voters' opinion formation and electoral behavior (Campbell *el al.*, 1960; Lewis-Beck *et al.*,

2008). Campaigns, in turn, allow parties and candidates to activate partisan attachments, making the connection between partisanship and vote choice stronger as election day approaches. Nevertheless, some partisans do not support their co-partisan candidates and engage in strategic voting. This study agrees with previous research that partisans should be less likely to engage in strategic voting and aims to understand why they do defect. It is less theoretically interesting to understand independents' behavior: they do not have partisan attachments that make them loyal to their candidate. Rather, the interesting puzzle is why partisans defect, and this paper seeks to account for the conditions under which partisans behave strategically.

It is important to highlight that the literature has paid less attention to strategic voting in younger democracies, particularly in Latin America, even though voters in these countries have incentives to engage in strategic voting given the combination of multiparty systems and FPTP electoral rules. The single-round plurality rule in Mexico and two-round elections in most South American countries provide voters with strong incentives to engage in strategic voting in the first round and support a candidate with a better chance of advancing to the second round. Some exceptions constitute studies of strategic voting during Mexico's transition to democracy period (Domínguez, 200 9; Bruhn, 1999; Magaloni and Poiré, 2000 and Abramson *et al.*, 2010) and studies that examine strategic voting in midterm elections in Mexico (Poiré, 2000). More recently, Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2019) study the first round in the 2015 presidential election in Argentina and find that between 6 % and 10 % of the electorate behaved strategically. This study focuses on the 2006 presidential election and the 2015 gubernatorial elections in Mexico which provide both institutional and electoral incentives for voters to engage in strategic voting: a three-party system where a party or a candidate wins if it or he gets the most votes and a third-party trails in the polls.

3. POLLING INFORMATION, PARTISAN BIAS, AND STRATEGIC VOTING IN YOUNG DEMOCRACIES

Strategic voters do not want to waste their votes on candidates that have no chance of winning the election. Such an electoral context makes them change their vote intention and support an alternative candidate barely a few days before election day. In other words, as Aldrich, Blais, and Stephenson (2018) suggest, strategic voting is the marriage of expectations and preferences. From the perspective of a rational voter, the main goal of the vote is to maximize expected utility (Downs, 1957). In order to do so, voters have to take into account the expected outcome of the election (Cox, 1997). Based on these expectations, it is possible that voters would better benefit from defecting from their most preferred party

/ candidate if it / he has a low chance of winning. However, consistent with the literature on long-standing democracies, not all individuals are expected to rely on objective information to inform their vote decisions (Meffert and Gschwend, 2011). Voters form expectations about parties' chance of winning on the basis of both objective contextual information and their own political predispositions (Blais and Bodet, 2006; Meffert and Gschwend, 2011). This means that voters' partisan bias implies a directional motivation that makes them overestimate the chances of their preferred parties and underestimate the chances of their disliked parties (Mutz, 1998; Blais and Turgeon, 2004; Meffert *et al.*, 2011).

How do these findings travel to young democracies? While some research on Latin America argues that partisanship in the region is weak, recent studies have found that partisanship is not as weak as previously expected; in fact, previous findings seem to be an artifact of question wording (Baker and Renno, 2019; Castro Cornejo, 2019). Moreover, partisans in Latin America tend to behave like partisans in long-standing democracies: they are more informed, engaged, and likely to participate in the political process (Lupu, 2015). This means that voters' partisan attachments can ultimately affect their capacity to accurately perceive polling information (Gaines *et al.*, 2007; Bartels, 2000; Lupia, 1992), making them filter polling information and potentially reject pieces inconsistent with their partisan predispositions (Green *et al.*, 2002; Zaller, 1992). Partisans' biased expectations are very relevant for voters' subsequent strategic behavior because they ultimately highlight incentives for voters to remain loyal to their co-partisan candidate or defect.

Based on the preceding discussion, the first hypothesis of this paper examines voters' perceptions of polling information, particularly which candidate is expected to win the election, which is expected something that is expected to differ among partisans and independents:

H1. Opinion Formation Effect (Expectations): Partisans are more likely to engage in biased assimilation of polling information than independents.

The following two hypotheses study the effects of polling on vote choice. As discussed previously, polling information increases the proportion of voters who change their vote preference throughout the campaign—a measure that helps campaign studies assess if campaigns are consequential on voters' behavior (Lawson and McCann, 2004; Baker Ames, and Renno, 2006; Greene, 2011). This study considers two plausible paths. First is a learning effect: polling information helps undecided voters reach a defined vote preference. As Hillygus's and Jackman's (2003) study of campaign effects finds, this group is sometimes omitted by campaign studies (which only focus on voters who change vote preference

from one party to another), but represents one of the largest groups that change vote preference during campaigns. As far as polling is concerned, voters who do not report a defined vote intention («don't know» answer) will be better able to reach that decision when they know how candidates are doing, as suggested by polling information. This effect, however, will be moderated by voters' partisan attachments. It is expected that polling information will have a stronger effect on independents who, by definition, do not have partisan attachments, and are more likely to need the contextual information provided by electoral polling.

H2. Learning Effect: Voters who are aware of polling information are more likely to report a defined vote intention (less likely to answer «don't know» to the vote choice question) than voters who are not aware of polling information.

Polling information also triggers a strategic voting effect and this effect is also moderated by partisan attachments. This third hypothesis highlights voters' different incentives to engage in strategic voting depending on whether they are partisans or independents. For example, most studies assume that vote choice depends on the strength of voters' preferences for their first choice relative to their preferences for their second choice and so on—merging partisan and independents into a single category in their analysis. However, even if these two groups share the same ordered preferences, they have different incentives to remain loyal to their first preference/co-partisan candidate. Since independents do not have partisan attachments, they are more likely to defect. In turn, partisans are more likely to remain loyal to their co-partisan candidate. Therefore, we should expect strategic voting to be muted among partisans. Voters' partisanship will obscure their chances of engaging in strategic voting by prioritizing expressive over instrumental concerns and overestimating their co-partisan candidate's chances of winning the election.

Which partisans can overcome their partisan bias in order to become strategic voters? The third hypothesis focuses on those voters who are aware that their co-partisan candidate is unlikely to win the election. These are the partisan voters who are more likely to overcome their partisan bias. Strategic voting requires some understanding of which candidate has a lead, which candidate lags behind, and how voters' electoral decisions can affect the outcome of the election. Partisans aware of polling information will be the most likely to understand the logic and necessity to defect and behave strategically and are, therefore, less likely to engage in partisan reinforcement or wishful thinking. Since these voters are aware of the political relevance of the information they are given and possess the contextual knowledge to understand the political implications of this information (Kuklinski and Hurley, 1994; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001), third-party partisans aware

of polling information are more likely to overcome their partisan bias than those who are not aware of that information:

H3a. Strategic Voting Effect (Polling information). Partisans aware of polling information are more likely to become strategic voters.

In an attempt to isolate cause and effect, the next section analyzes voters' responsiveness to electoral polling during the 2006 presidential election in Mexico using cross-sectional data and a survey experiment conducted during the 2015 gubernatorial elections.

4. OBSERVATIONAL DATA: THE 2006 MEXICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

As the American politics literature suggests, the rise of the polling industry in the last decades has produced a major shift in campaign news coverage. The latter has turned into a horse race (Broh, 1980; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994) and survey findings have become leading stories in breaking news (Atkin and Gaudino, 1984; Crespi, 1988). This particular news coverage with an emphasis on polling has also extended to young democracies, particularly in Latin America. In the process, electoral surveys not only take the pulse of a campaign—framing elections in terms of who is gaining the lead and who is falling behind—but also can shape elites' behavior and the media's narrative of the campaign. This, in turn, has the potential to conditions voters' behavior by affecting their expectations about the election. Such is the case of electoral polling in Mexico, which has significantly increased since the country's transition to democracy in 2000, as part of the campaign media coverage.[1]

The Mexican party system is fairly institutionalized for the region (Mainwaring, 2017). Since Mexico's transition to democracy and until recently,[2] the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) have been the major contenders in each election. The three major parties have fairly strong organizations, meaningful party labels, and partisanship is widespread within the electorate. For example, Mexico's

---

1. For example, in the 2012 presidential election in Mexico, the news coverage was marked by a significant increase in the number of electoral polls published by major news outlets (from 44 to 105 polls compared to the 2006 campaign), turning electoral coverage into a horse race.
2. This changed in 2018, when MORENA, a split from the PRD, won the presidential election. This study cannot speak to recent developments in Mexico's party system.

National Electoral Study (Beltrán *et al.*, 2020) and the Mexico Panel Surveys (Lawson *et al.* 2007) find that around 60 percent of the electorate self-identifies with a political party, excluding independent leaners. The Mexican case sheds light on the conditions under which strategic behavior among voters emerges. Like many countries in Latin America, individual parties' competitiveness tends to fluctuate across time (e.g. high electoral volatility and fragmentation, Mainwaring, 2017). Indeed, a different party has won each of the last three presidential elections in Mexico (2006: PAN; 2012: PRI; 2018: Morena) and the incumbent party finished third in the last two elections. Moreover, vote intention tends to be volatile during campaigns (Lawson and McCann, 2005; Greene, 2011).

Although previous studies on the Mexican system found weak evidence of voters' strategic behavior (Domínguez, 2009), the 2006 presidential election—the first presidential election after Mexico's transition to democracy in 2000—presented voters with an ideal context to behave strategically: it consisted of two strong candidates who improved their positions in the polls as election day got closer and a medium-sized competitive candidate. According to the polls (see figure 1), as the campaign unfolded, the PRI lost support and the PAN and the PRD candidates competed for the first place. The nomination process generated divisions within the PRI since its candidate—a former party president—was unpopular among some sectors of the party, which ultimately led to an unsuccessful campaign (Langston, 2007).[3] Major news outlets reported these polling results, suggesting that only the PAN or the PRD, which appeared tied in most electoral polls during the last 60 days of the campaign, had any chance of winning the election. The news media also reported that many political figures tied to the PRI either explicitly or implicitly endorsed the PAN candidate. In this context, electoral polls appear to have conditioned elites' behavior, as the PRI seemingly abandoned its own presidential candidate, potentially affecting voters' expectations about which candidate would most likely win on election day.

Indeed, nationally representative surveys conducted a few days before election day (pooled data from three national polls[4]) analyzed a potential direct link between polling results and voters' preferences by investigating if voters were aware of the candidates' standing in the polls. Table 1 presents voters' perceptions of each candidate's electoral standing a month before election day (*«Which candidate is leading in the polls?* And a follow-up: *«Which candidate is in second place?»*, complete question wordings in table A1 in the Appendix). The results of

---

3. During the primary season (between October and December 2015, not reported in figure 1), the PRI scored second place in many electoral polls.
4. Based on three nationally representative surveys conducted in the weeks before election day. The Mexican survey research firm BGC Beltrán y Asocs conducted the polls. The presidential election was held on July 2. More information located in Appendix B

Figure 1. Campaign Polling (Mexico 2006)

Source: Electoral Polling Results (Author's Dateset)

the entire sample mirrored what the major news outlets were reporting at the time: a tie between the PAN and the PRD (31 % thought the PAN was leading, 29 % that responded that the PRD was placed first, and 7 % believed that the PAN and PRD were tied). Only ten percent mentioned that the PRI was in first place.

However, when the sample is split across partisan groups—consistent with hypothesis 1— it provides evidence of partisan differences in perceptions about which candidate is leading in the polls: seven out of every ten partisans who self-identified with the PAN or the PRD thought that their co-partisan candidate was first in the polls. Their knowledge of polling information seems to be a combination of objective information (as «objective» as electoral polling can be) and partisan reinforcement. In turn, the partisan group that was more likely to behave in a strategic way—PRI partisans—were split between those who referred that the PRI candidate was leading in the polls (32 %), those who mentioned another candidate (39 %), and those who selected the «don't know» answer (23 %).

Table 1. Candidate Perceived as Leading According to Electoral Polling (Mexico 2006)

Scenarios According to Voters' Responses	Expectations about Election Results (Across Partisan Groups)				
	Entire Sample (N=3,595)	Party Identification			
		PAN (N=746)	PRI (N=695)	PRD (N=525)	Independents (N=1,445)
1st place: PAN	**31**	**69**	18	10	28
1st place: PRI	9	3	32	2	5
1st place: PRD	**29**	9	17	**69**	30
Tie PAN-PRD	7	7	4	5	10
Other	4	1	5	2	6
«Don't know»	19	10	23	12	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: BGC Beltrán y Asocs

If voters are fairly informed about candidates' standing in the polls, what are the electoral consequences of voters' expectations? In other words, what effect does polling information have on vote intention? Table 2 presents evidence of a learning effect because polling information helps voters make up their minds regarding their candidate preference (hypothesis 2). Voters who are aware of polling information (i.e. who have a response to the question «*Which candidate is leading the polls?*») are less likely to answer the vote choice question with «don't know» (the likelihood decreases from 20 to 10 percent, p<0.01) in the complete sample—even when variables that might affect information acquisition, such as campaign interest and voters' levels of education, are controlled for. As expected, this effect is particularly strong among independents who do not have a co-partisan candidate to support (the likelihood of a «don't know» answer decreases from 43 percent to 22 percent, p<0.01, figure 2). Although the effect is not as strong, partisans are also more likely to have a defined vote preference when they are aware of polling information: «don't know» answers decrease from 10 to 5 percent, p<0.01). In table A2 in the Appendix, the models also control for political information. Although this variable was only included in two of the three surveys, the results do not substantially differ when controlling for such a variable.

Table 2. Logistic Regressions Models, Polling Information and Vote Choice (Learning Effect)

	All Voters	Partisans	Independents
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Informed about Polling	-0.91***	-0.69***	-1.02***
	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.14)
Partisan	-1.69***		
	(0.11)		
Education	-0.08	0.05	-0.14**
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Campaign Interest	0.10	0.17	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.12)
Female	0.02***	0.01**	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Age	-0.14	0.04	-0.24
	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.15)
Survey 1	-0.08	0.04	-0.13
	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.15)
Survey 2	-0.10	-2.34***	0.18
	(0.29)	(0.51)	(0.35)
Constant	3,573	2,079	1,494
	0.150	0.0319	0.0750
Observations	-0.91***	-0.69***	-1.02***
Pseudo R-squared	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.14)

Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

DV= Vote Intention (1=Don't know; 0=Defined Vote Choice)

Source: Analysis based on BGC Beltrán y Asocs's datasets

Figure 2. Probability of replying «don't know»

Source: Analysis based on BGC Beltrán y Asocs's datasets

Finally, in terms of the third hypothesis, polling information also triggers a strategic behavior effect. Table 3 shows that the connection between PRI partisans who are aware that their co-partisan candidate is unlikely to win the election and their party is weakened: they overcome their partisan bias and defect from their co-partisan candidate. Specifically, table 3 presents PRI partisans' probability of voting for the PRI. The main independent variable is PRI partisans' expectation that (1) the PRI was trailing in the polls; (2) the PRI was leading in the polls, and; (3) they were unaware of the polling information («don't know» response). Indeed, PRI partisans were more likely to defect when they were aware that their co-partisan candidate was unlikely to win the election than when they were not aware (p<0.01, vote for the PRI candidate decreases from 95 to 67 percent when PRI partisans are aware of polling information, see figure 3 below). In other words, the connection between partisanship and voting behavior is weaker among voters who were aware of their candidate's standing in the polls; one in every three PRI partisans strategically defected, changing their vote preference a few days before election day. It is important to highlight that PRI defectors were split in their vote choice: they did not bandwagon to a specific candidate. They strategically changed their vote choice for the candidate of whom they had a better opinion: 44 % of them reported supporting the PRD candidate and 39 % supported the PAN candidate

Table 3. Polling Information and Vote Choice (Strategic Behavior Effect). Multinomial Logistic Regressions

	PRI Partisans			
	Other	DK	Other	DK
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Base Category «PRI Will Win»				
PRI Expectation: Will Lose	2.47***	1.28**	2.43***	1.11*
	(0.43)	(0.59)	(0.44)	(0.61)
PRI Expectation: Don´t Know	1.41***	1.43***	1.61***	1.05*
	(0.46)	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.58)
Education			0.05	0.07
			(0.14)	(0.22)
Campaign Interest			0.28**	-0.06
			(0.13)	(0.21)
Female			0.00	-0.08
			(0.30)	(0.43)
Age			0.01	0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Survey 1	0.17	1.35**	0.31	1.24*
	(0.35)	(0.66)	(0.36)	(0.67)
Survey 2	0.14	1.34**	0.22	1.16*
	(0.35)	(0.67)	(0.36)	(0.68)
Constant	-3.42***	-4.70***	-4.79***	-6.15***
	(0.44)	(0.71)	(0.92)	(1.43)
Observations	501	501	494	494
Pseudo R-squared	0.104	0.104	0.12	0.12

Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

DV = Vote for the PRI. 1=PRI (Omitted Category), 2=Not PRI, 3=DK

Source: Analysis based on BGC Beltrán y Asocs's datasets

Figure 3. Probability of defecting from the PRI candidate (among PRI partisans)

Expectations About the Election

Source: Analysis based on BGC Beltrán y Asocs's datasets

These overall findings suggest that PRI voters who defected from their co-partisan candidate as a result of polling information increased the proportion of voters who changed their vote preference in this election by three to four percentage points[5] (without taking into consideration other partisan groups or independents who lean toward the PRI). This vote shift is particularly relevant in elections like the 2006 presidential election in Mexico, in which the PAN candidate won the presidency by a margin of just 0.56 % of the official vote. These data suggest that polling effects and strategic behavior might explain a significant proportion of campaign effects, particularly those voters who shift their support in favor of a candidate against their political predispositions—a phenomenon that most campaign studies normally conceptualize as campaign persuasion (Greene, 2011). In comparative perspective, this proportion of vote swing equates the amount of vote shifts in American presidential elections (Finkel, 1993). The next

---

5. During the 2006 presidential campaign, 21 percent of voters self-identified with the PRI. Among PRI respondents who did not expect the party to win the election, 28 % defected, which corresponds to 3.4 percent of the entire sample.

section describes a survey experiment conducted during the 2015 gubernatorial elections in Mexico that isolates the information provided by the poll allowing for an assessment of the causal effect of polling information on voters' behavior a week before election day.

5. EXPERIMENTAL DATA: 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS IN MEXICO

Between 2000-2018, the PAN, the PRI, and the PRD were the main contenders at the subnational level in Mexico. Unlike the national level where electoral competition tended to be dominated by the left-right economic cleavage (Moreno, 2009), gubernatorial elections—during those years—brought a different cleavage: competition against the incumbent PRI. Previous studies relying on observational data have found that anti-PRI voters behaved strategically during Mexico's transition to democracy (1997–2000 elections: Domínguez, 2009; Bruhn, 1999; Magaloni and Poiré, 2004). To our knowledge, this is the first study to rely on experimental data in an attempt to isolate the effect of polling information on strategic voting in Latin America. These elections also allow us to test another expressive component of partisanship in polarized contexts and particularly highlight the role of anti-PRI feelings.

While in 2000 the country transitioned to democracy and the PRI lost the Presidency, there are states in which the PRI has never lost power at the gubernatorial level up until today. The center-right PAN and the center-left PRD have therefore joined efforts into anti-PRI coalitions and, in many cases, successfully taken the PRI out of office at the state level.[6] However, in Michoacán and Nuevo León—the two Mexican states where the following survey experiments took place—the opposition was fragmented since the PAN and the PRD did not negotiate any electoral coalition. The two states share a similar political scenario. Most electoral polls released by major media outlets reported that the incumbent PRI was either tied with or very close to an opposition candidate (the PRD candidate in Michoacán and the independent candidate in Nuevo León). In both scenarios, the PAN and several minor political parties were trailing behind in the polls. Moreover, anti-PRI feelings increased throughout this period—after the PRI's return to the Mexican Presidency (2012-2018, see figure A1 in the Appendix)—due to a general perception of failed governance amid corruption scandals (Flores Macías,

---

6. For example, in 2016, the PAN-PRD coalition defeated the PRI in three Mexican states that have never experienced alternation in power: Durango, Veracruz, and Quintana Roo. The PAN also defeated the PRI in Chihuahua via an informal electoral coalition with several PRD factions.

2018; Greene and Sanchez Talanquer, 2018). The latter seemed to increased voters' willingness to support political change, particularly in those states where the PRI still held local government, as was the case of both Michoacán and Nuevo León. This context makes these two particular gubernatorial elections ideal for testing polling information's effect on voters' strategic behavior.

6. SURVEY EXPERIMENT DESIGN

The survey experiment was embedded in the second-wave of an original gubernatorial panel survey conducted in two Mexican states (Michoacán and Nuevo León). The polling firm BGC Beltrán y Asocs. conducted a telephone survey between the 1st and 3rd of June[7]. The election was held on Sunday, June 7th. The sample of the survey experiment roughly consisted of 650 respondents, representative at the state level (further methodological information is in table A3 in the Appendix). The sample was divided into two randomly-assigned groups that varied according to whether the respondent was informed about the results of an electoral poll. Randomization guarantees that the treatment and control groups in the sample are on average identical in both observable and unobservable characteristics. Any systematic difference in the answers to the treatment provides an estimate of the impact of being informed about the electoral poll on vote choice. The treatment appears balanced across observed covariates (see table A4 of the Appendix).

The survey experiment followed an indirect strategy to inform the respondents of the polling results. The survey randomly assigned a question asking if the respondent was aware of the results of a recently released poll, which included information about the electoral standing of each major candidate. The vignette excluded the specific name of the newspaper and the name of the survey research firm in order to avoid having the political leaning of the newspaper or the prestige of the polling firm affect the results of the survey experiment. Similarly, the vignette did not include any message inviting third-party supporters to defect, as previous experimental studies had done; instead, the experiment simply provided polling information without any interpretation. Respondents who were randomly assigned to the control group were not asked whether they were aware of the results of such a poll.

In both states, the vignette gave the lead to the PRI candidate who was tied, or closely tied with an opposition candidate (the PRD candidate in Michoacán,

---

7. First Wave: Mar, 14-16, 2015. Second Wave: June 1-3, 2015

the independent candidate in Nuevo León). According to the vignette, the PAN candidate was trailing behind in third place:

MICHOACÁN: Did you know that an electoral poll, recently released by a national newspaper, reports that the PRI candidate, Ascensión Orihuela, and the PRD candidate, Silvano Aureoles, are tied with the 36 percent of the vote intention? Meanwhile, the PAN candidate, Luisa María Calderón, has 23 percent of vote intention.

NUEVO LEÓN: Did you know that an electoral poll was recently released by a national newspaper according to which the PRI candidate, Ivonne Álvarez, is leading with 38 percent of vote intention? The independent candidate is in second place with 32 percent of vote intention, and the PAN candidate, Felipe de Jesús Cantú, is in third place with 20 percent of vote intention.

Subsequently, both treatment and control groups were asked a question about vote intention («*Between [NAMES OF THE CANDIDATES and PARTY] which candidate would you vote for?*»), which constitutes the dependent variable in the following section (1=support for anti-PRI leading candidate; 0=otherwise). To account for potential state variations, the logistic models reported in the next section include a state dummy variable.[8]

Just like in the observational data section of this paper, voters' responsiveness to polling information is expected to be moderated by partisanship. However, in young democracies, some voters have weakly formed partisan attachments that allow them to change to independents (Lupu, 2013; Baker *et al.*, 2016), or even shift their identification to another political party during the campaign period (Castro Cornejo, 2021a). To take such shifts into account, and taking advantage of the panel nature of the data, the analysis separates partisans who consistently self-reported identifying with the same political party throughout the campaign (between the first and the second wave of the panel survey) and those who updated their partisanship. The results also include an analysis of anti-PRI voters; specifically, it identifies voters who are more likely to support the leading opposition candidate over the PRI candidate, and vice versa, based on voters' self-declared probability of supporting each candidate. This operationalization based on voters' preferences among the various candidates make it possible to focus exclusively on vote choice, instead of on indirect measures (such as candidate

---

8. The present paper does not aim to study state variations. Moreover, it does not have the necessary observations to do so.

evaluations, feeling thermometers, ideological utility functions), which might depart from voters' decision-making.

Using a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means not likely and 10 means very likely, how likely are you to vote for (CANDIDATE NAME) so he/she can be the next governor of the state?

7. RESULTS

Consistent with the findings reported in the observational data section of this paper, providing information about polling results increases the proportion of respondents with declared candidate preference (learning effect, hypothesis 2). On average, the «don't know» answers decrease from 26 to 19 percent in the treatment group (7-percentage points, $p < 0.05$). This means that polling information provides voters with a learning opportunity making voters more likely to report a defined vote intention. The following lines discuss the polling information's influence on voters' strategic behavior.

Given that responses to the poll treatment are expected to only affect voters who will strategically interpret the polling information, the analysis focuses on the portion of the sample in which strategic behavior is anticipated to occur (i.e., respondents who identify with parties trailing in the polls and don't know voters). As argued by this study, the latter are expected to shift their support in favor of the leading (anti-PRI) opposition candidate since at that moment the main cleavage of electoral competition at the state level in Mexico was the PRI vs. anti-PRI dimension.

When voters are informed of polling results, on average, the strategic voting effect is seven percentage points in the treatment group ($p < 0.06$, figure 4, table A5 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics splitting the sample across states: table A6 in the Appendix reports the complete regressions including a state dummy). Among voters who support parties trailing in the polls and don't-know voters, the effect is stronger among partisans (12 percentage points, $p < 0.05$) and among partisans who support candidates trailing in the polls[9] (14 percentage points, $p < 0.07$). The latter are willing to shift their candidate preference as a result of the expectation that the PRI candidate is likely to win the election. The polling effect is also statistically significant among anti-PRI voters,

9. Since the N is too small to report results across partisan groups, this category (respondents who support parties trailing in the polls) contains PAN partisans as well as respondents who self-identify with minor opposition parties at that time (Morena, PT, Movimiento Ciudadano).

whose likelihood of supporting the leading anti-PRI candidate increases by 14 percentage points (p < 0.05, figure 5).

Figure 4. Probability of Engaging in Strategic Voting

Source: Analysis based on Author's original survey

Moreover, consistent with the findings of the observational analysis, the treatment weakened the connection between partisanship and vote choice among third-party supporters (PAN). While 82 percent of PAN respondents supported their co-partisan candidate in the control group, this number declined to 76 % in the treatment group. These polling effects might be driven by voters' weakly formed partisan attachments, which could have allowed them to update their partisanship throughout the campaign. However, this does not seem to be the case: vote shifts in response to polling information are stronger among voters who consistently self-identified with the PAN; they report a larger vote shift in response to the treatment (a decrease of 10 percentage points).

A second reason that sheds light on voters' strategic behavior relates to the electoral behavior of undecided voters. The experimental design allows us to identify the direction in which undecided voters shifted in response to electoral polling. As previously mentioned, «don't know» responses decreased by seven

Figure 5. Probability of Engaging in Strategic Voting

Anti-PRI Voters

Source: Analysis based on Author's original survey

percent on average. These shifts decisively contributed to increasing the main opposition candidate's vote. Among undecided voters who preferred the leading opposition candidate to the PRI candidate, «don't know» responses decreased from 16 % to 8 % in the treatment group. Instead, among undecided voters who preferred the PRI candidate to the leading opposition candidate, this share increased from 6 % to 13 %. These results suggest that polling information not only triggers vote-choice shifts among supporters of candidates trailing in the polls; it also produces a learning effect in new voters who had not previously reported a defined vote choice. In this particular case, it makes them strategic voters supporting the leading anti-PRI opposition candidate.

8. DISCUSSION

This research contributes to the literature by building a bridge between our knowledge of campaign effects and studies on strategic voting and by providing a more complete picture of the factors that explain why so many voters change

their vote preference during Latin American presidential election campaigns. Some voters are willing to abandon their co-partisan candidate as a product of strategic considerations: partisans who are informed of polls are able to overcome their partisan bias and engage in strategic voting. These strategic shifts take place in the last days of the campaign and increase the proportion of voters who change their vote preferences during campaigns.

How the results of this paper travel to other countries should be examined by future studies. The fact that Blais *et al.* (2018) did not find significant polling effects brings attention to the conditions under which polling information is likely to affect votes' strategic efforts. In their study, two center-left parties were actively competing to be the main challenger to the Conservative Party potentially underscoring voters' likelihood to become strategic voters. In contrast, in the elections studied in this research, there was a clear third party trailing behind in the polls that could have made voters' decision to engage in strategic voting easier. Regardless, the results of this paper are likely to apply to most party systems in Latin America, since most countries in the region have multiparty systems with FPTP electoral rules with two-round elections, in which voters have strong incentives to engage in strategic voting in the first round and support a candidate with a better chance of advancing to the second round. As Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2019) find for the 2019 presidential election, coordination efforts do not necessarily need three parties with one trailing behind the other two. In fact, the findings of this paper are particularly relevant to elections in which the opposition is fragmented and has a strong incentive to coordinate efforts in the first round to throw the incumbent party out of office (e.g. the 2017 presidential election in Ecuador and coordination effort within coalitions in Chile, among others). While coordination efforts do not always succeed (e.g. coordination in support of the leading centrist candidate in the first round of the 2018 presidential election in Colombia), polling information offers elites and voters alike important feedback that informs their strategic decision-making.

While the survey experiment establishes that the source of the polling information can shape voters' strategic behavior, how this result generalizes to real-life settings remains an open question. Treatment effects in real world contexts could be diminished by other campaign events or voters' inattention to the media. Like all survey experiments, this study cannot place a value on these various factors (or speak about how non-respondents would have responded to the experimental stimulus or voters' survey taking behavior, Castro Cornejo, 2019). However, the logic of this paper's findings (e.g. experimental and non-experimental evidence) is sufficiently compelling that it would be extremely surprising if the source of the polling information played no role in real political campaigns. Moreover, since conducting the survey experiment during a real campaign increased the external validity of the study presented in this paper, it is also plausible that voters who

were part of the control group were aware of the polling information. If this is the case, the results of this study are conservative. The difference between the treatments and a «pure» control group would be larger. Similarly, this research does not analyze the influence of third-party candidates' endorsements, coordination cues, or media endorsements, among other events that can also trigger strategic behavior. For these reasons, this article provides a lower bound for strategic behavior, and the latter might be more dramatic and significant under different circumstances.

REFERENCES

Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. W. (2018). Negative partisanship: Why Americans dislike parties but behave like rabid partisans. *Political Psychology*, *39*, 119-135. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12479

Abramson, P., Aldrich, J., Paolino, P., & Rohde, D. (1992). «Sophisticated» Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries. *American Political Science Review*, *86*(1), 55-69. doi:10.2307/1964015

Abramson, P. R., Aldrich, J. H., Blais, A., Diamond, M., Diskin, A., Indridason, I. H., Lee, D. J. & Levine, R. (2010). Comparing strategic voting under FPTP and PR. *Comparative Political Studies*, *43*(1), 61-90. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009341717

Aldrich, J., Blais, A., & Stevenson, L. B. (2018). *Many Faces of Strategic Voting: Tactical Behavior in Electoral Systems Around the World*. University of Michigan Press. doi:10.1017/S000712340000003X

Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (2000). A new approach for modelling strategic voting in multiparty elections. *British Journal of Political Science*, *30*(1), 57-75. doi:10.1017/S000712340000003X

Alvarez, R. M., Boehmke, F. J., & Nagler, J. (2006). Strategic voting in British elections. *Electoral Studies*, *25*(1), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2005.02.008

Ansolabehere, S., & Iyengar, S. (1994). Of horseshoes and horse races: Experimental studies of the impact of poll results on electoral behavior. *Political Communication*, *11*(4), 413-430. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.1994.9963048

Atkin, C. K., & Gaudino, J. (1984). The impact of polling on the mass media. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *472*(1), 119-128. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716284472001011

Baker, A., Ames, B., & Renno, L. R. (2006). Social context and campaign volatility in new democracies: networks and neighborhoods in Brazil's 2002 Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, *50*(2), 382-399. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00190.x

Baker, A., Ames, B., & Rennó, L. (2020). *Persuasive peers: social communication and voting in Latin America*. Princeton University Press.

Baker, A., & Renno, L. (2019). Nonpartisans as false negatives: the mismeasurement of party identification in public opinion surveys. *The Journal of Politics*, *81*(3), 906-922. https://doi.org/10.1086/703129

Baker, A., Sokhey, A. E., Ames, B., & Renno, L. R. (2016). The dynamics of partisan identification when party brands change: the case of the Workers Party in Brazil. *The Journal of Politics*, *78*(1), 197-213. https://doi.org/10.1086/683609

Bartels, L. M. (1988). *Presidential primaries and the dynamics of public choice*. Princeton University Press.

Beltrán, U., Ley, S., & Cornejo, R. C. (2020). Estudio Nacional Electoral (CIDE-CSES) 2018. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas.

Berelson, B. R., Lazarsfeld, P. F., & McPhee, W. N. (1986). *Voting: A study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign*. University of Chicago Press.

Blais, A. (2002). Why is there so little strategic voting in Canadian plurality rule elections? *Political Studies*, *50*(3), 445-454. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00378

Blais, A., & Bodet, M. A. (2006). How do voters form expectations about the parties' chances of winning the election? *Social Science Quarterly*, *87*(3), 477-493. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2006.00392.x

Blais, A., & Turgeon, M. (2004). How good are voters at sorting out the weakest candidate in their constituency? *Electoral Studies*, *23*(3), 455-461. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(03)00031-3

Blais, A., Nadeau, R., Gidengil, E., & Nevitte, N. (2001). Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality elections. *Electoral Studies*, *20*(3), 343-352. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(00)00017-2

Blais, A., Young, R., & Turcotte, M. (2005). Direct or indirect? Assessing two approaches to the measurement of strategic voting. *Electoral Studies*, *24*(2), 163-176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2004.03.001

Blais, A., Loewen, P. J., Rubenson, D., Stephenson, L. B., & Gidengil, E. (2018). Information on party strength and strategic voting. *The many faces of strategic voting*, 89-103.

Boudreau, C., & McCubbins, M. D. (2010). The blind leading the blind: Who gets polling information and does it improve decisions? *The Journal of Politics*, *72*(2), 513-527. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990946

Brady, H. E., Johnston, R. G., & Johnston, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Capturing campaign effects*. University of Michigan Press.

Broh, C. A. (1980). Horse-race journalism: Reporting the polls in the 1976 presidential election. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *44*(4), 514-529. https://doi.org/10.1086/268620

Bruhn, K. (1999). The resurrection of the Mexican left in the 1997 elections: implications for the party system. *Toward Mexico's Democratizations: Parties, Campaigns, Elections, and Public Opinion*, Routledge, 88.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1980). *The american voter*. University of Chicago Press.

Castro Cornejo, R. (2019). Partisanship and question-wording effects: experimental evidence from Latin America. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *83*(1), 26-45. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfz006

Castro Cornejo, R. (2019). Do Campaigns Matter (in New Democracies)? Campaign Interest, Vote Choice and Survey Satisficing. *Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública*, *8*(1), 83-126. https://doi.org/10.14201/rlop.22343

Castro Cornejo, R. (2021). How do campaigns matter? Independents, political information, and the enlightening role of campaigns in Mexico. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *33*(4), 779-798. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa029

Cornejo, R. C. (2021). Short-and Long-Term Partisanship: Campaign Effects and the Stability of Party Identification in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, *56*(2), 300-317. doi:10.25222/larr.638

Ceci, S. J., & Kain, E. L. (1982). Jumping on the bandwagon with the underdog: The impact of attitude polls on polling behavior. *Public opinion quarterly*, *46*(2), 228-242. https://doi.org/10.1086/268715

Chatterjee, S., & Kamal, J. (2021). Voting for the underdog or jumping on the bandwagon? Evidence from India's exit poll ban. *Public Choice*, *188*(3), 431-453. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00837-y

Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems*. Cambridge University Press.

Crespi, I. (1988). *Pre-election polling: Sources of accuracy and error*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Daoust, J. F. (2015). Vote stratégique au Québec: analyse de l'élection de 2012. *Politique et sociétés*, *34*(2), 3-15. https://doi.org/10.7202/1032504ar CopiedAn error has occurred

Daoust, J. F., & Bol, D. (2020). Polarization, partisan preferences and strategic voting. *Government and Opposition*, *55*(4), 578-594. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.42

Domínguez, J., «Introduction», In Domínguez, J. I., Lawson, C. H., & Moreno, A. (Eds.). (2009). Consolidating Mexico's democracy: The 2006 presidential campaign in comparative perspective. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper.

Finkel, S. E. (1993). Reexamining the» minimal effects» model in recent presidential campaigns. *The Journal of Politics*, *55*(1), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.2307/2132225

Flores-Macías, F. 2009. «Electoral Volatility in 2006» In Domínguez, J. I., Lawson, C. H., & Moreno, A. (Eds.). (2009). Consolidating Mexico's democracy: The 2006 presidential campaign in comparative perspective. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Flores-Macías, G. A. (2018). in Mainwaring S. and Loxton J. (Eds.). *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*. Cambridge University Press.

Gelman, A., & King, G. (1993). Why are American presidential election campaign polls so variable when votes are so predictable? *British Journal of Political Science*, *23*(4), 409-451. doi:10.1017/S0007123400006682

Gschwend, T. (2007). Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany. *European Journal of Political Research*, *46*(1), 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00641.x

Greene, K. F. (2011). Campaign persuasion and nascent partisanship in Mexico's new democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, *55*(2), 398-416. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00497.x

Hamlin, A., & Jennings, C. (2011). Expressive political behaviour: Foundations, scope and implications. *British Journal of Political Science*, *41*(3), 645-670. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000020

Hardy, B. W., & Jamieson, K. H. (2005). Can a poll affect perception of candidate traits? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *69*(5), 725-743. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfi067

Iyengar, S., & Krupenkin, M. (2018). The strengthening of partisan affect. *Political Psychology*, *39*, 201-218. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12487

Kaplan, N., Park, D. K., & Gelman, A. (2012). Polls and elections understanding persuasion and activation in presidential campaigns: The random walk and mean reversion models. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, *42*(4), 843-866. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2012.04021.x

Kuklinski, J. H., & Hurley, N. L. (1994). On hearing and interpreting political messages: A cautionary tale of citizen cue-taking. *The Journal of Politics*, *56*(3), 729-751. https://doi.org/10.2307/2132190

Langston, J. K. (2017). *Democratization and authoritarian party survival: Mexico's PRI*. Oxford University Press.

Lau, R. R., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2001). Advantages and disadvantages of cognitive heuristics in political decision making. *American journal of political science*, 951-971. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669334

Lawson, C., & McCann, J. (2005). Television News, Mexico's 2000 Elections and Media Effects in Emerging Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, *35*(1), 1-30. doi:10.1017/S0007123405000013

Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Tien, C. (1999). Voters as forecasters: a micromodel of election prediction. *International Journal of Forecasting*, *15*(2), 175-184. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-2070(98)00063-6

Lewis-Beck, M. S., Jacoby, W. G., Norpoth, H., & Weisberg, H. F. (2008). *The American voter revisited*. University of Michigan Press.

Lupu, N. (2013). Party brands and partisanship: Theory with evidence from a survey experiment in Argentina. *American Journal of Political Science*, *57*(1), 49-64. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00615.x

Lupu, N. (2015). Partisanship in Latin America. In Carlin, R. E., Singer, M. M., & Zechmeister, E. J. *The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts*. University of Michigan Press. 226-244.

Magaloni, B., & Poiré, A. (2004). Strategic coordination in the 2000 Mexican presidential race. *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Candidates, Voters, and the Presidential Campaign of 2000*, Stanford University Press. 264-282.

Mainwaring, S. (2017). Latin American Party Systems: Institutionalization, Decay and Collapse in Mainwaring, S. *Latin American Party Systems: Institutionalization, Decay and Collapse.* Cambridge University Press

Meffert, M. F., & Gschwend, T. (2010). Strategic coalition voting: Evidence from Austria. *Electoral Studies*, *29*(3), 339-349. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.005

Meffert, M. F., Huber, S., Gschwend, T., & Pappi, F. U. (2011). More than wishful thinking: Causes and consequences of voters' electoral expectations about parties and coalitions. *Electoral Studies*, *30*(4), 804-815. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.08.001

Merolla, J. L. (2009). The effect of information signals on strategic voting in mock mayoral elections. *Political Behavior*, *31*(3), 379-399.

Merolla, J., & Stephenson, L. B. 2007. Strategic voting in Canada: A cross time analysis. Electoral Studies 26:235-46. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-008-9080-y

Moreno, A. (2015). *El votante mexicano: democracia, actitudes políticas y conducta electoral*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Álvarez, J. A. M. (2019). El cambio electoral: Votantes, encuestas y democracia en México. Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Morton, R. B., Muller, D., Page, L., & Torgler, B. (2015). Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment. *European Economic Review*, *77*, 65-81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.03.012

Mutz, D. C. (1998). *Impersonal influence: How perceptions of mass collectives affect political attitudes*. Cambridge University Press.

Nadeau, R., Cloutier, E., & Guay, J. H. (1993). New evidence about the existence of a bandwagon effect in the opinion formation process. *International Political Science Review*, *14*(2), 203-213. https://doi.org/10.1177/019251219301400204

Niemi, R. G., Written, G., & Franklin, M. N. (1992). Constituency characteristics, individual characteristics and tactical voting in the 1987 British general election. *British Journal of Political Science*, *22*(2), 229-240. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400006347

Plescia, C. (2017). The effect of pre-electoral party coordination on vote choice: Evidence from the Italian regional elections. *Political Studies*, *65*(1), 144-160. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321715607512

Poiré, A. (2000). Un modelo sofisticado de decisión electoral racional: el voto estratégico en México,. 1997. *Política y gobierno*, 353-382.

Raymond, C. D., & Tromborg, M. W. (2016). What's information got to do with it? Third-party voting in plurality systems. *Party Politics*, *22*(4), 534-543. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068814551295

Rickershauser, J., & Aldrich, J. H. (2007). «It's the electability, stupid»– or maybe not? Electability, substance, and strategic voting in presidential primaries. *Electoral Studies*, *26*(2), 371-380. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2006.09.003

Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. *Organizational identity*: *A reader*, *56*(65), 9780203505984-16.

Weitz-Shapiro, R., & Winters, M. S. (2019). Strategic Voting in a Two-Round, Multi-Candidate. *Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies: Argentina in Comparative Perspective*, 187.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Questions Wordings.
Electoral Polls (Observational Data)

	English
Vote Choice	On July 2nd elections to choose President will be held. If elections were held today, which candidate or political party would you vote for?
Partisanship	Regardless of which party you vote for, do you normally think or yourself as panista, priista or perredista or any other political party?
Candidate Evaluations	Do you know [NAME OF THE CANDIDATE]? What opinion do you have of him: very good, good, fair, bad, very bad?
Voters' Expectations about the Election	Which candidate is leading in the polls? And follow-up: Which candidate is in second place?
Campaign Interest	How much attention do you pay to news about political campaigns for the next Presidential elections: very much, some, not much, not at all?

Survey Experiment

Vote Choice	If elections were held today, between [NAMES OF THE CANDIDATES and PARTY] which candidate would you vote for?
Partisanship	Regardless of which party you vote for, do you normally think or yourself as panista, priista or perredista or any other political party?
Ordered Preferences to identify anti-PRI voters	Using a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means not likely and 10 means very likely, how likely are you to vote for (CANDIDATE NAME) so he/she can be the next governor of the state?
Anti-PRI > PRI	If respondents prefer non-PRI candidates vis-à-vis the PRI candidate (higher responses on the 0-10 scale)
PRI > Anti-PRI	If respondents prefer the PRI candidate vis-à-vis the non-PRI candidates (higher responses on the 0-10 scale)

Source: BGC Beltrán y Asocs. and Original Study

Table A2. Including Political Information as a Control Variable
Logistic Regressions Models
DV= Vote Intention (1=Don't know; 0=Defined Vote Choice)

	All Voters	Partisans	Independents
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Informed about Polling	-0.92***	-0.53**	-1.10***
	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.16)
Partisan	-1.68***		
	(0.14)		
Education	-0.05	0.15	-0.15*
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Political Information	-0.40***	-0.76***	-0.29*
	(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.17)
Campaign Interest	-0.11*	-0.14	-0.09
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Female	0.04	0.29	-0.07
	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.16)
Age	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Survey 1	0.08	-0.01	0.14
	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.15)
Constant	-0.47	-2.77***	-0.18
	(0.33)	(0.60)	(0.40)
Observations	2,377	1,373	1,004
Pseudo R-squared	0.16	0.05	0.09

Note: Since the surveys were pooled, the models include n-1 dummy variables.
Base Category =1. Political information was not included in the questionnaire of one of
the surveys. Therefore, only two polls were pooled (N=2,385).

Source: Analysis based on BGC Beltrán y Asocs's datasets

Table A3
Attrition Rate in Second Wave

Second Wave Interview Status	Michoacán	Nuevo León
Complete interview	39%	45%
Incomplete interview	2%	2%
Made an appointment but did not answer	22%	22%
Respondent does not live in that house anymore	11%	9%
Did not answer the phone	10%	8%
Telephone out of service	4%	5%
Did not accept the second interview	2%	3%
Did not accept a second interview (since first wave)	7%	3%
Answering machine	1%	2%
Telephone - Busy	2%	1%

Source: Author's original survey

Demographic Variables (Wave 1 and Wave 2)

	Michoacán		Nuevo León	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Female	50%	54%	51%	55%
Age				
18-25	11%	8%	11%	9%
26-40	20%	18%	18%	16%
41-60	46%	48%	40%	43%
61+	23%	25%	32%	42%
Income (minimum wage)				
0 - 1 MW	8%	5%	4%	3%
1 - 3 MW	26%	24%	20%	18%

	Michoacán		Nuevo León	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
3 - 5 MW	13%	15%	11%	12%
5 - 7 MW	3%	6%	4%	3%
7 - 10 MW	10%	8%	10%	13%
10+ MW	5%	6%	14%	14%
Education				
None	13%	13%	9%	9%
Elementary	16%	15%	13%	13%
Secondary	19%	21%	19%	23%
High School	24%	23%	24%	24%
College	28%	28%	36%	32%

Source: Author's original survey

Table A4. Balance across Treatment/Control Group

Variables	Treatment			Control			
	Obs	Mean	Std.Err	Obs	Mean	Std.Err	P-Value
Female	365	.5342466	.0261456	311	.5498392	.0282567	0.6856
Age	365	52.6411	.8501002	311	51.23151	.8717187	0.2495
Elementary School	365	.4438356	.0260413	311	.392283	.0277313	0.1764
High School	365	.2356164	.0222437	311	.221865	.0235989	0.6722
College +	365	.3205479	.0244611	311	.3858521	.0276481	0.0763
Partisan	365	.5342466	.0261456	311	.488746	.0283909	0.2388
PAN Partisan	365	.2246575	.0218754	311	.1832797	.0219742	0.1851
PRI Partisan	365	.1616438	.0192949	311	.1736334	.0215141	0.6777
PRD Partisan	365	.0493151	.011349	311	.0257235	.0089914	0.1122
Independent	365	.3589041	.025142	311	.414791	.0279827	0.1370

		Treatment			Control		
Variables	Obs	Mean	Std.Err	Obs	Mean	Std.Err	P-Value
Other Partisan	365	.0986301	.0156281	311	.1061093	.0174919	0.7493
PAN (Vote probability)	358	5.094972	.2090389	293	4.699659	.2342213	0.2078
PRI (Vote Probability)	352	3.525568	.2107911	295	3.335593	.218687	0.5338
PRD/Bronco (Probability)	355	4.002817	.2189226	295	4.00339	.2231551	0.9985

Source: Analysis based on Author's original survey

Table A5. Descriptive Statistics (Vote Intention)
Among entire sample of potential strategic voters

	Nuevo León (N=290)		Michoacán (N=255)	
	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment
Other	69	61	78	72
Vote for anti-PRI leading candidate	31	39	22	28

Source: Analysis based on Author's original survey

Among entire sample of potential strategic voters (only partisans)

	Nuevo León (N=155)		Michoacán (N=102)	
	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment
Other	75	61	80	71
Vote for anti-PRI leading candidate	25	39	20	29

Source: Analysis based on Author's original survey

Among entire sample of potential strategic voters (only third-party partisans)

	Nuevo León (N=133)		Michoacán (N=65)	
	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment
Other	77	64	93	86
Vote for anti-PRI leading candidate	23	36	7	14

Source: Analysis based on Author's original survey

Among anti-PRI voters

	Nuevo León (N=142)		Michoacán (N=76)	
	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment
Other	38	26	36	20
Vote for anti-PRI leading candidate	62	74	64	80

Source: Analysis based on Author's original survey

Table A6. Logistic Regression Model – Vote Choice Effect (among opposition and undecided voters)

	Aggregate Effect	Partisans	Partisans Trailing in the Polls	Independents	Anti-PRI > PRI	PRI > Anti-PRI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strategic Voting Effect	0.35*	0.60**	0.65*	0.16	0.66**	-0.09
	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(1.44)
State dummy	-0.47**	-0.41	-1.28***	-0.55**	0.21	-0.09
	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.45)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(1.44)
Constant	-0.80***	-1.06***	-1.24***	-0.58***	0.43*	-3.48***
	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(1.26)
Observations	545	257	198	288	218	73
Pseudo R-sq	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.00

DV = Support for the anti-PRI candidate with better standing in the polls. 1: Anti-PRI candidate / 0: Otherwise

Standard Errors in parenthesis; *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Source: Analysis based on Author's original survey

Figure A1. Feeling Thermometer PRI (0: very bad opinion; 10 very good opinion).

Source: Mexico's National Electoral Study (Beltrán *et al.*, 2018)

APPENDIX B

The national electoral polls reported in this study were conducted by the polling firm BGC Ulises Beltrán y Asocs., with a sample size of 1,200 effective interviews. The samples were distributed in a probabilistic sample of 120 electoral precincts. The surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews with citizens over 18 years old with a voting ID who live in the country. Surveys were conducted the month prior to election day on the following dates:

Table B1. 2006 Electoral Polling

Survey	Date
1	May 31 – June 3, 2006
2	June 16 – 19, 2006
3	June 24 – 26, 2006

Source: BGC Beltrán y Asocs.

The selection of the electoral precincts was made through systematic random sampling with probability proportional to the size of the precinct, where the size is defined by the nominal list. The selection of the block and the house corresponds to a systematic process, while that of the interviewee was made by random selection. The sample size allowed to obtain results representative at the national level with a confidence level of 95 % and a theoretical margin of error of ± 2.9 percentage points.

SURVEY MODE EFFECTS IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: COMPARING PHONE AND FACE-TO-FACE SURVEYS IN COSTA RICA

Efectos del modo de encuesta en un país en desarrollo: Comparando encuestas telefónicas y presenciales en Costa Rica

Efeitos do modo de pesquisa em um país em desenvolvimento: Comparando pesquisas por telefone e face a face na Costa Rica

NOAM LUPU [ID] noam.lupu@vanderbilt.edu [1]
ADAM WOLSKY [ID] awolsky@princeton.edu [2]

[1] Vanderbilt University
[2] Princeton University

Abstract
Responses to phone surveys tend to exhibit higher rates of social desirability bias and extreme responses when compared to face-to-face surveys. Yet, studies of mode effects typically compare either representative studies that implausibly assume comparability or experimental studies that rely on convenience samples. Our study compares two national probability samples but uses matching to address comparability. We study Costa Rica, a middle-income democracy, to see whether the conventional wisdom drawn from Western Europe and North America extends to the Global South. We analyze two nationally representative surveys, one fielded by phone and one face-to-face, allowing us to compare identically worded items we placed on both surveys. We find that phone respondents exhibited more socially desirable responding and were more likely to choose negative endpoints on scalar items. This suggests that survey researchers and practitioners should carefully assess the tradeoffs in shifting modes or employing mixed modes.

Palabras clave:

encuestas;
efectos del modo;
encuestas
telefónicas;
encuestas
presenciales;
Costa Rica

Resumen

Las respuestas a las encuestas telefónicas generalmente generan tasas más altas de sesgo de deseabilidad social y respuestas extremas en comparación con las encuestas cara a cara. Sin embargo, los estudios de los efectos de modo generalmente comparan estudios representativos que asumen una comparabilidad implausible o estudios experimentales que se basan en muestras de conveniencia. Nuestro estudio compara dos muestras probabilísticas nacionales, pero utiliza matching para abordar la comparabilidad. Estudiamos el caso de Costa Rica, una democracia de ingresos medios, para ver si la sabiduría convencional extraída de Europa Occidental y América del Norte se extiende al Sur Global. Analizamos dos encuestas nacionales representativas, una realizada por teléfono y la otra cara a cara, lo que nos permite comparar preguntas idénticas que colocamos en ambos cuestionarios. Encontramos que los encuestados por teléfono tienden más a dar la respuesta más socialmente deseable y a elegir valores extremos negativos en preguntas con escalas. Esto sugiere que los investigadores de encuestas y los profesionales deberían evaluar cuidadosamente las ventajas y desventajas de un cambio de modo o del uso de modos mixtos.

Palavras-chave:

pesquisas;
efeitos do modo;
pesquisas
telefónicas;
pesquisas face a
face;
Costa Rica

Resumo

As respostas a pesquisas por telefone geralmente geram taxas mais altas de viés de desejabilidade social e respostas extremas em comparação com pesquisas face a face. No entanto, estudos de efeitos do modo geralmente comparam estudos representativos que assumem comparabilidade implausível ou estudos experimentais baseados em amostras de conveniência. Nosso estudo compara duas amostras probabilísticas nacionais, mas usa matching para abordar a comparabilidade. Estudamos o caso da Costa Rica, uma democracia de renda média, para ver se a sabedoria convencional adquirida na Europa Ocidental e na América do Norte se estende ao Sul Global. Analisamos duas pesquisas nacionais representativas, uma realizada por telefone e outra face a face, permitindo-nos comparar perguntas idênticas que colocamos em ambos os questionários. Descobrimos que os entrevistados por telefone eram mais propensos a dar a resposta socialmente desejável e a escolher valores extremos negativos para perguntas com escalas. Isso sugere que pesquisadores e profissionais de pesquisa devem pesar cuidadosamente as vantagens e desvantagens de alternar modos ou usar modos mistos.

INTRODUCTION

Phone coverage has become nearly universal in many low- and middle-income countries with the expansion of cellphones. According to the International Telecommunication Union, in 2016, developing countries had 94 cellphone subscriptions per 100 individuals (Gibson *et al.*, 2017). In the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer, 90 percent of respondents in the average Latin American and Caribbean country reported having access to a cellphone in their household. Given these trends, phone surveys are becoming a viable alternative to the face-to-face surveys that are considered the gold standard in developing contexts (e.g., Montalvo, Pizzolitto, and Plutowski, 2022).

Face-to-face surveys have some clear advantages over phone surveys, including higher response rates, longer questionnaires, the ability to use visual aids and cues, and better rapport between interviewer and respondent (e.g., Holbrook *et al.*, 2003; Hox and de Leeuw, 1994; Jäckle *et al.*, 2010; Roberts and Jäckle, 2012). But phone surveys have some advantages of their own, including potential cost savings, the ease of re-contacting respondents, and the potentially broader geographic coverage as compared to clustered area sampling. Phone surveys became even more vital during the COVID-19 pandemic, which made it challenging to carry out face-to-face surveys safely. Online surveys represent another alternative—with its own potential mode effects (e.g., Homola, Jackson, and Gill, 2016; Shino and Martinez, 2021)—but recent studies suggest that they fail to produce nationally representative samples in developing contexts like Latin America (Castorena *et al.* Forthcoming). Researchers wishing to draw nationally representative samples in developing contexts therefore have to choose between face-to-face and phone surveys.

One issue in considering phone surveys is the possibility of mode effects, such that data quality or responses themselves differ when people are interviewed over the phone rather than in-person. Social-scientific studies in the US and Europe generally find that responses to phone surveys tend to exhibit more social desirability bias when compared to face-to-face (e.g., Dahlberg and Persson, 2014; Holbrook *et al.*, 2003; Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010; Roberts and Jäckle, 2012) or online surveys (e.g., Kreuter *et al.*, 2008). Similarly, studies in public health find that respondents in phone surveys are less likely to admit drug and alcohol use (e.g., Aquilino, 1991; 1994).[1] Studies also show that for questions that ask respondents to use a numeric scale, purely aural survey modes like phone tend to elicit more extreme responses than more visual modes like face-to-face surveys with visual aids (Christian *et al.* 2009; Dillman *et al.* 2009). In particular, these studies find that respondents in phone surveys tend to choose the positive extreme of the scale more often, a result of primacy bias since the positive endpoint is typically mentioned first.

Studies of mode effects involve methodological tradeoffs. Observational studies, which typically use generalizable samples, rarely address the possible differences between those samples, making it difficult to draw accurate comparisons. Experiments avoid this limitation by assigning survey mode after sampling, but typically rely on convenience samples or very local probability samples because of the difficulty of randomly assigning mode in a national probability survey—and this raises questions about generalizability. Taking a middle-ground approach, our

---

1. While this seems to be the modal finding, some studies also find no effect of mode on social desirability bias (Greenfield, Midanik, and Rogers, 2000; Vannieuwenhuyze, Loosveldt, and Molenberghs, 2010).

study relies on an observational comparison of two national probability samples but uses matching to address imbalances. This approach entails its own methodological limitations, which we return to in the final discussion below, but it provides us with the generalizability of national samples and helps us approximate an experimental ideal with observational comparisons.

What we know about mode effects, especially when it comes to surveys on politics, comes almost exclusively from studies conducted in the affluent democracies of Western Europe and North America. There may be reasons to expect similar findings in less-affluent contexts in the Global South, but we might also expect differences: surveys are far less common in developing countries, the typical respondent has less formal education and less familiarity with numeric scales, and differing cultural contexts may condition how respondents interact with enumerators across modes (see Lupu and Michelitch, 2018). This could mean that we would see stronger mode effects on extreme responses, given lower levels of overall familiarity with numeric scales in the population and the association between extreme responses and lower levels of formal education (e.g., Meisenberg and Williams, 2008). At the same time, it might also mean more attenuated mode effects with regard to social desirability bias, since those with more formal education appear to misreport more (e.g., Karp and Brockington, 2005). Would we see mode effects in developing contexts similar to those documented in more-affluent contexts?

To answer this question, we carried out two nationally representative surveys, one by phone and one face-to-face, in Costa Rica in 2018, several months after that year's two-round presidential election. Costa Rica is a Central American country that ranks in the middle third of countries by wealth and human development. Because of its comparatively long democratic history, it also has a history of survey research (see Seligson, 2020). Comparing effectively identical items we placed on the two surveys allows us to assess differences in social desirability bias and response styles for scalar questions.

This approach follows what many mode studies comparing national probability samples do, effectively treating the two independent samples as experimental groups. Of course, we know that phone and face-to-face surveys use different recruitment methods, potentially producing samples with important demographic and geographic differences (see discussion in Holbrook *et al.*, 2003). Rather than assume that there are no differences between our phone and face-to-face samples, as many prior studies do, we use coarsened exact matching to better approximate an experimental design. This makes us more confident that the differences we observe between our samples are driven by mode effects rather than sampling—a point we return to below.

Even after adjusting for observable covariates through coarsened exact matching, we find that phone respondents were significantly more likely to say that

they turned out to vote for both rounds of the 2018 presidential election. Phone respondents were also significantly less likely to agree that a woman should be able to have an abortion if her health is at risk and that same-sex couples should have the right to marry. Finally, phone respondents were significantly more likely to choose negative endpoints for three scalar questions included on both surveys. This suggests that Costa Ricans are more likely to engage in socially desirable responding for sensitive questions when interviewed by phone, consistent with prior work. Phone respondents also appear to rely more on endpoint responses, but unlike prior work, we find that they tend to choose the extreme negative options rather than the extreme positive ones.

DATA AND METHODS

The face-to-face survey we analyze in this paper is part of the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer, a cross-national study fielded roughly every two years since 2004 across the Americas (more information about the AmericasBarometer can be found at www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/). The Costa Rica survey was conducted between September 24 and October 31, 2018, included 1,501 respondents, and had a margin of error of ±2.5% and a response rate of 26% (AAPOR RR3). The survey employed a multistage clustered area sample, stratified by urban/rural residence and five geographical census regions. Like all AmericasBarometer surveys, respondent selection within the household relied on matching to gender and age group frequencies (see Lupu *et al.*, 2022). The fieldwork was conducted by Analítica, a well-respected local provider. Importantly, the face-to-face survey used show cards as visual aids for items with ordinal 1-7 or 1-10 response scales.

The phone survey was fielded by the Center for Political Research and Study at the University of Costa Rica. The study was carried out between August 13 and 16, 2018, included 720 respondents, and had a margin of error of ±3.7%. Unfortunately, we do not have data for the response rate of this survey; a similar survey conducted November 2020 had a response rate of 8.8%. The phone survey randomly dialed numbers from a government-provided list of active cellphone numbers in Costa Rica, attempting each number up to three times.[2]

Both surveys only included residents or citizens of the country who were at least 18 years old and both instruments included nine effectively identically worded questions (in addition to demographics). Only the item on vote choice differed very slightly between modes (see appendix), but it was effectively identical.

---

2. See Alfaro Córdoba, Villareal Galera, and Navarro Cerdas (2010) and Montalvo, Pizzolitto, and Plutowski (2022) for discussions about the choice to use cellphones versus landlines.

However, the questionnaires of the two surveys were not identical, with the face-to-face questionnaire being significantly longer.

Table 1. Survey items included in both surveys

Item	Response scale	Social Desirability?
Internal efficacy	Ordinal (1-7)	No
Inequality	Ordinal (1-7)	No
Same-sex marriage	Ordinal (1-10)	Yes
Abortion	Binary	Yes
Turnout (round 1)	Binary	Yes
Turnout (round 2)	Binary	Yes
Vote choice (round 1)	Multicategorical	Yes
Vote choice (round 2)	Multicategorical	Yes

Note: See appendix for complete question wording in Spanish and English.

Source: 2018 AmericasBarometer, University of Costa Rica 2018 phone survey

Table 1 lists the nine items included on both surveys, with the full wording of each one provided in English and Spanish in the online appendix. We included both standard political items that would seem uncontroversial to the average Costa Rican (internal efficacy and whether the government should reduce inequality) and others that could be viewed as sensitive (support for same-sex marriage legalization, support for abortions in cases where the mother's life is at risk, and vote choice) or subject to social desirability bias (turnout). Given the socially conservative cultural context in Costa Rica, we expect respondents may be reluctant to admit supporting same-sex marriage or abortion in certain instances. Same-sex marriage in particular had been a salient point of contention in the 2018 election following a decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that required Costa Rica to recognize same-sex marriages (Pignataro and Treminio, 2019).

Like respondents elsewhere in the world (e.g., Adida *et al.*, 2019; Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010), Costa Ricans may also be motivated to over-report participation in elections in order to cast themselves in a favorable light. Finally, since voting is secret, respondents may feel uneasy about sharing their past vote choice with an interviewer, especially if they think the interviewer has a particular preference (Cassell and Cohen Forthcoming). Costa Rica's 2018 election was unlike prior elections, characterized by the decline of the country's traditional political parties

and the rising political influence of religious cleavages (see Alfaro-Redondo and Alpízar Rodríguez, 2020; Alfaro-Redondo and Gómez Campos, 2021; Colburn and Cruz S., 2018; Díaz González and Cordero Cordero, 2020; Pignataro and Treminio 2019). Respondents who voted for Fabricio Alvarado, who lost the runoff, might be especially reluctant to admit doing so given that Carlos Alvarado won the run-off by a landslide and given the extreme positions that Fabricio Alvarado took on cultural issues during the course of the campaign.

Although both surveys employed probability samples targeting the national population, some important demographic and geographic differences did emerge between the two effective samples (see Table A1).[3] In particular, the phone survey has a significantly lower proportion in the highest age category, landline own-ers, and residents of San José, but a higher proportion of university-educated re-spondents. Moreover, the two surveys had different interviewers, and the phone survey had a bigger percentage of interviews conducted by female enumerators (69%) compared to the face-to-face survey (46%). We employ matching in order to address these imbalances across the two surveys and increase our confidence that any substantive differences we find are driven by mode rather than differ-ences between the samples. This allows us to better approximate an experimental design than the typical approach to comparing independent samples in which re-searchers simply assume random assignment to mode.

We employ coarsened exact matching in our analysis. This approach tempo-rarily coarsens the data to produce an exact match between samples and then produces survey weights to incorporate into data analysis. This method has some advantages over exact matching, which often produces very few matches, and Mahalanobis distance or propensity score matching, which requires setting the matching ex ante and checking for balance ex post, resulting in multiple specifica-tions until the user obtains balance (Blackwell *et al.*, 2009). We use many-to-one matching with replacement in order to avoid unnecessarily dropping observa-tions. One-to-one matching produces treatment and control groups of the same size at the cost of substantially reducing the matched sample—a problem that is particularly acute when one sample is much larger than the other, as in our case. However, our substantive results are robust to one-to-one matching without re-placement as well (see Tables A5 and A6).[4]

---

3. For reference, Table A1 also compares both samples to population benchmarks, either from the 2018 National Household Survey (ENAHO, *Encuesta Nacional de Hogares*) fielded annually by the Na-tional Institute of Statistics and Census or the 2011 Census.

4. The exception to this is the result on same-sex marriage, which shrinks somewhat. This is likely due to the process of randomly pruning observations from the treatment and control groups, combined with the large reduction in sample size (from 1,716 to 1,092 observations). At the same time, using a different seed value produced a larger, statistically significant coefficient even with the smaller sample, underscoring the instability of one-to-one matching and reinforcing our preferred approach.

To account for demographic and geographic differences between the samples, we matched on gender, education, age group, residence in San José and Puntarenas provinces, ownership of household items that proxy for wealth (computer/tablet ownership, landline ownership, and internet access), and interviewer gender. Although this is not an exhaustive set of variables, they substantially reduce the differences between the samples (see Table A2). We do lose some observations in the process (416 face-to-face observations and 89 phone observations), but the multivariate L1 distance which measures the global imbalance drops from 0.53 to 0.27 and now there are no differences between the samples on these variables.

We compare the two samples by conducting difference-in-proportions tests (for binary variables) or difference-in-means tests (for ordinal variables). First, we assess differences in substantive responses between the two modes for both ostensibly sensitive and non-sensitive questions. To do this, we recode our ordinal and categorical variables. For vote choice, we create a dummy variable for those who said they voted in each round of the election for the eventual winner, Carlos Alvarado. Next, we evaluate differences across modes in endpoint responding by recoding each of our items with an ordinal response scale (internal efficacy, inequality, and same-sex marriage) into dummy variables that identify respondents who chose either the lowest or the highest value (figura 1).

FINDINGS

We first want to know whether survey mode affected how people responded, particularly when it comes to sensitive items or those subject to social desirability. Figure 1 plots the difference-in-proportions (for binary variables) and difference-in-means (for ordinal variables) between our face-to-face and phone survey samples. Here we do see a clear distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive items. The items we expected not to be sensitive (internal efficacy and inequality) show no statistically significant differences between the two survey modes.

Where we do see differences is for the sensitive items on abortion and same-sex marriage, and for the turnout questions that are subject to social desirability bias. On the two sensitive items, we see that Costa Rican respondents are more likely to support these contentious social policies in the face-to-face survey than in the phone survey, consistent with the findings in prior work that respondents are more forthcoming about sensitive topics in face-to-face surveys. We see similar patterns with turnout: the phone mode, where prior studies suggest social desirability bias will be higher, yields more over-reporting of electoral participation. Although some scholars consider our items on vote choice potentially sensitive, we find no differences on this item between survey modes. This could be

Figure 1. Comparing substantive responses across modes

Note: Dots represent estimated difference-in-proportions or difference-in-means for each item, comparing the face-to-face and phone surveys. Negative values indicate higher rates in phone as compared to face-to-face. Lines represent 95 % confidence intervals. Black circles represent differences that are statistically significant, open circles those that are not. Rates for each sample are provided in Table A3.

Source: 2018 AmericasBarometer, University of Costa Rica 2018 phone survey

specific to this particular election, which was won overwhelmingly by Carlos Alvarado, making this question less sensitive. In addition, the question was asked 6-8 months after the election, and 3-5 months after Carlos Alvarado was sworn in as president. In the context of a more contested election, where such an item is more sensitive, we might expect to see mode effects like those we observe with our more sensitive questions.

Next, we want to examine whether our phone survey in Costa Rica yielded higher rates of responses at the extreme ends of scales, as previous work has found in other contexts. Here we focus only on the three items with ordinal response scales: internal efficacy, inequality, and same-sex marriage. In each case, the scale values are only labeled for respondents at the endpoints, but it should be highlighted that the face-to-face mode included visual aids. Figure 2 presents

the results of difference-in-proportions tests comparing the face-to-face mode to the phone mode for each endpoint of each of these scales.

Figure 2. Comparing endpoint responses across modes

Note: Dots represent estimated differences-in-proportions of endpoint responses for each item, comparing the face-to-face and phone surveys. Negative values indicate higher rates in phone as compared to face-to-face. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Black circles represent differences that are statistically significant, open circles those that are not. Rates for each sample are provided in Table A4.

Source: 2018 AmericasBarometer, University of Costa Rica 2018 phone survey

The results indeed suggest that respondents in this context are more prone to choosing endpoint responses in the phone mode. But they further suggest that this bias tends to skew toward more extreme negative responses than toward extreme positive responses. That is, the underlying cause may be primacy bias—the response options respondents were exposed to first—rather than recency bias—the options they heard last. This primacy bias runs counter to some prior work showing that primacy effects are associated with self-administered and visual presentation of answers (Bowling, 2005; Dillman and Christian, 2005), and that phone surveys tend to have a higher incidence of recency effects. Our findings

suggest that the face-to-face survey with visual show cards had a significantly *lower* rate of primacy bias than the phone survey.[5]

DISCUSSION

While a substantial literature in survey methods finds compelling evidence of mode effects when comparing face-to-face and phone surveys, much of the work compares two independent samples without taking into consideration the differences in the composition of the samples or interviews. Experimental work that randomly assigns mode can improve causal estimates of the differences in response patterns, but typically has to rely on convenience samples that limit generalizability. By using coarsened exact matching, our analysis better approximates an experiment by artificially creating samples that are comparable on geography, demographics, and interviewer characteristics. At the same time, our findings have external validity because they uncover differences in response patterns across two probability-based national samples. Moreover, using a more rigorous method of assessing mode differences, we are able to examine whether mode differences in the literature travel to developing countries by comparing surveys in Costa Rica.

Our findings suggest that some of the conventional wisdom about mode effects obtain in our context as well. Sensitive items and those subject to social desirability bias, like turnout, do exhibit the usual pattern: respondents are more likely to choose the more socially acceptable response over the phone than they are face-to-face. We also find fairly consistent evidence of extreme responses, but they tend to be at the negative extreme of the scale—in contrast to a number of prior studies.

These results suggest that researchers working in the developing world should think carefully before adopting mixed-mode approaches to their surveys. Changing modes over the course of longitudinal surveys or combining data from surveys collected through different modes may introduce biases that subsequently affect

---

5. Homola, Jackson, and Gill (2016) suggest using entropy scores to compare the dispersion of responses across modes. Using their approach, we get fairly similar entropy scores for internal efficacy (1.83 for the face-to-face survey and 1.88 for the phone survey) and inequality (1.30 for the face-to-face survey and 1.34 for the phone survey) across the two modes, with slightly higher values in the phone survey. The same-sex marriage item yields a higher entropy score in the face-to-face survey (1.85) than in the phone survey (1.50), suggesting that responses were more spread out when administered in person. We think these results speak to the extent to which respondents utilize the full scale of responses equivalently across modes, which is an important methodological question. But they speak less directly to our focus—drawing on prior studies—on whether respondents are more likely to select an endpoint response in some modes.

inferences (see also de Leeuw, 2018; Dillman, 2009). Researchers should also be careful when studying changes over time in repeated cross-sectional surveys where the mode has changed.

Nevertheless, our findings do not suggest that face-to-face surveys are always more desirable in a context like Costa Rica. Phone surveys have some clear advantages over face-to-face surveys and while our study points to potential disadvantages when it comes to measurement, there are also tools to address these issues. Scholars have developed a variety of techniques to elicit more truthful responses to sensitive questions, including the item-count technique, randomized response method, endorsement experiments, and numerous others (e.g., Blair *et al.*, 2020; Cassell and Cohen Forthcoming; Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010; Rosenfeld *et al.*, 2015). In cellphone surveys like ours, researchers could consider sending respondents visual aids for numeric scales via SMS to parallel the face-to-face experience. Or they might use branching rather than large numeric scales to improve accuracy and reduce endpoint responses (Malhotra, Krosnick, and Thomas, 2009; but see Gilbert, 2015). Finally, researchers fielding phone surveys could label the midpoint of numeric response scales, a practice that has been shown to reduce nonresponse (Courser and Lavrakas, 2012).

Our study also has its own limitations. While the ideal design would assign respondents to mode after sampling (see, e.g., Gooch and Vavreck, 2019), our study compares two independent samples. This raises the possibility that we might conflate sampling effects with mode effects, and while we address this by matching on observables, that solution is imperfect as there could still be unobserved effects of sampling. Moreover, even though the two surveys were primarily asking about political issues, they did use different questionnaires. While we were able to place some identically worded items on both, our items were embedded among others, which could impact our comparisons (Schwarz *et al.*, 1991).

Still, the comparisons we make across survey modes in Costa Rica are instructive. Placing identically worded questions on two nationally representative surveys fielded very close together in combination with matching offers some advantages over experimental convenience samples. Using this methodology, we have been able to approximate the effect of survey mode on response patterns for sensitive and scalar survey items in a very different context compared to the majority of studies in predominantly affluent countries. This is of course only one such context among hundreds of other developing countries around the world. As more and more people around the developing world gain access to phones, we hope other researchers undertake similar studies of survey mode effects. Only with additional studies across a variety of contexts will we be able to know how much of our conventional wisdom about mode effects holds generally and how much is in fact circumscribed to particular social, cultural, or political contexts.

REFERENCES

Adida, Claire, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon. 2019. «Response Bias in Survey Measures of Voter Behavior: Implications for Measurement and Inference.» *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 6(3): 192-8. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2019.9

Alfaro Córdoba, Marcela, María Paula Villareal Galera, and Gustavo Navarro Cerdas. 2010. «Comparación Metodológica de Encuestas vía Telefonía Fija y Celular en Costa Rica.» *Ciencias Económicas* 28(1): 51-68. https://doi.org/10.15517/rce.v28i1.7064

Alfaro-Redondo, Ronald, and Felipe Alpízar Rodríguez, eds. 2020. *Elecciones 2018 en Costa Rica: Retrato de una Democracia Amenazada*. San José: Programa Estado de la Nación.

Alfaro-Redondo, Ronald, and Steffan Gómez-Campos. 2021. «PLN and PAC: Two Costa Rican Parties with Constituencies Evolving in Opposite Directions.» In *Diminished Parties: Democratic Representation in Contemporary Latin America*, eds. Juan Pablo Luna, Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez, Fernando Rosenblatt, and Gabriel Vommaro. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 111-28.

Aquilino, William S. 1991. «Telephone Versus Face-to-Face Interviewing for Household Drug Use Surveys.» *International Journal of the Addictions* 27(1): 71-91. https://doi.org/10.3109/10826089109063463

Aquilino, William S. 1994. «Interview Mode Effects in Surveys of Drug and Alcohol Use: A Field Experiment.» *Public Opinion Quarterly* 58: 210-40. https://doi.org/10.1086/269419

Blackwell, Matthew, Stefano Iacus, Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro. 2009. «cem: Coarsened Exact Matching in Stata.» *The Stata Journal* 9(4): 524-46. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0900900402

Blair, Graeme, Alexander Coppock, and Margaret Moor. 2020. «When to Worry about Sensitivity Bias: A Social Reference Theory and Evidence from 30 Years of List Experiments.» *American Political Science Review* 114(4): 1297-315. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000374

Bowling, Ann. 2005. «Mode of Questionnaire Administration Can Have Serious Effects on Data Quality.» *Journal of Public Health* 27(3): 281–91. https://doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/fdi031

Cassell, Kaitlen J., and Mollie J. Cohen. Forthcoming. «Reducing Item Non-Response to Vote Choice Questions: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Mexico.» *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Available at http://nebula.wsimg.com/4f954acc79f53e6189906a4b95ca82ab?AccessKeyId=6C80BA4D3A5A4F2D4389&disposition=0&alloworigin=1

Castorena, Oscar, Noam Lupu, Maita Schade, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. Forthcoming. «Online Surveys in Latin America.» *PS: Political Science & Politics*. Available at https://noamlupu.com/online_samples.pdf.

Christian, Leah Melani, Nicholas L. Parsons, and Don A. Dillman. 2009. «Designing Scalar Questions for Web Surveys.» *Sociological Methods & Research* 37(3): 393-425. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124108330004

Colburn, Forrest D., and Arturo Cruz S. 2018. «Latin America's Shifting Politics: The Fading of Costa Rica's Old Parties.» *Journal of Democracy* 29(4): 43-53. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0061

Courser, Matthew, and Paul J. Lavrakas. 2012. «Item-Nonresponse and the 10-Point Response Scale in Telephone Surveys.» *Survey Practice* 5(4): 1-7. https://doi.org/10.29115/SP-2012-0021

Dahlberg, Stefan, and Mikael Persson. 2014. «Different Surveys, Different Results? A Comparison of Two Surveys on the 2009 European Parliamentary Election.» *West European Politics* 37(1): 204-221. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.814961

de Leeuw, Edith D. 2018. «Mixed-Mode: Past, Present, and Future.» *Survey Research Methods* 12(2): 75-89. https://doi.org/10.18148/srm/2018.v12i2.7402

Díaz González, José Andrés, and Stephanie Cordero Cordero. 2020. «Las Preferencias del Electorado en la Segunda Ronda Presidencial de 2018 en Costa Rica: Un Modelo de Socialización Política.» *Política y Gobierno* 27(1): 1-22. https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?pid=S1665-20372020000100200&script=sci_arttext

Dillman, Don A. 2009. «Some Consequences of Survey Mode Changes in Longitudinal Surveys.» In *Methodology of Longitudinal Surveys*, ed. Peter Lynn. London: Wiley, pp. 127-40.

Dillman, Don A., and Leah Melani Christian. 2005. «Survey Mode as a Source of Instability in Responses across Surveys.» *Field Methods* 17(1): 30–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X04269550

Dillman, Don A., Glenn Phelps, Robert Tortora, Karen Swift, Julie Kohrell, Jodi Berck, and Benjamin L. Messer. 2009. «Response Rate and Measurement Differences in Mixed-Mode Surveys Using Mail, Telephone, Interactive Voice Response (IVR) and the Internet.» *Social Science Research* 38(1): 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2008.03.007

Gibson, Dustin G. Amanda Pereira, Brooke A. Farrenkopf, Alain B. Labrique, George W. Pariyo, and Adnan A. Hyder. 2017. «Mobile Phone Surveys for Collecting Population-Level Estimates in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Literature Review.» *Journal of Medical Internet Research* 19(5): 1-12. https://doi.org/10.2196/jmir.7428

Gilbert, Emily E. 2015. «A Comparison of Branched Versus Unbranched Rating Scales for the Measurement of Attitudes in Surveys.» *Public Opinion Quarterly* 79(2): 443-70. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfu090

Gooch, Andrew, and Lynn Vavreck. 2019. «How Face-to-Face Interviews and Cognitive Skill Affect Item Non-Response: A Randomized Experiment Assigning Mode of Interview.» *Political Science Research and Methods* 7(1): 143-62. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2016.20

Greenfield, Thomas K., Lorrain T. Midanik, and John D. Rogers. 2000. «Effects of Telephone versus Face-to-Face Interview Modes on Reports of Alcohol Consumption.» *Addiction* 95(2). https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1360-0443.2000.95227714.x

Holbrook, Allyson L., Melanie C. Green, and Jon A. Krosnick. 2003. «Telephone versus Face-to-Face Interviewing of National Probability Samples with Long Questionnaires: Comparisons of Respondent Satisficing and Social Desirability Response Bias.» *Public Opinion Quarterly* 67(1): 79-125. https://doi.org/10.1086/346010

Holbrook, Allyson L., and Jon A. Krosnick. 2010. «Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique.» *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74(1): 37-67. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfp065

Homola, Jonathan, Natalie Jackson, and Jeff Gill. 2016. «A Measure of Survey Mode Differences.» *Electoral Studies* 44: 255-74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.06.010

Hox, Joop J., and Edith D. de Leeuw. 1994. «A Comparison of Nonresponse in Mail, Telephone, and Face-to-Face Surveys: Applying Multilevel Modeling to Meta-Analysis.» *Quality & Quantity* 28: 329-44. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01097014

Jäckle, Annette, Caroline Roberts and Peter Lynn. 2010. «Assessing the Effect of Data Collection Mode on Measurement.» *International Statistical Review* 78(1): 3-20. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-5823.2010.00102.x

Karp, Jeffrey A., and David Brockington. 2005. «Social Desirability and Response Validity: A Comparative Analysis of Overreporting Voter Turnout in Five Countries.» *Journal of Politics* 67(3):825-40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00341.x

Kreuter, Frauke, Stanley Presser, and Roger Tourangeau. 2008. «Social Desirability Dias in CATI, IVR, and Web Surveys: The Effects of Mode and Question Sensitivity.» *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72(5): 847-65. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfn063

Lupu, Noam, and Kristin Michelitch. 2018. «Advances in Survey Methods for the Developing World.» *Annual Review of Political Science* 21: 195-214. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052115-021432

Lupu, Noam, J. Daniel Montalvo, Mitchell A. Seligson, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, and Kirill Zhirkov. 2022. «Comparing Two Common Approaches to Within-Household Sampling: A Field Experiment in Costa Rica.» Unpublished manuscript. Available at https://noamlupu.com/FM_vs_LB.pdf

Malhotra, Neil, Jon A. Krosnick, and Randall K. Thomas. 2009. «Optimal Design of Branching Questions to Measure Bipolar Constructs.» *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73(2): 304-24. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfp023

Meisenberg, Gerhard, and Amandy Williams. 2008. «Are Acquiescent and Extreme Response Styles Related to Low Intelligence and Education?» *Personality and Individual Differences* 44(7): 1539-50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2008.01.010

Montalvo, J. Daniel, Georgina Pizzolitto, and Luke Plutowski. 2022. «Telephone Sampling in the 2021 AmericasBarometer.» LAPOP Methodological Note No. 009. Available at https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IMN009en.pdf

Perelló, Lucas, and Patricio Navia. 2021. «Abrupt and Gradual Realignments: The Case of Costa Rica, 1958-2018.» *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 13(1): 86-113. https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20967733

Pignataro, Adrián, and Ilka Treminio. 2019. «Reto Económico, Valores y Religión en las Elecciones Nacionales de Costa Rica 2018.» *Revista de Ciencia Política* 39(2): 239-64. http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2019000200239

Roberts, Caroline, and Annette Jäckle. 2012. «Causes of Mode Effects: Separating Out Interviewer and Stimulus Effects in Comparisons of Face-to-Face and Telephone Surveys.» ISER Working Paper No. 2012-27. Available at https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/91682

Rosenfeld, Bryn, Kosuke Imai, and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2016. «An Empirical Validation Study of Popular Survey Methodologies for Sensitive Questions.» *American Journal of Political Science* 60(3): 783-802. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12205

Schwarz, Norbert, Fritz Strack, Hans-J. Hippler, and George Bishop. 1991. «The Impact of Administration Mode on Response Effects in Survey Measurement.» *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 5: 193-212. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2350050304

Seligson, Mitchell A. 2020. «The Seligson Political Culture Survey Archive: Costa Rica, 1973-2005.» LAPOP Insights Series No. 143. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO943en.pdf

Shino, Enrijeta, and Michael D. Martinez. 2021. «The Different Faces of Public Opinion: Is the American Voter Tinted by Mode?» *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 33(4): 756-78. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edab003

Vannieuwenhuyze, Jorre, Geert Loosveldt, and Geert Molenberghs. 2010. «A Method for Evaluating Mode Effects in Mixed-Mode Surveys.» *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74(5) 1027-45. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfq059

APPENDIX A

Question Wording

Internal efficacy:
Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? (1) Muy en desacuerdo – (7) Muy de acuerdo
You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1) Strongly disagree – (7) Strongly agree

Government should reduce inequality
El Estado costarricense debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? (1) Muy en desacuerdo – (7) Muy de acuerdo
The Costa Rican government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1) Strongly disagree – (7) Strongly agree

Same-sex marriage
¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse? (1) Desaprueba firmemente – (10) Aprueba firmemente
How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry? (1) Strongly disapprove – (10) Strongly approve

Abortion when mother's health at risk
¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre? (1) Sí, (0) No
Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the
mother's health is in danger? (1) Yes, (0) No

Turnout (round 1)
Face-to-face: ¿Votó usted en la primera ronda de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2018? (1) Sí, (0) No
Phone: ¿Votó usted en las elecciones de febrero de 2018 (primera ronda)? (1) Sí votó, (2) No votó
Did you vote in the first round of the last presidential elections of 2018? (1) Yes, (0) No

Turnout (round 2)

Face-to-face: *Votó usted en la segunda ronda de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2018? (1) Sí, (0) No*

Phone: *¿Votó usted en la s elecciones de abril de 2018 (segunda ronda)? (1) Sí votó, (2) No votó*

Did you vote in the second round of the last presidential elections of 2018? (1) Yes, (0) No

Vote choice (round 1)

Face-to-face: *¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la primera ronda de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2018? (0) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco), (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto), (601) Carlos Alvarado Quesada (PAC), (602) Fabricio Alvarado Muñoz (PRN), (603) Antonio Álvarez Desanti (PLN), (604) Rodolfo Piza Rocafort (PUSC), (605) Juan Diego Castro Fernández (PIN), (606) Rodolfo Hernández Gómez (PRSC), (607) Otto Guevara Guth (ML), (608) Edgardo Araya Sibaja (FA), (677) Otro*

Who did you vote for in the first round of the last presidential election of 2018? (0) No one (blank vote), (97) No one (null vote), (601) Carlos Alvarado Quesada (PAC), (602) Fabricio Alvarado Muñoz (PRN), (603) Antonio Álvarez Desanti (PLN), (604) Rodolfo Piza Rocafort (PUSC), (605) Juan Diego Castro Fernández (PIN), (606) Rodolfo Hernández Gómez (PRSC), (607) Otto Guevara Guth (ML), (608) Edgardo Araya Sibaja (FA), (677) Other

Phone: *¿Por quién votó usted? (0) No votó, (97) Ninguno (anuló el voto), (1) Rodolfo Piza (PUSC), (2) Antonio Álvarez (PLN), (3) Carlos Alvarado (PAC), (4) Otto Guevara (ML), (5) Edgardo Araya (FA), (6) Rodolfo Hernández (RSC), (7) Juan Diego Castro (PIN), (8) Sergio Mena (NG), (9) John Vega (PT), (11) Fabricio Alvarado (RN), (10) Otro*

For whom did you vote? (0) Didn't Vote, (97) No one (cast a null ballot), (1) Rodolfo Piza (PUSC), (2) Antonio Álvarez (PLN), (3) Carlos Alvarado (PAC), (4) Otto Guevara (ML), (5) Edgardo Araya (FA), (6) Rodolfo Hernández (RSC), (7) Juan Diego Castro (PIN), (8) Sergio Mena (NG), (9) John Vega (PT), (11) Fabricio Alvarado (RN), (10) Other

Vote choice (round 2)

Face-to-face: *¿Y por quién votó para Presidente en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales del 2018? (0) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco), (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto), (601) Carlos Alvarado Quesada (PAC), (602) Fabricio Alvarado Muñoz (PRN)*

For whom did you vote in the second round of the presidential elections in 2018? (0) No one (blank vote), (97) No one (null vote), (601) Carlos Alvarado Quesada (PAC), (602) Fabricio Alvarado Muñoz (PRN)

Phone: *¿Por quién votó usted el pasado 01 de abril? (3) Carlos Alvarado, (11) Fabricio Alvarado, (96) Se abstuvo, (97) Anuló el voto, (98) Votó en blanco*
For whom did you vote on April 1st? (3) Carlos Alvarado, (11) Fabricio Alvarado, (96) Abstained, (97) Null vote, (98) Cast a blank vote

APPENDIX B

Additional Tables

Table A1. Comparing demographic distributions

Variable	Face-to-Face Sample	Phone Sample	ENAHO 2018
Gender			
Female	50.0%	52.9%	52.3%
Male	50.0%	47.1%	47.7%
Age group			
18-25	22.1%	21.7%	18.1%
26-35	25.7%	24.3%	20.4%
36-45	16.4%	19.4%	17.9%
46-55	14.2%	16.9%	16.6%
56-65	11.1%	10.6%	14.0%
65+	10.5%	7.1%	13.0%
Education level			
Primary or less	32.3%	27.5%	41.8%
Secondary	47.9%	38.8%	39.1%
Tertiary	19.8%	33.8%	19.1%
Household assets			
Computer	52.8%	56.8%	48.9%
Landline phone	33.0%	28.4%	
Internet access	67.9%	69.8%	75.6%

Variable	Face-to-Face Sample	Phone Sample	ENAHO 2018
Province			Census 2011
San José	40.0%	32.8%	32.7%
Alajuela	17.3%	20.4%	20.0%
Cartago	10.0%	10.7%	10.7%
Heredia	9.9%	9.7%	10.2%
Guanacaste	6.4%	7.9%	7.7%
Puntarenas	6.3%	9.5%	9.7%
Limón	9.9%	8.9%	9.0%

Note: Bolded values identify statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) differences between the two survey samples. Italicized values identify statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) differences between a survey and the benchmark (ENAHO or Census).

Source: 2018 AmericasBarometer, University of Costa Rica 2018 phone survey

Table A2: Comparing distributions with and without matching

	Face-to-Face Sample (No Matching)	Phone Sample (No Matching)	Face-to-Face Sample (CEM Weights)	Phone Sample (CEM Weights)
College	0.20	0.34	0.31	0.31
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
65+	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.06
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	0.50	0.53	0.52	0.52
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Landline	0.33	0.28	0.27	0.27
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Computer	0.53	0.57	0.58	0.58
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

	Face-to-Face Sample (No Matching)	Phone Sample (No Matching)	Face-to-Face Sample (CEM Weights)	Phone Sample (CEM Weights)
Internet	0.68	0.70	0.73	0.73
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
San Jose	0.40	0.33	0.34	0.34
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Puntarenas	0.06	0.09	0.05	0.05
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	0.46	0.69	0.69	0.69
Interviewer	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
N	1,501	720	1,085	631

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: 2018 AmericasBarometer, University of Costa Rica 2018 phone survey

Table A3. Comparing substantive responses across modes

Variable	Face-to-Face Sample	Phone Sample	Difference
Internal efficacy	0.609	0.615	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Inequality	0.855	0.838	0.016
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Abortion	0.659	0.582	0.077
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Same-sex marriage	0.380	0.336	0.045
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Turnout (R1)	0.724	0.786	-0.062
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Turnout (R2)	0.653	0.734	-0.081

Variable	Face-to-Face Sample	Phone Sample	Difference
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.023)
C. Alvarado vote (R1)	0.385	0.385	-0.000
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.029)
C. Alvarado vote (R2)	0.658	0.636	0.022
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.030)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Bolded differences are statistically significant (*p < 0.05*).

Source: 2018 AmericasBarometer, University of Costa Rica 2018 phone survey

Table A4. Comparing endpoint responses across modes

Variable	Face-to-Face Sample	Phone Sample	Difference
Internal efficacy	0.042	0.108	-0.066
(strongly disagree)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Internal efficacy	0.140	0.200	-0.059
(strongly agree)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Inequality	0.026	0.057	-0.030
(strongly disagree)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Inequality	0.613	0.622	-0.010
(strongly agree)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Same-sex marriage	0.397	0.547	-0.150
(strongly disapprove)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Same-sex marriage	0.183	0.217	-0.033
(strongly approve)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.020)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Bolded differences are statistically significant (*p < 0.05*).

Source: 2018 AmericasBarometer, University of Costa Rica 2018 phone survey

Table A5. Comparing substantive responses across modes (one-to-one matching)

Variable	Face-to-Face Sample	Phone Sample	Difference
INTERNAL EFFICACY	0.610	0.620	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.017)
INEQUALITY	0.844	0.842	0.003
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)
ABORTION	0.658	0.579	0.079
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.030)
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE	0.367	0.331	0.035
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.025)
TURNOUT (R1)	0.705	0.775	-0.070
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.026)
TURNOUT (R2)	0.629	0.723	-0.095
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.028)
C. ALVARADO VOTE (R1)	0.398	0.389	0.009
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.037)
C. ALVARADO VOTE (R2)	0.633	0.633	0.001
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.037)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Bolded differences are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).

Source: 2018 AmericasBarometer, University of Costa Rica 2018 phone survey

Table A6. Comparing endpoint responses across modes (one-to-one matching)

Variable	Face-to-Face Sample	Phone Sample	Difference
Internal efficacy	0.040	0.097	-0.057
(strongly disagree)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Internal efficacy	0.139	0.211	-0.072
(strongly agree)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Inequality	0.029	0.056	-0.027
(strongly disagree)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Inequality	0.607	0.627	-0.020
(strongly agree)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Same-sex marriage	0.412	0.552	-0.139
(strongly disapprove)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.030)
Same-sex marriage	0.174	0.211	-0.037
(strongly approve)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.024)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Bolded differences are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).
Source: 2018 AmericasBarometer, University of Costa Rica 2018 phone survey

NOTAS DE INVESTIGACIÓN

TOLERANCE FOR POSTPONING ELECTIONS IN CRISIS CONDITIONS

Tolerancia a Posponer Elecciones en Tiempos de Crisis

Tolerância para Adiar Eleições em Tempos de Crise

LUKE PLUTOWSKI [iD] luke.plutowski@vanderbilt.edu [1]

ELIZABETH J. ZECHMEISTER [iD] liz.zechmeister@vanderbilt.edu [1]

[1] Vanderbilt University

Abstract

Election postponements occur around the world for a variety of reasons, but they became especially widespread during the Covid-19 pandemic. Little is known how the public perceives and reacts to such democratic delays. To shed light on this topic, we included a question module in the 2021 AmericasBarometer about tolerance for alterations to democracy during periods of crisis. The data reveal that tolerance for election postponements is quite high. Further, through a wording experiment, we find that the public is more willing to accept such a delay during a health emergency vis-à-vis an alternative condition (widespread violence). We contextualize these findings by comparing them with attitudes about a more extreme anti-democratic disruption: a coup d'etat by security forces. Coups are significantly less popular than election postponements, especially during a health emergency. The results improve our understanding of public appetite for authoritarianism during periods of crisis.

Palabras clave:
*aplazamiento
de elecciones;
democracia;
encuestas;
Covid-19;
América Latina*

Resumen

Los aplazamientos de elecciones ocurren en todo el mundo por diferentes motivos. Sin embargo, estos se generalizaron particularmente durante la pandemia de Covid-19. Poco se conoce sobre cómo el público percibe y reacciona ante tales retrasos democráticos. Para dar una idea más clara sobre este tema, se incluyó un módulo de preguntas en el Barómetro de las Américas 2021 sobre la tolerancia a las alteraciones de la democracia durante períodos de crisis. Los datos revelan que la tolerancia a los aplazamientos de las elecciones es bastante alta. Además, a través de un experimento de redacción, se encuentra que el público está más dispuesto a aceptar retrasos electorales durante una emergencia de salud que durante una condición alternativa (violencia generalizada). El artículo contextualiza estos hallazgos comparándolos con actitudes sobre una ruptura antidemocrática más extrema: un golpe de estado por parte de las fuerzas del orden. Los golpes de Estado son significativamente menos populares que los aplazamientos de elecciones, especialmente durante una emergencia sanitaria. Los resultados incrementan nuestra comprensión sobre la demanda pública por autoritarismo durante períodos de crisis.

Palavra s-chave:
*adiamento
de eleições;
democracia;
pesquisas de
opinião pública;
Covid-19;
América Latina*

Resumo

Os adiamentos de eleições ocorrem em todo o mundo por diferentes razões. No entanto, estes se tornaram difundidos especialmente durante a pandemia de Covid-19. Pouco se sabe sobre como o público percebe e reage a esses atrasos democráticos. Para esclarecer essa questão, um módulo de perguntas foi incluído no Barômetro das Américas 2021 sobre tolerância a alterações à democracia durante períodos de crise. Os dados revelam que a tolerância para adiamentos de eleições é bastante alta. Além disso, por meio de um experimento de redação, descobrimos que o público está mais disposto a aceitar atrasos eleitorais durante uma emergência de saúde do que durante uma condição alternativa (violência generalizada). O artigo contextualiza essas descobertas comparando-as com atitudes sobre uma ruptura antidemocrática mais extrema: um golpe de Estado. Os golpes de Estado são significativamente menos populares do que adiamentos de eleições, especialmente durante uma emergência de saúde. Os resultados melhoram nossa compreensão da demanda pública por autoritarismo em períodos de crise.

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 pandemic intersected with a decade-long global trend toward authoritarianism (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2020), under which democratic faultlines have appeared or widened across the Americas. In 2019, instability challenged the region: congress was dissolved in Peru, and violent clashes took place between protestors and security forces in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and elsewhere. As the pandemic unfolded in 2020 and into 2021, backsliding continued to close the space available for political discourse and competition with, for example, politically-motivated arrests by Nicolás Maduro's regime in Venezuela and President Daniel Ortega's administration in Nicaragua.

Adding to democratic stall in the region, the pandemic motivated the postponement of some local and national elections.[1] While public health and safety concerns may make it reasonable to reschedule some elections during a pandemic, the act nonetheless places stress on a democracy by removing its core guarantee: the right for citizens to participate in a public contest between political candidates (Dahl, 1971). Further, election delays can be an autocratic tool for incumbent officeholders to extend their term or gain electoral advantage. For example, Moraski and Reisinger (2007) describe how Russian President Vladimir Putin strategically used changes in the timing of gubernatorial elections to influence election results and ultimately undermine their credibility as institutions. In short, while justifiable in theory, the postponement of elections can place democracy at risk (James & Alihodzic, 2020).

Public appetite for postponing elections can factor into leaders' decisions regarding when and for how long to delay elections in times of threat. For example, following 9/11, then-Mayor of New York City Rudy Giuliani reportedly raised the idea of postponing city elections, but backtracked after encountering resistance.[2] In general, public opinion shapes the policy space in which politicians maneuver (Shapiro, 2011). Public support can embolden leaders and facilitate "executive aggrandizement" – legal maneuvers to centralize and extend power (Bermeo, 2016). Consequently, it is important to consider this question: how did the Covid-19 pandemic influence the public's tolerance for postponing elections?

We answer this question via original survey data from 13 countries across Latin America and the Caribbean. The data permit us to evaluate public tolerance toward a hypothetical election postponement by the executive due to a health emergency like the Covid-19 pandemic –on its own and in comparison to another type of crisis, widespread violence. For broader perspective, we also compare these views on the acceptability of pausing democratic processes (delaying elections) against views on more extreme democratic disruptions: coups d'etat by security forces.

We find high degrees of tolerance for postponing elections under conditions of a major health emergency. Appetite for this type of pause is consistently higher than it is for a scenario involving a high degree of violence. Tolerance for delaying democracy via postponing elections also is higher than tolerance for disrupting democracy via a coup, no matter the circumstance. As a point of comparison, health emergencies do not consistently boost tolerance for democratic disruptions (coups) compared to other crises, as they do for democratic delays (postponements).

---

1. See a list of postponed elections due to Covid-19 from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance here: https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections
2. https://www.businessinsider.com/rudy-giuliani-george-pataki-cancel-elections-stay-mayor-after-911-2020-2

This study makes three main contributions. First, to our knowledge, we are the first to provide region-wide estimates of support for election postponements, which is an important yet understudied political phenomenon. Second, the findings address the ongoing debate about the relationship between Covid-19 and democracy. The results suggest that the pandemic raises support for pauses on democratic processes more so than other large scale problems like widespread violence. Finally, the results provide evidence that democratic attitudes play a stabilizing role in times of crisis. Although most people are quite preoccupied with Covid-19, and they are willing to embrace disruptions to normal election schedules, they do not turn to regime change to solve the crisis. In the conclusion, we return to a discussion of the study's implications and suggest avenues for further research.

MOTIVATION

At least 80 countries around the world have postponed elections due to the Covid-19 pandemic.[3] Postponements have occurred in various countries through the Americas, though the extent to which the delays were directly related to the virus varies by country. For example, general elections in the Dominican Republic were scheduled for May 17, 2020 but were delayed because of coronavirus until July 5, 2020, at which point they proceeded smoothly. Likewise, in Brazil, municipal elections were pushed back by a month and a half, from October 4, 2020 to November 15, 2020, after some proposed delaying them until the general elections of 2022.[4] A different case is Bolivia's general elections, which were scheduled for May 3 but delayed twice and finally held on October 18, 2020. The Bolivian postponements were ostensibly due to Covid-19, but they took place amidst the backdrop of a power struggle following a controversial annulment of election results in 2019. Additionally, presidential elections and a constitutional referendum in Haiti were indefinitely postponed due to a combination of Covid-19, outbreaks of violence in the streets, and difficulties in the electoral council. In contrast, elections were held on schedule in other countries in the Americas, including in Ecuador and the United States.

While the pandemic brought about changes to electoral cycles in many countries, interrupted elections are nothing new to the world's developing democracies. The National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset

3. https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections
4. "Prefeitos defendem adiamento de eleições e votação única." Estadão. 24 March 2020. https://exame.com/brasil/prefeitos-defendem-adiamento-de-eleicoes-e-votacao-unica-a-cada-cinco-anos/

identifies 144 states that have experienced a "suspended election" between 1945 and 2015 (Hyde & Marinov, 2012).

Election postponements are controversial. As the Covid-19 pandemic unfurled, supporters of election delays argued that they were necessary to help stop the spread of the virus[5] and to ensure free and fair elections with widespread participation.[6] In contrast, critics claimed that election delays are an illegitimate power grab[7] and raised concerns about the effects of such delays on institutional legitimacy.[8]

At the heart of this debate lies a tension between managing the crisis and maintaining the stability of the electoral system. James and Alihodzic (2020) provide an overview of normative justifications for postponing elections during emergencies like the Covid-19 pandemic, natural disasters, and conflict, arguing that such crises compromise "opportunities for deliberation, contestation, participation, and election management quality." Limited ability or willingness to travel and engage in in-person activity poses risks to various aspects of elections, including campaigning, nominations and primaries, registration, observer training, voting, security, and vote counting, especially in countries with limited internet and telephone access. Analyses of participation in municipal elections in France and Spain show a strong inverse relationship between Covid-19 outbreaks and voter turnout (Fernández-Navia, 2021; Noury *et al.*, 2021).

However, election postponements represent a departure from normal democratic procedure and hold the potential to compromise or destabilize democracy (James & Alihodzic, 2020). Such postponements can diminish institutional certainty by altering the expectation of transfer of power. That can shake faith in the democratic process, especially in new democracies and hybrid regimes (Landman

---

5. Experts testified in front of Brazil's Congress advocating for election delays, with one remarking that holding elections in October would be "inconceivable". See: Garcia, Gustavo. "Eleições 2020: senadores debatem eventual adiamento com presidente do TSE e especialistas." *Globo*, 22 June 2020. https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2020/noticia/2020/06/22/eleicoes-2020-senadores-debatem-eventual-adiamento-com-presidente-do-tse-e-especialistas.ghtml
6. President of Chile Sebastián Piñera said that his government's decision to delay 2021 elections until health indicators improved helps "achieve high citizen participation." See: "Presidente Piñera promulgó postergación de elecciones para el 15 y 16 de mayo" *CNN Chile*. 6 April 2021. https://www.cnnchile.com/pais/pinera-promulga-postergacion-elecciones_20210406/
7. Former Bolivian President Evo Morales spoke out against the second election delay, claiming it was meant to extend the interim's government hold on power. See: "Evo Morales advierte sobre otra posible postergación de las elecciones presidenciales." Télam Consur. 23 July, 2020. https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/202007/493440-evo-morales-bolivia-postergacion-elecciones-presidenciales.html
8. United States President Donald Trump proposed delaying the 2020 elections, which drew condemnation from his own party, with Republican Senator Chuck Grassley stating, "we still are a country based on the rule of law and we want to follow the law until ... the Constitution is changed." See Wu, Nicholas and Christal Hayes. "McConnell, other top Republicans say Election Day isn't moving after Trump floated delay." *USA Today*. 30 July 2020. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/30/mcconnell-gop-say-election-day-not-moving-after-trump-floated-delay/5545609002/

& Splendore, 2020). In Ethiopia, for example, postponement of elections in 2020 exacerbated and intensified existing political strife, which ultimately triggered an armed conflict (Matlosa, 2021).

Though they are common, especially in the context of the pandemic, election postponements are not well understood by political science. For the most part, scholarly discussion on election postponements considers their legal or normative justifications (James & Alihodzic, 2020; Morley, 2017) or their macro-level effects on political institutions (Landman & Splendore, 2020; Matlosa, 2021).[9] We extend scholarship on election postponement by providing insight into this question: Are citizens willing to accept election postponements in times of emergency, and in what circumstances? The answer to this question is important because the survival of democracy depends on public support of the system (Claassen, 2020). If elites move to delay elections, the public could lose faith in the electoral process. Related, it is important to understand public opinion on this topic because policy makers are influenced by popular sentiment (Shapiro, 2011). That is, in theory, the decision to delay elections (or not) is conditional on the extent to which executives anticipate public approval (or resistance).

Our study also extends work on the political effects of Covid-19, which has focused a good deal of attention on trust in government and support for incumbent regimes and less on attitudes toward elections. We add perspective to a debate in extant research on whether the pandemic has positive or negative consequences for democratic attitudes. Some studies have found a link between the onset of the pandemic (and accompanying lockdown measures) and support for incumbents, trust in democratic political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy (Devine *et al.*, 2020; De Vries *et al.*, 2021; Bol *et al.*, 2021; Esaiasson, 2021; Jennings, 2020; Schraff, 2020). Others, though, suggest that the crisis increased national favoritism, desire for strong leadership, and willingness to give up freedom (Amat *et al.*, 2020). Likewise, some have argued that the pandemic has accelerated democratic backsliding where democratic institutions were already beginning to deteriorate (Rapeli and Saikkonen, 2020). Within Latin America, several studies find that presidents received a boost in popularity at the beginning of the pandemic, though the effects quickly faded (Klobovs, 2020; Sosa-Villagarcia & Hurtado Lozada, 2021; Lupu & Zechmeister, 2021).

Why, in theory, would attitudes towards elections shift under the specter of the pandemic? Three strands of argument provide complementary but distinct reasons why the public's tolerance for election postponement would be comparatively elevated when confronting a public health crisis. First, conditions of threat and crisis

---

9. An exception is Lupu and Zechmeister (2021), who estimate support for an election postponement, but it is not their main focus and analysis is limited to one country (Haiti).

move the public in authoritarian directions (e.g., among many, Sales, 1973; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009). To the extent that the pandemic nudges opinion away from liberal perspectives, the public may become more tolerant of deviations from normal democratic processes. Second, the rally 'round the flag framework holds that support for incumbents increases in the face of external shocks (Mueller, 1970). If a similar logic holds under the pandemic (see, e.g., Lupu & Zechmeister, 2021; Kritzinger *et al.*, 2021), individuals may accept postponing elections to keep the executive in place. Third, individuals consider risks to their safety in deciding whether or not to participate in elections (Ley, 2018; Trelles and Carreras, 2012). While perceptions of risk due to the Covid-19 pandemic vary by personal and political factors (e.g., Aruguete *et al.*, 2021; Bell-Martin & Díaz Domínguez, 2021; Calvo & Ventura, 2021; Sobral *et al.*, 2020), overall levels of concern about contracting the disease were elevated as cases surged around the world. AmericasBarometer data show, for example, that in 2021 across the Latin America and Caribbean region, worry about the Covid-19 pandemic was widespread: on average across the region, 65.7% of individuals reported being "very worried" about someone in the household contracting the virus. Because of the communicable nature of the virus, voters could feel personally vulnerable at the polls, raising tolerance for alterations to elections even more than other types of national crisis.[10]

Support for postponing elections is, at least temporarily, an endorsement of the status quo. Some scholars have reported evidence that the pandemic motivates an embrace of status quo and/or mainstream politics (Bisbee and Honig 2022). Conversely, the three factors identified above – authoritarianism, rally 'round the flag, and personal risk – could generate momentum for drastic *changes* to the status quo. That is, in times of crisis and/or widespread discontent, we might expect support for coups (Seligson & Carrión, 2002; Seligson & Booth, 2009) or the entry of populist politicians (Hawkins, Read, & Pauwels, 2017). If voters are eager to replace incumbent leaders, we would expect low levels of tolerance for postponements, since elections are one channel through which a new leader could emerge.

To evaluate how the public considers election postponement under a pandemic, we gather original comparative data from 13 countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region. We first provide baseline estimates of tolerance for executive-issued election postponements during a health emergency like Covid-19, which, to our knowledge, is the first set of region-wide data on attitudes toward election delays. We then contextualize these estimates by viewing them through two lenses.

---

10.   Testing these micro-logics is outside the scope of this research note; therefore, we caution against the potential for an ecological fallacy in which aggregate patterns do not map on to micro-level mechanisms. As we note in the conclusion, a next step in this research agenda is to use the publicly available AmericasBarometer data to study individual-level opinion dynamics on these topics.

First, to test our hypothesis about elevated tolerance for postponements under public health crises, we compare attitudes toward postponing elections during a health emergency to views on the acceptability of postponements during another type of crisis which could plausibly impact elections: widespread violence.

Second, we compare attitudes about postponing elections to tolerance for a complete disruption of democracy in the form of a coup d'etat. We note an important facet of this comparison is that the former question asks about granting the executive leeway with respect to the administration of elections, while the latter asks about a scenario in which the executive is deposed. We consider these two scenarios as deviations from democracy, as any democratic system relies on regularly held elections and, accordingly, the expectation that the public will have the chance to choose new leadership. However, if opinion shifts in an undemocratic way that favors deep democratic disruptions carried out by the executive, rather than against the executive, our analysis will fail to detect that turn. Thus, we acknowledge that this comparison is only one way, among theoretical others, to assess whether tolerance for election postponements simply constitutes an endorsement of the status quo or signals an embrace of authoritarianism in response to the crisis.

DATA

To investigate opinion toward election postponement, we designed original questions and a question-wording experiment, and included these instruments in the 2021 round of LAPOP's AmericasBarometer survey. The AmericasBarometer is a biennial survey of democratic attitudes across the Americas continent. Interviews for this round took place entirely over mobile phones in 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries.[11] Data were collected between January and August 2021.

Our analysis is centered on two wording experiments related to support for democratic disruptions.[12] The first asks whether it is justifiable for the president to postpone elections under one of two randomly assigned conditions: when "there is a public health emergency like the coronavirus", or when "there is a lot of violence". The second experiment mirrors the first but provides perspective on a more unequivocally undemocratic action: military coups. Respondents are asked whether it would be justified for the "military of this country to take by a

---

11. Web surveys were also conducted in the U.S. and Canada but are not analyzed in this study as they do not include the relevant questions. Technical information for the 2021 AmericasBarometer can be found here: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2021/AB2021-Technical-Report-v1.0-FINAL-eng-120921.pdf

12. Questionnaires are available here: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/core-surveys.php

coup d'etat (military coup)" under one of two randomly assigned conditions: when "there is a public health emergency like the coronavirus" or "there is a lot of corruption". In each experiment, there are only two possible responses: yes or no.

It is important to acknowledge that the baseline condition (violence or corruption) differs across the two modules. LAPOP was unable to alter the coup question due to objectives and constraints unrelated to this study, and we did not consider postponing elections due to corruption to be a plausible situation (whereas some countries have postponed elections due to violence). However, we consider the two situations to be roughly comparable conditions of crisis. Between 2006 and 2019, the AmericasBarometer asked whether coups are justified both in the case of widespread corruption and high crime. Across all years and countries, there was a correlation of 0.66 between the two measures. Moreover, the incongruity of the baselines should not affect the comparison between levels of support for postponing elections due to a health emergency and level of support for coups due to a health emergency. However, the difference should be kept in mind when comparing treatment effects across the two experiments.

The first experiment, on postponements, was conducted in 13 countries: Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina. The second, on coups, was included in the same countries except Costa Rica.[13]

While the target number of complete interviews for the AmericasBarometer was 3,000 in each country, the questionnaire featured a split sample, so each of these experiments was conducted with around 1,500 respondents. That is, around 1,500 individuals were asked one question about tolerance for election postponements and the same 1,500 were also asked about tolerance for coups. Among these 1,500, half were randomly given the health emergency treatment and the other half the baseline condition (violence or corruption). Randomization for each experiment was independent from the other.

The experiments were placed near the beginning of a questionnaire broadly related to democratic attitudes and related topics.[14] The survey also featured

---

13. The full wording is as follows. For postponement (experimental condition in bold): JCCOV1/2. "Do you believe that when there is **a public health emergency like the coronavirus / a lot of violence** it is justifiable for the president of the country to postpone elections? (1) Yes, it is justified. (2) No, it is not justified." For coups (experimental condition in bold): JC13/COVID. "Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion, would a military coup be justified when **there is a lot of corruption / there is a public health emergency like the coronavirus.** (1) It would be justified. (2) No, it would not be justified." We note that the coup question is customized in the case of Panama to refer to the Fuerza Pública de Panamá.

14. The general structure of the questionnaire is as follows: 10 eligibility and demographic questions; one generic current events question; five questions about COVID-19; one question about

five to seven questions related to general attitudes about the pandemic. We use one item from that module, the extent to which the respondent is worried about someone in their household contracting the coronavirus, to contextualize results from the experiments; see our report on this in the prior section.

All analyses presented here use the survey weights included in the dataset, which, according to the technical information report, adjust for differences in the sample size for each country as well as imbalances in demographic distributions between the samples and national population benchmarks. The region-wide response rate (defined as the AAPOR code RR3) for the 2021 AmericasBarometer was 4.0%. Within-country response rates varied widely; among the countries we analyze, the lowest was 1.0% (Argentina, Bolivia) and the highest was 22.5% (Brazil).

RESULTS

We first examine tolerance for an executive decision to delay democracy. Specifically, Table 1 shows the results of questions about postponement of elections. The table displays the percentage of the population that believes postponing elections would be justified when there is a lot of violence or during a public health emergency like the coronavirus. The overall (regional) averages are shown in the first row, followed by the within-country results, organized by size of the treatment effect (i.e., the difference between the two conditions).

The results show that public opinion is largely sympathetic to election postponement. Region-wide, 59.2% of people say that it justified when there is a public health emergency. Substantial portions of the public appear willing to justify election delays across all 13 countries, ranging from 44.3% in Colombia to 81.7% in Jamaica. In only three cases does a majority disapprove of election postponements (Colombia, at 44.3% approving; Costa Rica, 47.5%; and Argentina, 49.0%).

Next, in order to establish a reference point for these numbers, we display tolerance for postponement under conditions of violence in the same table. Overall, willingness to justify postponement is nearly 14 percentage points lower during violence compared to a public health emergency (p = 0.000). In only five of 13 countries do a majority support postponing elections due to violence, and levels of support range from as low as 29.1% (Uruguay) to a maximum of 67.2% (Jamaica). Further, tolerance for postponement is higher in the health emergency across all countries. The treatment effect is significant at a conventional $p \leq 0.05$

---

interpersonal trust; the coup experiment; the postponement experiment; 40 questions about support for democracy, trust in institutions, natural disasters, corruption, attitudes toward China and the US, and the courts; 20 more demographic and sampling questions.

threshold within all countries except Peru (difference of 3.5 percentage points, p = 0.26). Uruguayans are the most discerning between the two conditions; tolerance for postponements during health emergencies is nearly double than what it is under the violence treatment (51.3% versus 29.1%). The results clearly support the conclusion that public tolerance for democratic delays is comparatively elevated during a pandemic.

Table 1. Election Postponement Experiment Results

Study	Health Emergency Treatment (SE)	Violence Treatment (SE)	Difference (SE)	t-stat (p-value)	n
Overall	59.25% (0.61)	45.43% (0.62)	13.81 (0.87)	15.49 (0.000)	18,794
Uruguay	51.33% (2.22)	29.06% (2.06)	22.26 (3.03)	7.34 (0.000)	1406
Argentina	49.04% (2.41)	30.38% (2.12)	18.65 (3.21)	5.81 (0.000)	1407
Brazil	52.15% (2.64)	35.50% (2.53)	16.65 (3.66)	4.55 (0.000)	1487
Chile	69.49% (1.98)	53.30% (2.30)	16.19 (2.98)	5.43 (0.000)	1415
Panama	54.33% (2.06)	38.81% (2.05)	15.52 (2.91)	5.34 (0.000)	1609
Dominican Republic	65.60% (2.15)	50.40% (2.35)	15.20 (3.19)	4.77 (0.000)	1420
Costa Rica	47.53% (2.19)	32.75% (2.04)	14.78 (2.99)	4.94 (0.000)	1384
Jamaica	81.70% (1.65)	67.22% (1.95)	14.48 (2.55)	5.68 (0.000)	1489
Paraguay	59.01% (2.25)	48.30% (2.26)	10.71 (3.20)	3.35 (0.001)	1389
Bolivia	69.95% (2.00)	59.51% (2.16)	10.44 (2.94)	3.55 (0.000)	1425

Study	Health Emergency Treatment (SE)	Violence Treatment (SE)	Difference (SE)	t-stat (p-value)	n
Ecuador	70.50% (1.95)	60.11% (2.05)	10.39 (2.83)	3.67 (0.000)	1491
Colombia	44.31% (2.39)	36.46% (2.37)	7.84 (3.36)	2.33 (0.020)	1388
Peru	52.69% (2.21)	49.15% (2.27)	3.54 (3.17)	1.12 (0.264)	1484

Source: AmericasBarometer 2021.

As a second point of comparison for these results, we consider responses to questions about tolerance of a coup d'etat by security forces, under different conditions. Table 2 shows average tolerance for coups during periods of widespread corruption and during health emergencies, both region-wide and within each country under study. Comparing the results in Tables 1 and 2, there is consistently less appetite for coups compared to election postponements. In only one country (Peru) is there at least one condition in which a majority of the population is willing to report that a coup can be justified (compared to 10 of 13 countries in the postponement). Under the health emergency condition, average tolerance for a coup is almost 30 percentage points lower than tolerance for election postponements (59.2% to 30.0%).

Next, looking within Table 2, we see that tolerance for coups is consistently lower during health emergencies compared to widespread corruption. The average difference across the region is around 10 percentage points, while within-country treatment effects range from 2 to 13 percentage points (Jamaica and Peru, respectively). In nine of 12 countries, the treatment effect is significant. Thus, when comparing the results from Table 1 and 2, we see that the health emergency condition *raises* willingness to justify election postponements, but it *decreases* willingness to justify coups (compared to baseline conditions).

Table 2. Coup Experiment Results

Study	Health Emergency Treatment (SE)	Corruption Treatment (SE)	Difference (SE)	t-stat (p-value)	n
Overall	30.03% (0.61)	39.89% (0.54)	-9.86 (0.82)	-11.99 (0.000)	20,547
Peru	39.14% (2.12)	52.46% (2.34)	-13.32 (3.16)	-4.22 (0.000)	1469
Bolivia	32.53% (2.10)	45.81% (2.28)	-13.28 (3.10)	-4.29 (0.000)	1361
Colombia	25.16% (2.20)	38.23% (2.39)	-13.07 (3.26)	-4.01 (0.000)	1363
Panama	31.38% (2.01)	42.22% (2.09)	-10.84 (2.90)	-3.74 (0.000)	1538
Brazil	28.12% (2.43)	38.15% (2.72)	-10.04 (3.65)	-2.75 (0.006)	1437
Dominican Republic	24.19% (2.09)	34.12% (2.29)	-9.93 (3.10)	-3.20 (0.001)	1376
Chile	24.17% (1.84)	33.67% (2.16)	-9.49 (2.84)	-3.35 (0.001)	1408
Paraguay	36.61% (2.31)	45.06% (2.30)	-8.44 (3.26)	-2.59 (0.010)	1329
Uruguay	12.44% (1.55)	20.39% (1.96)	-7.95 (2.50)	-3.18 (0.001)	1407
Argentina	23.71% (2.06)	29.58% (2.20)	-5.87 (3.01)	-1.95 (0.051)	1398
Ecuador	38.96% (2.14)	43.98% (2.15)	-5.02 (3.03)	-1.66 (0.098)	1419
Jamaica	43.78% (2.16)	46.33% (2.25)	-2.55 (3.12)	-0.82 (0.414)	1305
Costa Rica					

Note: Coup questions were not asked in Costa Rica.
Source: AmericasBarometer 2021.

DISCUSSION

The Covid-19 pandemic has placed enormous strain on governments and publics across the Americas, at a time in which the quality and stability of democracy is already in peril. We investigate the potential for the pandemic to shake commitment to the most fundamental aspect of democracy: alternation of power by way of regularly held elections. We do so by considering the extent to which the pandemic may have increased tolerance for an executive decision to postpone elections, a move that may be justified even by public health officials but which places democracy at risk (James & Alihodzic, 2020). We juxtapose those beliefs with an attitude that is more unequivocally undemocratic: tolerance for removing the executive by non-electoral means. We find that public health emergencies are effective in increasing the public's willingness to permit the president to delay elections, but not effective in changing public opinion regarding the justifiability of a military takeover of the state (in fact, the evidence suggests that they *lessen* public appetite for coups). Tolerance for election postponements is much higher than tolerance for security force coups, though a sizeable minority (around 30-40%) accept the latter too.

These findings could tell one of a few stories about the under-studied phenomenon of citizen support for election postponements. One interpretation is that the public is willing to tolerate short-term alterations to democracy during an emergency situation, but they do not want to upend democracy altogether. In other words, the pandemic may have expanded tolerance for democratic irregularities (e.g., permitting the president to postpone elections), but had no consequences, or perhaps even diminished, support for extreme movements away from democracy (e.g. coups). An alternative interpretation is that the results show that the public resists *any type* of political change of any type during these types of emergency situations. Perhaps citizens fear that political alterations (in the form of elections or wholesale regime change) could destabilize their country, leading them to embrace the status quo until the crisis is resolved. One final possibility is that the public views election postponements as a *pro*-democracy decision, which could be the case if the pandemic is seen as a threat to electoral fairness. If, for example, voters do not turn out on election day for fear of contracting the virus (as Noury *et al.* 2021 find), then the health of democracy will suffer. Citizens may believe that, during a pandemic, delaying elections protects the integrity of the vote, while under alternative conditions like rampant violence, holding elections does not pose a direct, additional risk to the population.

Future research is needed to fully understand how citizens process election postponements. The Covid-19 pandemic made these commonplace, but they are not new, and will not end once the pandemic is over. Next steps in this research agenda ought to include individual-level analyses to identify who is most likely to

tolerate these postponements – e.g., is it those who are most affected by or most concerned about Covid-19 and are those with elevated tolerance for postponements more or less committed to other democratic processes? We acknowledge that our country-level focus cannot answer these individual-level questions, but the AmericasBarometer dataset is publicly available for the pursuit of these questions[15]. Another next step is to extend the analysis to data from different regions and time periods. That will help researchers understand how tolerance for alterations to democracy varies across countries and, as well, ebbs and flow during health emergencies and other types of crises. With respect to the Covid-19 pandemic, on the one hand, it is possible that the public will come to live with the virus and desire a return to normal democratic routines, in which case the gap between tolerance for postponements under health emergencies and under violence will shrink. On the other hand, if the virus continues to spread, it is possible that people will grow even more concerned, perhaps bolstering support for democratic delays or even more overt authoritarian maneuvers like military coups. Ultimately, it will also be instructive to consider whether public opinion dynamics produced under the specter of the Covid-19 pandemic on public opinion are fleeting or, instead, take hold and reshape more lasting attitudes toward political systems and democratic processes in the Americas, and beyond.

REFERENCES

Amat, F., Arenas, A., Falcó-Gimeno, A., & Muñoz, J. (2020). Pandemics meet democracy: experimental evidence from the Covid-19 crisis in Spain. Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/dkusw

Aruguete, N., Calvo, E., Cantú, F., Ley, S., Scartascini, C. & Ventura, T. (2021). The partisan cues and perceived risks: the effect of partisan social media frames during the COVID-19 crisis in Mexico. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, *31*(sup. 1), 82-95. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2021.1924740

Bell-Martin, R. V., & Díaz Domínguez, A. (2021). The unmasked electorate: Co-partisanship, personal experience, and perceptions of COVID-19 risk in Mexico. *Revista Latinoamericana De Opinión Pública, 10*(2), 137–162. https://doi.org/10.14201/rlop.26490u

Bisbee, J. & Honig, D. (2021). Flight to safety: COVID-induced changes in the intensity of status quo preference and voting behavior. *American Political Science Review*, *116*(1), 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000691

Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, *27*(1), 5-19.

Bol, D., Giani, M., Blais, A., & Loewen, P. J. (2021). The effect of COVID-19 lockdowns on political support: Some good news for democracy? *European Journal of Political Research*, *60*(2): 497-505. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12401

Calvo, E. & Ventura, T. (2021). Will I get Covid-19? Partisanship, social media frames, and perceptions of health risk in Brazil. *Latin American Politics and Society*, *63*(1), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2020.30

Claassen, C. (2020). Does public support help democracy survive? *American Journal of Political Science 64*(1), 118-134. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12452

Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. Yale University Press.

Devine, D., Gaskell, J., Jennings, W. & Stoker, G. (2020). Trust and the coronavirus pandemic: What are the consequences of and for trust? An early review of the literature. *Political Studies Review*, *19*(2), 274-285. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929920948684

De Vries, C. E., Bakker, B. N., Hobolt, S. B., & Arceneaux, K. (2021). Crisis signaling: how Italy's coronavirus lockdown affected incumbent support in other European countries. *Political Science Research and Methods*, *9*(3), 451-467. 10.1017/psrm.2021.6

Esaiasson, P., Sohlberg, J., Ghersetti, M., & Johansson, B. (2021). How the coronavirus crisis affects citizen trust in institutions and in unknown others: Evidence from 'the Swedish experiment'. *European Journal of Political Research*, *60*(3), 748-760. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12419

Fernández-Navia, T., Polo-Muro, E., & Tercero-Lucas, D. (2021). Too afraid to vote? The effects of COVID-19 on voting behaviour. *European Journal of Political Economy*, *69*, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102012

Hawkins, K., Read, M., & Pauwels, T. (2017). Populism and its causes. In Kaltwasser, C. R., Taggart, P. A., Espejo, P. O., & Ostiguy, P. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (pp. 267-286). Oxford University Press. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001

Hyde, S. D., & Marinov, N. (2012). Which elections can be lost?. *Political Analysis*, *20*(2), 191-210. 10.1093/pan/mpr040

James, T. S. & Alihodzic, S. (2020). When is it democratic to postpone an election? Elections during natural disasters, Covid-19, and emergency situations. *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 19*(3): 344-362. https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2020.0642

Jennings, W. (2020). Covid-19 and the 'Rally-Round-the Flag' effect, UK in a changing Europe. Working Paper. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/covid-19-and-the-rally-round-the-flag-effect/

Klobovs, L. (2020). El impacto del Coronavirus en la figura presidencial Argentina. *Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública*, *10*(2), 15-38. https://doi.org/10.14201/rlop.23517

Kritzinger, S., Foucault, M., Lachat, R., Partheymüller, J., Plescia, C., & Brouard, S. (2021). 'Rally round the flag': the COVID-19 crisis and trust in the national government. *West European Politics*, *44*(5-6), 1205-1231. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1925017

Landman, T. & Di Gennaro Splendore, L. (2020). Pandemic democracy: Elections and COVID-19. *Journal of Risk Research 23*(7-8): 1060-1066. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1765003

LAPOP Lab. (2021). *AmericasBarometer*. [Data set]. www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop

Ley, S. (2018). To vote or not to vote: How criminal violence shapes electoral participation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution 62*(9): 1963-1990. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717708600

Lupu, N. & Zechmeister, E. J. (2021). The early Covid-19 pandemic and democratic Attitudes. *PloS one 16*(6): e0253485. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253485

Matlosa, K. (2021). Elections in Africa during Covid-19: The tenuous balance between democracy and human security. *Politikon*, *48*(2): 159-173. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2021.1913798

Merolla, J. L. & Zechmeister, E. J. (2009). *Democracy at risk*. University of Chicago Press.

Moraski, B. J. & Reisinger, W. M. (2007). Eroding democracy: Federal intervention in Russia's gubernatorial elections. *Democratization*, *14*(4), 603-621. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340701398303

Morley, M. T. (2017). Election emergencies: Voting in the wake of natural disasters and terrorist attacks. *Emory Law Journal*, *67*(3), 545. https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol67/iss3/6

Mueller, J. E. (1970). Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson. *American Political Science Review*, *64*(1), 18-34. https://doi.org/10.2307/1955610

Noury, A., François, A., Gergaud, O., & Garel, A. (2021). How does COVID-19 affect electoral participation? evidence from the French municipal elections. *PloS one*, *16*(2), e0247026. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0247026

Rapeli, L. & Saikkonen, I. (2020). How will the COVID-19 pandemic affect democracy? *Democratic Theory*, *7*(2): 25-32. https://doi.org/10.3167/dt.2020.070204

Repucci, S. & Slipowitz, A. (2020). *Democracy under lockdown*. Freedom House Organization. https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/democracy-under-lockdown

Sales, S. M. (1973). Threat as a factor in authoritarianism: An analysis of archival data. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *28*(1), 44-57. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0035588

Schraff, D. (2020). Political trust during the Covid-19 pandemic: Rally around the flag or lockdown effects? *European Journal of Political Research*, *60*(4), 1007-1017. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12425

Seligson, M. A., & Booth, J. A. (2009). *Predicting coups? Democratic vulnerabilities, the AmericasBarometer and the 2009 Honduran crisis*. Latin American Public Opinion Project "Insights" Series. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0821en.pdf

Seligson, M. A., & Carrión, J. F. (2002). Political support, political skepticism, and political stability in new democracies: An empirical examination of mass support for coups d'etat in Peru. *Comparative political studies*, *35*(1), 58-82.

Shapiro, R. Y. (2011). Public opinion and American democracy. *Public Opinion Quarterly 75*(5): 982-1017. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfr053

Sobral, F., Carvalho, J., Łagowska, U., Furtado, L. M. G. P., & Grobman, M. (2020). Better safe than sorry: Leadership sensemaking in the time of Covid-19. *Revista de Administração Pública*, *54*(4), 758-781. https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-761220200262x

Sosa-Villagarcia, P. & Hurtado Lozada, V. (2020). Covid-19 and presidential popularity in Latin America. *Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública*, *10*(2), 71-91. https://doi.org/10.14201/rlop.23664

Trelles, A., & Carreras, M. (2012). Bullets and votes: Violence and electoral participation in Mexico. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, *4*(2), 89-123. https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1200400204

RESEÑAS

Julio Carrión. *A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power: The Andes in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. 269 pages. ISBN: 978-0-19-757229-0. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.001.0001.

ORÇUN SELÇUK

Luther College

Since the election of Donald Trump, there has been a growing interest in populism studies. Thanks to its rich history of populism, alongside Western Europe, Latin America is at the center of academic debates on this hot topic. Amid the proliferation of books and articles on populist parties, leaders, and movements globally, Julio Carrión's recent book makes important contributions both theoretically and empirically. *A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power* studies the trajectory of five populist leaders in the Andean region: Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Álvaro Uribe in Colombia, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. In his book, Carrión analyzes the relationship between populism and electoral democracy and explains why some populist leaders manage to erode democracy, but others fail to do so. In other words, Carrión aims to refine the view that populism in power always leads to democratic erosion. By differentiating between constrained and unconstrained populism, Carrión convincingly argues that only populist leaders who belong to the former group successfully undermine democracy, whereas the latter group faces strong resistance from the judiciary, the legislature, and traditional political parties. As a result of the resistance, democratic erosion in such cases is averted.

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

In the first two chapters, Carrión situates the book in the literature and develops his theory of populism in power. Because Carrión is interested in what populists do rather than say, he sides with Weyland's (2017) politico-strategic definition of populism instead of the ideational approach (Mudde, 2017; Hawkins, 2009). Throughout the book, Carrión analyzes populist leaders as power-maximizers, who exhibit personalistic, anti-pluralistic, and confrontational leadership. Despite their distrust

of democratic institutions that are designed as a check on executive power, Carrión demonstrates that populist leaders do not always succeed in eroding democracy. If a populist leader manages to overcome societal opposition and establish power asymmetry, they end up building a competitive authoritarian regime. Otherwise, they do not effectively pose a serious threat to the democratic regime.

Carrión calls the book's theoretical framework "dynamic" because it follows a sequence of "moments" that populist chief executives go through: the Tsunami Moment (Chapter 4), the Hobbesian Moment (Chapter 5), and the Populist Moment (Chapter 6). Before coming to the tsunami moment, Carrión focuses on mass political discontent and elite disarray as the critical antecedents of populism. In Chapter 3, he documents how Fujimori, Chávez, Uribe, Morales, and Correa arrived in the political scene when the voters were disillusioned with the traditional political parties and their elite. In all five cases, with the partial exception of Colombia (I will address this below), he identifies common enabling conditions such as security challenges (Peru), corruption (Venezuela), protests (Bolivia), and presidents who could not complete their terms (Ecuador).

In Chapter 4, the book scrutinizes the tsunami moment, when the populist candidates "all came from behind and increased their electoral appeal up to a point where the momentum became unstoppable" (75). Carrión uses a variety of public opinion polls to illustrate how all five populist leaders did not start the presidential race as favorites but suddenly gained momentum and won the crucial elections. Although they initially polled around 10 percent, Chávez, Morales, and Uribe managed to surpass 50 percent of the vote in the first round. In contrast, Fujimori and Correa finished the first round in second place but defeated Mario Vargas Llosa and Álvaro Noboa in the runoff. Regardless of their exact trajectory, all populist leaders successfully distinguished themselves from the candidates of the establishment and quickly rose to prominence. While Fujimori, Uribe, and Correa almost came out of nowhere, Chávez and Morales had some name recognition prior to their tsunami moment. Chávez became a household name after the 1992 coup attempt, whereas Morales came from the social movements and was the runner up of the 2002 presidential elections. Beyond these five cases, the concept of the tsunami moment helps us comprehend the rise of populist candidates in recent South American elections, namely Pedro Castillo in Peru, José Antonio Kast in Chile, and Rodolfo Hernández in Colombia.

After explaining the meteoric rise of populist leaders, Carrión's primary concern is to understand whether they emerged victorious or defeated from the Hobbesian moment, "a zero-sum struggle whose resolution determines the trajectory of populism in power and the potential for regime change" (103). In Chapter 5, Carrión relies on two productive conditions that help the populist leaders win the power struggle and establish their dominance over their opponents. In line with the Hobbesian logic, the first factor is the use of the state's repressive apparatus

against political enemies in the right moment. For instance, Fujimori counted on the support of the military and the police in the implementation of his self-coup. Similarly, Correa deployed the police to Congress when he needed the establish an all-powerful constituent assembly.

The second factor is the ability to mobilize their base against the actors that resist change as a form of intimidation and deterrence. In their Hobbesian moments, Chávez and Morales not only used the military but also activated their followers, who confronted the opposition in the streets, often violently. In Venezuela, the newly created Bolivarian Circles helped Chávez return to power in the 2002 coup attempt. In Bolivia, during the conflictual constitution-making process and other instances, Morales' social movement base turned out to be useful to encircle and intimidate the opposition in the public space. On the other hand, when the legislature and the judiciary blocked or slowed down his attempted power grabs, Uribe did not resort to repression and mobilization, which, according to Carrión, explains his defeat in the Hobbesian moment and the survival of the Colombian democracy.

Following the temporal order of the theoretical framework, in Chapters 6 and 7, the book deals with the four populist leaders who survived their Hobbesian moments and successfully achieved power asymmetry. Chapter 6 is on the populist moment when the incumbent presidents secured and further expanded their power. As the opposition actors were weak, fragmented and demoralized, Fujimori, Chávez, Morales, and Correa easily won reelection and debilitated the fragile mechanisms of horizontal accountability. A common practice in all four cases was to appoint loyalists to the judiciary and the electoral body, further tilting the playing field in their favor and against the opposition. Chapter 7 exclusively focuses on the electoral arena, where the populist leaders made institutional changes to gain further advantage and validate themselves at the ballot box. One common theme across all four cases is how the power-hungry populist leaders violated their own constitutions and pushed for indefinite reelection. The most prominent cases here are Chávez and Morales, who lost popular referendums on this matter but abolished term limits anyway, in the absence of independent media, judiciary, and legislature.

Overall, the book makes a compelling argument that advances the discussion on populism in power and democratic erosion. Carrión's deep knowledge of the Andean cases helps the reader understand the main actors and their actions in key moments. The structure of the

book follows the causal mechanisms of the theoretical framework. Methodologically, the book utilizes comparative historical analysis and complements the sequence of events with survey data from Latinobarómetro as well as measures of democracy from the Varieties of Democracy and Polity Projects. The book would be of interest to scholars of comparative populism and autocratization as well as specialists on Latin American politics and the five Andean countries.

DISCUSSION

In the remaining parts of this review, I critically evaluate the book and further situate Carrión's contributions to the study of populism in power. To start with case selection, the book covers the most prominent populist leaders in the Andean region from both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum in the last three decades. Despite their ideological differences, there is a consensus in the literature that Fujimori, Chávez, Morales, and Correa ran and governed as a populist. As Carrión acknowledges in Chapter 1, there is no such consensus on Uribe. In their seminal article "Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes," Levitsky and Loxton do not classify Uribe as a populist leader because "he was a career politician whose electoral appeal – though personalistic – was not anti-establishment" (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013, p. 127). In another article that Carrión also cites, Dugas argues against categorizing Uribe as a populist due to the lack of "a movement based upon direct, unmediated ties to the masses" (Dugas, 2003, p. 1134). Like Levitsky and Loxton, Dugas considers Uribe a personalist but not a populist president.

Labeling Uribe as a populist or not would not be a significant issue if Colombia was not the only case of constrained populism among the five presidents that the book covers. As Carrión notes, the party-system in Colombia did not collapse with the election of Uribe, which "had a causal impact in the trajectory of the Hobbesian moment" (61). Unlike Fujimori, Chávez, Morales, and Correa, in the Hobbesian moment, Uribe did not resort to repressive tactics and mobilization to emerge victorious. After the Constitutional Court ruled against his push for a second reelection, Uribe simply respected the decision. Why is that? A potential explanation is that Uribe was not a populist or an anti-establishment figure but simply a personalist president. Alternatively, he was less of a populist compared to the other leaders, more respectful of democratic institutions, and less willing to erode them. In her comparative study of Colombia and Venezuela, Gamboa (2022) considers both Uribe and Chávez equally populist and polarizing but prefers to label them "presidents with hegemonic aspirations." Different than Carríon's focus on the incumbent populist leader's actions, she highlights the agency of the opposition in explaining why Uribe failed to erode democracy in Colombia, but Chávez achieved his objectives. Gamboa argues that the Colombian opposition primarily pursued moderate institutional strategies like legislative obstruction and denouncing procedural irregularities. In contrast, the Venezuelan opposition resorted to radical extra-institutional strategies such as the national strike, the coup attempt and the oil strike. Carrión is definitely right in stating that Uribe did not emerge victorious from the Hobbesian moment, but there may be more to the story than a defeated populist president.

Leaving the definitional issues on populism aside, Carrión's theory easily travels outside of the five case studies. As he mentions in the conclusion section, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary could be classified as an example of unconstrained populism. Given the resilience of the legislature and the judiciary against him, I agree with Carrión that Trump was a case of constrained populism. However, despite strong resistance, he still managed to erode the American democracy to some degree (V-Dem and Freedom House data confirm this) and continues to undermine it at the sub-national level. This is also true for other populist leaders who are out of office, but their polarizing legacy threatens democratic stability in their countries. In the concluding chapter, Carrión refers to the Peruvian, Ecuadorian, and Bolivian cases in preventing democratic deepening, but the autocratic legacy of Uribe is very much alive in Colombian politics, too. Similar to Morales and Correa, Uribe supports proxy candidates in presidential elections and acts as a destabilizing actor on Twitter. Therefore, one key challenge for democracy in Latin America and elsewhere is former presidents who retain a large group of followers and continue to shape ongoing power struggles.

If Carrión's book has one big lesson for the advocates of democracy, that would be to strengthen the constitutional veto players (legislature, judiciary, and electoral body), term limits, and the media against potential attacks in the future. Stronger the democratic institutions, the higher the likelihood that they would endure challenges from populist chief executives. Although *A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power* is mainly on populist leaders in the Andes, it should be read as a warning to other countries, especially presidential systems where an outsider could easily capitalize on the massive discontent, rapidly rise to the presidency, subjugate the opponents, and erode already fragile democratic regime. Populists around the world are good at turning crises into opportunities, but despite all odds, the opponents should learn from past mistakes and try to achieve unity around democratic values. As Carrión says in the book's preface, "By understanding the dynamics that may lead to the demise of democracy under populism, I hope we will be better equipped to thwart its autocratic impulses" (xiii).

REFERENCES

Carrión, J. F. (2022). *A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power: The Andes in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford University Press.

Dugas, J. C. (2003). The emergence of Neopopulism in Colombia? The case of Álvaro Uribe. *Third World Quarterly, 24*(6), 1117-1136.

Gamboa, L. (2022). *Resisting Backsliding: Opposition Strategies Against the Erosion of Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

RESEÑAS

Hawkins, K. A. (2009). Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Political Studies*, *42*(8): 1040-1067.

Levitsky, S., & Loxton, J. (2013). Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. *Democratization*, *20*(1), 107-136.

Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: An Ideational Approach. In C. Róvira Kaltwasser, P. A. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (pp. 27-47). Oxford University Press.

Weyland, K. (2017). Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach. In C. Róvira Kaltwasser, P. A. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (pp. 48-72). Oxford University Press.

Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND   RLOP. Vol. 11, 2 (2022), 155-160

| 160 |

RLOP

Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública

Vol. 11, N.º 2 (2022)

VNiVERSiDAD D SALAMANCA