ISSN: 1852-9003 - eISSN: 2660-700X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14201/rlop.31722

ON THE FRONT LINE OF VIOLENCE: A SURVEY-BASED PORTRAIT OF WOMEN SEEKING TO EMIGRATE FROM NORTHERN CENTRAL AMERICA

En la primera línea de la violencia: un retrato basado en encuestas de mujeres que buscan emigrar del norte de Centroamérica

Na linha de frente da violência: um retrato baseado em pesquisa de mulheres que buscam emigrar do norte da América Central

MARY FRAN T. MALONE mary.malone@unh.edu [1]
JONATHAN HISKEY j.hiskey@vanderbilt.edu [2]
ABBY CÓRDOVA acordov3@nd.edu [3]
DIANA ORCÉS dorces@prri.org [4]

[1] University of New Hampshire
[2] Vanderbilt University
[3] Notre Dame University
[4] Public Religion Research Institute

Submission: 2023-09-07
Accepted: 2024-11-20
Publication: 2025-03-05

Keywords:
Central America; migration; crime; violence against women; U.S. migration policy

Abstract
The profile of migrants seeking to cross the southwest U.S. border has changed dramatically. Women currently represent approximately one third of border apprehensions at the southwest border, and many are fleeing pervasive violence and insecurity in Northern Central America. To understand these changing migration patterns, we rely upon survey data to examine the lives of women from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras who have been victims of crime within the past year and who report plans to emigrate in the near future. In comparing these women to their counterparts, we find that this group of "victim emigrants" faces an array of daily challenges and security threats that others do not, ranging from police corruption to extortion. This survey-based portrayal of the lives of those women most likely to emigrate provides a critical first step in understanding the increasingly mixed nature of Central American emigration and the consequent need for a more nuanced policy response to address the issue.

Palabras clave:
América Central; migración; crimen; violencia contra las mujeres; política migratoria de los Estados Unidos

Resumen
El perfil de los migrantes que intentan cruzar la frontera suroeste de los Estados Unidos ha cambiado drásticamente. Hoy día, las mujeres representan aproximadamente un tercio de las detenciones en la frontera suroeste, y muchas huyen de la violencia y la inseguridad generalizada en el norte de América Central. Para comprender estos patrones migratorios cambiantes, nos basamos en datos de encuestas para examinar las vidas de las mujeres de Guatemala, El Salvador y Honduras que han sido víctimas de delitos durante el año pasado y que informan que planean emigrar en el futuro cercano. Al comparar a estas mujeres con sus contrapartes, descubrimos que este grupo de "emigrantes víctimas" enfrenta una serie de desafíos diarios y amenazas a la seguridad que otros no enfrentan, que van desde la corrupción policial hasta la extorsión. Esta descripción basada en encuestas de las vidas de las mujeres con más probabilidades de emigrar proporciona un primer paso fundamental para comprender los patrones cada vez más mixtos de la emigración centroamericana y la consiguiente necesidad de una respuesta política más matizada para abordar el problema.

Palavras-chave:
América Central; migração; crime; violência contra as mulheres; política migratória dos EUA

Resumo
O perfil dos migrantes que procuram atravessar a fronteira sudoeste dos EUA mudou drasticamente. Atualmente, mulheres representam aproximadamente um terço das apreensões fronteiriças na fronteira sudoeste, e muitas fogem da violência e da insegurança generalizadas no Norte da América Central. Para compreender estas mudanças nos padrões de migração, utilizamos dados de surveys que examinam a vida de mulheres da Guatemala, El Salvador e Honduras que foram vítimas de crimes no ano passado e relataram planos de emigrar num futuro próximo. Ao comparar estas mulheres com as suas homólogas, descobrimos que este grupo de "vítimas emigrantes" enfrenta uma série de desafios diários e ameaças à segurança que outros não enfrentam, que vão desde a corrupção policial à extorsão. Este retrato baseado em surveys sobre a vida das mulheres com maior probabilidade de emigrar proporciona um primeiro passo crítico na compreensão da natureza cada vez mais mista da emigração centro-americana e da consequente necessidade de uma resposta política mais sensível às nuances para abordar a questão.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the first quarter of the 21st century, the characteristics of migrants seeking to cross the U.S. southwest border have changed dramatically. In 2000, over 98 percent of the 1.64 million individuals apprehended at the border were born in Mexico. Nineteen years later, that number had dropped to 20 percent (CBP 2000-2020). In 2010, only 13 percent of those apprehended were women; this number had climbed to 35 percent by 2021. Unaccompanied children and family units now constitute a much larger share of apprehensions, reaching levels never seen before at the border (CBP 2013-2019; CBP 2010-2020). What was once a predominantly economic migration corridor between Mexico and the U.S. has now become strikingly mixed, yet much remains unknown about the individuals now arriving at the border.

To understand the increasingly mixed nature of Central American-U.S. migration, in the following pages we offer a detailed profile of the demographic, socioeconomic, and experiential characteristics of those women from northern Central America who have reported plans to emigrate.[1] Between 2011 and 2019, the number of women apprehensions at the southwest border increased more than 600 percent (CBP 2011, 2019). This sharp and sudden increase merits closer examination and highlights the need to understand why migration patterns have shifted so dramatically at the southwest border.[2]

A growing number of scholars in recent years have explored and highlighted the role that crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity play in the emigration plans of many residents of the so-called "Northern Triangle" (Hiskey et al 2018; Cruz 2015; Heffron 2019; Huerta 2017; Menjívar and Walsh 2017; Obinna 2021).[3] In a prior analysis of the emigration intentions among survey respondents from this region, we found that the probability of an individual making plans to emigrate from Honduras and El Salvador significantly increases if she reports having been victimized by crime in the previous twelve months (Hiskey et al

1. Mixed migration refers "to cross-border movements of people including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking and people seeking better lives and opportunities," according to The Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), See, https://mixedmigration.org/about/.

2. In 2020, U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) began to report migration data on the Southwest border very differently. Data are no longer grouped by gender. In March of the 2020 fiscal year, USBP began to report data on encounters instead of apprehensions. Consequently, data on encounters after 2020 is not strictly comparable to data on apprehensions from prior years. We focus our analysis on the 2014-2019 period, when the percentage of women apprehensions rose to approximately 35%. This focus also allows us to isolate our analysis from the impact of the 2020 pandemic, which abruptly changed migration patterns.

3. Despite its widespread usage in the media and policymaking circles, we will refrain from using the term "Northern Triangle" to describe the region of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras due to its purported etymological roots in the U.S. military label of the region during the civil conflicts of the 1980s.

2018). In the pages below, we conduct a similar analysis as a point of departure for our exploration of the daily lives of those women who have been victimized by crime and, as we show, have made plans to emigrate in part because of their experiences with crime.

Other scholars have also identified a strong and enduring relationship between crime, insecurity, and emigration intentions (if not actual behavior). Cruz assesses the root causes that lead some individuals to leave their home countries, and concludes that "Rampant insecurity and hopeless institutions spurred migration" from northern Central America (2015, 47). Huerta refers to the predominant role that violence plays in the migration decision of women in particular as the "perverse trinity" of gender-based violence, state-based violence, and market-based violence (2017). Obinna concludes that "violence in the NTCA has remained one of the primary factors forcing women and young girls to flee" (2021, 821).

These empirical studies corroborate the accounts of numerous comprehensive and highly nuanced qualitative reports on the magnitude of the crime and violence confronted by many women deciding to leave northern Central America in recent years. For example, in 2015 the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released a widely cited report entitled *Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico*, which is based on interviews with over 150 women migrants from these countries. The report offers a blunt assessment of the daily lives of the women respondents:

> *"Women interviewed for this report indicated that they and their children face extreme levels of violence on a near-daily basis. They described being raped, assaulted, extorted, and threatened by members of criminal armed groups, including gangs and drug cartels. Eighty-five percent of the women described living in neighborhoods under the control of maras… [and] [s]ixty-four percent… described being the targets of direct threats and attacks by members of criminal armed groups as at least one of the primary reasons for their flight" (UNHCR 2015, 4).*

This is but one example of the extensive qualitative documentation of the horrific conditions faced by a subset of women in northern Central America (e.g., Heffron, 2019; Huerta, 2017; Lemus-Way and Johansson, 2020; Menjívar and Walsh, and 2017; Obinna, 2021; Valdez, et al., 2015; Wilson, 2014; Wolf, 2021). While men also face the threat of crime and violence, women are exposed to distinct forms of violence, including domestic and sexual violence. In these qualitative accounts, women report that the threat of violence is omnipresent, as they face threats to their personal safety in public and private spheres. These narratives are essential to understanding the nuanced ways in which women experience violence in Central America.

While there is a growing body of evidence that finds that many of the "non-traditional" migrants (i.e., non-Mexican; non-male) arriving at the U.S. border in recent years from Central America were driven at least in part by their experiences with crime and violence, we have a limited systematic understanding of who these individuals are and what they face in their daily lives. We seek to complement prior studies by offering survey-based evidence of the unique conditions faced by women who have experienced crime victimization and expressed a desire to emigrate – we refer to this category of respondents as "victim emigrants." We also aim to understand better how this particular subset of women in the region (victims of crime) differ from those who have not been victimized by crime nor made plans to leave their country. To this end, we rely on nationally representative survey data collected by Vanderbilt University's LAPOP Lab across Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras between 2014 and 2019. We focus on this time period as the 2020 Covid pandemic abruptly changed migration patterns, and as of 2024, migration trends have exhibited sharp fluctuations that deviate from pre-pandemic patterns.

Through this combination of gender, crime victimization, and emigration intentions, we pursue the question of whether this categorization of respondents does in fact help identify a distinct stream of potential emigrants whose life experiences set them apart from those who either have not been recently victimized by crime and/or have no plans to emigrate. Our expectation is that with this fairly blunt respondent categorization strategy, we can identify and better understand that subset of potential emigrants from northern Central America who are on the front lines of their respective countries' epidemics of crime and violence – overseen by an ineffective, if not culpable, government and state apparatus that characterizes many parts of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.

We proceed as follows. First, we provide an historical overview that links these contemporary threats to women's security with a longer historical legacy of violence in the region. We also note the role of organized criminal groups, like *maras* (gangs), in daily threats of violence towards women. We then introduce and discuss our categorization of women respondents into four groups along two dimensions – crime victimization and emigration intentions. These categorizations serve as the principal focus of this study, and we offer a demographic and socio-economic account of these groups as a first step in answering the question of who these women are and how they differ from one another and more broadly from men. We then examine the ways in which crime and violence have altered the lives of women in our four groups. Finally, we present the results of a series of regression models that highlight the robust relationship between gender, crime victimization and emigration intentions. These regression models provide additional empirical support to the studies we have highlighted above, which link women's increased migration to their direct experiences with crime. Throughout all of these

comparisons, it is clear that the women in our surveys who have been victimized by crime and express a desire to leave their countries constitute a unique group whose lives have been fundamentally altered by their countries' respective crime waves, and their states' inability to protect them.

Our goal is to move a step forward in better understanding the pattern of mixed migration that has now come to characterize the movement of individuals at the southwest border. In the process, we offer insight into ways in which domestic and international non-governmental and governmental agencies can better design and implement programs that will address the daily challenges of this population.

2. CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND WOMEN IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Today's trends of violence and crime, and the different ways in which women experience these trends, are rooted in the conflicts of the 20th century. Both El Salvador and Guatemala had long periods of civil war, and while Honduras did not directly experience civil war, its proximity to the wars of its neighbors, and the pervasive presence of the U.S. military in the country as a staging ground for operations in neighboring countries, translated into insecurity problems as well (Malone 2012; Menjívar, 1993). During these conflicts of the 1980s, women's security was systematically violated by representatives of the state through widespread incidents of sexual assault, rape, torture, and murder.[4] In such times of conflict, women often tend to experience higher levels of insecurity in their own homes as well, as the violence of civil wars can normalize other types of violence (Svallfors 2023).

Though the violent civil conflicts in both El Salvador and Guatemala ended in the 1990s, and the U.S. military presence in Honduras diminished somewhat during this period, women continued to face high levels of insecurity. As the states struggled to form new civilian police forces with limited resources while confronting the many challenges of post-conflict societies, their ability, and willingness, to adequately address issues like violence against women was questionable at best. Such crimes were often dismissed as "private issues," and therefore not within the bounds of state jurisdiction. To this day, many police are unresponsive to reports of gender-based violence (Menjívar and Drysdale Walsh, 2017), making official

4. For example, Danner (1994) documents one of the most infamous examples of state abuse, detailing how the military raped and murdered women and young girls at El Mozote. Wilkinson (2002) also chronicles state abuses of women during the civil war of Guatemala.

statistics on these crimes notoriously unreliable as many women simply do not report such incidents (Belloso, 2021).

In addition to physical and sexual violence, femicide is another deadly outcome of this systematic and pervasive violence against women. In a study of these same three countries, Obinna (2021) links violence, gender, and migration. She analyzes the ways in which gendered hierarchies normalize violence against women in northern Central America, noting in particular the ways in which femicide is a powerful push factor that forces women to leave their homes in "search of sanctuary" in another country.[5] In a study of 70 asylum seekers from these three countries, Baranowski, et al (2019) find that these women were repeatedly exposed to multiple types of gender-based violence in their homes and communities, and faced death threats by organized criminal groups operating in their neighborhoods. More generally, the concept of hegemonic masculinities, which refers to those practices that permit men's collective dominance over women to continue, applies here, both in terms of the home country context in which many women of northern Central America find themselves as well as the migrant journey itself where that same gendered violence, carried out by both state and non-state actors, is replicated en route to the border and in the border crossing itself (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005).

The post-conflict era in northern Central America, then, has been one characterized by exceedingly high levels of violent crime. Homicide rates, for example, have been among the highest in the world since the late 1990s, as organized criminal groups took advantage of weak, incapable, and often complicit states, and entrenched themselves into the socio-economic fabric of these countries (see e.g., Cruz, 2012 and 2015). Salvadoran gangs, or *maras*, spread to neighboring Honduras during this period, and homicide rates rose sharply. Homicide rates in Guatemala have tended to be lower, but still far higher than the global average (UNODC, 2020). Even when homicide rates declined during the quarantines of the Covid-19 pandemic, *maras* remained entrenched in their territories and in many cases took on the responsibilities of the state by enforcing quarantines and distributing aid packages (Dudley and McDermott, 2020). During this time, other indicators of gang activity, such as rates of *desaparecidos* (disappeared), rose sharply (FESPAD, 2021).

In 2023, President Nayib Bukele's state of emergency appeared to have contributed to a sharp decline in homicide rates in El Salvador, with the suspension of civil liberties allowing for the widespread incarceration of suspected gang

5. In a different geographic context, Sela-Shayovitz (2010) notes that rates of femicide vary dramatically among ethnic groups, highlighting the ways in which different cultures create gendered hierarchies that can perpetuate cycles of violence against women and femicide.

members, mostly young men between the ages of 15 and 25. However, observers have documented a corresponding increase in human rights abuses and questioned the sustainability of Bukele's mano dura policies (Cruz 2024). Despite these reservations and historical lessons concerning the flaws of the mano dura strategy, countries like Honduras are seeking to replicate the Bukele approach to crime reduction.

3. GANGS AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

While official crime records indicate that men are more likely than women to be victims of violent crime (especially murder), women experience distinct forms of everyday violence, such as rape and domestic assault, and these often go unreported and/or unsolved. For example, in a recent survey in El Salvador, a majority of women respondents (63 %) reported having experienced sexual violence at some point in their lives, but only 2.5 percent said they took the matter to the police (Belloso 2021). According to a United Nations report on violence against women in El Salvador, "Impunity for crimes, socio-economic disparities and the machista culture continue to foster a generalized state of violence, subjecting women to a continuum of multiple violent acts, including murder, rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment and commercial sexual exploitation" (Manjoo 2011). Further, women across northern Central America often find themselves caught in the middle of battles between state and non-state actors, with gender-based violence serving as a means to assert territorial control by one side or the other (Córdova 2019; Hume 2009).

Within Latin America, El Salvador and Honduras reported the highest rates of femicide in 2019, followed by Guatemala (Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2021). According to Menjívar and Walsh (2017), rates of violence against women in Honduras rose sharply after the country's 2009 coup, as the few specialized policing units addressing violence against women were dismantled, and state resources were reallocated to focus on repressing organized crime (and political activism) at the expense of fighting other types of crime.

Women's personal safety in the region is particularly precarious in neighborhoods where gangs have established a strong presence. Gang members intimidate women and young girls through rape and assault, using such violent tactics to terrorize local communities (Gurney 2014). For example, gang members demand protection money from mothers (oftentimes the ex-wives or ex-girlfriends of the gang member), and if this money is not paid, threaten to have their daughters raped and/or killed. Gangs also threaten women and girls with murder and use these threats as leverage to coerce family members to comply with gang requests. These crimes frequently are not investigated or prosecuted. In 2011, the Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights (2011) estimated that approximately 96 % of femicides in Honduras were not prosecuted. As Silvia Juarez, a lawyer with the Gender Violence Observatory, notes, "We have cases in which the mother knows how her daughter died, but she cannot talk because the gangsters who raped and killed her have come to the wake to offer condolences for their girlfriend" (Arce 2014).

This historical legacy of violence, intensified by the presence of organized criminal groups and corrupt, inefficient, and often times complicit police, has contributed to the significant increase in women fleeing these countries in recent years, with many seeking safety in the U.S. As Table 1 indicates, the number of women emigrating from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador (as measured by U.S. southwest border apprehensions) rose steadily between 2011 and 2013 and spiked dramatically in 2014. This rapid increase slowed in 2015, coinciding with an increase in deportations by Mexican migration authorities, only to be followed by another significant increase in 2016. Another surge occurred in 2019, suggesting that the desire to escape the persistent context of insecurity in northern Central America remained high until the 2020 Covid pandemic altered migration trends, at least temporarily.

Table 1. U.S. Southwest Border Apprehension Rates, 2011-2019

Fiscal Year	Total Apprehensions – Southwest Border	Annual Change in Total Apprehensions (%) – Southwest Border	Female Apprehensions – Southwest Border	Female Apprehensions as % of Total – Southwest Border
2011	327,577	—	42,590	13.0
2012	356,873	8.9	51,620	14.5
2013	414,397	16.1	68,645	16.6
2014	479,371	15.7	119,415	24.9
2015	331,333	-30.9	71,463	21.6
2016	408,870	23.4	100,515	24.6
2017	303,916	-25.7	80,857	26.6
2018	396,579	30.5	95,980	24.2
2019	851,508	114.7	298,489	35.1

Source: U.S. Customs Border Patrol, 2020.

4. METHODS AND DATA

To begin our analysis, we rely upon data from the AmericasBarometer surveys, carried out under the direction of Vanderbilt University's LAPOP Lab.[6] In order to have a sufficient number of respondents in each of our four categories, and given the prolonged nature of the surge in female emigrants from these countries, we pool nationally representative data from three rounds of AmericasBarometer surveys (2014, 2016/17, and 2018/19) across Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. These survey years included questions on our two key areas of interest: crime and migration intentions.[7] The time range for these data also correspond to those years during which a significant increase in female emigration from these countries took place.

As a point of departure, we focus the first part of our analysis on women, driven by the need to better understand those individuals who do not fit the long-used stereotype of migrants from this region – young, single males leaving home in search of economic opportunity or, in the case of women migrants, as spouses of migrants who are simply following their husbands (Cerruti and Massey 2001, Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). Here we seek to directly challenge these stereotypes by providing a systematic account of those most likely to be similar to the thousands of women who have arrived at the border in recent years – those who find themselves on the front lines of the pervasive violence that has affected their countries.

While men too have suffered from this violence, women often face distinct conditions in their daily lives, and their vulnerability to domestic violence and sexual assault increases the likelihood that they will face insecurity on multiple fronts – at home, in their neighborhoods, and at the hands of organized criminal groups and public officials. Only with such specific, systematic exploration of this subset of individuals leaving northern Central America in recent years can we begin to understand the highly heterogeneous nature of the region's recent migration flows.

We use these survey data to create four analytical categories of women respondents from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.[8] We use two survey items

6. Our deep thanks to Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making these data available. The full text of the survey questionnaire, along with a description of survey methodology and data collection, can be found here: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/studies-country.php.

7. Earlier survey waves did not include both of these questions and consequently are not included in this analysis.

8. There are substantial differences across these countries in terms of the types and levels of criminal activity; however, for the purposes of this analysis, we will put aside those country differences and

to identify those respondents that fall into our category of interest – what we refer to as "victim emigrants":

> *Crime Victimization: [H]ave you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?*
>
> *Emigration Intentions: Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?*

Table 2 displays the four categories that will be the focus of the first part of our analysis and the number of respondents in each.

Table 2. Crime Victimization and Emigration Intentions in Northern Central America (2014-2019)

	Victimization	No Victimization
Emigration Intentions	Female victims with emigration intentions (VE) N=499 (7.1%)	Female non-victims with emigration intentions (NVE) N=1307 (18.6%)
No Emigration Intentions	Female victims with no emigration intentions (VNE) N=736 (10.5%)	Female non-victims with no emigration intentions (NVNE) N=4,464 (63.8%)

Source: Author elaboration

Our expectation is that the depth and severity of crime's impact on these four groups will vary substantially, with those in our "victim emigrant (VE)" category experiencing the most insecurity on a daily basis. Indeed, the fundamental proposition we explore in the following pages is that those women who have been victimized by crime in the previous year and express plans to emigrate represent a class of individuals that confront a distinct threat to their daily lives that separates them from their fellow compatriots.

Throughout our comparisons of these four groups, we will keep an eye on the similarities and points of departure between the group of primary interest, "victim emigrants" (VEs), and the two groups that share at least one characteristic with them. That is, we expect that on some dimensions, particularly socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, women in the VE category will be similar

focus on the shared experiences of victim emigrants.

to those women who have not been victimized (in the previous twelve months) but who express plans to emigrate ("non-victim emigrants"/NVEs). Conversely, VEs may share other characteristics with those women that have been victimized by a crime, but who do not have plans to emigrate ("victim non-emigrants"/VNEs). Our basic proposition, though, is that VEs will stand apart from these groups.

As Table 2 reports, the victim emigrant category has the fewest respondents, with only 7.1 percent of our female respondents in our sample falling into this category. Conversely, the vast majority (63.8 percent) of women surveyed during this period were neither crime victims nor potential emigrants. If we are correct in our expectations regarding the experiences of the VE group, we should find that they stand apart from other women respondents with respect to their daily experiences as well as their perceptions of insecurity.

We turn now to examine the differences between the VE group and the other three groups, relying on comparison of means tests to determine the degree to which these groups of respondents are statistically distinct, or not, from one another. Specifically, we use the post-hoc Tukey's B test that takes into account the different sizes of the four groups of comparison.

5. SOCIOECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF WOMEN CRIME VICTIMS WITH EMIGRATION INTENTIONS[9]

We first compare these groups along standard socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. In Table 3, we examine the means of the following variables for each of our four respondent groups:

1. Age
2. Years of education (years of formal schooling completed)
3. The education level of respondent's mother (0=none=; 3=post-secondary)
4. Household goods index (0=none; 1=All)[10]
5. The size of respondent's community[11]
6. Respondent's assessment of personal income compared to 12 months ago (1=Better; 2=Same; 3=Worse)

9. For those interested in comparisons of men and women in our four groups, please see the Appendix.
10. This scale was calculated based upon answers to the following survey items: Do you or any member of your household have any of the following possessions? TV; car; refrigerator; telephone; cell phone; computer; microwave oven; washing machine; drinking water; sewage system. Responses were coded as (1) yes and (0) no. The household asset index was created using a means formula that included a case if there were valid responses to at least eight of the ten items.
11. The variable measuring the size of respondents' town or city was coded as: (1) capital city; (2) large city; (3) medium city; (4) small city; (5) rural area.

Table 3. Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of Northern Central American Women

	Age	Education	Mother's Education Category	Household Goods Index	Community Size	Perception of personal economic situation (% "worse")
Non-victims; non-emigrants (NVNE)	40.83*	7.03*	.92*	$.50_a$	3.67_a	43.8*
Non-victims; emigrants (NVE)	33.65_a	8.35_a	1.44_a	$.52_a$	3.55_a	49.5_a
Victims; non-emigrants (VNE)	38.95*	8.53_a	1.36_a	$.57_b$	3.04_b	52.6_a
Victims; emigrants (VE)	**32.32_a**	**9.63***	**1.89***	**$.59_b$**	**3.04_b**	**55.6_a**

Note: With the exception of the last column (personal economic situation), the mean scores for each group are displayed. We assess whether these group means are statistically different from one another while taking into account he different number of respondents in each group.

*=Group mean significant from other groups at p<.05 based on post-hoc Tukey's B test.

Means sharing a letter are not significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Source: Author elaboration

The results in Table 3 provide a clear indication that the VE group in our sample does indeed stand apart from other female respondents in important ways. First, this group has a higher education level than all of the other groups, and the average education level of the mothers of these women also is significantly higher than the other groups. Second, the VE group is distinct from the two non-victim groups in terms of their income levels (owning more household goods) and the settings in which they live (more urban). The VE group was statistically similar to the Victim Non-Emigrant (VNE) group in terms of income (as measured by a household asset index) and the urban/rural nature of their community but, as might be expected given that those considering emigration generally tend to be younger and better educated, the VNE group is significantly older and less educated. Third, the average age of those respondents who report no plans to emigrate is higher than those who do express such plans, regardless of whether or not they had been victimized by crime. This difference too is consistent with the well-established finding that migration tends to become much less likely as individuals move out of the 18-35 age range.

Along with the significant markers for the VE group, and the expected characteristics it shares with other respondent groups, we find one important *insignificant* difference between VEs and respondents in two of our three remaining categories – their assessment of their personal economic situation. For this item, the only group with significantly more positive views of their economic situation is the non-victim, non-emigrant group (NVNE). The mean scores on this item for the other three groups are not statistically distinguishable from one another. This suggests that economic dissatisfaction is not what sets those in the VE category apart from respondents in the NVE and VNE categories, as they are no more or less dissatisfied than respondents in these categories. Respondents in all three of these categories do stand apart, however, from the 60 percent of female respondents who fall in the NVNE group. Along with other important differences, women in this group were significantly more satisfied with their economic situation than their counterparts in the other three groups.

This initial portrait of the VE category does not comport with the narrative one often hears in policymaking and popular media circles regarding those women arriving at the border. First, they are not the poorest of the poor. Rather, on average they are significantly better off financially than most other respondents in our sample. Second, as noted above, they are not particularly more dissatisfied with their economic situation than other female respondents who either had been victimized by crime or reported emigration intentions. Finally, the education levels of the VEs (and their mothers) are significantly higher than those of women in any of the other groups. These characteristics give us our first indication that those women victimized by crime and seeking to emigrate do indeed represent a unique category of potential emigrants driven, at least in part, by factors other than economic considerations. These findings also highlight the loss of human capital that occurs when women in this group are forced to flee their country.

We now turn to the familial characteristics of VEs, with the goal once again of simply painting as complete a picture as possible of the women in this group, and to further explore in what ways they differ from other women respondents. From Table 4 we see again that those women with emigration intentions, regardless of crime victimization status, align with the standard account of emigrants as more likely to be single and have fewer children.[12] Still, 48.4 percent of women in the VE category are married or in a civil union, and close to 80 percent have at least one child. Importantly, there are no significant inter-group differences between the VE group and all but the NVNE group in terms of the average number of children under the age of 13, with those three groups reporting an average of around 1.5

12. The Appendix contains an expanded table that reports the family characteristics for men as well.

children. In sum, the only truly unique characteristics of the VE group we can draw from Tables 3 and 4 are education and income levels.

Table 4. Family Characteristics

	Single (%)	Married/Civil Union (%)	Avg. # of people in household	Percent w/ Children	Avg. # of children	Avg. # of children under 13
Non-victims; non-emigrants (NVNE)	25.4_{a}	62.0_{a}	4.93_{a}	86.0_{a}	3.01*	1.38_{a}
Non-victims; emigrants (NVE)	38.4_{b}	49.8_{b}	5.16_{a}	75.3_{b}	2.17_{a}	1.58_{b}
Victims; non-emigrants (VNE)	29.1_{a}	55.9_{a}	4.92_{a}	85.4_{a}	2.47*	1.43_{ab}
Victims; emigrants (VE)	41.9_{b}	48.4_{b}	4.94_{a}	79.2_{b}	1.99_{a}	1.52_{ab}

Note: *=Group mean significant from all other groups at p<.05 based on post-hoc Tukey's B test. Means sharing a letter are not significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Source: Author elaboration

As Figure 1 demonstrates, there is one family characteristic that does set the VE group apart from the other three groups: experiences with crime victimization. In addition to asking respondents about their own experiences with crime, the AmericasBarometer survey asked if anyone else living in their household had been victimized by crime in the previous twelve months. One need only glance at Figure 1 to appreciate the depth of the insecurity crisis confronting women in the VE group compared to those in the other three groups. The majority of respondents in our VE category (54.8%) had at least one other member of their household who had also been victimized in the previous year, fifteen percentage points more than the VNE group (40.6%) and nearly four times the percentage of respondents in the NVNE category (14.3%). In the NVE group, the percentage of women who reported victimization of a family member (22.4%) was less than half that of the VE group, indicating that the non-victim women with emigration intentions did not share the same level of insecurity caused by the victimization of family members. In our comparison of means test, the VE group stood alone in terms of the level of household victimization, statistically distinct from the other three. As the basis for an atmosphere of pervasive threat, the victimization of multiple members of a single household within the span of a year seems to support this depiction. This finding indicates that it likely is not just personal victimization

that drives emigration intentions in this group, but victimization of family members too.

Figure 1. Additional Crime Victim and Extortion in Household



Source: Author elaboration

To further underscore the potential role that household victimization, rather than just individual victimization, may play in driving those in the VE category to flee their country, we examined an item included in the 2018-2019 round of the AmericasBarometer that asked respondents if they or anyone in their family had been a victim of extortion in the previous twelve months. This type of victimization is a key signal that organized criminal groups, particularly maras, have a powerful presence in a community. As Figure 1 documents, only 4.5 % of the NVNE category reported such an event, yet 27.6 % of the VE category reported an extortion threat against their family. The VNE group reported lower rates of family extortion victimization (22.0%) compared to the VE group, but this difference was not statistically significant.

In contrast, the difference between our two groups with migration intentions – VE and NVE – is quite striking. Here, we see that the VE group reports levels of household extortion victimization four times higher than the NVE group,

a significant and sizeable difference. Extortion is a type of crime that arguably has the most immediate and dramatic effects on all members of the household, no matter who the victim is, because all household members tend to be directly vulnerable to extortion reprisals if payments are not made. Thus, the fact that "victim emigrants" and their immediate family members were most likely to have direct experience with extortion makes only clearer the distinct reality in which these women find themselves. In the following section, we examine the prevalent neighborhood characteristics reported by individuals in our four categories in an effort to more completely capture this reality.

6. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

In large part because of the severity of the crime and violence afflicting the countries of northern Central America in recent years, the AmericasBarometer survey instrument included in 2018 an extensive battery of items designed to measure, through the eyes of respondents, the extent to which gangs and organized crime have infiltrated their neighborhoods. As highlighted in Figures 2 and 3, for every one of these neighborhood assessment items, VEs report the highest levels of insecurity: they register the highest levels of fear of crime; perceptions that gangs are active in their neighborhoods; reports of extortion; and reports of homicide in their neighborhoods.[13] While the VE group reports the highest percentages across these four items, these differences are not statistically significant from the VNE group. We do see stark statistically significant differences between the VE group and the two non-victim groups (NVE and NVN). From these simple comparisons, we see again that a greater percentage of women in the VE category are living in neighborhoods where gangs and the violence and insecurity they bring with them are a part of daily life; however, these differences are not always statistically significant from the group of women who have been victimized but do not intend to migrate (VNE).

13. As noted above, some of these items were only included in the 2018 round of the AmericasBarometer and thus the analyses of these items are based on a lower number of respondents than others conducted in this study.

Figure 2. Gang Presence and Fear of Crime in the Neighborhood



Source: Author elaboration

Figure 3. Extortion and Homicide in Neighborhood



Source: Author elaboration

We next turn to another series of AmericasBarometer items that allow us to assess the impact this environment of insecurity has had on women's behavior in our four groups. We determine whether the VE group differs from the other groups in terms of their responses to crime in their daily lives, through survey items measuring whether respondents considered moving to avoid crime, avoided sending their children to school, and limited their recreation. As Figure 4 reveals, the VE group emerges as highly distinct in terms of the ways in which crime and violence have affected their daily lives. We find that the mean values of the "victim emigrant" group were significantly higher than the other three groups for two items: limiting recreation and considering moving to avoid crime. While a higher percentage of the VE group (56.1%) reported that they avoided sending their children to school due to fear of crime, this percentage was not significantly different from the VNE group (47.6%). However, compared to the two non-victim groups, the VE group reported a significantly higher percentage of respondents who avoided sending their children to school due to crime.

Figure 4. Crime and Daily Activities



Source: Author elaboration

The differences in how crime and insecurity have affected women respondents in the VE group are striking. Whether in terms of wanting to move, limiting the places they go for recreation, or in deciding whether or not to send their kids

to school, women in the VE group appear to be living in a dramatically different situation of insecurity than women in the other three groups. Indeed, when asked about their fear of being murdered, close to six out of ten "victim emigrants" report "a lot" of fear. These results underscore the severity of the situation confronted by this pool of potential emigrants, and how different this group is from female emigrants who have not been affected by violence. These group comparisons of neighborhood characteristics further demonstrate that women who have been victimized by crime and report plans to emigrate represent a group of individuals that in many ways is fundamentally distinct from all other groups of women in terms of the degree to which crime and insecurity have pervaded their daily lives.

One final area in which individuals in the "victim emigrant" category may be distinct from their counterparts is the degree to which they report being victimized by corrupt public officials. The experience of crime victimization tends to bring the victim into more contact with government officials, particularly police, than those not victimized by crime. Further, those considering emigration may also have increased contacts with public officials in order to clear any bureaucratic hurdles that may stand in the way of leaving one's country.[14] With such increased interactions between individuals and public officials likely among those in the "victim emigrant" category, and given the highly corrupt nature of governments in the northern Central America region, we expect to find higher rates of corruption victimization reported by women in this category.

The AmericasBarometer asked respondents whether or not a public official had solicited a bribe in the previous twelve months. As Figure 5 clearly shows, respondents in the VE category seem to have been targeted by corrupt officials far more than women in other categories. Not surprisingly, when asked to indicate the number of politicians involved in corruption, a significantly higher percentage of respondents in the victim emigrant group widely regarded politicians in their country to be corrupt – 80.4 % of VE indicated that more than half or all politicians were corrupt, compared to 59.7 % of NVN, 65.1 % of NVE, and 68.8 % of VNE.

Thus, not only are those individuals in our VE group confronting significantly higher levels of local insecurity and living in households with other members who have been victimized by crime, but they are also significantly more likely to have

14. We recognize the potential for a recursive relationship between corruption victimization, crime victimization, and emigration intentions. It is for this reason that we have intentionally refrained from making any causal claims here or elsewhere in the paper. Rather our interest is simply to establish that the conditions of those in our "victim emigrant" category are in many ways fundamentally distinct from those faced by respondents in our three other categories. If, however, making plans to emigrate does increase the probability that an individual will be asked for a bribe, then we suspect this experience will only fortify the resolve of the individual to follow through on her emigration plans.

been victimized by the very officials one might hope would provide some measure of protection. This is particularly significant when considering asylum claims, as U.S. asylum hearings often give a great deal of weight to evidence that the state has been unable and/or unwilling to provide basic protections from such forms of persecution as extortion and domestic violence.

Figure 5. Respondent Experiences with Corruption[15]



Source: Author elaboration

7. LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF EMIGRATION INTENTIONS

From this survey-based exploration of the ways in which the lives of women "victim emigrants" differ from their counterparts, we now turn to a series of regression analyses modeling the correlates of responses to a long-used survey item

15. Though percentages are displayed in the figure, we also analyzed the mean scores of each group across each item, allowing for an assessment of the significance of the differences between the groups while taking into account the different number of respondents in each group. The VE group mean scores are statistically different from the means of all other groups.

designed to measure emigration intentions: "*In the next three years, do you plan to go live or work in another country?*" ("*Yes*"/"*No*"). Along with a well-established set of variables commonly associated with emigration intentions, we include in these models a series of interaction terms to evaluate the specific ways in which crime victimization and a context of insecurity influence the emigration plans of women respondents.[16]

As is evident from the results displayed in Table 5, there is strong and consistent support for the proposition that women who are victimized by crime and corruption are *particularly likely* to report plans to emigrate. Though men are far more likely to express plans to emigrate than women, all else equal, the results from the interaction terms offer clear evidence that women's emigration plans are uniquely affected by crime and victimization.[17] Based on Model 2 and Model 4, we estimate the predicted probability of emigration intentions by gender to have a better understanding of these findings. In Figure 6 we observe a clear gap on emigration intentions between men and women when they report to have not been victims of crime or corruption. However, this gap substantially diminishes when they report being victims. More specifically, we observe on the left side of Figure 6 that the probability increases significantly from 24 percent, when women say they have not been victims of crime, to 35 percent, when women report to being victims of crime—representing an 11 percent increase. By contrast, the probability of men intending to migrate shows a small increase from 34 to 38 percent. Similarly, we observe on the right side of Figure 6 that the probability increases significantly from 25 percent, when women say they have not been victims of corruption, to 35 percent, when women report being victims—representing a 10 percent increase. By contrast, the probability of men intending to migrate shows a smaller increase from 34 to 40 percent, highlighting the impact that experiences with crime and corruption have on migration intentions.

It is notable as well in Table 5 that the interaction term for women and perceived insecurity is not significant. This undercuts the stereotype of women being more susceptible to a context of insecurity than men – rather these results demonstrate that it is the actual experiences with crime and corruption that have a particularly strong impact on women. These results highlight the need to better understand the unique realities that this subset of potential emigrants face in their daily lives.

16. The Appendix includes the exact survey text of the items included in these analyses. In the Appendix, we also report results of multinomial logistic models of our four categories to assess the degree to which the picture painted in the preceding pages holds in a multivariate model.
17. The interaction effect for crime victimization is highly statistically significant at $p<0.01$, while for corruption victimization is significant at $p<0.06$.

Figure 6. Mean Predicted Probabilities of Emigration Intentions



Source: Author elaboration

Table 5. Logistic Regression Models of Northern Central Americans' Migration Intentions

	Model 1 (baseline, no interacts)	Model 2 (crime victimization)	Model 3 (perceptions insecurity)	Model 4 (corruption victimization)
Women (=1=Men=0)	-0.439***	-0.522***	-0.565***	-0.479***
	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.125)	(0.047)
Crime victimization (Yes=1, No=0)	0.363***	0.210**	0.364***	0.362***
	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Women*Crime victimization	–	0.347***	–	–
		(0.101)		

	Model 1 (baseline, no interacts)	Model 2 (crime victimization)	Model 3 (perceptions insecurity)	Model 4 (corruption victimization)
Perception of insecurity (1-4)	0.145***	0.145***	0.120***	0.145***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.021)
Women*Perception of insecurity	–	–	0.052	–
			(0.048)	
Corruption victimization (Yes=1, No=0)	0.410***	0.412***	0.411***	0.335***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.066)
Women * Corruption victimization	–	–	–	0.186+
				(0.101)
Murders in neighborhood (Yes=1; No=0)	0.224***	0.225***	0.224***	0.223***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Perception of personal economic situation (same=1; better=0)	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Worse (=1; better=0)	0.295***	0.289***	0.295***	0.293***
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Perception of national economic situation (same=1; better=0)	-0.095	-0.096	-0.094	-0.097
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Worse (=1; better=0)	0.104	0.109	0.106	0.103
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Levels of Household Wealth (Scale 1-5)	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.014
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Education (1-18+)	0.017**	0.017**	0.017**	0.017**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)

	Model 1 (baseline, no interacts)	Model 2 (crime victimization)	Model 3 (perceptions insecurity)	Model 4 (corruption victimization)
Age	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age Squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Internet Service (=1; No=0)	0.119+	0.117+	0.118+	0.120+
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Single (=1; Married=0)	0.508***	0.507***	0.507***	0.507***
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Civil Union (=1; Married=0)	0.248***	0.249***	0.247***	0.248***
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Divorced (=1; Married=0)	0.228	0.221	0.225	0.231
	(0.201)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.201)
Separated (=1; Married=0)	0.448***	0.446***	0.447***	0.448***
	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.122)
Widowed (=1; Married=0)	0.430**	0.434**	0.426**	0.427**
	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.145)
Number of individuals in household (1-10+)	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Number of children younger than age 13 (1-10+)	0.048*	0.048*	0.049*	0.049*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Mestiza (=1; White=0)	-0.093	-0.093	-0.092	-0.097
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)

	Model 1 (baseline, no interacts)	Model 2 (crime victimization)	Model 3 (perceptions insecurity)	Model 4 (corruption victimization)
Indigenous (=1; White=0)	0.103	0.101	0.104	0.099
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Black (=1; White=0)	0.100	0.100	0.099	0.097
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)
Mulatto (=1; White=0)	0.176	0.173	0.176	0.173
	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.178)
Other race/ethnicity (=1; White=0)	-0.031	-0.038	-0.031	-0.032
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Respondents' skin color (1"Lighest"-11"Darkest")	0.046**	0.046**	0.046**	0.046**
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Interviewers' skin color (1"Lighest"-11"Darkest")	-0.027	-0.027	-0.027	-0.027
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Big city (=1; metropolitan area=0)	0.050	0.053	0.049	0.052
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Medium city (=1; metropolitan area=0)	0.199*	0.200*	0.199*	0.199*
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Small City (=1; metropolitan area=0)	0.066	0.065	0.065	0.066
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Rural Area (=1, metropolitan area=0)	0.102	0.104	0.103	0.104
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)
El Salvador (=1; Guatemala=0)	0.616***	0.619***	0.616***	0.615***
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)

	Model 1 (baseline, no interacts)	Model 2 (crime victimization)	Model 3 (perceptions insecurity)	Model 4 (corruption victimization)
Honduras (=1; Guatemala=0)	0.749***	0.749***	0.750***	0.746***
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Constant	-1.773***	-1.751***	-1.718***	-1.750***
	(0.275)	(0.276)	(0.280)	(0.275)
N	11,949	11,949	11,949	11,949

+ $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$

Source: Author elaboration

Table 6 reports the results of these logistic regression analyses separately for men and women. Overall, these results corroborate the results from the interaction terms in Table 5. Even though crime victimization matters for both men and women, the effect is much higher for women. In a similar vein, corruption victimization increases victimization intentions for both men and women, but the effect is higher for women. As we saw in Table 3, women with higher levels of education are more likely to intend to migrate. While it is clear that crime and corruption victimization increase the likelihood that women will plan to migrate, the results of Table 6 do find that economic perceptions have a stronger impact on women's migration intentions when compared to those of men. There are also a few other differences between the models for women and men. For example, the effect of marital status is stronger for women compared to men, yet the impact of skin color on migration intentions is only significant for men.

Table 6. Logistic Regression Models of Northern Central Americans' Migration Intentions by Gender

	Women	Men
Crime victimization (Yes=1, No=0)	0.494***	0.269***
	(0.082)	(0.071)
Murders in neighborhood (Yes=1; No=0)	0.225**	0.224***
	(0.072)	(0.063)

	Women	Men
Perception of insecurity (1-4)	0.151***	0.140***
	(0.034)	(0.033)
Corruption victimization (Yes=1, No=0)	0.494***	0.363***
	(0.082)	(0.067)
Perception of personal economic situation (same=1; better=0)	0.157	-0.104
	(0.110)	(0.090)
Worse (=1; better=0)	0.461***	0.165+
	(0.115)	(0.098)
Perception of national economic situation (same=1; better=0)	-0.349*	0.048
	(0.151)	(0.131)
Worse (=1; better=0)	-0.118	0.234+
	(0.145)	(0.131)
Levels of Household Wealth (Scale 1-5)	0.023	0.008
	(0.032)	(0.031)
Education (1-18+)	0.031***	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age	0.004	-0.020+
	(0.013)	(0.012)
Age Squared	-0.000**	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Internet Service (=1; No=0)	0.168+	0.088
	(0.094)	(0.080)
Single (=1; Married=0)	0.618***	0.372***

	Women	Men
	(0.085)	(0.079)
Civil Union (=1; Married=0)	0.222**	0.295***
	(0.085)	(0.082)
Divorced (=1; Married=0)	0.507*	-0.202
	(0.254)	(0.322)
Separated (=1; Married=0)	0.623***	0.178
	(0.156)	(0.176)
Widowed (=1; Married=0)	0.624***	-0.037
	(0.175)	(0.278)
Number of individuals in household (1-10+)	0.021	-0.001
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Number of children younger than age 13 (1-10+)	0.036	0.058*
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Mestiza (=1; White=0)	-0.013	-0.173+
	(0.098)	(0.090)
Indigenous (=1; White=0)	0.223	-0.029
	(0.145)	(0.130)
Black (=1; White=0)	0.231	-0.043
	(0.213)	(0.208)
Mulatto (=1; White=0)	0.397	-0.053
	(0.253)	(0.221)
Other race/ethnicity (=1; White=0)	0.091	-0.163
	(0.167)	(0.154)

	Women	Men
Respondents' skin color (1"Lighest"-11"Darkest")	0.035	0.055*
	(0.024)	(0.022)
Interviewers' skin color (1"Lighest"-11"Darkest")	-0.039+	-0.015
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Big city (=1; metropolitan area=0)	-0.092	0.184
	(0.116)	(0.117)
Medium city (=1; metropolitan area=0)	0.123	0.283**
	(0.102)	(0.103)
Small City (=1; metropolitan area=0)	-0.009	0.136
	(0.111)	(0.101)
Rural Area (=1, metropolitan area=0)	-0.012	0.206*
	(0.100)	(0.087)
El Salvador (=1; Guatemala=0)	0.631***	0.606***
	(0.101)	(0.086)
Honduras (=1; Guatemala=0)	0.806***	0.686***
	(0.093)	(0.087)
Constant	-2.579***	-1.222***
	(0.395)	(0.364)
N	5,943	6,006

+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Source: Author elaboration

8. CONCLUSION

We have explored the differences between female respondents who report being a victim of a crime with intentions to emigrate and their counterparts who have not been victimized and/or do not have emigration intentions. In our analysis of the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of these four groups of respondents, we find that "victim emigrants" are more educated and wealthier on average than the other three categories of women. There are few significant differences in terms of age, marital status, and number of children, however.

Most importantly, the women in the VE group emerged from our analyses as individuals who confront significantly more insecurity, violence, and corruption in their daily lives. For example, not only did they experience crime personally, they also reported significantly higher levels of victimization rates in their families, and indicated that they were more likely to alter their daily routines to try and protect themselves from crime. Indeed, this is what sharply distinguishes women in the VE group from those in the NVE group – both groups express intentions to emigrate, but the former has experienced both personal victimization and significantly higher levels of victimization of family members while the latter appear to be driven in their emigration aspirations by non-security factors. There is ample evidence that "victim emigrants" constitute a unique pool of potential emigrants that are seeking to escape a life of violence, insecurity, and a corrupt government unable and/or unwilling to provide assistance.

Our results also demonstrate that women in the VE category face significantly higher rates of corruption victimization at the hands of the government officials they most need to help with their situations – police officers and other public officials. It is perhaps no surprise then that when suffering through a criminal attack, and, often, witnessing another member of their household go through a similar experience, that these individuals look at emigration rather than their own government as the most viable solution. Their combined life experiences with crime and a corrupt state appears to have led them to the point where emigration is their only way out.

The story we have told through survey data in this paper is one that has already been told through in-depth interviews with women who have fled these countries. What the findings in this paper provide is simply another base of empirical support for the accounts of those women who were able to escape. In the process, our hope is that through this combination of qualitative, in-depth accounts of the war-like conditions faced by residents of these countries, and quantitative, survey-based data that tell the same story, we can establish that those women arriving at the U.S. border in recent years are likely far closer to being refugees than they are economic migrants - - and should be treated as such.

The past four years of migration trends along the U.S. border have highlighted the rapid changes and increased heterogeneity among border arrivals, with individuals arriving from all corners of the world, driven by myriad factors in their home countries. The widespread damage of the November 2020 Hurricanes Eta and Iota across much of Honduras and Guatemala, the mounting levels of economic and food insecurity along the "dry corridor" of the region, and the built-up pressures related to the COVID-19 pandemic all have contributed to a complex mix of individuals arriving at the border. As authoritarianism has proven resilient in countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua, political repression now also drives individuals away from their home countries. This complexity makes it all the more pressing to disaggregate the migration flow in an effort to better understand who is arriving at the border and why. As the demographics and life experiences of those at the border continue to evolve, we must deepen our understanding of these mixed migration flows.

Our results also have important policy implications. Despite the watershed changes in the southwest border migration flow over the past two decades, the U.S. policy response on both sides of the partisan aisle has remained remarkably consistent, relying on a strategy of deterrence through tools like detention, expedited removal, denial of the rights to claim asylum, and investments in border security. From Reagan to Biden, U.S. policy on the southwest border has been guided by the notion that all potential emigrants can be dissuaded from attempting entry through border enforcement, detention, and deportations. More recently, Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden have relied increasingly on the Mexican government to serve as an extension of U.S. border control efforts by funding, for example, Mexico's Southern Border Plan to stop individuals before they reach the U.S. border. Given the severity of the security crisis faced by women in the "victim emigrant" group, it is unlikely that U.S. or Mexican policies based primarily on deterrence will discourage their migration. Rather, these policies of deterrence will only serve to imperil the lives of more individuals seeking to flee their countries.

In a recent study, Massey (2020) highlights the failure of U.S. policymakers (along with many of their European counterparts) over the past twenty years to recognize the changes in the "underlying motivations for international movement" that have led to the increasing heterogeneity of border arrivals. This failure, Massey contends, has resulted in "policy mismatches" leading to "dysfunctional outcomes" (Massey 2020, 23). Taking this conclusion a step further, we contend that at the root of this border policy disconnect is the inability, and/or unwillingness, of many policymakers to recognize and adequately understand the various motivations and backgrounds of individuals leaving their country of origin to join the increasingly mixed migration flows around the world. To develop an effective policy response to a mixed migrant flow, one must first identify, disentangle, and better understand the myriad life experiences and motivations of those arriving

at the border rather than viewing them as either economic migrants or refugees. A more nuanced understanding of the motivations and migration calculus of Central American women then becomes a critical first step in formulating policy responses both within the region and, from the U.S. perspective, along the border.

9. REFERENCES

Arce, A. (2014, November 6). Sexual Violence Rampant Among El Salvador Gangs, *Associated Press*. https://apnews.com/article/274e264284ce477ea14b2acfe5c232a8.

Baranowski K.A., Wang E., D'Andrea MR, Singer EK. (2019). "Experiences of gender-based violence in women asylum seekers from Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala." *Torture*, 29(3): 46-58. doi: 10.7146/torture.v29i3.111970. PMID: 31984943.

Belloso, M. (2021, January 4). 63 de cada 100 mujeres han sufrido violencia en El Salvador. *La Prensa Gráfica*. https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/63-de-cada-100-mujeres-han-sufrido-violencia-sexual-20210103-0060.html.

Cerrutti, M. & D. Massey. (2001). "On the Auspices of Female Migration from Mexico to the United States." *Demography* 38, (2): 187-200.

Connell, R. W., & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept." *Gender & Society*, 19(6), 829-859. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243205278639.

Córdova, A. (2019). "Living in Gang-Controlled Neighborhoods: Impacts on Electoral and Non-Electoral Participation in El Salvador." *Latin American Research Review* 54(1), 201-221.

Customs and Border Protection. (2011). U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year 2011 Sector Profile. https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%202011%20Sector%20Profile.pdf

Customs and Border Protection. (2019). U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year 2019 Sector Profile. https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Jan/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%202019%20Sector%20Profile_0.pdf

Customs and Border Protection. (2000-2020). U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions from Mexico and Other Than Mexico (FY 2000 -2020). https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2021-Aug/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Apprehensions%20From%20Mexico%20and%20Other%20Than%20Mexico%20%28FY%202000%20-%20FY%202020%29.pdf.

Customs and Border Protection. (2010-2020). U.S. Border Patrol Total Monthly UC Encounters by Sector (FY 2010 - FY 2020). https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2021-Aug/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Total%20Monthly%20UC%20Encounters%20by%20Sector%20%28FY%202010%20-%20FY%202020%29%20%28508%29a_0.pdf

Customs and Border Protection. (2013-2019). U.S. Border Patrol Total Monthly Family Unit Apprehensions by Sector (FY 2013 - FY 2019). https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Jan/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Total%20Monthly%20Family%20Unit%20Apprehensions%20by%20Sector%20%28FY%202013%20-%20FY%202019%29_1.pdf

Cruz, J.M. (2012). The Transformation of Street Gangs in Central America: Organized Crime, Mano Dura Policies and Lost Opportunities. *Revista Harvard Review of Latin America*. https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/transformation-street-gangs-central-america.

Cruz, J.M. (2015). The Root Causes of the Central American Crisis. *Current History* 114 (769): 43-48. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2015.114.769.43.

Cruz, J.M. (2024). "Addressing the Problem of Violent Crime in Central America: Citizen Security Based on Human Rights." Cristosal Newsletter. https://cristosal.org/EN/2023/08/16/addressing-the-problem-of-violent-crime-in-central-america-citizen-security-based-on-human-rights/

Danner, M. (1994). *The Massacre at El Mozote*. New York: Vintage.

Dudley, S. & J. McDermott. (2020, December 21). GameChangers 2020: How Organized Crime Survived the Pandemic. *InSight Crime*. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/gamechangers-organized-crime-pandemic/.

Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD). (2021). *Desaparación de Personas en El Salvador*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1U6d8M8h0RgZmZ0jx4gdhnAeu-pn_o3CN/view.

Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean. (2021). https://oig.cepal.org/en/infographics/femicide

Gurney, K. (2014, November 7). Report Details How El Salvador Gangs Use Rape as Weapon. *InSight Crime*. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-gangs-rape-sexual-violence-femicides

Heffron, L.C. (2019). 'Salía de uno y me metí en otro': Exploring the Migration-Violence Nexus Among Central American Women. *Violence Against Women*, 25(6): 677-702.

Hiskey, J., A. Córdova, M. Malone, and D. Orcés. (2018). "Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime.

Victimization, U.S. Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision in Central America," *Latin American Research Review* 53(3): 1-19.

Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (1994). *Gendered Transitions: Mexican Experiences of Immigration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Huerta, A.V. (2017). La trinidad perversa de la que huyen las fugitivas centroamericanas: violencia feminicida, violencia de estado, y violencia de mercado. *Debate Feminista* 53: 1-17.

Hume, M. (2009). *The Politics of Violence: Gender, Conflict and Community in El Salvador*.

New York: Wiley-Blackwell.

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). (2011). *Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2010*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Lemus-Way, M.C. & H. Johansson. (2020). Strengths and Resilience of Migrant Women in Transit: An Analysis of the Narratives of Central American Women in Irregular Transit Through Mexico Towards the USA. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 21: 745-763. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-019-00690-z

Malone, M. (2012). "Crimen y Gobernabilidad en una Honduras Contemporánea," *Air & Space Power Journal: Spanish Edition* 24 (4): 63-81.

Manjoo, R. (2011). Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Addendum, Follow-up Mission to El Salvador. United Nations Human Rights Council https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ef1a8ae2.html.

Massey, D.S. (2020). Immigration Policy Mismatches and Counterproductive Outcomes: Unauthorized Migration to The U.S. in Two Eras. *Comparative Migration Studies* 8: 21. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-020-00181-6

Menjívar, C. (1993). History, Economy, and Politics: Macro and Micro-level Factors in Recent Salvadorean Migration to the US. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 6 (4): 350-371.

Menjívar, C. & S. Drysdale-Walsh. (2017). The Architecture of Femicide: The State, Inequalities, and Everyday Gender Violence in Honduras. *Latin American Research Review* 52(2): 221-240.

Obinna, D.N. (2021). Seeking Sanctuary: Violence Against Women in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. *Violence Against Women* 27(6-7): 806-827.

Sela-Shayovitz, R. (2010). The Role of Ethnicity and Context: Intimate femicide rates among.
social groups in Israeli society. *Violence Against Women* 16(12): 1424-1436.

Svallfors, S. (2023). Hidden Casualties: The Links between Armed Conflict and Intimate Partner Violence in Colombia. *Politics & Gender*, 19(1), 133-165. doi:10.1017/S1743923X2100043X

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2015). *Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador*, *Guatemala*, *Honduras*, *and Mexico*. http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-intentional-homicide-victims

Valdez, E.S., L.A. Valdez, & S. Sabo. (2015). Structural Vulnerability Among Migrating Women and Children Fleeing Central America and Mexico: The Public Health Impact of 'Humanitarian Parole'. *Frontiers in Public Health* 3:1-8. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2015.00163.

Wilkinson, D. (2002). *Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror*, *Betrayal*, *and Forgetting in Guatemala*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Wilson, T. D. (2014). Introduction: Violence against Women in Latin America. *Latin American Perspectives*, 41(1): 3-18.

Wolf, S. (2021). Talking to Migrants: Invisibility, Vulnerability, and Protection. *Geopolitics* 26(1), 193-214.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Text of Survey Questions for Logistic Regression Analysis (LAPOP Lab 2014-2019)

	Variable	Variable Code	Exact Text of Survey Item
Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics	Gender	Q1	Sex [Record but DO NOT ask]: (1) Male (2) Female
	Age	Q2	How old are you? _____ years
	Education	ED	How many years of schooling have you completed? _____
	Community Size	TAMANO	Size of place: (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area
	Marital Status	Q11N	What is your marital status? (1) Single (2) Married (3) Civil Union (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widowed
	Number of individuals in household	Q12C	How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____
	Number of children younger than age 13	Q12BN	How many children under the age of 13 live in this household? ____
	Levels of Household Wealth	WEALTH	Less wealthy – (5) more wealthy
	Ethnicity	ETID	Do you consider yourself (1) white, (2) mestizo, (3) indigenous, (4) black, (5) mulatto, or (7) of another race?
	Race	COLORR	When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent. (1) light skin – (11) darker skin

	Variable	Variable Code	Exact Text of Survey Item
Economic Perceptions	Pocketbook	IDIO2	Do you think that your current economic situation is better, the same or worse than it was twelve months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse
	Sociotropic	SOCT2	Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse
Crime and Corruption	Murders in neighborhood	VICBAR7	Have there been any murders in the last 12 months in your neighborhood? (1) Yes (2) No
	Fear of Crime	AOJ11	Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe
	Corruption Victimization	CORVIC	Variable comprised of following questions: **EXC2.** Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? (0) No (1) Yes **EXC6.** In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? (0) No (1) Yes **EXC11.** In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government (0) No (1) Yes

Source: Author elaboration

Table A2. Multinomial Logistic Regression (Base Category = Victim with Emigration Plan, VE)

	WOMEN (Model 1)			MEN (Model 2)		
	NVE Nonvictim with Emigration Plan	VNE Victim without Emigration Plan	NVNE Nonvictim without Emigration Plan	NVE Nonvictim with Emigration Plan	VNE Victim without Emigration Plan	NVNE Nonvictim without Emigration Plan
Age (18+)	0.005	0.030***	0.036***	0.002	0.035***	0.045***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Education (1-18+)	-0.050**	-0.035*	-0.079***	-0.059***	-0.001	-0.062***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Community Size						
Big city (=1, metropolitan area=0)	0.206	0.061	0.048	-0.074	-0.409*	-0.360*
	(0.214)	(0.211)	(0.181)	(0.168)	(0.198)	(0.154)
Medium city (=1, metropolitan area=0)	0.235	-0.234	-0.131	-0.002	-0.573***	-0.389**
	(0.187)	(0.195)	(0.167)	(0.157)	(0.166)	(0.147)
Small City (=1, metropolitan area=0)	0.285	-0.008	0.251	0.401*	-0.067	0.250
	(0.189)	(0.208)	(0.172)	(0.164)	(0.182)	(0.158)
Rural Area (=1, metropolitan area=0)	0.538**	-0.151	0.487**	0.622***	-0.143	0.385**
	(0.163)	(0.178)	(0.151)	(0.142)	(0.158)	(0.138)
Perception of personal economic situation (better=0)						
Same (=1; better=0)	0.036	-0.123	-0.089	-0.338*	-0.353*	-0.109
	(0.198)	(0.205)	(0.182)	(0.157)	(0.169)	(0.150)
Worse (=1; better=0)	-0.264	-0.442*	-0.823***	-0.369*	-0.541**	-0.620***
	(0.198)	(0.206)	(0.180)	(0.156)	(0.171)	(0.159)

	WOMEN (Model 1)			MEN (Model 2)		
	NVE Nonvictim with Emigration Plan	VNE Victim without Emigration Plan	NVNE Nonvictim without Emigration Plan	NVE Nonvictim with Emigration Plan	VNE Victim without Emigration Plan	NVNE Nonvictim without Emigration Plan
Marital Status						
Married (=1; Single=0)	0.162	0.653***	0.827***	0.076	0.414**	0.454**
	(0.148)	(0.158)	(0.139)	(0.147)	(0.155)	(0.138)
Civil Union (=1; Single=0)	-0.077	0.161	0.294*	-0.109	-0.082	-0.074
	(0.141)	(0.166)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.151)	(0.131)
Divorced (=1; Single=0)	-0.345	-0.241	-0.100	0.194	0.653	0.703
	(0.437)	(0.478)	(0.387)	(0.551)	(0.546)	(0.476)
Separated (=1; Single=0)	0.294	0.526+	0.107	-0.079	0.354	0.047
	(0.263)	(0.290)	(0.256)	(0.317)	(0.312)	(0.282)
Widowed (=1; Single=0)	0.495	0.591	0.607+	-0.606	0.128	0.056
	(0.355)	(0.362)	(0.333)	(0.506)	(0.471)	(0.435)
Number of individuals in household (1-10+)	0.060+	0.027	0.061*	-0.004	0.031	0.019
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.026)
Number of children younger than age 13 (1-10+)	-0.013	-0.011	-0.082+	-0.015	-0.082	-0.072
	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.044)
Levels of Household Wealth (1-5)	-0.065	-0.045	-0.109*	-0.028	0.057	-0.055
	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.045)
Murders in neighborhood (Yes=1; No=0)	-0.337**	-0.077	-0.584***	-0.682***	-0.413***	-0.840***
	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.111)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.098)

	WOMEN (Model 1)			MEN (Model 2)		
	NVE Nonvictim with Emigration Plan	VNE Victim without Emigration Plan	NVNE Nonvictim without Emigration Plan	NVE Nonvictim with Emigration Plan	VNE Victim without Emigration Plan	NVNE Nonvictim without Emigration Plan
Perception of insecurity (1-4)	-0.431***	-0.170**	-0.539***	-0.401***	-0.077	-0.520***
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.049)
Corruption victimization (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.008***	-0.004**	-0.014***	-0.008***	-0.003**	-0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	1.748***	0.233	2.288***	1.659***	-1.142**	0.979**
	(0.461)	(0.513)	(0.437)	(0.375)	(0.412)	(0.351)
Number of cases	*6,447*			*6,340*		

+ $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$

Source: Author elaboration

Table A3. Multinomial Logistic Regression (Base Category = Victim with Emigration Plan, VE)

	NVE Nonvictim with Emigration Plan	VNE Victim without Emigration Plan	NVNE Nonvictim without Emigration Plan
Men (=1; women=0)	-0.094	-0.191*	-0.604***
	(0.073)	(0.082)	(0.069)
Age (18+)	0.003	0.032***	0.040***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education (1-18+)	-0.055***	-0.017	-0.070***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)

	NVE Nonvictim with Emigration Plan	VNE Victim without Emigration Plan	NVNE Nonvictim without Emigration Plan
Community Size			
Big city (=1; metropolitan area=0)	0.037	-0.210	-0.179
	(0.123)	(0.142)	(0.122)
Medium city (=1; metropolitan area=0)	0.094	-0.424**	-0.273*
	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.117)
Small City (=1; metropolitan area=0)	0.346**	-0.042	0.256*
	(0.124)	(0.137)	(0.116)
Rural Area (=1; metropolitan area=0)	0.587***	-0.144	0.444***
	(0.115)	(0.125)	(0.109)
Marital Status			
Married (=1; Single=0)	0.113	0.529***	0.656***
	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.100)
Civil Union (=1; Single=0)	-0.102	0.036	0.132
	(0.098)	(0.115)	(0.096)
Divorced (=1; Single=0)	-0.150	0.080	0.187
	(0.323)	(0.356)	(0.297)
Separated (=1; Single=0)	0.166	0.453*	0.066
	(0.199)	(0.213)	(0.188)
Widowed (=1; Single=0)	0.209	0.432	0.382
	(0.287)	(0.287)	(0.275)
Number of individuals in household (1-10+)	0.024	0.026	0.035+
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)

	NVE Nonvictim with Emigration Plan	VNE Victim without Emigration Plan	NVNE Nonvictim without Emigration Plan
Number of children younger than age 13 (1-10+)	-0.015	-0.051	-0.079*
	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Levels of Household Wealth (1-5)	-0.043	0.013	-0.077*
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.032)
Perception of personal economic situation			
Same (=1; better=0)	-0.184	-0.268*	-0.120
	(0.119)	(0.132)	(0.114)
Worse (=1; better=0)	-0.331**	-0.508***	-0.732***
	(0.119)	(0.133)	(0.117)
Murders in neighborhood (Yes=1; No=0)	-0.535***	-0.269**	-0.734***
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.076)
Perception of insecurity (1-4)	-0.411***	-0.118**	-0.524***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Corruption victimization (Yes=1; No=0)	-0.008***	-0.003***	-0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	2.721***	-0.026	2.783***
	(0.265)	(0.290)	(0.253)
Number of cases		12,787	

+ $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$

Source: Author elaboration

Table A4. Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics

	Age		Education		Mother's Education Category		Household Goods Wealth Index (1-5)		Community Size (1=capital; 5=rural area)		Perception of personal economic situation (% "worse")	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
Non-victims; non-emigrants (NVNE)	40.83	44	7.03	7.51	0.92	1.01	2.75	2.97	3.67	3.67	43.8	40.9
Non-victims; emigrants (NVE)	33.65	32.7	8.35	8.45	1.44	1.48	2.90	3.03	3.55	3.76	49.5	43.9
Victims; non-emigrants (VNE)	38.95	39.8	8.53	9.65	1.36	1.72	3.13	3.56	3.04	2.97	52.6	44.0
Victims; emigrants (VE)	**32.32**	**32.2**	**9.63**	**9.88**	**1.89**	**2.01**	**3.24**	**3.49**	**3.04**	**3.08**	**55.6**	**47.8**

Source: Author elaboration

Table A5. Family Characteristics

	Single (%)		Married/Civil Union (%)		Avg. # of people in household		Percent w/ Children		Avg. # of children		Avg. # of childrenunder 13	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
Non-victims; non-emigrants (NVNE)	25.4	27	62.0	65.8	4.93	4.79	86.0	77.96	3.01	2.93	1.38	1.23
Non-victims; emigrants (NVE)	38.4	43.9	49.8	52.7	5.16	5.05	75.3	58.76	2.17	1.66	1.58	1.41
Victims; non-emigrants (VNE)	29.1	31.9	55.9	60.5	4.92	4.77	85.4	72.03	2.47	2.32	1.43	1.21
Victims; emigrants (VE)	**41.9**	**43.9**	**48.4**	**51.6**	**4.94**	**4.97**	**79.2**	**59.07**	**1.99**	**1.57**	**1.52**	**1.4**

Source: Author elaboration

Table A6. Additional Crime Victim and Extortion in Household

	Family member victim of extortion		Other victim in Household	
	F	M	F	M
Non-victims; non-emigrants (NVNE)	4.5	3.2	14.3	13.7
Non-victims; emigrants (NVE)	6.9	7.3	22.4	19.4
Victims; non-emigrants (VNE)	22.0	16.6	40.6	41.2
Victims; emigrants (VE)	**27.7**	**27.6**	**54.9**	**48.6**

Source: Author elaboration

Table A7. Gang Presence and Fear of Crime in the Neighborhood

	Gang presence in neighborhood		Fear of crime in neighborhood	
	F	M	F	M
Non-victims; non-emigrants (NVNE)	2.0	1.9	2.3	3.1
Non-victims; emigrants (NVE)	2.1	1.9	2.4	3.1
Victims; non-emigrants (VNE)	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.5
Victims; emigrants (VE)	2.7	2.6	2.9	2.4

Source: Author elaboration

Table A8. Extortion and Homicide in Neighborhood

	Murder in neighborhood		Extortion	
	F	M	F	M
Non-victims; non-emigrants (NVNE)	26.4	26.2	12.2	14.2
Non-victims; emigrants (NVE)	34.6	31.2	16.2	16.6
Victims; non-emigrants (VNE)	46.3	43.5	30.1	32.4
Victims; emigrants (VE)	50.7	55.1	38.7	38.0

Source: Author elaboration

Table A9. Respondents' Experiences with Corruption

	Police		Public Employee	
	F	M	F	M
Non-victims; non-emigrants (NVNE)	4.0	10.1	1.8	3.9
Non-victims; emigrants (NVE)	6.3	16.0	3.1	6.1
Victims; non-emigrants (VNE)	12.3	26.0	6.4	11.8
Victims; emigrants (VE)	19.6	32.2	12.0	17.4

Source: Author elaboration