

CRIME, INSECURITY AND EROSION OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN LATIN AMERICA

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Abstract: In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is helping to build popular support for repressive measures, and by extension, for repressive regimes. In short, is it possible that growing crime is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America? To test this proposition, this paper uses the 2008 *Americas Barometer* surveys. The premise of the paper is that rising crime and insecurity undermine democratic values and increase support for authoritarian measures. As crime rates increase and governments fail to stem the tide, citizen's belief that democracy is the best system may decline. Some citizens may support the implementation of greater controls or extra-judicial measures. High levels of crime may reduce levels of tolerance and interpersonal trust, thus undermining social capital. Finally, crime victimization and the fear

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of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, particularly the police and judicial authorities.


Síntesis: En el contexto latinoamericano de alta delincuencia, los datos de la Organización Mundial de la Salud indican que la región es la más violenta del mundo. Politólogos y políticos necesitan preguntarse si el crimen y el temor de ser víctima de la delincuencia incentivan o no el apoyo popular a medidas represivas y, por extensión, a regímenes represivos. ¿Es posible que la delincuencia constituya una amenaza creciente a la durabilidad de la democracia en América Latina? Para intentar responder esta pregunta, este trabajo utiliza las encuestas del Barómetro de las Américas realizadas en el año 2008. La premisa de este trabajo es que la creciente delincuencia y la inseguridad socavan los valores democráticos y aumentan el apoyo a medidas autoritarias. A medida que aumenten los índices de criminalidad, y si los gobiernos no logran detener la ola de violencia, puede llegar a disminuir entre los ciudadanos la creencia de que la democracia es el mejor sistema político posible. Para enfrentar la violencia, los ciudadanos pueden apoyar la aplicación de controles extrajudiciales o extraconstitucionales. Los altos niveles de delincuencia pueden reducir los niveles de tolerancia y la confianza interpersonal, lo que socava el capital social. Por último, la victimización y el temor a la delincuencia podrían conducir a los ciudadanos a perder confianza en sus instituciones políticas, en particular hacia las autoridades policiales y judiciales.

1. Introduction

Crime and insecurity have emerged as critical issues in Latin America and the rest of the developing world. Studies have shown that citizens view crime as one of the most pressing problems facing their nation (Quann and Hung, 2002). Despite the significance of the issue the link between crime and democracy has not been examined extensively in a comparative perspective (Beirne, 1997; Newman and Pridemore, 2000; Pérez, 2003; Prillaman, 2003).

Figure 1 presents data that shows that Latin America has the dubious distinction of having the highest rates of crime and violence in the world (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008). Violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 1998). Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the differences with the rest of the world are growing larger (Gaviria and Pagés, 1999).

Figure 1. Intentional Homicide Rates per 100,000 Inhabitants by Region and Sub-Region²



Coinciding with the recent wave of crime in Latin America, the last two decades have seen the rise of a new form of repressive policing called *mano dura*, or “strong hand,” as well as relative high levels of support for authoritarian measures. As Orlando J. Pérez explains: “Crime

² Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008), *Global Burden of Armed Violence Report*, Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. On line: www.genevadeclaration.org.

undermines support for democratic regimes. As crime rates increase, pressure mounts for ‘strong’ government action which in many instances results in highly repressive and undemocratic measures” (2003, p. 638).

At its core, *mano dura* necessitates curtailing individual rights and re-empowering the military and police. These sets of policies normally include deploying the military for internal policing, in addition to lengthening prison sentences, suspending due process guarantees and other protections for alleged criminals, and aggressively arresting youths suspected of gang membership.

The evidence shows that criminal activity has not been disrupted by these strategies; instead, gangs and other criminal networks have increased their level of organization, technological sophistication, and international links. Moreover, because *mano dura* policies have led to the incarceration of growing numbers of at-risk youth, they have created prison conditions that facilitate the organization of prison gangs, and that increase youths’ risk for continuing involvement in gang-related activities.³

Some authors suggest that fear of violent crime drives citizens to demand punitive and repressive measures against alleged criminals (Sanjuán, 2003), often in the form of “*mano dura*” policies. Fear can generate demand for strong governance, leading to support for authoritarianism and dictatorship (Corradi, 1992, pp. 267-292). Concern about violent crime in Latin America appears to be so severe that citizens are “willing to sacrifice certain liberties in order to feel more secure” (Tulchin and Ruthenberg, 2006, p. 5). Pérez found that in El Salvador up to 55% of the population

³ In El Salvador alone, police records show that some 60,000 young people were jailed as a result of the *mano dura* policies. Salvadoran police estimate that more than 10,000 of some 14,000 suspected gang members arrested in 2005 were later released for lack of evidence against them.

could support a military coup if there were high levels of crime (2003). In Africa, for example, fear of crime also has been associated with decreased support for democracy (Kuenzi, 2006). Furthermore, studies have found that victimization (measured by fear and burglary victimization) undermines interpersonal trust (Brehm and Rahn, 1997).

In the seminal work on the breakdown of democratic regimes, Juan Linz defines legitimacy as “the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established...” (1978, p. 16). According to Linz, the “efficacy” and “effectiveness” of the political system play a major role in determining its legitimacy. When the inability to formulate or implement adequate policies combines with a disloyal opposition, democratic governments tend to collapse (27-38). To the extent that individuals view the job performed by democratic governments as effective, they will be less inclined to support extra-constitutional measures and an increased role for the armed forces. However, when legitimacy declines citizens may be receptive to new political alternatives, even those that would undermine democracy.

This paper examines the link between crime and insecurity and democratic values. As crime rates increase and governments fail to stem the tide, citizen’s belief that democracy is the best system may decline. Some citizens may support the implementation of greater controls or extra-judicial measures. High levels of crime may reduce levels of tolerance and interpersonal trust, thus undermining social capital. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions.

2. Data

The data used in this study come from the AmericasBarometer series, involving face-to-face interviews conducted in nations of North, Central and South America and the Caribbean in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010; analysis in this paper will focus on the 2008 data. The surveys were all carried out with uniform sample and questionnaire designs under the auspices of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. The samples were all national and stratified by region and sub-stratified by urban/rural. For purposes of our analysis each national sample has been weighted equally to represent an N of 1500.⁴ For purposes of this analysis I will be focusing on a subset of countries in the series: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Uruguay.

The paper uses a series of OLS regression analyses to examine the impact of crime and fear of crime on a series of important democratic values. The dependent variables will include four key measures of democratic values: support for democracy, legitimacy of key institutions, interpersonal trust, and rights of the opposition to full participation. An appendix details the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables.

3. Victimization and Perception of Insecurity

First, using the survey data, I want to contextualize further the scale of the crime problem. The survey asked: “*AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree*

⁴ The data on which they are based can be found at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/datasets>.

usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho, (2) Algo, (3) Poco, (4) Nada, (8) NS / NR". To what extent do citizens believe crime a major problem for the nation's wellbeing?⁵

Figure 2. Crime is a Threat to Nation's Wellbeing




Figure 2 shows overwhelming support for the idea that crime is a major threat to the wellbeing of the nation. In nearly all the countries, the average score on the scale is


⁵ Responses have been mathematically altered so as to represent a scale from 0-100, where 0 meaning that crime is not a threat and 100 a major (or a lot) threat to the wellbeing of the nation. This is done by recoding responses as 4=0, 3=33, 2=66, and 1=100. Similar transformations are made with other variables in order to develop scales that can be used in regression analysis and to improve the illustration of data.

well above 70. There is scant difference between 12 of the 20 countries in the analysis. Statistically there seems to be 2 distinct groups, and Honduras as an outlier. Honduras is an interesting case as one of the most violent countries in the region but exhibiting a relatively low score. It is beyond the purview of this paper to go much further with the analysis of Honduras, except to say that a score of 74.3 is still quite high and only seems small relative to the other countries. The countries with the highest scores on the scale –about 90– are El Salvador and Brazil. El Salvador is among the most violent countries in the region, with the former having the highest homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in the hemisphere.

Figure 3 shows the extent to which respondents fear becoming victims of crime in their neighborhood.⁶ here we see an interesting difference with the almost universal results presented in Figure 2. While virtually all respondents believe crime a major threat to the nation's well-being, Figure 3 shows that only in Peru do we find a majority of citizens, 51.7, that express fear of becoming victims of crime in their neighborhood. A possible explanation for the difference between evaluations of the national threat and conditions in the neighborhood is that for many citizens their neighborhood is the area they know the best, where their family and friends live, and in many cases a place they have lived for most of their lives. Additionally, even in the most violent society only a small minority of citizens ever experience crime directly.

⁶ The exact question used: AOJ11. *Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro, (2) Algo seguro, (3) Algo inseguro, (4) Muy inseguro, (8) NS / NR.*

Figure 3. Perception of Insecurity




Irrespective of the rankings, at least a third of respondents across Latin America express fear of being victims of crime in their neighborhood and in most countries are near or above 40 on a scale of 0-100.⁷

Figure 4 shows the percentage of respondents that reported being victims of crime at least once during the previous 12 months.⁸

⁷ Evidence from the AmericasBarometer on the United States and Canada, not shown, indicate that barely a fifth of respondents in those two nations express fear of being victims of crime.

⁸ The exact question was: *VICI. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [sig], (2) No [pasar a VIC20], (8) NS / NR [pasar a VIC20].*

Figure 4. Crime Victimization



The levels of victimization range from a fourth of the population in the case of Peru to slightly more than 1 in eight citizens for Honduras.⁹ The chart shows three groups of countries: (1) Those with levels of victimization above 20% such as Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and Ecuador; (2) Bolivia and El Salvador with levels just below 20%; and (3) the rest of the countries ranging between 17.1% for Guatemala and 13.7% for Honduras.

⁹ It is worth noting that levels of self-reported victimization are subject to a number of caveats. First, respondents' memories may not be completely accurate, either because of non-reporting or false reporting. Second, the results are subject to the inherent problems associated with survey research, namely random and non-random errors.

4. Crime and Democracy


Now I turn to examining the impact of crime and perceptions of insecurity on democratic values. Table 1 shows the results of a series of regression equations that examine the impact of crime victimization and insecurity when other variables are held constant.¹⁰ The results indicate that crime victimization has a positive impact on the willingness to support the right of the opposition to participate. This means that those respondents who have been victims of crime tend to exhibit higher levels of support for the right of the opposition. These results require further analysis beyond the purview of this paper; however, they may reflect the fact that victims of crime may generally become more active politically and thus would naturally be more supportive of the rights of the opposition since presumably many of them represent the opposition. Crime victimization has a negative impact on the legitimacy of key institutions. Those respondents that were victims of crime are significantly less likely to express confidence in the key institutions of the state.

Insecurity is an even more significant factor than crime victimization. Those individuals who are more fearful of becoming victims of crime in their neighborhood are less willing to extend rights to the opposition, have significantly lower interpersonal trust, lower support for the idea that democracy is the best political system, and exhibit far less confidence in political institutions.

¹⁰ In order to account for the effect of each case, the analysis includes a series of dummy variables. Mexico is the reference case. For each respondent a variable is created measured as "1" if the person is from that country or "0" if they are not. By including the country dummy variables we account for the impact that are "fixed" for each respondent. When using this technique we must assign one set of dummy variables as reference, in this case it is Mexico. Therefore, each country coefficient measures the variance and statistical significance in relation to Mexico.

In order to further illustrate the results of the regression analysis, I employ bivariate graphs which show the relationship between fear from and victimization by crime on key democratic variables.¹¹

Figure 5. Perception of Insecurity and Democratic Values



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP


Figure 5 shows the effect of insecurity on key democratic values. The impact on support for democracy and right of participation is fairly small; although the regression analysis does indicate that the effect is statistically significant and in the expected direction. Support for democracy declines from an average level of 72.5 to around 70. The impact of insecurity on the right of participation is more

¹¹ The results presented in the graphs are for the pooled sample; individual countries may present different patterns of relationship since each independent and dependent variable will interact somewhat differently depending on national context.

pronounced than for support for democracy with a drop from an average of 71 to just below 68 on the scale of 0-100.

In the case of interpersonal trust the impact of insecurity is dramatic. Figure 5 shows a precipitous drop in interpersonal trust for those citizens who feel insecure in their neighborhood. Interpersonal trust drops from an average of 70 to less than 50, a 20 point drop. Interpersonal trust is an important component to building social capital which in turn is important for the development of a robust civil society. The fact that insecurity affects the trust that citizens have in each other in such a dramatic way should be of significant concern given the rising trend of violence and crime in Latin America. Clearly, those nation's that suffer from high levels of crime and where citizens are most fearful of being victims of crime will find it difficult to build stable and strong civil society.

Figure 6. Legitimacy of institutions and crime victimization



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Figure 6 shows the impact of crime victimization on the legitimacy of key state institutions. The graph shows that those individuals who have been victims of a crime in the previous year express significantly lower confidence in state institutions.

Finally, how does crime affect support for repressive actions? The survey asked a series of questions about respondents' willingness to support a military coup under various circumstances, including high levels of crime. The questions were worded as follows:


Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión, ¿se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de Estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? [Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:

JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.	(8) NS/ NR
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.	(8) NS/ NR
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.	(8) NS/ NR
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.	(8) NS/ NR

Figure 7 shows the percentages of respondents who support a coup under various circumstances.¹² The graph shows that high levels of crime and corruption are the two reasons under which citizens would support a coup in greater numbers.

¹² Note that the questions about coup support were not asked in all countries.

Figure 7. Support for military coup under Various Conditions



With the exception of Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic majorities of citizens in the rest of the countries analyzed here are willing to support military coups under conditions of high levels of crime. In Honduras and Mexico, for example, well over 60% of respondents justify military coups if there is a lot of crime. Of course, these findings do not mean that those citizens *prefer* military-led governments or would automatically support a coup. But the fact that such significant


numbers could find justifications for a military take-over should concern everyone who is interested in promoting democratic governance in the region. More to the point, it represents a large majority of citizens whose concern over crime is so significant they are willing to support an alternative political system.

So what are the factors that explain support for military coups under high levels of crime? Here, our dependent variable is the measure of support for military coups under conditions of high levels of crime and our independent variables include the traditional socio-demographic variables, along with a series of attitudinal variables measuring trust in the armed forces, support for democracy, presidential job approval, political tolerance, and interpersonal trust, as well as crime victimization and perception of insecurity.¹³ Figure 8 shows graphically the results of the regression analysis.¹⁴ The figure illustrates the results of the regression analysis through the use of confidence intervals. Statistical significance is graphically represented by a confidence interval that does not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). When the dot, which represents the predicted impact of that variable, falls to the right of the vertical “0” line it implies a positive relationship whereas if it falls to the left it indicates a negative contribution. Appendix 2 shows the full results with regression coefficients.

¹³ The appendix displays how the independent variables are measured.

¹⁴ The analysis includes a series of dummy variables accounting for the fixed effects of each country (not shown for clarity). For each respondent a variable is created measured as “1” if the person is from that country or “0” if they are not. By including the country dummy variables we account for the impact that is “fixed” for each respondent. When using this technique we must assign one set of dummy variables as reference, in this case it is Mexico. Therefore, each country coefficient measures the variance and statistical significance in relation to Mexico. The full analysis, with the country dummy variable, can be seen in Appendix 2.

Figure 8 Determinants of Support for Military Coup when High Levels of Crime




Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

The regression results indicate that age, gender, and education are all statistically significant. Younger, females, and less educated respondents are more inclined to support military coups when there is high crime. Wealth is not statistically significant. All the attitudinal variables included in the analysis are statistically significant, and in the expected direction. On the one hand, the more support for the political system, tolerance, presidential approval, interpersonal trust, and support for democracy, the less support for military coups. On the other hand, the more trust respondents' exhibit toward the armed forces the more support for military coups. Crime victimization and perception of insecurity also are statistically significant and

in the expected direction: those citizens who have experienced crime directly and those who are more fearful of being victims of crime are more likely to support military coups. Not surprisingly, the greatest impact seems to be exerted by opinions toward the armed forces.

Figure 9 shows the linear relation between trust in the armed forces and support for coup d'état under conditions of high levels of crime. Support for coups increases significantly as trust in the armed forces increases. The difference in support for coups is close to 20 points between those individuals that have low trust in the armed forces and those who have high levels of trust.

Figure 9 Trust in the Armed Forces and Support for Coup d'état under Conditions of High Crime



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

5. Conclusion

This paper has examined the impact of crime and insecurity on democratic values in Latin America. Crime and violence are significant problems in the region. Latin America has the highest homicide rate in the world, and crime has led to the adoption of repressive policies including the increasing use of the military.

The paper has shown that crime erodes democratic values. Crime victimization reduces the legitimacy of state institutions. Particularly important is the effects of perceptions of insecurity. The fear of becoming a victim of crime significantly erodes support for democracy as the best system, reduces support for the political legitimacy of key state institutions, and decreases support for the participation of the opposition. Additionally, substantial majorities in many countries of the region are willing to support military coups if there are high levels of crime.

The paper has found that younger, less educated, and women are more likely to support military coups when there are high levels of crime. Key attitudinal variables such as support for democracy, greater political tolerance, interpersonal trust, and greater support for the extant political system and for the job the sitting president is doing are all statistically significant factors in determining support for military coups. Additionally, crime victims and those who fear becoming victims also serve to determine support for military coups.

In the last 25 years Latin America has witnessed a remarkable transformation, from military dictatorship and revolution, to institutional democracy, competitive party systems, and more open societies. However, while there is much to be hopeful about, the specter of the military still lingers. To the extent that elected civilian governments are unable to deal effectively with the myriad of social problems

facing their countries –crime principally among them– the legitimacy of democracy *vis-à-vis* authoritarianism will diminish. On the one hand, the loss of legitimacy may lead to public clamoring for the “strong” leadership of the military. A deeper concern is that the militaries of some countries may take public discontent with their current governments’ effectiveness in fighting crime as a green light to expand their reach into more areas of domestic politics.

While additional analysis is needed to examine other aspects of the connection between crime and democratic values, such as whether there are different effects depending on the crime experienced or examination of the impact on other values such as support for populism, the evidence presented in this paper demonstrates an alarming link between increasing violence and erosion of democratic values.

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Appendix 1. Measurement of Variables

Support for democracy: NG4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

Interpersonal trust: IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas] 1) Muy confiable, 2) Algo confiable, 3) Poco confiable, 4) Nada confiable.

Legitimacy of Institutions: Scale developed from the following three items: B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?; *B10A.* ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?; *B31.* ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?; *B13.* ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?; *B21.* ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

Right of Participation: Scale developed from the following three items: E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Con qué firmeza

usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?; E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?; E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

Education: ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted completó o aprobó?

Gender: Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre, (2) Mujer.

Age: Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?

Crime victim: VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?

Perception of Insecurity: AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio / colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?

Trust in Armed Forces: B12 ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

Wealth: Measured as a scale of possession of capital goods

Presidential job approval: M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente [NOMBRE PRESIDENTE ACTUAL] es...?:

System support: Scale composed of the following 5 questions: B1 ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de (país) garantizan un juicio justo?; *B2.* ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de (país)?; *B3.* ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político (país)?; *B4.* ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político (país)?;

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político (país)?

Political Tolerance: Scale composed of the following 4 questions: D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de (país), no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas?; D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista?; D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de (país). ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?; D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?

Appendix 2. Regression Equation for Support for Military Coups under Conditions of High Crime

Dependent Variable: Coup support high levels of crime		
	Coefficient	t
Age	-0.095*	(-10.88)
Gender	0.036*	(4.95)
Support for Democracy	-0.051*	(-5.42)
Trust in Armed Forces	0.132*	(13.14)
Perception of Insecurity	0.045*	(4.94)
Education	-0.056*	(-5.24)
System Support	-0.032*	(-2.88)
Political Tolerance	-0.044*	(-4.76)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.030*	(-3.34)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.068*	(-6.84)

Crime Victim	0.032*	(4.14)
Wealth	-0.021	(-1.86)
El Salvador	-0.042*	(-3.56)
Dominican Republic	-0.108*	(-8.99)
Venezuela	-0.116*	(-7.60)
Uruguay	-0.109*	(-8.11)
Brazil	-0.088*	(-5.77)
Peru	-0.044*	(-3.23)
Bolivia	-0.131*	(-7.34)
Ecuador	-0.116*	(-6.39)
Nicaragua	-0.069*	(-4.81)
Honduras	-0.012	(-0.83)
Guatemala	-0.063*	(-4.61)
Constant	0.042*	(3.66)
R-Squared	0.075	
Number of Obs.	17339	
* $p < 0.05$		