

# PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: UNPACKING THE EXPERIENCES OF VICTIMS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE WITH THE POLICE

*Justicia procedimental y actitudes políticas: explorando las experiencias de las víctimas de violencia doméstica con la policía*

*Justiça processual e atitudes políticas: desvendando as experiências das vítimas de violência doméstica com a polícia*

**HELEN RABELLO KRAS**  [hrabellokras@fordham.edu](mailto:hrabellokras@fordham.edu) <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Regis University - Fordham University

Submission: 2023-07-04

Accepted: 2023-10-24

Publication: 2024-04-30

## **Keywords:**

*Intimate Partner  
Violence; Police;  
Procedural  
Fairness;  
Bystander  
Intervention;  
Brazil*

## **Abstract**

What is the relationship between procedural fairness in encounters with the police and intimate partner violence (IPV) survivors' attitudes? I argue that because of the emotional damage caused by victimization, survivors are especially attuned to the interpersonal treatment they receive when seeking help from specialized services (e. g., police). If this treatment is procedurally unfair, they might conclude that IPV laws are not effective and become less likely to report intentions to intervene by calling the police if they witness intimate partner violence. Relying on public opinion data from Brazil, I find that procedural fairness matters for survivors' opinions about laws, but I found no relationship between procedural fairness and bystander intervention attitudes. I explore possible explanations for this non-finding with several additional analyses.

**Palabras clave:**  
violencia  
doméstica;  
policía; justicia  
procedimental;  
intervención de  
transeúntes; Brasil

**Resumen**

¿Cuál es la relación entre la justicia procedimental en los encuentros con la policía y las actitudes de las sobrevivientes de violencia doméstica? Sostengo que, debido al daño emocional causado por la victimización, las sobrevivientes están especialmente en sintonía con el trato interpersonal que reciben cuando buscan ayuda de servicios especializados (por ejemplo, la policía). Si este trato es injusto desde el punto de vista procedimental, podrían llegar a la conclusión de que las leyes sobre violencia doméstica no son efectivas y ser menos propensas a intervenir llamando a la policía si son testigos de violencia doméstica. Basándome en los datos de la opinión pública de Brasil, encuentro que la justicia procedimental es importante para las opiniones de las sobrevivientes sobre las leyes, pero no encontré ninguna relación entre la justicia procedimental y las actitudes de intervención de las espectadoras. Exploro posibles explicaciones para este hallazgo nulo con análisis adicionales.

**Palavras-chave:**  
violência  
doméstica; polícia;  
justiça processual;  
intervenção de  
espectadores;  
Brasil

**Resumo**

Qual seria a relação entre o tratamento interpessoal justo nos encontros com a polícia e as atitudes de vítimas de violência doméstica? Devido ao dano emocional causado pela vitimização, vítimas estão especialmente vulneráveis ao tipo de tratamento que recebem quando procuram ajuda de serviços especializados (como por exemplo, a polícia). Se esse tratamento for processualmente injusto, elas podem concluir que as leis de combate a violência doméstica e familiar não são eficazes e se tornam menos propensas a relatar intenções de intervir chamando a polícia se testemunharem um caso de violência doméstica. Baseando-me em dados da opinião pública do Brasil, os resultados sugerem que o tratamento interpessoal justo em contato com a polícia é importante para as opiniões de vítimas sobre as leis, mas não encontrei nenhuma relação entre justiça processual e as atitudes de intervenção. Eu exploro possíveis explicações para esse resultado final com análises adicionais.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Gender-based violence (GBV) is a global problem that poses serious challenges to women's well-being and safety around the world. The United Nations estimates that almost one in three women in the world have been subjected to some form of GBV, such as intimate partner violence or sexual violence. GBV interferes with every major aspect of women's lives — physical and emotional health, bodily integrity, and participation in society (Nussbaum 2005). While most countries have adopted some form of legislation to address the negative consequences of different forms of GBV, implementation of laws and specialized services for survivors across countries vary drastically (e. g., Htun and Jensenius 2020). It is critically important that we understand the various effects of public policies on GBV in order to strengthen states' efforts to combat all forms of gender violence.

Several countries have adopted robust legislation to combat and respond to GBV (Brysk 2018). In addition to criminalizing GBV, comprehensive GBV legislation often entails the enactment of a network of services for survivors — including police, crisis centers, health clinics, and shelters. The scant implementation of these services, however, precludes governments from adequately addressing this multi-faceted problem (e. g., Araújo and Gatto 2021) — raising questions about the credibility of state efforts to tackle GBV. Research has shown that survivors' access to these specialized public institutions matters not only for their safety and chances of starting a new life but also for their political opinions (Kras 2022). Yet, questions remain about the various effects of anti-GBV policies on victims' opinions and behaviors. For example, do intimate partner violence (IPV) victims who were able to access specialized services use the information they gained in the process to form opinions about state efforts to combat GBV? And does this information, in turn, shape their bystander intervention attitudes?

In this article, I argue that the treatment survivors receive while seeking help from the police is consequential for their evaluations of the effectiveness of laws in protecting women from violence and for their bystander intervention attitudes. I rely on the vast literature on procedural fairness (e. g., Tyler and Huo 2002; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010), to argue that fair treatment (e. g., being treated with dignity and respect) should be particularly important for IPV survivors when forming opinions about the performance of state efforts in addressing GBV. How victims are treated when seeking help matters as IPV survivors experience emotional distress and trauma, among countless other negative consequences of victimization (e. g., Jordan *et al.*, 2010). The police are often victims' main entry point into the network of public support services for survivors (e. g., Schraiber *et al.*, 2012) — especially in contexts in which the location of certain services, such as shelters, remains concealed from the public. How the police react and respond to victims might be consequential for their subsequent coping behavior (e. g., Calton and Cattaneo 2014).

Research has documented extensively the dramatic difference between the written law and the law in practice regarding GBV (e. g., Htun and Jensenius 2020). Victim-blaming attitudes, doubt, and patronizing treatment are still common experiences for IPV survivors when navigating the criminal justice system and accessing their rights as victims (e. g., Srinivas and DePrince 2015). Due to the high emotional costs associated with IPV, unfair treatment from service providers leaves victims without the emotional support they need to cope with victimization (e. g., Herman 1997). As the main policy implementer of GBV laws in many countries, the way the police treat victims carries information about the credibility of state attempts to protect women from violence. Similarly, unfair treatment by the police might signal to survivors that other IPV victims would be equally mistreated by providers, dissuading them from calling the police if they witness abuse. Thus, I contribute to the literature by analyzing the effect of procedural fairness on *IPV victims'* political

opinions and bystander intervention attitudes. The political attitudes, as well as bystander intervention intentions of GBV victims, have remained understudied across disciplines.

To test my hypotheses, I rely on public opinion data conducted by DataSenado in Brazil. These surveys are conducted with representative samples of the female population every two years. I rely on three waves of the survey that contain questions on perceptions of procedural fairness in contact with the police. I argue that Brazil is an ideal case to test my hypotheses due to its very well-known legislation on IPV as well as the large number of additional GBV laws subsequently passed. Brazil was also a pioneer in creating women's police stations, the main vehicle through which IPV laws are implemented (Santos 2010). I find support for my argument that perceptions of procedural fairness in encounters with the police matter for IPV victims' evaluations of the effectiveness of anti-GBV laws. However, I do not find evidence that perceptions of procedural fairness shape victims' bystander intervention attitudes. I explore possible explanations for this non-finding by conducting a series of additional analyses. These additional tests suggest that IPV survivors' bystander intervention attitudes might be linked to long-lasting awareness-building and bystander campaigns, which are widespread in the context of Brazil.

Taken together, these findings carry with them important policy implications. They suggest that quality interpersonal treatment of survivors is just as consequential for IPV survivors' well-being as delivering tangible resources to victims. Police officers are often victims' first contact of support, and their negative or positive reactions carry information about the effectiveness of anti-GBV policies for victims.

## 2. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS AUTHORITIES

Extant research on procedural fairness has consistently shown that citizens rely on information derived from fair or unfair processes to form opinions about authorities (e. g., Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005). Procedural fairness, which generally refers to the quality of interpersonal treatment, is obtained when service providers are unbiased, treat individuals with dignity and respect, appear trustworthy, and offer individuals a voice in the process (Tyler and Huo 2002). In the case of GBV, survivors might also determine whether processes are fair or unfair depending on the extent to which they are met with blame or doubt from service providers (e. g., Ptacek 1999). Conversely, distributive fairness is defined as the perceived fairness of the *outcome* of a proceeding (e. g., Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). Scholars operationalize distributive fairness in terms of whether

the outcome received at the end of a proceeding matched the outcome the victim was after when contacting the authorities (e. g., Calton and Cattaneo 2014). Crucially, research suggests that people are concerned with procedural fairness independent of their perceptions of distributive fairness (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).

Scholars have argued that personal encounters with the authorities shape citizens' political judgments. People learn from their personal experiences with the authorities (i.e., police, bureaucrats) as these encounters might be as close as people come to «the government» (e. g., Soss 1999; Peffley and Hurwitz 2005). People then use these experiences to form opinions about other relevant political institutions. For example, research in the context of the United States consistently finds that when citizens believe the police to be procedurally fair, they view police and the criminal justice system as legitimate (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). Procedural fairness also has been shown to improve compliance and cooperation, including increased crime reporting (e. g., Murphy and Barkworth 2014; Tyler and Huo 2002; Trinkner *et al.*, 2019). Generally speaking, people's experiences with agents of the state form the basis for broader political judgments (Soss 1999).

Interdisciplinary research on GBV has documented extensively the effect of procedural fairness on various outcomes for victims. Research has focused primarily on the powerful effects of procedural fairness on survivors' agency, well-being, and the likelihood of reporting future violence to the police. For example, McLeod, Hays, and Chang (2010) found through interviews with survivors of IPV, that the simple acknowledgment of pain from service providers was perceived as valuable by survivors for their recovery process. Similarly, Kulkarni, Bell, and Rhodes (2012) document survivors' strong desire to be treated with compassion when seeking help from support institutions. Importantly, Cattaneo and colleagues (2014, 2010) find that perceptions of fairness in court processes are uniquely predictive of improvements in depression symptoms among victims. Thus, even if survivors do not receive the tangible resources they seek, such as restraining orders or convictions in criminal cases, they may still benefit from seeking help from the police or other public support services if they are treated with dignity and respect (i.e., procedural fairness).

In addition, procedural fairness might also matter in predicting intentions of future help-seeking. In their study, Calton and Cattaneo (2014) and Fleury-Steiner *et al.*, (2006) find that procedural fairness predicted survivors' intentions of reaching out to the criminal justice system for help in the future. It is important to note, however, that evidence of the effect of procedural fairness on deterring or encouraging future help-seeking is mixed. For example, Hickman and Simpson (2003) find that IPV survivors' intentions of utilizing police services following subsequent victimization were only shaped by distributive fairness. Nevertheless, empirical studies suggest that procedural fairness might matter in predicting *bystanders'* referral of

sexual assault victims to the police (Henry, *et al.*, 2020). In turn, friends and family can play a crucial role in GBV victims' decisions to report the crime to the police (e. g., Medie 2017). In this way, perceptions of fairness might be a strong consideration for both victims and their informal support network of friends and family.

I bring this interdisciplinary literature together to argue that procedural fairness in encounters with the police should also matter in predicting IPV survivors' judgments of the extent to which government efforts to combat GBV are *credible*. That is, do survivors generalize from their experience with the police to opinions about government performance in tackling GBV? To my knowledge, this question remains understudied. Moreover, I also examine whether procedural fairness is related to *survivors'* intentions of reporting IPV to the police if they witness it happening to someone else. This way, this research adds to our knowledge about the relationship between procedural fairness and attitudes of *victims of intimate partner violence* specifically.

### 3. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND IPV SURVIVORS' ATTITUDES

Previous research in the context of GBV has found that IPV victims who were not able to access specialized public services downgrade their evaluations of government performance in addressing GBV (Kras 2022). I argue that survivors not only form attitudes towards the credibility of state efforts to address GBV based on the *accessibility* of services but also on the *fairness of service delivery*. Both service accessibility and quality of service delivery convey information to IPV survivors on the credibility of state efforts to combat GBV. When services are available, survivors rely on what they have learned in this process. As Soss (1999) has argued about recipients of welfare benefits in the United States: public services become the «image of the government.» Survivors learn from their experience receiving assistance from these support services which then spills over to their performance evaluations of governmental attempts to curtail gender violence. Once victims have access to anti-GBV services, procedural fairness in service provision should influence their political opinions and bystander intervention attitudes.

Procedural fairness should be particularly important for survivors of IPV in forming their opinions, as demonstrated by its impacts on mental health and well-being (e. g., Cattaneo and Goodman 2010). In the context of GBV, positive or negative experiences with service provision generate a feedback loop of positive or negative evaluations of the political institutions that survivors see as responsible for addressing their needs. Procedural fairness should be especially consequential for victims' attitudes due to the high levels of emotional distress that IPV survivors experience. Researchers have documented extensively the negative consequences of GBV victimization, for example: anxiety, depression, PTSD, and

low self-esteem (e. g., Aguilar and Nightingale 1994; Jordan, *et al.*, 2010). Against this backdrop, negative messages from the police and other service providers are particularly damaging for women who have experienced GBV.

Procedural fairness in service delivery might be particularly consequential for IPV victims' attitude formation because of fear of stigma. An enduring, and in fact, exclusive, characteristic of GBV is that society often attributes blame to victims. Government institutions might not sufficiently challenge these patriarchal beliefs (e. g., Ptacek 1999), which can be reflected in the way providers treat survivors. Because society has historically placed the blame on survivors themselves, women in such situations often experience anticipated stigma — the fear of how others will perceive and treat them once they know about their situation (Overstreet and Quinn 2013). As a consequence, IPV survivors might be uncertain about the outcome of reporting as well as the reaction of service providers. Indeed, scholars have shown that procedural fairness is a particularly important consideration when people experience uncertainty (Van den Bos, *et al.*, 1998). Procedural unfairness in service delivery can stigmatize victims, while fair treatment can build confidence survivors need to continue with the proceeding. Both scenarios provide information to victims about the extent of the state's commitment to aiding victims.

Unsupportive and judgmental responses from service providers might compound the trauma survivors are already experiencing (e. g., Herman 1997; Cattaneo and Goodman 2010; McLeod, *et al.*, 2010). A negative response by the police might generate negative sentiments among survivors, which they can ultimately generalize to state action on GBV more broadly — just as it has been shown with the case of Black Americans and perceptions of the criminal justice system in the United States (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Bell 2017). The idea that procedural fairness matters for the formation of political attitudes among survivors is consistent with theories emphasizing the central role of human contact in healing people from trauma (e. g., Herman 1997; Keshet *et al.*, 2019). As a result, in the aftermath of trauma, rebuilding some minimal form of trust is a priority (Herman 1997; Rancher *et al.*, 2018).

Researchers have argued that reporting to the police might be the first time that GBV survivors have verbally described their experiences with violence to someone else (e. g., Srinivas and DePrince 2015; Schraiber *et al.*, 2012). This might be especially the case in countries that have enacted specialized police stations tasked exclusively with the goal of combating and responding to GBV. The problem, however, is that the police leadership plays a vital role in how each individual station responds to IPV and treats victims, even in women's police stations (e. g., Hautzinger 2007). As a result, some IPV victims might experience fair service provision while others might experience unfair treatment.

The way that victims are treated in their encounters with the police should consequently shape how they perceive the state's job in responding to GBV more

broadly. IPV victimization certainly imposes severe financial costs on victims and jeopardizes their physical integrity and safety. But IPV also shatters victims' emotional well-being (Aguilar and Nightingale 1994). Thus, the police can offer victims tangible resources, such as referring them to anonymous shelters or providing them with emergency restraining orders (distributive fairness), all of which improve their safety and address some of the costs associated with IPV. But if the police fail to offer survivors fair treatment, they can leave victims feeling worst about themselves (e. g., Ptacek 1999).

My argument builds on Altamirano, Berens, and Ley (2020), whose study finds that victims of generalized crime have higher rates of support for public welfare and healthcare than non-victims. They argue that the costs associated with victimization, such as economic and physical costs, increase victims' demands for support from state institutions. I argue that the emotional costs associated with IPV victimization are particularly high — given what we know about the role of coercive control in abusive relationships (e. g., Rakovec-Felser 2014). If these emotional demands are left unmet, survivors might interpret state efforts to tackle GBV as half-baked promises. As a result, if IPV victims perceive that they were not treated fairly by police — the main implementers of GBV laws — they are more likely to be skeptical of the effectiveness of anti-GBV laws in protecting women. This is especially the case for contexts in which state action on GBV is very salient, implying that victims know they are supposed to receive assistance and protection.<sup>1</sup> These theoretical insights lead me to the following hypothesis.

H<sub>1</sub>: IPV survivors who received unfair treatment from the police will be less likely to evaluate the performance of anti-GBV legislation positively than survivors who perceived treatment as fair and non-victims.

### 3.1. Bystander Intervention

I have argued thus far that procedural unfairness should lead IPV victims to conclude that state efforts to tackle GBV are not credible. But should these negative opinions extend to victims' bystander intervention attitudes? These attitudes range from ignoring the situation, preventing the violence from escalating, or calling upon outside resources for help (e. g., Bennett, *et al.*, 2014). Programs promoting bystander intervention have proliferated across college campuses and communities in the United States, showing promising results (e. g., Powers and Leili 2018). In addition to awareness-building programs, research has shown that when states

---

1. Figure A1 in the appendix presents women's responses to a question in these surveys about the IPV law.



send strong signals to citizens about the criminal nature of IPV, men are more likely to report their willingness to intervene by calling the police if they witness a case of IPV (Córdoba and Kras 2022). The police, in turn, can play a crucial role in preventing IPV from escalating (e. g., Xie and Lynch 2017). What remains unclear in the literature is whether procedural fairness shapes *IPV victims'* bystander attitudes. Surely, IPV survivors who have had access to specialized services are likely to rely on what they have learned in their own process of help-seeking to decide whether it is worthwhile to call the police if they witness another woman being abused.

As mentioned previously, Henry, Franklin, and Franklin's (2020) study shows that people's perceptions of the police as procedurally fair shape their intentions of referring sexual assault survivors to the police. Kras (2024), too, finds an effect of procedural fairness and bystander intervention for non-victims. She finds that those who read about an IPV victim who received procedurally unfair treatment from officers at a women's police station in experimental vignettes were more likely to consider calling informal channels (e. g., family) for help. Interestingly, this study does not find an effect of procedural fairness and intentions of calling a women's police station — possibly due to social desirability bias. However, very few studies have been conducted with GBV victims in regard to *their* bystander attitudes and how these attitudes are influenced by their personal experience with fair or unfair treatment from service providers.

The few studies that have been conducted with IPV victims analyze their intentions to re-utilize police or court services following fair or unfair treatment (Hickman and Simpson 2003; Calton and Cattaneo 2014; Fleury-Steiner *et al.*, 2006) — albeit results are mixed. While Calton and Cattaneo (2014) and Fleury-Steiner *et al.*, (2006) find that procedural fairness predicted IPV survivors' intentions of reaching out to courts again in the future, Hickman and Simpson (2003) found that only distributive fairness predicted intentions of re-utilizing police services again among victims. Despite important and valuable contributions to the literature, these studies only included IPV victims in their samples, which preclude important comparisons between victims and non-victims. In short, existing studies reveal a need for further investigations into IPV victims' bystander attitudes.

I argue that unfair treatment adds to the high emotional costs associated with IPV victimization, engendering skepticism of the state's commitment to combating GBV among victims. Because these attitudes were formed due to personal experience with unfair treatment from service providers, they are likely to be more stable and resistant to change (Chong and Druckman 2012). Attitudes linked to one's own experience and rights exert a stronger influence on behaviors (Boninger *et al.*, 1995). Unfair treatment from service providers has been shown to lead to worse mental health outcomes for IPV survivors (e. g., Fleury-Steiner *et al.*, 2006), which can further crystalize these negative attitudes. Further, Bell (2017) shows that both vicarious and personal experiences with procedurally unfair treatment from

the police can lead to *avoidance* of police in the future. As such, experience with procedurally unfair treatment by the police might lead IPV survivors to believe that calling the police if they witness IPV is not worthwhile compared to victims who received fair police treatment and non-victims. Due to their own negative experience, they might believe that the police might cause more harm than good for the victim, but also, they might want to *avoid* contact with the police themselves. They might prefer, instead, to refer victims to informal channels of help – as shown by Kras (2023) in the case of non-victims – or other services (e. g., crisis centers or NGOs).

H<sub>2</sub>: IPV survivors who received unfair treatment from the police will be less likely to express willingness to report IPV crimes to the police compared to survivors who perceived treatment as fair and non-victims.

#### 4. THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT

Brazil represents an ideal case to test my theoretical insights outlined above. While Brazil has engaged in notable attempts to mitigate the problem of GBV, rates of GBV are still very high (Brysk 2018). This suggests a disconnect between law on paper and implementation and enforcement – which raises questions about the credibility of state efforts to combat this problem.

Even so, Brazil is considered to be a country with one of the most thorough legislative responses to GBV in the world (Brysk 2018). The Maria da Penha law addressing intimate partner violence – which was designed by a coalition of feminist activists, politicians, and representatives of international organizations – was adopted in 2006 by the government of President Lula da Silva from the Workers Party. This law modified the way in which the state treats domestic violence in important ways; it increased the costs of engaging in IPV for the aggressor, empowered women in situations of violence through measures such as restraining orders, and expanded services for survivors. Importantly, the law spelled out preventive measures against GBV, including the creation of awareness campaigns to diffuse the law to «all society».

The law has successfully increased resources to support women who have experienced intimate partner violence or are at risk of violence. The legislation expanded a system of integrated services that focus exclusively on GBV: women's police stations, crisis centers, specialized courts, special units with the prosecutor's office, shelters, hotlines, and medical units (e. g., Araújo and Gatto 2021). Even before the law, Brazil was a pioneer in the creation of women's police stations in the city of São Paulo in 1985. These specialized police units focus exclusively on responding to GBV and are staffed primarily, although not exclusively, with female

police officers. Since the adoption of the Maria da Penha Law, the implementation of these stations has increased across municipalities within the country reaching 460 in 2018 (Araújo and Gatto 2021). The women’s police stations are considered the main institutional channel through which GBV is addressed in Brazil (Santos 2010). In 2015 under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff of the Worker’s Party, Brazil passed another law covering femicides.

Given these comprehensive efforts that span decades, Brazilians are aware of anti-GBV policies. For example, survey evidence from 2015 suggests that almost no female respondents reported being completely unaware of the IPV law – and awareness of the law increased over time (see Figure A1 in the appendix). Perhaps even more impressive, surveys also find that 96 percent of Brazilian respondents (men and women) reported that they know of the existence of women’s police stations. However, given Brazil’s decentralization, there is substantial variation across municipalities and states not only in the extent to which policy instruments are actually adopted at the local level (Araújo and Gatto 2021), but also in how much sheriffs at both regular police stations and women’s police stations prioritize GBV and treatment of victims. This subnational variation in conjunction with the salience of women’s police stations and the Maria da Penha law makes Brazil an appropriate case to test the hypotheses developed in this study.

## 5. DATA AND METHODS

To test my hypotheses, I use data from three nationally representative surveys of the female population in Brazil conducted by DataSenado. The waves of the survey included in my analysis are 2011, 2013, and 2015. The total sample of these three waves combined consists of 3,702 phone interviews conducted across all 26 states and the federal district in Brazil.<sup>2</sup> In this sample, 688 respondents are victims of IPV. I combine these public opinion surveys with state-level data collected from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and Mapa da Violência.

### 5.1. *Dependent Variables*

The measure assessing respondents’ evaluations of the credibility of state efforts in combating GBV centers on anti-GBV laws. This corresponds to the following question in the surveys: on a scale from 1 (no protection) to 3 (a lot of protection), do you think that Brazilian laws protect women from domestic or family

---

2. Box A1 in the appendix describes DataSenado’s sampling methodology.

violence? And to analyze survivors' bystander intervention attitudes, I use the following question available in the surveys: where 0 means «other» and 1 means «police» (either women's police station or regular police), if you witnessed a woman being abused, to whom would you report the abuse you saw?<sup>3</sup>

On the question assessing whether female citizens believe that Brazilian laws protect women against domestic violence, 50 percent of respondents believe that the laws protect women only in part (option 2 on the scale). Strikingly, only 18 percent of female respondents believe that the laws protect women from violence (3 on the scale), while 32 percent report that existing laws do not protect women from violence at all (1 on the scale). Unlike the more divided opinions on the effectiveness of the law, citizens overwhelmingly report intentions of calling the police if they witness IPV. Only 19 percent of respondents report intentions of talking to friends, or others, or not intervening if they witness IPV, while, remarkably, 81 percent of respondents report intentions of calling the police if they witness IPV. This might illustrate the success of campaigns promoting bystander intervention. In addition, women's police stations are the most salient and well-established institutions for victims (e. g., Hautzinger 2007), which might signal to citizens that the best course of action is calling the police if they witness IPV.

## 5.2. Independent Variables

I use items in the surveys assessing intimate partner violence victimization, the victims' coping strategy, and evaluations of customer service victims receive at a regular police station or at a women's police station (WPS) to create the main independent variable used for this analysis. I combined these items into a categorical measure coded 0 to 4. I coded this measure as 0 for non-victims and 1 for victims that did not use the police or any other public support services.<sup>4</sup> The remaining values in this measure indicate that victims have sought help at a regular police station or a women's police station. Among these victims, I coded 2 for victims that rated the police's customer service as excellent, 3 for good/satisfactory, and 4 for poor. This way, I am able to compare victims with various degrees of subjective positive or negative experiences with the police with victims that have not received any

---

3. For this measure, I coded as 0 if respondents indicated that they would contact friends, NGOs, family, church, or other. Respondents who said they would not intervene are also coded as 0.

4. The victims coded as 1 in this measure could have sought help from friends, family, church, NGO's or not sought help at all. The original question included an «other» option, which I omitted from the analysis to avoid including victims that received assistance from other public support services. The question did not list other public services besides the police or women's police station. 116 victims in the «other» category were excluded from the analysis.

public support services as well as with non-victims. Among the victims in this main independent variable, 366 did not receive any help from state support services or the police, 53 received support from the police and rated the customer service at the station as excellent, 92 victims rated the police service as good/satisfactory, and 59 rated the police services as poor.

At the individual level, the models in this analysis account for perceptions that women are treated with respect in society, as they can influence attitudes toward GBV. The models also control for perceptions of impunity around GBV crimes in Brazil, as they could influence opinions about the effectiveness of the law in protecting women from violence and, in particular, bystander attitudes. Perceptions of police effectiveness in fighting crime have been shown to influence citizens' cooperation with the police (e. g., Tankebe 2009). And even though only 1.16 percent of respondents in the three waves of the survey reported that they never heard of the IPV legislation, I also control for this variable in the models to rule out the possibility that the results are driven by outlier cases. Further, the models control for individuals' socio-demographic characteristics.

The models also account for state-level variables that might influence citizens' views on the two dependent variables. The models control for population size and GDP at the state level. In Brazil, public services for GBV survivors tend to be established in greater numbers in larger and richer areas (e. g., Córdova and Kras 2022). Additionally, models control for homicide rates at the state level. Higher levels of violence might signal to women that the state is doing a poor job of protecting citizens from violence in general. Models also control for a measure indicating whether states have adopted their own state-level legislation on GBV. The existence of legislation at the state level addressing GBV might send stronger signals to citizens that the government is committed to aiding victims.<sup>5</sup>

*Method:*

To test  $H_1$  and  $H_2$ , I estimate multilevel models that account for the nested structure of the data (e. g., Snijders and Bosker 2012). In the multilevel models, the clustering effects at the state level are accounted for in the estimation of the standard errors. For  $H_1$ , I estimate ordered logit multilevel models, while for  $H_2$ , I estimate logit multilevel models.<sup>6</sup>

---

5. Refer to Table A1 in the appendix for a description of variables and Table A2 for descriptive statistics.

6. I also conducted the analysis with no State-level controls. Results remain unchanged (Table A4 in the appendix).

## 6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

### 6.1. Evaluations of Effectiveness of anti-GBV Laws

Table 1 presents the results of the multilevel models that test H1 and H2. Models 1 and 2 test the effect of IPV victims' perceptions of fairness in the service provided at the police station on their evaluations of laws designed to combat GBV. Model 1 shows the effect of perceptions of procedural fairness on victims' evaluations compared to female non-victims. When compared to non-victims, victims who did not receive assistance from the police or other public services were less likely to think the laws protect women ( $p < 0.05$ ). This suggests that accessibility to public services influences victims' opinions about the credibility of state efforts to mitigate GBV – consistent with findings reported by Kras (2022). The only groups who were equally optimistic about the laws compared to non-victims were victims who went to the police and evaluated their customer service as excellent or satisfactory. Victims who went to the police and evaluated their customer service as poor were more likely than non-victims to negatively evaluate the laws in protecting women against IPV. This result is negative and statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ , providing support to H1.

**Table 1. Procedural Fairness and IPV Victims' Attitudes:**

|  | Evaluation of Anti-GBV Law |                          | Bystander Intervention |                          |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
|  | Model 1                    | Model 2                  | Model 3                | Model 4                  |
| Baseline for Victimization Variable:     | Non-Victims                | Victims with No Services | Non-Victims            | Victims with No Services |
| Non-Victims                              |                            | 0.293**<br>(0.116)       |                        | 0.194<br>(0.194)         |
| Victims with no Services                 | -0.293**<br>(0.116)        |                          | -0.194<br>(0.194)      |                          |
| Victims with Excellent Police Service    | 0.428<br>(0.286)           | 0.722**<br>(0.302)       | 0.329<br>(0.561)       | 0.523<br>(0.584)         |
| Victims with Satisfactory Police Service | -0.313<br>(0.218)          | -0.0198<br>(0.240)       | 0.0721<br>(0.390)      | 0.266<br>(0.421)         |
| Victims with Poor Police Services        | -0.757***<br>(0.267)       | -0.464<br>(0.286)        | 0.127<br>(0.506)       | 0.322<br>(0.532)         |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

| Baseline for Victimization Variable:   | Evaluation of Anti-GBV Law |                            | Bystander Intervention    |                           |
|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|  | Model 1                    | Model 2                    | Model 3                   | Model 4                   |
|  | Non-Victims                | Victims with No Services   | Non-Victims               | Victims with No Services  |
| Individual-Level Controls:             |                            |                            |                           |                           |
| Perceives GBV Impunity                 | -0.667***<br>(0.0828)      | -0.667***<br>(0.0828)      | -0.280*<br>(0.148)        | -0.280*<br>(0.148)        |
| Perceives Discrimination Against Women | -0.618***<br>(0.0620)      | -0.618***<br>(0.0620)      | 0.332***<br>(0.110)       | 0.332***<br>(0.110)       |
| Age                                    | -0.124***<br>(0.0320)      | -0.124***<br>(0.0320)      | -0.0921<br>(0.0564)       | -0.0921<br>(0.0564)       |
| Educational Level                      | 0.150**<br>(0.0614)        | 0.150**<br>(0.0614)        | 0.190*<br>(0.110)         | 0.190*<br>(0.110)         |
| Black (=1; 0=White)                    | -0.407***<br>(0.129)       | -0.407***<br>(0.129)       | -0.316<br>(0.216)         | -0.316<br>(0.216)         |
| Multiracial                            | -0.177**<br>(0.0786)       | -0.177**<br>(0.0786)       | -0.152<br>(0.139)         | -0.152<br>(0.139)         |
| Indigenous                             | -0.635*<br>(0.334)         | -0.635*<br>(0.334)         | 0.193<br>(0.583)          | 0.193<br>(0.583)          |
| Asian                                  | 0.301<br>(0.224)           | 0.301<br>(0.224)           | 0.670<br>(0.543)          | 0.670<br>(0.543)          |
| State-Level Controls:                  |                            |                            |                           |                           |
| GDP                                    | -5.02e-06**<br>(2.43e-06)  | -5.02e-06**<br>(2.43e-06)  | 3.23e-05***<br>(5.06e-06) | 3.23e-05***<br>(5.06e-06) |
| Population                             | -1.88e-08***<br>(4.07e-09) | -1.88e-08***<br>(4.07e-09) | 3.94e-09<br>(8.64e-09)    | 3.94e-09<br>(8.64e-09)    |
| State-Level GBV Law                    | 0.324**<br>(0.149)         | 0.324**<br>(0.149)         | 0.0254<br>(0.323)         | 0.0254<br>(0.323)         |
| Constant                               |                            |                            | 0.275<br>(0.524)          | 0.0806<br>(0.554)         |

| Baseline for Victimization Variable: | Evaluation of Anti-GBV Law |                          | Bystander Intervention |                          |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
|                                      | Model 1                    | Model 2                  | Model 3                | Model 4                  |
|                                      | Non-Victims                | Victims with No Services | Non-Victims            | Victims with No Services |
| Observations                         | 3,178                      | 3,178                    | 1,916                  | 1,916                    |
| Number of groups                     | 27                         | 27                       | 27                     | 27                       |

Notes: DataSenado sample. The models also control for awareness of the IPV law, employment, income, and homicide rates. Full results are presented in Table A3 in the appendix. Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$


Model 2 shows that both non-victims and victims who received excellent police service are more likely than victims who did not receive assistance from the police or other support public services to believe that the laws protect women against violence ( $p < 0.05$ ). All other victims evaluate the effectiveness of anti-GBV laws similarly to victims who have received no assistance from public services. In fact, the customer service at the police station must be perceived as excellent to generate positive attitudes towards the anti-GBV laws among victims. These results suggest that receiving low-quality interpersonal treatment from public service providers can offset the positive effects of access to support services on survivors' political attitudes. Indeed, unfair services and lack of access to support services are equally as damaging to survivors' political attitudes in the context of Brazil. These results add to the existing body of work suggesting that procedural fairness matters for victims (e. g., Srinivas and DePrince 2015; Calton and Cattaneo 2014), by demonstrating that procedural fairness in victims' contact with the police matters too for their political opinions.

Figure 1 presents the mean predicted probabilities separately for each category of victims and for non-victims of perceiving Brazilian laws as effective in protecting women from GBV based on model 1. As can be observed, non-victims' probability of believing that anti-GBV laws are effective is, on average, 18 percent, while the probability for victims with no access to services is 14 percent ( $p < 0.05$ ). Compared to non-victims, IPV survivors who rated the customer service at the police as poor are 9 percent likely to think anti-GBV laws are credible, on average ( $p < 0.01$ ). Strikingly, IPV survivors who perceive police service delivery to be excellent are 24 percent likely to positively evaluate anti-GBV laws compared to victims with no services ( $p < 0.05$ ). This is a statistically significant difference of 15 percentage points compared to victims that rated interpersonal treatment at the police station as poor. These results suggest that fair treatment (excellent category)



demonstrates to victims that the state's commitment to protecting women from violence is credible, making them more confident in the performance of anti-GBV laws – even compared to non-victims.

**Figure 1. Positive Evaluations of the Effectiveness of anti-GBV Laws**



Source: Based on Model 1, Table 1.

The in-depth interviews with IPV survivors and service providers that I conducted in Brazil corroborate these findings. I spoke to three IPV survivors who described to me their experiences with WPS. When I asked if they received support from WPS officers, all of them said they felt disrespected or not taken seriously in the process; one victim said she was treated «horribly». They all rated interpersonal treatment at WPS as poor. None of these survivors stayed with their aggressors; they were able to receive referrals to shelters or other services – with two of the survivors leaving their states to escape the aggressor that kept stalking them. But when I asked what they thought of the Maria da Penha law, responses were overwhelmingly negative. One survivor called the law a «joke,» another described it as «just talk». All these survivors had bad experiences with the quality of the treatment they received at WPS. And while they stayed in public shelters, or received assistance from NGOs, they still concluded the law in Brazil is cheap talk.

As shown in Table 1, other control variables also exert significant effects on perceptions of the effectiveness of the law in protecting women from violence. As expected, perceptions of impunity around GBV as well as gender discrimination exert negative effects on evaluations of anti-GBV laws. Notably, higher levels of education improve women's evaluations of these laws; while Black and multi-racial women are more likely to negatively evaluate them. At the state level, local GBV laws improve evaluations of state efforts to protect women from gender violence. This finding might indicate that states that have adopted their own laws might send stronger signals to women about their commitment to combating GBV and might actually devote more resources to prevention programs.

## 6.2. Bystander Intervention Attitudes

Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 test the effect of procedural fairness in police service delivery on IPV survivors' bystander intervention attitudes (H2). To be exact, these models test IPV victims' willingness to call the *police* specifically if they witness IPV. Contrary to my predictions, victims whose encounters with the police were perceived as procedurally unjust do not seem to be less willing to call the police if they see a woman being abused. All categories of victims are equally as likely as non-victims to report intentions of calling the police if they witness a case of IPV. This indicates that IPV victimization and procedural fairness do not account for variations in bystander attitudes in this sample.

Having experienced violence themselves, victims might not be deterred from contacting the police even after experiencing negative encounters with the police themselves. Indeed, safety considerations might take priority over the emotional damage caused by unfair police treatment. It is also possible that the victims that rated the customer service at the police station as less than excellent still received tangible resources, such as restraining orders, information, or referral to shelters and other services. Those resources might have improved their health and safety. Thus, it might be that access to tangible resources from the police, or *distributive* fairness, that drives survivors' bystander intervention attitudes. This would be consistent with findings reported by Tankebe (2009) and Hickman and Simpson (2003). However, more research is needed to test the validity of this argument.

It is also entirely possible that the salience of the GBV laws and women's police stations in the context of Brazil makes women in general more willing to call the police if they witness a case of IPV. During my own fieldwork in Brazil, I learned of the extensive public awareness campaigns across cities encouraging people to report IPV to the police specifically. For example, metro stations in São Paulo display

billboards encouraging bystanders to report IPV to a local women's police station.<sup>7</sup> Decades of such campaigns might have cemented an understanding that one ought to report IPV to the police — generating a sense of duty to report IPV to law enforcement through a learning mechanism. Related to this, Taylor's (2018) research in Colombia suggests that people's attitudes and behaviors towards institutions are somewhat disconnected. She finds that while people judge the justice system to be ineffective, they still reach out to them to remedy rights violations. Taylor's argument is that despite the system's ineffectiveness, people have an understanding that they are entitled to claim their rights — and ineffective institutions might be the only mechanism through which people can do that. A similar process might be at play with IPV victims. While unfair treatment from the police might generate skepticism about the state's commitment to victims, IPV victims might not see other alternatives to calling the police if they witness domestic violence.

Yet, the findings reported above might be a result of social desirability bias. Unfortunately, given the observational nature of the data, I have no simple way to disentangle whether the bystander intervention attitudes reported in the empirical findings of this analysis are a result of entrenched attitudes emerging from social norms around IPV spread via public campaigns of the sorts I described earlier, or simply a desire to report a «politically correct» answer when asked about bystander intervention. In an experimental study in Mexico, Arias (2018) finds that these types of public anti-GBV campaigns elicit more rejection of GBV among the public than awareness campaigns transmitted privately. He posits that public information is not only used to update one's own beliefs about an issue but it also allows people to update their beliefs as to the beliefs of others. That is, with public information, everyone knows that everyone else also received that same message. Thus, it is possible that because these messages in Brazil are so widely available, and delivered publicly (e. g., buses, public television, public radio), there might be a «common knowledge» that one *ought* to call the police if they witness IPV — regardless of whether one would actually do so if faced with that scenario in real life. Future research is needed to test this possibility.

## 7. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

### 7.1. Robustness Checks

To evaluate the robustness of the results that test my hypotheses, I conduct a series of additional analyses. I first test the robustness of the results to alternative

---

7. In Box A2 located in the online appendix, I discuss my fieldwork in more detail.

control variables. At the state level, I test if results hold controlling for whether states have designated funds for combating GBV, instead of local GBV laws, and I control for femicide rates instead of homicide rates. At the individual level, I test whether the inclusion of religiosity changes the results. Because the surveys do not contain a question on ideological preferences, I control for religiosity as a proxy for ideological leanings. Indeed, religious preferences have been shown to play a major role in Brazilian voting behavior (e. g., Setzler 2020). Results, however, remain unchanged (Table A5 and Table A6 in the appendix).

I also restricted the analyses to victims only in order to include an important item in the survey that only victims answered: whether they still have regular contact with the aggressor. This question enables me to rule out the possibility that victims that rated customer service at the police station well are the same victims that were able to access the resources needed to leave their abusive relationships. However, this variable does not exert significant effects on attitudes toward GBV laws or bystander intervention — giving me confidence in the main findings of this study. These tests are presented in Table A7 of the appendix.

## 7.2. Unpacking Bystander Intervention

In this section, I further examine whether bystander intervention attitudes might be linked to awareness-building campaigns and how these campaigns relate to deep-rooted social norms or social desirability bias. It is important, however, to preface this section by highlighting the tentative nature of these additional tests. To properly disentangle deep-rooted attitudes from social desirability bias — both potentially emerging from public campaigns — experimental research similar to those conducted by Arias (2019) is required. Or at the very least, more granular data at the municipal level. However, this analysis can provide some preliminary evidence as to the underlying mechanism at play in the bystander attitudes results from the main analysis in Table 1.

As I have mentioned above, it is possible that the non-findings related to H2 might be due to the success of anti-GBV campaigns organized by federal and local governments, NGOs, and women’s police stations in the context of Brazil.<sup>8</sup> While the DataSenado surveys do not include a question that would allow me to test whether respondents in the sample were exposed to any of these awareness campaign efforts, I can still explore this possibility using state-level data on the existence of women’s police stations in the respondents’ state of residence. Using data from IBGE and the *Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres*, I calculated the

---

8. Refer to the appendix, Figures A2, for examples of these campaigns.

number of WPS per state and coded states as having a low number of WPS (1-6), low-medium (7-15), medium-high (16-24), and high number of WPS (38-120).<sup>9</sup> The underlying assumption behind this strategy is that the larger the number of WPS established in one's state, the more likely it is that a resident of that state would have been exposed to WPS, bystander campaigns, or other anti-GBV messages.

Using a multilevel model (presented in the appendix, Table A8)<sup>10</sup>, I test whether women in states with higher numbers of WPS are more likely to report intentions of calling the police if they witnessed IPV. I further examine if this effect is conditional on victimization status. The substantive findings are presented in Figure 2. Panel A shows the «victimization gap» in the probability of reporting intentions of calling law enforcement if one witnessed a domestic violence incident. As can be observed, IPV victims are much less likely to report intentions of calling the police if they witness IPV compared to non-victims in states with a low number of WPS. In these states, victims are 62 percent likely to report intentions of contacting the police in such scenarios. In contrast, non-victims are 83 percent likely to report intentions of contacting law enforcement (Panel B). This is a statistically significant gap of 21 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ). This gap closes in states with low-medium through a high number of WPS (i. e., CIs cross the line set at zero in Panel A, Figure 2). However, as the number of WPS established in the state grows, so do IPV victims' and non-victims' intentions of reporting abuse to the police (Panel B).

I argue that these results provide some preliminary evidence that WPS might cement an understanding that IPV warrants police involvement, as argued by Taylor (2018) in the case of rights-claiming in Colombia, rather than simply generating empty «common knowledge» leading to social desirability bias. The results show a «victimization gap» in states with a low number of WPS, but it is unclear why this is the case. Since local-level efforts to spread awareness about reporting IPV to the police have been consistent since the adoption of the IPV law in 2006, and WPS themselves are involved in these attempts, people in states with high WPS presence might have been continuously exposed to these messages. These messages seem to be particularly important in getting IPV victims *specifically* to report intentions of intervening by calling the police (Panel B). This difference between victims and non-victims reveals the importance of samples that can make such comparisons. This difference might suggest that social desirability bias is less of a concern.


Although observational data do not allow for an elaborate explanation of this gap, we might find some clues in the stigma literature. Scholars across disciplines have argued that stigma can hinder help-seeking among GBV victims (e. g., Overstreet and Quinn 2013; Medie 2017). IPV victims can internalize negative beliefs

---

9. Table A9 in the appendix presents the number of WPS per state.

10. The model controls for other individual and state-level variables.

Figure 2. Bystander Intervention Attitudes and Number of WPS in the State



Source: Based on Model 1, Table A8 of the Appendix.

about IPV (*internalized stigma*), which impacts help-seeking and mental health, but they can also fear what will happen when others know about their situation (*anticipated stigma*) (Overstreet and Quinn 2013). Thus, stigma might also shape victims' bystander attitudes – although I am not aware of research making this link. Research on HIV/AIDS has found that governmental and structural level interventions might, in the long run, generate less stigma around that identity (e. g., Heijnders and Van Der Meij 2006).

Established WPS might decrease the fear of stigma among IPV victims, by sending messages emphasizing that the perpetrator is the only one to blame for violence, for example. In addition, these stations might reduce stigma simply because they are public institutions for GBV victims specifically – which also sends signals that they have the *right* to claim protection from violence (see Taylor 2018). These messages could, in turn, shape victims' bystander intervention attitudes. And higher numbers of WPS in the state might be more effective in diffusing anti-GBV messages. Relatedly, Córdoba and Kras (2022) found that the mere existence of WPS in one's municipality, increased men's likelihood of expressing in surveys that they would report IPV to the police if they witnessed abuse in Brazil. Because they ruled out the possibility of social desirability bias, they concluded that this effect was due to a change in deep-rooted social norms around GBV in those municipalities. IPV victims might have a low baseline likelihood to intervene as bystanders by calling the police because of fear of stigma for the victim; WPS might send signals that

IPV victimization is not a stigmatized identity. This, in turn, could make them as likely as non-victims to report intentions to intervene as bystanders if they witness IPV themselves. Further research, however, is required to test these suggestions directly as these results are tentative in nature.

## 8. CONCLUSIONS

In this study, I sought to demonstrate that procedural fairness in IPV victims' encounters with the police matter for their attitudes towards GBV laws and bystander intervention. The police tend to be victims' entry point into the system of support services for survivors (e. g., Srinivas and DePrince 2015). This is especially the case in the context of Brazil, where the police have been considered the main institutional channel through which GBV is addressed (e. g., Santos 2010). Unlike many cities in the United States, addresses of shelters for GBV victims in Brazil are concealed from the public, highlighting the police's role in directing victims to potentially life-saving resources. In essence, the police are the primary implementers of GBV laws in Brazil. As a consequence, the treatment victims receive when seeking help from the police carries information about the effectiveness of the laws in protecting women as well as whether it would be beneficial for other IPV victims to contact the police.

Previous research has shown that procedural fairness matters for IPV victims' mental health, coping strategies, and well-being. In this study, I show that procedural fairness matters too for IPV victims' attitudes towards GBV laws. Only victims that rated the customer service at the police station as excellent have more positive evaluations of the effectiveness of GBV laws in protecting women compared to other victims. This is consistent with research in political science showing that procedural fairness matters for citizens' evaluations of the criminal justice system (e. g., Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).

I have argued that a potential mechanism explaining this finding is the need for emotional support following IPV victimization. Service providers play a crucial role in repairing the emotional costs that survivors experience from abuse. If victims are not treated with dignity and respect, contact with the police might add to the emotional costs of victimization, even if the police provide victims with tangible resources such as restraining orders. Poor interpersonal treatment can compound victims' trauma (e. g., Kulkarni *et al.*, 2012). As such, procedural unfairness signals to victims that state efforts to mitigate the problem of GBV are empty promises.

However, contrary to my expectations, procedural fairness in encounters with the police was not correlated with victims' bystander intervention attitudes. It is possible that distributive fairness would explain victims' bystander attitudes; but unfortunately, these surveys do not include questions that would adequately

assess distributive fairness. As mentioned above, awareness-building campaigns as well as the salience of women's police stations in the Brazilian context might explain why female citizens overwhelmingly report intentions of calling the police if they witness IPV. The tentative analysis conducted with the number of WPS per state lends some credibility to this argument. However, analyzing the impact of distributive fairness as well as awareness-building campaigns directly across contexts are fruitful paths forward in this research agenda.

## REFERENCES

- Aguilar, Rudy J., and Nightingale, Narina N. (1994). «The impact of specific battering experiences on the self-esteem of abused women». *Journal of Family Violence* 9(1): 35-45.
- Altamirano, Melina, Berens, Sarah, and Ley, Sandra. (2020). «The Welfare State amid Crime: How Victimization and Perceptions of Insecurity Affect Social Policy Preferences in Latin America and the Caribbean». *Politics & Society* 48(3): 389-422.
- Araújo, Victor, and Gatto, Malu A. C. (2022). «Can conservatism make women more vulnerable to violence?» *Comparative Political Studies* 55(1): 122-153.
- Arias, Eric. (2019). «How Does Media Influence Social Norms? Experimental Evidence on the Role of Common Knowledge». *Political Science Research and Methods* 7(3): 561-578.
- Bell, Monica. C. (2017). «Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement». *Yale Law Journal* 2057-249
- Bennett, Sidney, Banyard, Victoria L., and Garnhart, Lydia. (2014). «To Act or Not to Act, That Is the Question? Barriers and Facilitators of Bystander Intervention». *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 29(3): 476-496.
- Boninger, David S., Mattew K. Berent, and Jon A. Krosnick. (1995). «Origins of Attitude Importance: Self-Interest, Social Identification, and Value Relevance». *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 68(1): 61-80.
- Brysk, Alison. (2018). *The Struggle for Freedom from Fear: Contesting Violence Against Women at the Frontiers of Globalization*. Oxford University Press.
- Calton, Janna, and Cattaneo, Lauren B. (2014). «The Effects of Procedural and Distributive Justice on Intimate Partner Violence Victims' Mental Health and Likelihood of Future Help-Seeking». *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 84(4): 329-40.
- Cattaneo, Lauren B., and Goodman, Lisa A. (2010). «Through the Lens of Therapeutic Jurisprudence». *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 25(3): 481-502.
- Chong, Dennis, and Druckman, James N. (2012). «Counterframing Effects». *The Journal of Politics* 75(1): 1-16.
- Córdova, Abby, and Kras, Helen R. (2022). «State Action to Prevent Violence Against Women: How Women's Police Stations Affect Men's Attitudes toward Gender-based Violence». *The Journal of Politics* 84(1): 1-17.
- Cruz, José Miguel. (2022). «Police, Non-State Actors, and Political Legitimacy in Central America». *Policing and Society* 32(3): 291-310.




- Fleury-Steiner, Ruth E., Bybee, Deborah, Sullivan, Cris M., Belknap, Joanne, and Melton, Heather C. (2005). «Contextual Factors Impacting Battered Women's Intentions to Re-use the Criminal Legal System». *Journal of Community Psychology* 34(3): 327-42.
- Hautzinger, Sarah. (2007). *Violence in the City of Women: Gender and Battering in Bahia, Brazil*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Heijnders, Miriam, and Van Der Meij, Suzanne. (2006). «The Fight Against Stigma: An Overview of Stigma-Reduction Strategies and Interventions». *Psychology, Health & Medicine* 11(3): 353-363.
- Henry, Tri Keah S., Franklin, Travis W., and Franklin, Courtney A. (2020). «Facilitating Sexual Assault Reporting on the College Campus: The Role of Procedural Justice in Bystander Decisions to Provide Police Referrals». *Violence against Women* 27(1): 1-26.
- Herman, Judith L. (1997). *Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence - From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror*. Philadelphia, PA: Basic Books.
- Hickman, Laure J., and Simpson, Sally S. (2003). «Fair Treatment or Preferred Outcome? The Impact of Police Behavior on Victim Reports of Domestic Violence Incidents». *Law & Society Review* 37(3): 607-34.
- Htun, Mala, and Jensenius, Francesca. (2020). «Fighting Violence Against Women: Laws, Norms, and Challenges Ahead». *Daedalus* 149(1): 144-159.
- Hurwitz, Jon, and Peffley, Mark. (2005). «Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions of Fairness in the U. S. Criminal Justice System». *The Journal of Politics* 67(3): 762-83.
- Instituto DataSenado. Pesquisa de Opinião Pública Nacional: Violência Doméstica Contra a Mulher.
- Jordan, Carol E., Campbell, Rebecca., and Follingstad, Diane. (2010). «Violence and Women's Mental Health: The Impact of Physical, Sexual and Psychological Aggression». *Annual Review of Clinical Psychology* 6: 607-628.
- Keshet, Hadar, Foa, Edna B., and Gilboa-Schechtman, Eva. (2019). «Women's Self-Perceptions in the Aftermath of Trauma: The Role of Trauma-Centrality and Trauma-Type». *Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy* 11(5): 542-50.
- Kras, Helen R. (2022). «The Politics of Private Violence: How Intimate Partner Violence Victimization Influences Political Attitudes». *Latin American Politics and Society* 64(4): 119-145.
- Kras, Helen R. (2024). Does Procedural Justice Influence Evaluations of State Efforts to Combat Gender-Based Violence? Evidence from Brazil. *Politics & Gender* 20(1): 77-103.
- Kulkarni, Shanti J., Bell, Holly, and Rhodes, Diane M. (2012). «Back to Basics: Essential Qualities of Services for Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence». *Violence against Women* 18(1): 85-101.
- McLeod, Amy L., Hays, Danica G., and Chang, Catherine Y. (2010). «Female Intimate Partner Violence Survivors' Experiences with Accessing Resources». *Journal of Counseling and Development* 88(3): 303-10.
- Medie, Peace A. (2017). «Rape Reporting in Post-Conflict Côte D'Ivoire: Accessing Justice and Ending Impunity». *African Affairs* 116(464): 414-434.
- Murphy, Kristina, and Barkworth, Julie. (2014). «Victim Willingness to Report Crime to Police: Does Procedural Justice or Outcome Matter Most?». *Victims & Offenders* 9(2): 178-204.

- Nussbaum, Martha C. (2005). «Women's Bodies: Violence, Security, Capabilities». *Journal of Human Development* 6(2): 167-83.
- Overstreet, Nicole M., and Quinn, Diane, D. (2013). «The Intimate Partner Violence Stigmatization Model and Barriers to Help Seeking». *Basic Applied Social Psychology* 35(1): 109-122.
- Peffley, Mark, and Hurwitz, Jon. (2010). *Justice in America: The Separate Realities of Blacks and Whites*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ptacek, James. (1999). *Battered Women in The Courtroom: The Power of Judicial Responses*. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
- Powers, Ráchael, A., and Leili, Jennifer. (2018). «Bar Training for Active Bystanders: Evaluation of a Community-Based Bystander Intervention Program». *Violence against Women* 24(13): 1614-1634.
- Rakovec-Felser, Zlatka. (2014). «Domestic Violence and Abuse in Intimate Relationships from Public Health Perspective». *Health Psychology Research* 2(3):1821.
- Rancher, Caitlin, Jouriles, Ernest N., and McDonald, Renee. (2018). «Intimate Partner Violence, Police Involvement, and Women's Trauma Symptoms». *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 38(8): 1-14.
- Sunshine, Jason, and Tyler, Tom R. (2003). «The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing». *Law & Society Review* 37(3), 513-48.
- Santos, Cecilia M. (2010). «From Women's Police Stations to the Maria da Penha Law: The State's Absorption/Translation of Women's Demands». *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais* 89: 153-170.
- Schraiber, Lilia. B., D'Oliveira, Ana Flavia, Hanada, Heloisa L., & Kiss, Ligia. (2012). «Assistência a Mulheres em Situação de Violência». *Athenea Digital* 12(3): 237- 254.
- Setzler, Mark. (2020). «Did Brazilians Vote for Jair Bolsonaro Because They Share His Most Controversial Views?». *Brazilian Political Science Review* 5(1): 1-16.
- Snijders, Tom, and Bosker, Roel J. (2012). *Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modelling (2nd ed.)*. London, England: SAGE.
- Soss, Joe. (1999). «Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action». *The American Political Science Review* 93(2): 363-80.
- Srinivas, Tejaswinhi, and DePrince, Anne P. (2015). «Links Between the Police Response and Women's Psychological Outcomes Following Intimate Partner Violence». *Violence and Victims* 30(1): 32-48.
- Tankebe, Justice. (2009). «Public Cooperation with The Police in Ghana: Does Procedural Fairness Matter?». *Criminology* 47(4): 1265- 1293.
- Taylor, Whitney K. (2018). «Ambivalent Legal Mobilization: Perceptions of Justice and the Use of the Tutela in Colombia». *Law & Society Review* 52: 337-367.
- Trinkner, Rick, Rodrigues, Herbert, Piccirillo, Debora, Gifford, Faith, and Gomes, Aline M. M. (2019). «Legal Socialization in Brazil: Examining the Generalizability of the Procedural Justice Model». *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, 44(1-2), 7-27.
- Tyler, Tom R., and Huo, Yuen J. (2002). *Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- United Nations Women. (2021). *Facts and Figures: Ending Violence against Women*.

- Van Den Bos, Kees, Wilke, Henk A. M., & Lind, E. Allan. (1998). «When Do We Need Procedural Fairness? The Role of Trust in Authority». *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 75(6): 1449-1458.
- Xie, Min, and Lynch, James P. (2017). «The Effects of Arrest, Reporting to the Police, and Victim Services on Intimate Partner Violence». *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 54(3): 338-378.

## APPENDIX

**Figure A1. Awareness of Maria da Penha Law (Domestic Violence Law)**



Source: Own elaboration

**Table A1: List and Description of Variables used in the Analysis**

| Variables                    | Description   | Data Source  |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| <b>Dependent Variables</b>   |   |  |
| Evaluations of anti-GBV Laws | Do you think that Brazilian laws protect women against domestic and family violence?<br>0 no<br>1 partially<br>2 yes  | Data Senado National Public Opinion Surveys on Domestic Violence Waves 2011, 2013 and 2015 |
| Bystander Intervention       | This variable was constructed with two questions in the survey:<br>If you witness an act of aggression against a woman, would you denounce it?<br>1 yes<br>2 no | Data Senado  |

| Variables                          | Description   | Data Source |
|------------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Dependent Variables</b>         |   |             |
| Bystander Intervention             | <p>If so, who would you contact first?</p> <p>1 friend<br/>2 ligue 180<br/>3 women's police station<br/>4 NGOs<br/>5 family<br/>7 regular police<br/>8 other answers<br/>9 don't know</p>   | Data Senado |
|                                    | <p>I combined the answer «no» from question a with all other options in question b that are not women's police station or police. I coded this option as 0 and women's police station and police as 1</p>   |             |
| <b>Independent Variables</b>       |   |             |
| Victims and Non-Victims Categories | <p>I combined a question on IPV victimization, services used, and evaluations of the customer service received at the women's police station or regular police station</p> <p>Have you personally suffered domestic or familial violence perpetrated by a man?</p> <p>1 yes<br/>2 no</p>  | Data Senado |
| Victims and Non-Victims Categories | <p>What was your attitude in relation to the aggression?</p> <p>1 denounced at a women's police station<br/>2 denounced at a regular police station<br/>3 talked to friends<br/>4 talked to family<br/>5 called the Ligue 180 for information<br/>6 contacted the church<br/>7 contacted a NGO<br/>8 remained silent about the aggression<br/>9 other options<br/>10 don't know</p> | Data Senado |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

| Variables                              | Description   | Data Source |
|--|---|-------------|
| <b>Dependent Variables</b>             |   |             |
|  | How do you evaluate the customer service received at the station?<br>1 excellent<br>2 good<br>3 satisfactory<br>4 bad<br>5 terrible<br>97 no answer   |             |
| Victims and Non-Victims Categories     | I combined these questions to code the main independent variable as:<br>0 non-victims<br>1 victims who did not receive any public or police services<br>2 victims who rated the police station' service as excellent<br>3 victims who rated the police station' services as good and victims who rated the police station' services as satisfactory<br>4 victims who rated the police station' services as bad and victims who rated the police station' services as terrible | Data Senado |
| Perceives GBV Impunity                 | VAW impunity leads women to refrain from pressing charges against aggressors<br>0 no<br>1 yes   | Data Senado |
| Unaware of Maria da Penha Law          | Have you heard about the Maria da Penha Law?<br>1 no<br>2 yes   | Data Senado |
| Perceives Discrimination Against Women | In general, do you think that women are treated with respect in Brazil?<br>1 yes<br>2 sometimes<br>3 no   | Data Senado |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

| Variables                  | Description   | Data Source |
|----------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Dependent Variables</b> |   |             |
| Employment status          | What is your occupation?<br>1 homemaker<br>2 maid or clean houses<br>3 works independently (Autonomous)<br>4 works for the government<br>5 works for private business<br>6 student<br>7 retired<br>8 unemployed<br>97 did not respond | Data Senado |
| Age                        | What is your age?<br>1 16-19<br>2 20-29<br>3 30-39<br>4 40-49<br>5 50-59<br>6 above 60<br>97 did not respond  | Data Senado |
| Income                     | What is your individual monthly income?<br>1 no individual income<br>2 up to R\$ 1080.00<br>3 up to R\$2700.00<br>4 up to R\$5400.00<br>5 up to R\$5400.00<br>97 did not respond  | Data Senado |
| Education Level            | What is your educational level?<br>1 elementary school or below<br>2 high school or below<br>3 college or graduate degree<br>97 did not respond   | Data Senado |
| Race                       | What is your color or race?<br>1 white<br>2 black<br>3 multiracial<br>4 indigenous<br>5 Asian<br>97 did not respond   | Data Senado |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

| Variables  | Description  | Data Source   |
|--|--|---|
| <b>Dependent Variables</b>   |  |   |
| Religion   | What is your religion?<br>1 Catholic<br>2 Evangelical<br>3 Spiritual<br>4 Umbanda or Candomblé<br>5 Not Religious<br>97 did not answer                               | Data Senado   |
| Victims' Contact with Aggressor (this question was only asked for victims) | Do you still live or have any contact with the aggressor?<br>1 yes<br>2 no<br>97 did not answer  | Data Senado   |
| <b>State Level Controls</b>  |  |   |
| Homicide rate  | Homicide rate for the state per one hundred thousand for years 2010 and 2014   | Mapa da Violência                                       |
| Femicide   | Femicide rate for the state per one hundred thousand for years 2010 and 2014   | Mapa da Violência                                       |
| GDP  | GDP per capita for each state for years 2010 and 2014  | Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) |
| Population   | Based on 2010 census   | IBGE  |
| State-Level GBV Law  | Indicates whether the state has enacted their own legislation or legislations on GBV based 2014 IBGE data (indicates the year the first one was enacted)             | IBGE  |
| State Fund for the Defense of Women  | Indicates whether the state has allocated funds to the defense of women from gender-based violence (based on IBGE 2014, data includes the year the fund was created) | IBGE  |

*Source: Own elaboration*



### Box A1 Methodology of DataSenado Surveys.

#### Methodology of Surveys:

DataSenado's surveys are conducted through sampling with telephone interviews. The population considered is that of women aged 16 years or older, living in Brazil, and with access to landlines. The admitted margin of error is plus or minus three percentage points. The confidence level used in the search results is 95%. This means that if 100 surveys are conducted with the same methodology, approximately 95 will have the results within the stipulated margin of error.

In the period from June 24 to July 8, DataSenado conducts interviews distributed in the 27 units of the Federation (UFs), maintaining the proportionality of the participation of the population of the UF's in the Brazilian population, considering the estimate released by the IBGE for the previous year. The selection of the research participants was made by stratified random sample, with proportional allocation: each UF was defined as a stratum and, for each stratum, landline telephone numbers extracted from the Anatel register were randomly drawn, which contain all the numbers that can be enabled in the country. Then, the selected numbers are arranged randomly and telephone calls are made to each UF.

Once the phone is answered, authorization is requested to carry out the research. These calls are made until the number of respondents defined a priori in the calculation of the sample size is reached, in a given UF, adopting the proportionality criterion described in the previous paragraph. In the calculation of the results, the weighting of the answers was applied according to the distribution of women in each UF, using as sample weight the demographic distribution of the population based on data from the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) in the previous year. During the application of the questionnaires, 20% of the interviews were verified and validated, conducted by a team of DataSenado professionals, duly trained for this purpose.

Source: [MethodologyDataSen\\_2015 \(1\).pdf](#)

<https://www12.senado.leg.br/institucional/datasenado/metodo>

**Table A2. Descriptive Statistics**

| <b>Individual-Level Variables:</b>                   | <b>Obs</b> | <b>Mean</b> | <b>Std. Dev</b> | <b>Min</b> | <b>Max</b> |
|--|------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|------------|
| Evaluations of Anti-GBV Laws                         | 3,665      | 1.86        | .69             | 1          | 3          |
| Bystander Intervention (would call the police)       | 2,193      | .8148       | .3884           | 0          | 1          |
| Evaluations of Procedural Fairness at Police Station | 3,582      | .2747       | .7620           | 0          | 4          |
| Perceives GBV Impunity                               | 3,652      | 1.766       | .23384          | 0          | 1          |
| Perceives Discrimination Against Women               | 3,675      | 2.333       | .59909          | 1          | 3          |
| Unaware of IPV Laws                                  | 3,702      | 1.0116      | .10716          | 1          | 2          |
| Employment Status                                    | 3,633      | 3.8973      | 2.0014          | 1          | 8          |
| Age  | 3,697      | 3.5815      | 1.490           | 1          | 7          |
| Income   | 3,472      | 2.2335      | .92245          | 1          | 5          |
| Education Level                                      | 3,686      | 1.9777      | .72411          | 1          | 3          |
| Race   | 3,643      | 1.95196     | 1.0734          | 1          | 5          |
| <b>State-Level Variables:</b>                        |            |             |                 |            |            |
| Homicide Rate  | 3,702      | 27.7        | 11.9666         | 12.7       | 64.6       |
| State Law on GBV                                     | 3,702      | .05618      | .2303           | 0          | 1          |

Source: Own elaboration

**Table A3. Procedural Fairness and IPV Victims' Attitudes (Main Findings):**

|  | Evaluation of Anti-GBV Law |                          | Bystander Intervention |                          |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
|  | Model 1                    | Model 2                  | Model 3                | Model 4                  |
| Baseline:                                | Non-Victims                | Victims with No Services | Non-Victims            | Victims with No Services |
| Non-Victims                              |                            | 0.293**<br>(0.116)       |                        | 0.194<br>(0.194)         |
| Victims with no Services                 | -0.293**<br>(0.116)        |                          | -0.194<br>(0.194)      |                          |
| Victims with Excellent Police Service    | 0.428<br>(0.286)           | 0.722**<br>(0.302)       | 0.329<br>(0.561)       | 0.523<br>(0.584)         |
| Victims with Satisfactory Police Service | -0.313<br>(0.218)          | -0.0198<br>(0.240)       | 0.0721<br>(0.390)      | 0.266<br>(0.421)         |
| Victims with Poor Police Services        | -0.757***<br>(0.267)       | -0.464<br>(0.286)        | 0.127<br>(0.506)       | 0.322<br>(0.532)         |
| <u>Attitudinal Controls:</u>             |                            |                          |                        |                          |
| Perceives GBV Impunity                   | -0.667***<br>(0.0828)      | -0.667***<br>(0.0828)    | -0.280*<br>(0.148)     | -0.280*<br>(0.148)       |
| Perceives Discrimination Against Women   | -0.618***<br>(0.0620)      | -0.618***<br>(0.0620)    | 0.332***<br>(0.110)    | 0.332***<br>(0.110)      |
| Unaware of IPV law                       | 0.0662<br>(0.362)          | 0.0662<br>(0.362)        | -0.188<br>(0.502)      | -0.188<br>(0.502)        |
| <u>Socio-Demographic Controls:</u>       |                            |                          |                        |                          |
| Cleans Houses (=1; 0= Homemaker)         | 0.0414<br>(0.168)          | 0.0414<br>(0.168)        | 0.253<br>(0.269)       | 0.253<br>(0.269)         |
| Works Independently                      | 0.0540<br>(0.133)          | 0.0540<br>(0.133)        | 0.396*<br>(0.233)      | 0.396*<br>(0.233)        |
| Works for Government                     | 0.112<br>(0.151)           | 0.112<br>(0.151)         | 0.0568<br>(0.263)      | 0.0568<br>(0.263)        |
| Works in Private Business                | 0.179<br>(0.123)           | 0.179<br>(0.123)         | 0.109<br>(0.210)       | 0.109<br>(0.210)         |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|                              | Evaluation of Anti-GBV Law |                            | Bystander Intervention    |                           |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|                              | Model 1                    | Model 2                    | Model 3                   | Model 4                   |
| Baseline:                    | Non-Victims                | Victims with No Services   | Non-Victims               | Victims with No Services  |
| Student                      | 0.390**<br>(0.180)         | 0.390**<br>(0.180)         | 1.058***<br>(0.383)       | 1.058***<br>(0.383)       |
| Retired                      | 0.274<br>(0.169)           | 0.274<br>(0.169)           | -0.0383<br>(0.281)        | -0.0383<br>(0.281)        |
| Unemployed                   | -0.00771<br>(0.208)        | -0.00771<br>(0.208)        | 0.627<br>(0.394)          | 0.627<br>(0.394)          |
| Age                          | -0.124***<br>(0.0320)      | -0.124***<br>(0.0320)      | -0.0921<br>(0.0564)       | -0.0921<br>(0.0564)       |
| Income                       | 0.0194<br>(0.0488)         | 0.0194<br>(0.0488)         | 0.123<br>(0.0925)         | 0.123<br>(0.0925)         |
| Educational Level            | 0.150**<br>(0.0614)        | 0.150**<br>(0.0614)        | 0.190*<br>(0.110)         | 0.190*<br>(0.110)         |
| Black (=1; 0=White)          | -0.407***<br>(0.129)       | -0.407***<br>(0.129)       | -0.316<br>(0.216)         | -0.316<br>(0.216)         |
| Multiracial                  | -0.177**<br>(0.0786)       | -0.177**<br>(0.0786)       | -0.152<br>(0.139)         | -0.152<br>(0.139)         |
| Indigenous                   | -0.635*<br>(0.334)         | -0.635*<br>(0.334)         | 0.193<br>(0.583)          | 0.193<br>(0.583)          |
| Asian                        | 0.301<br>(0.224)           | 0.301<br>(0.224)           | 0.670<br>(0.543)          | 0.670<br>(0.543)          |
| <u>State-Level Controls:</u> |                            |                            |                           |                           |
| Homicide Rate                | -0.00706<br>(0.00460)      | -0.00706<br>(0.00460)      | -0.00722<br>(0.00811)     | -0.00722<br>(0.00811)     |
| GDP                          | -5.02e-06**<br>(2.43e-06)  | -5.02e-06**<br>(2.43e-06)  | 3.23e-05***<br>(5.06e-06) | 3.23e-05***<br>(5.06e-06) |
| Population                   | -1.88e-08***<br>(4.07e-09) | -1.88e-08***<br>(4.07e-09) | 3.94e-09<br>(8.64e-09)    | 3.94e-09<br>(8.64e-09)    |
| State-Level GBV Law          | 0.324**<br>(0.149)         | 0.324**<br>(0.149)         | 0.0254<br>(0.323)         | 0.0254<br>(0.323)         |

|                  | Evaluation of Anti-GBV Law |                          | Bystander Intervention |                          |
|------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
|                  | Model 1                    | Model 2                  | Model 3                | Model 4                  |
| Baseline:        | Non-Victims                | Victims with No Services | Non-Victims            | Victims with No Services |
| Constant         |                            |                          | 0.275<br>(0.524)       | 0.0806<br>(0.554)        |
| Observations     | 3,178                      | 3,178                    | 1,916                  | 1,916                    |
| Number of groups | 27                         | 27                       | 27                     | 27                       |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: Own elaboration

**Table A4. Main Results with no State-Level Controls:**

|  | Evaluation of Anti-GBV Laws |                          | Bystander Intervention |
|--|-----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
|  | Model 1                     | Model 2                  | Model 3                |
| Baseline:                                | Non-Victims                 | Victims with No Services | Non-Victims            |
| Non-Victims                              |                             | 0.290*<br>(0.116)        |                        |
| Victims with no Services                 | -0.290*<br>(0.116)          |                          | -0.207<br>(0.190)      |
| Victims with Excellent Police Service    | 0.428<br>(0.287)            | 0.718*<br>(0.303)        | 0.335<br>(0.554)       |
| Victims with Satisfactory Police Service | -0.334<br>(0.218)           | -0.0442<br>(0.239)       | -0.0419<br>(0.510)     |
| Victims with Poor Police Services        | -0.775**<br>(0.265)         | -0.485<br>(0.284)        | -0.0170<br>(0.795)     |
| <u>Attitudinal Controls:</u>             |                             |                          |                        |
| Perceives GBV Impunity                   | -0.712***<br>(0.0821)       | -0.712***<br>(0.0821)    | -0.159<br>(0.144)      |
| Perceives Discrimination Against Women   | -0.622***<br>(0.0616)       | -0.622***<br>(0.0616)    | 0.337**<br>(0.107)     |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|                                    | Evaluation of Anti-GBV Laws |                          | Bystander Intervention |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
|                                    | Model 1                     | Model 2                  | Model 3                |
| Baseline:                          | Non-Victims                 | Victims with No Services | Non-Victims            |
| Unaware of IPV Law                 | 0.0797<br>(0.362)           | 0.0797<br>(0.362)        | -0.442<br>(0.494)      |
| <u>Socio-Demographic Controls:</u> |                             |                          |                        |
| Cleans Houses (=1; 0=Homemaker)    | 0.102<br>(0.167)            | 0.102<br>(0.167)         | 0.138<br>(0.264)       |
| Works Independently                | 0.105<br>(0.133)            | 0.105<br>(0.133)         | 0.400<br>(0.227)       |
| Works for Government               | 0.198<br>(0.150)            | 0.198<br>(0.150)         | -0.0375<br>(0.257)     |
| Works in the Private Sector        | 0.220<br>(0.122)            | 0.220<br>(0.122)         | 0.213<br>(0.204)       |
| Student                            | 0.456*<br>(0.178)           | 0.456*<br>(0.178)        | 1.181**<br>(0.377)     |
| Retired                            | 0.333*<br>(0.168)           | 0.333*<br>(0.168)        | -0.109<br>(0.274)      |
| Unemployed                         | -0.0444<br>(0.207)          | -0.0444<br>(0.207)       | 0.643<br>(0.388)       |
| Age                                | -0.140***<br>(0.0319)       | -0.140***<br>(0.0319)    | -0.0599<br>(0.0547)    |
| Income                             | 0.00353<br>(0.0485)         | 0.00353<br>(0.0485)      | 0.177*<br>(0.0899)     |
| Education Level                    | 0.157*<br>(0.0611)          | 0.157*<br>(0.0611)       | 0.208<br>(0.107)       |
| Black (=1;0=White)                 | -0.367**<br>(0.126)         | -0.367**<br>(0.126)      | -0.369<br>(0.210)      |
| Multiracial                        | -0.111<br>(0.0759)          | -0.111<br>(0.0759)       | -0.268*<br>(0.134)     |
| Indigenous                         | -0.575<br>(0.331)           | -0.575<br>(0.331)        | -0.000633<br>(0.575)   |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|              | Evaluation of Anti-GBV Laws |                          | Bystander Intervention |
|--------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
|              | Model 1                     | Model 2                  | Model 3                |
| Baseline:    | Non-Victims                 | Victims with No Services | Non-Victims            |
| Asian        | 0.365<br>(0.223)            | 0.365<br>(0.223)         | 0.715<br>(0.537)       |
| /cut1        | -2.601***<br>(0.236)        | -2.311***<br>(0.259)     |                        |
| /cut2        | -0.0341<br>(0.230)          | 0.256<br>(0.255)         |                        |
| Constant     |                             |                          | 0.178<br>(0.398)       |
| Observations | 3,178                       | 3,178                    | 1,916                  |

Notes: Models 1 and 2, ordered logit. Model 3, logit. Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Source: Own elaboration

**Table A5. With Femicide and State-Defense Fund Controls**

|  | Evaluation of GBV Laws |                         | Bystander Intervention Attitudes |                         |
|--|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
|  | Model 1                | Model 2                 | Model 3                          | Model 4                 |
| Baseline:                                | Non-Victims            | Victims with No Service | Non-Victims                      | Victims with No Service |
| Non-Victims                              |                        | 0.291**<br>(0.116)      |                                  | 0.194<br>(0.194)        |
| Victims with No Services                 | -0.291**<br>(0.116)    |                         | -0.194<br>(0.194)                |                         |
| Victims with Excellent Police Service    | 0.414<br>(0.286)       | 0.705**<br>(0.302)      | 0.316<br>(0.562)                 | 0.510<br>(0.585)        |
| Victims with Satisfactory Police Service | -0.332<br>(0.219)      | -0.0404<br>(0.241)      | 0.0554<br>(0.391)                | 0.250<br>(0.423)        |
| Victims with Poor Police Service         | -0.759***<br>(0.267)   | -0.467<br>(0.286)       | 0.126<br>(0.507)                 | 0.321<br>(0.533)        |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|  | Evaluation of GBV Laws |                         | Bystander Intervention Attitudes |                         |
|--|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
|  | Model 1                | Model 2                 | Model 3                          | Model 4                 |
| Baseline:                              | Non-Victims            | Victims with No Service | Non-Victims                      | Victims with No Service |
| Perceives GBV Impunity                 | -0.669***<br>(0.0829)  | -0.669***<br>(0.0829)   | -0.279*<br>(0.148)               | -0.279*<br>(0.148)      |
| Perceives Discrimination Against Women | -0.614***<br>(0.0619)  | -0.614***<br>(0.0619)   | 0.332***<br>(0.110)              | 0.332***<br>(0.110)     |
| Unaware of Maria da Penha Law          | 0.0613<br>(0.363)      | 0.0613<br>(0.363)       | -0.171<br>(0.506)                | -0.171<br>(0.506)       |
| Cleans Houses (=1; 0= Homemaker)       | 0.0417<br>(0.168)      | 0.0417<br>(0.168)       | 0.251<br>(0.269)                 | 0.251<br>(0.269)        |
| Works Independently                    | 0.0465<br>(0.134)      | 0.0465<br>(0.134)       | 0.382<br>(0.233)                 | 0.382<br>(0.233)        |
| Works for Government                   | 0.108<br>(0.151)       | 0.108<br>(0.151)        | 0.0539<br>(0.263)                | 0.0539<br>(0.263)       |
| Works in Private Business              | 0.181<br>(0.123)       | 0.181<br>(0.123)        | 0.102<br>(0.210)                 | 0.102<br>(0.210)        |
| Student                                | 0.400**<br>(0.180)     | 0.400**<br>(0.180)      | 1.060***<br>(0.384)              | 1.060***<br>(0.384)     |
| Retired                                | 0.268<br>(0.169)       | 0.268<br>(0.169)        | -0.0482<br>(0.281)               | -0.0482<br>(0.281)      |
| Unemployed                             | -0.00266<br>(0.208)    | -0.00266<br>(0.208)     | 0.631<br>(0.394)                 | 0.631<br>(0.394)        |
| Age                                    | -0.125***<br>(0.0321)  | -0.125***<br>(0.0321)   | -0.0921<br>(0.0565)              | -0.0921<br>(0.0565)     |
| Income                                 | 0.0206<br>(0.0489)     | 0.0206<br>(0.0489)      | 0.126<br>(0.0927)                | 0.126<br>(0.0927)       |
| Educational Level                      | 0.154**<br>(0.0614)    | 0.154**<br>(0.0614)     | 0.190*<br>(0.110)                | 0.190*<br>(0.110)       |
| Black (=1; 0=White)                    | -0.394***<br>(0.129)   | -0.394***<br>(0.129)    | -0.322<br>(0.217)                | -0.322<br>(0.217)       |



RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|                                     | Evaluation of GBV Laws     |                            | Bystander Intervention Attitudes |                           |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
|                                     | Model 1                    | Model 2                    | Model 3                          | Model 4                   |
| Baseline:                           | Non-Victims                | Victims with No Service    | Non-Victims                      | Victims with No Service   |
| Multiracial                         | -0.169**<br>(0.0789)       | -0.169**<br>(0.0789)       | -0.163<br>(0.139)                | -0.163<br>(0.139)         |
| Indigenous                          | -0.622*<br>(0.334)         | -0.622*<br>(0.334)         | 0.175<br>(0.582)                 | 0.175<br>(0.582)          |
| Asian                               | 0.306<br>(0.224)           | 0.306<br>(0.224)           | 0.673<br>(0.544)                 | 0.673<br>(0.544)          |
| <u>State-Level Controls:</u>        |                            |                            |                                  |                           |
| Femicide Rate                       | -0.0373<br>(0.0310)        | -0.0373<br>(0.0310)        | -0.0336<br>(0.0547)              | -0.0336<br>(0.0547)       |
| GDP                                 | -5.09e-06**<br>(2.44e-06)  | -5.09e-06**<br>(2.44e-06)  | 3.22e-05***<br>(5.04e-06)        | 3.22e-05***<br>(5.04e-06) |
| Population                          | -1.71e-08***<br>(4.28e-09) | -1.71e-08***<br>(4.28e-09) | 7.38e-09<br>(8.42e-09)           | 7.38e-09<br>(8.42e-09)    |
| State Fund for the Defense of Women | 0.243*<br>(0.147)          | 0.243*<br>(0.147)          | 0.248<br>(0.291)                 | 0.248<br>(0.291)          |
| Constant                            |                            |                            | 0.165<br>(0.541)                 | -0.0296<br>(0.569)        |
| Observations                        | 3,178                      | 3,178                      | 1,916                            | 1,916                     |
| Number of groups                    | 27                         | 27                         | 27                               | 27                        |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: Own elaboration

**Table A6. With Religion Control**

|  | Evaluations of GBV Laws |                          | Bystander Intervention Attitudes |                          |
|--|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
|  | Model 1                 | Model 2                  | Model 3                          | Model 4                  |
| Baseline:                                | Non-Victims             | Victims with No Services | Non-Victims                      | Victims with No Services |
| Non-Victims                              |                         | 0.310***<br>(0.117)      |                                  | 0.182<br>(0.196)         |
| Victims with No Service                  | -0.310***<br>(0.117)    |                          | -0.182<br>(0.196)                |                          |
| Victims with Excellent Police Service    | 0.421<br>(0.286)        | 0.731**<br>(0.303)       | 0.307<br>(0.567)                 | 0.490<br>(0.590)         |
| Victims with Satisfactory Police Service | -0.327<br>(0.219)       | -0.0166<br>(0.240)       | 0.0456<br>(0.391)                | 0.228<br>(0.423)         |
| Victims with Poor Police Service         | -0.764***<br>(0.267)    | -0.454<br>(0.286)        | 0.124<br>(0.507)                 | 0.306<br>(0.533)         |
| Perceives GBV Impunity                   | -0.664***<br>(0.0832)   | -0.664***<br>(0.0832)    | -0.293**<br>(0.149)              | -0.293**<br>(0.149)      |
| Perceives Discrimination Against Women   | -0.623***<br>(0.0622)   | -0.623***<br>(0.0622)    | 0.347***<br>(0.110)              | 0.347***<br>(0.110)      |
| Evangelical (=1; 0=Catholic)             | -0.0110<br>(0.0804)     | -0.0110<br>(0.0804)      | -0.0232<br>(0.144)               | -0.0232<br>(0.144)       |
| Spiritual                                | 0.324*<br>(0.178)       | 0.324*<br>(0.178)        | -0.233<br>(0.466)                | -0.233<br>(0.466)        |
| Umbanda or Candomblé                     | -0.0653<br>(0.602)      | -0.0653<br>(0.602)       | -1.067<br>(0.910)                | -1.067<br>(0.910)        |
| Other Religions                          | -0.0366<br>(0.163)      | -0.0366<br>(0.163)       | 0.480*<br>(0.292)                | 0.480*<br>(0.292)        |
| Non-Religious                            | 0.121<br>(0.174)        | 0.121<br>(0.174)         | -0.391<br>(0.392)                | -0.391<br>(0.392)        |
| Cleans Houses (=1; 0=Homemaker)          | 0.0548<br>(0.169)       | 0.0548<br>(0.169)        | 0.240<br>(0.269)                 | 0.240<br>(0.269)         |
| Works Independently                      | 0.0843<br>(0.134)       | 0.0843<br>(0.134)        | 0.393*<br>(0.235)                | 0.393*<br>(0.235)        |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|                              | Evaluations of GBV Laws   |                           | Bystander Intervention Attitudes |                           |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
|                              | Model 1                   | Model 2                   | Model 3                          | Model 4                   |
| Baseline:                    | Non-Victims               | Victims with No Services  | Non-Victims                      | Victims with No Services  |
| Works for Government         | 0.109<br>(0.151)          | 0.109<br>(0.151)          | 0.0586<br>(0.264)                | 0.0586<br>(0.264)         |
| Works in Private Business    | 0.168<br>(0.123)          | 0.168<br>(0.123)          | 0.0960<br>(0.211)                | 0.0960<br>(0.211)         |
| Student                      | 0.389**<br>(0.181)        | 0.389**<br>(0.181)        | 1.025***<br>(0.385)              | 1.025***<br>(0.385)       |
| Retired                      | 0.280*<br>(0.169)         | 0.280*<br>(0.169)         | -0.0203<br>(0.282)               | -0.0203<br>(0.282)        |
| Unemployed                   | -0.0147<br>(0.210)        | -0.0147<br>(0.210)        | 0.617<br>(0.395)                 | 0.617<br>(0.395)          |
| Age                          | -0.127***<br>(0.0323)     | -0.127***<br>(0.0323)     | -0.102*<br>(0.0572)              | -0.102*<br>(0.0572)       |
| Income                       | 0.0127<br>(0.0492)        | 0.0127<br>(0.0492)        | 0.120<br>(0.0934)                | 0.120<br>(0.0934)         |
| Educational Level            | 0.149**<br>(0.0619)       | 0.149**<br>(0.0619)       | 0.184*<br>(0.111)                | 0.184*<br>(0.111)         |
| Black (=1; 0=White)          | -0.414***<br>(0.130)      | -0.414***<br>(0.130)      | -0.313<br>(0.218)                | -0.313<br>(0.218)         |
| Multiracial                  | -0.177**<br>(0.0791)      | -0.177**<br>(0.0791)      | -0.158<br>(0.140)                | -0.158<br>(0.140)         |
| Indigenous                   | -0.629*<br>(0.334)        | -0.629*<br>(0.334)        | 0.217<br>(0.584)                 | 0.217<br>(0.584)          |
| Asian                        | 0.311<br>(0.228)          | 0.311<br>(0.228)          | 0.692<br>(0.548)                 | 0.692<br>(0.548)          |
| <u>State-Level Controls:</u> |                           |                           |                                  |                           |
| Homicide Rate                | -0.00646<br>(0.00457)     | -0.00646<br>(0.00457)     | -0.00669<br>(0.00828)            | -0.00669<br>(0.00828)     |
| GDP                          | -5.91e-06**<br>(2.47e-06) | -5.91e-06**<br>(2.47e-06) | 3.51e-05***<br>(5.38e-06)        | 3.51e-05***<br>(5.38e-06) |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|                      | Evaluations of GBV Laws    |                            | Bystander Intervention Attitudes |                          |
|----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
|                      | Model 1                    | Model 2                    | Model 3                          | Model 4                  |
| Baseline:            | Non-Victims                | Victims with No Services   | Non-Victims                      | Victims with No Services |
| Population           | -1.82e-08***<br>(4.10e-09) | -1.82e-08***<br>(4.10e-09) | 4.03e-09<br>(8.98e-09)           | 4.03e-09<br>(8.98e-09)   |
| State Level GBV Laws | 0.328**<br>(0.151)         | 0.328**<br>(0.151)         | 0.0493<br>(0.329)                | 0.0493<br>(0.329)        |
| Constant             |                            |                            | 0.262<br>(0.535)                 | 0.0798<br>(0.564)        |
| Observations         | 3,159                      | 3,159                      | 1,908                            | 1,908                    |
| Number of groups     | 27                         | 27                         | 27                               | 27                       |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: Own elaboration

**Table A7. Among IPV Victims Only**

|  | Evaluations of GBV Laws |                                | Bystander Intervention Attentions |                                |
|--|-------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
|  | Model 1                 | Model 2                        | Model 3                           | Model 4                        |
| Baseline:                                | Victims with No Service | Victims with Excellent Service | Victims with No Service           | Victims with Excellent Service |
| Victims with No Services                 |                         | -0.989***<br>(0.320)           |                                   | -0.343<br>(0.644)              |
| Victims with Excellent Police Service    | 0.989***<br>(0.320)     |                                | 0.343<br>(0.644)                  |                                |
| Victims with Satisfactory Police Service | -0.0268<br>(0.255)      | -1.016***<br>(0.377)           | 0.156<br>(0.468)                  | -0.187<br>(0.743)              |
| Victims with Poor Police Service         | -0.351<br>(0.309)       | -1.340***<br>(0.412)           | 0.324<br>(0.586)                  | -0.0191<br>(0.821)             |
| Victim is no Longer with The Aggressor   | 0.159<br>(0.209)        | 0.159<br>(0.209)               | 0.353<br>(0.362)                  | 0.353<br>(0.362)               |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|   | Evaluations of GBV Laws |                      | Bystander Intervention Attentions |                    |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| Perceives GBV Impunity                    | -0.208<br>(0.206)       | -0.208<br>(0.206)    | -0.517<br>(0.361)                 | -0.517<br>(0.361)  |
| Perceives Discrimination<br>Against Women | -0.812***<br>(0.170)    | -0.812***<br>(0.170) | -0.0569<br>(0.286)                | -0.0569<br>(0.286) |
| Unaware of Maria da<br>Penha Law          | 2.679***<br>(0.988)     | 2.679***<br>(0.988)  | -0.439<br>(1.358)                 | -0.439<br>(1.358)  |
| Cleans Houses (=1; 0=<br>Homemaker)       | -0.705*<br>(0.417)      | -0.705*<br>(0.417)   | 0.550<br>(0.662)                  | 0.550<br>(0.662)   |
| Works Independently                       | -0.308<br>(0.305)       | -0.308<br>(0.305)    | 1.228**<br>(0.546)                | 1.228**<br>(0.546) |
| Works for Government                      | 0.160<br>(0.373)        | 0.160<br>(0.373)     | 1.862**<br>(0.778)                | 1.862**<br>(0.778) |
| Works in Private<br>Business              | -0.611**<br>(0.304)     | -0.611**<br>(0.304)  | 0.506<br>(0.511)                  | 0.506<br>(0.511)   |
| Student                                   | 0.480<br>(0.573)        | 0.480<br>(0.573)     | 0.0846<br>(0.881)                 | 0.0846<br>(0.881)  |
| Retired                                   | 0.628<br>(0.455)        | 0.628<br>(0.455)     | 0.297<br>(0.746)                  | 0.297<br>(0.746)   |
| Unemployed                                | 0.401<br>(0.521)        | 0.401<br>(0.521)     | 1.392<br>(1.132)                  | 1.392<br>(1.132)   |
| Age                                       | -0.189**<br>(0.0851)    | -0.189**<br>(0.0851) | 0.134<br>(0.151)                  | 0.134<br>(0.151)   |
| Income                                    | 0.0351<br>(0.134)       | 0.0351<br>(0.134)    | -0.445*<br>(0.240)                | -0.445*<br>(0.240) |
| Educational Level                         | 0.154<br>(0.162)        | 0.154<br>(0.162)     | 0.0142<br>(0.278)                 | 0.0142<br>(0.278)  |
| Black (=1; 0=White)                       | -0.179<br>(0.333)       | -0.179<br>(0.333)    | 0.897<br>(0.654)                  | 0.897<br>(0.654)   |
| Multiracial                               | -0.0421<br>(0.206)      | -0.0421<br>(0.206)   | 0.240<br>(0.377)                  | 0.240<br>(0.377)   |
| Indigenous                                | -1.548**<br>(0.715)     | -1.548**<br>(0.715)  | -0.0182<br>(0.988)                | -0.0182<br>(0.988) |

|                              | Evaluations of GBV Laws    |                            | Bystander Intervention Attentions |                           |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Asian                        | 0.857<br>(0.521)           | 0.857<br>(0.521)           | 0.717<br>(1.213)                  | 0.717<br>(1.213)          |
| <u>State-Level Controls:</u> |                            |                            |                                   |                           |
| Homicide Rate                | -0.0226**<br>(0.0106)      | -0.0226**<br>(0.0106)      | -0.0218<br>(0.0199)               | -0.0218<br>(0.0199)       |
| GDP                          | 2.40e-06<br>(6.70e-06)     | 2.40e-06<br>(6.70e-06)     | 4.30e-05***<br>(1.40e-05)         | 4.30e-05***<br>(1.40e-05) |
| Population                   | -3.26e-08***<br>(9.22e-09) | -3.26e-08***<br>(9.22e-09) | 1.09e-08<br>(2.33e-08)            | 1.09e-08<br>(2.33e-08)    |
| State-Level GBV Laws         | 0.252<br>(0.441)           | 0.252<br>(0.441)           | 0.471<br>(0.920)                  | 0.471<br>(0.920)          |
| Constant                     |                            |                            | 1.084<br>(1.411)                  | 1.428<br>(1.526)          |
| Observations                 | 489                        | 489                        | 306                               | 306                       |
| Number of groups             | 27                         | 27                         | 26                                | 26                        |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: Own elaboration

**Table A8. Bystander Intervention and Number of WPS in the State**

|                        | Model 1<br>Bystander Intervention:<br>Police |
|------------------------|--|
| Victim of IPV          | -0.203**<br>(0.0644)                         |
| Low-Med Number of WPS  | -0.0458<br>(0.0954)                          |
| Med-High Number of WPS | 0.0430<br>(0.141)                            |
| High Number of WPS     | 0.143<br>(0.211)                             |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|  | <b>Model 1<br/>Bystander Intervention:<br/>Police</b> |
|--|---|
| Victim x Low-Med WPS                     | 0.218**<br>(0.0750)                                   |
| Victim x Med-High WPS                    | 0.238*<br>(0.0949)                                    |
| Victim x High WPS                        | 0.226**<br>(0.0788)                                   |
| Perceive GBV Impunity                    | -0.00578<br>(0.0212)                                  |
| Perceive Discrimination<br>Against Women | 0.0365*<br>(0.0174)                                   |
| Cleans Houses                            | -0.0529<br>(0.0551)                                   |
| Works Independently                      | 0.0420<br>(0.0378)                                    |
| Works in Private Business                | 0.0120<br>(0.0438)                                    |
| Student                                  | 0.0454<br>(0.0350)                                    |
| Unemployed                               | 0.0885<br>(0.0504)                                    |
| Age                                      | 0.00425<br>(0.00879)                                  |
| Income                                   | -0.00265<br>(0.0131)                                  |
| Education Level                          | 0.0455**<br>(0.0170)                                  |
| Black (=1; White=0)                      | 0.00889<br>(0.0340)                                   |
| Multiracial                              | 0.0271<br>(0.0229)                                    |

RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

|                              | Model 1<br>Bystander Intervention:<br>Police |
|------------------------------|--|
| Indigenous                   | 0.108<br>(0.0994)                            |
| Asian                        | 0.0853<br>(0.0569)                           |
| <u>State-Level Controls:</u> |  |
| Homicide Rate                | 0.0189***<br>(0.00358)                       |
| GDP                          | 2.35e-05***<br>(1.04e-06)                    |
| State-Level GBV Law          | 0.218<br>(0.146)                             |
| GBV Municipal Fund           | 0.0791<br>(0.158)                            |
| Constant                     | -0.585***<br>(0.147)                         |
| Observations                 | 939  |
| Number of groups             | 27   |

Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Source: Own elaboration

**Table A9. Number of WPS per state for 2013 and 2015**

| State    | Number of WPS<br>2013 | Number of WPS<br>2015 |
|----------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Acre     | 2                     | 2                     |
| Alagoas  | 2                     | 2                     |
| Amazonas | 5                     | 5                     |
| Amapa    | 2                     | 2                     |



RABELLO KRAS  
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

| State               | Number of WPS<br>2013 | Number of WPS<br>2015 |
|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Bahia               | 14                    | 14                    |
| Ceara               | 6                     | 8                     |
| Distrito Federal    | 1                     | 1                     |
| Espirito Santo      | 10                    | 10                    |
| Goiias              | 13                    | 17                    |
| Maranhao            | 14                    | 14                    |
| Mato Grosso         | 6                     | 6                     |
| Mato Grosso do Sul  | 10                    | 10                    |
| Minas Gerais        | 44                    | 47                    |
| Para                | 13                    | 13                    |
| Paraiba             | 9                     | 10                    |
| Parana              | 18                    | 21                    |
| Pernambuco          | 9                     | 9                     |
| Piaui               | 6                     | 6                     |
| Rio de Janeiro      | 8                     | 12                    |
| Rio Grande do Norte | 4                     | 4                     |
| Rio Grande do Sul   | 17                    | 23                    |
| Rondonia            | 7                     | 7                     |
| Roraima             | 1                     | 1                     |
| Santa Catarina      | 23                    | 24                    |
| Sao Paulo           | 117                   | 120                   |
| Sergipe             | 4                     | 4                     |
| Tocantins           | 7                     | 7                     |

*Source: Own elaboration*

### Box A2. Details of Fieldwork conducted by Author

For several theoretical insights used in the paper, I relied on the findings from the extensive fieldwork I carried out in the south of Brazil in the summer of 2019. During fieldwork, I conducted 6 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with survivors of IPV and 35 interviews with GBV public service providers, for a total of 41 interviews. Among the service providers, I interviewed lawyers, officers of the military and civil police, sheriffs of different women's police stations, therapists, social workers, project coordinators, and community activists. The qualitative interview questions and procedures were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Kentucky.

The interviews were conducted across 12 municipalities in the Southern Brazilian states of São Paulo, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. Participants were recruited using an email and phone script. I contacted all public organizations that offer services to women in situations of violence in those municipalities and requested an interview with a service provider. Survivors were recruited through two non-governmental organizations for victims. I visited all institutions in which interviews were conducted. But to protect the privacy and safety of survivors, I interviewed victims using video calls from the platform WhatsApp.

The themes of all interviews were victims' access to public services and their quality, the challenges service providers face in combating GBV, the condition of facilities, and the fluctuations in funding and personnel following changes of political parties in power in the state and local legislatures. Mental health and trauma were topics that emerged in every single interview. Last, I asked all participants about survivors' experience with seeking help in general, their knowledge of the Maria da Penha Law, and their perceptions of state support for victims and trust in government. Interviews lasted between one-three hours.

*Source: Own elaboration*

**Figure A2. Pictures from Fieldwork in Brazil**



«Don't be silent: The state's government is by your side» The phone line called Lilás is a hot line in this southern state of Brazil (this is a huge billboard displayed in a busy area of the city)

Source: Own elaboration (taken by the author)

**Figure A3. Pictures from Fieldwork in Brazil**



This is the car of a unit of the military police, specialized in domestic violence and issues related to the anti-GBV law (Maria da Penha). They are called «Maria da Penha Patrol» – in the picture, the police officers were visiting a small town in the south of Brazil for information sessions.

*Source:* Own elaboration (taken by the author)

Figure A4. Pictures from Fieldwork in Brazil



A women's police station next to a regular police station in a town in the south of Brazil.

Source: Own elaboration (taken by the author)

Figure A5. Pictures from Fieldwork in Brazil



A bystander intervention campaign (*denuncie*) spotted on a public bus in a town in the south of Brazil. (it reads: «Don't be Silent», Domestic Violence is a crime, Report it (and has the hotline numbers and police numbers)

Source: Own elaboration (taken by the author)

## PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: UNPACKING THE EXPERIENCES OF VICTIMS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE WITH THE POLICE

Helen Rabello Kras

Rabello Kras, H. (2024). Procedural fairness and political attitudes: unpacking the experiences of victims of intimate partner violence with the police. *Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública*, 13, e31356. <https://doi.org/10.14201/rlop.31356>

Con el auspicio de:



IntiCo es una empresa líder en transformar la experiencia de los clientes a través de tecnología e innovación. Con más de 17 años de experiencia en el mercado atendemos a más de 50 países y tenemos presencia física en 8 países (Estados Unidos, México, Guatemala, Ecuador, Colombia, Perú, Chile y Emiratos Árabes Unidos).



Más de 15 años de experiencia en el desarrollo de soluciones para aplicación de entrevistas cara-a-cara (CAPI), por Internet (CAWI) y telefónicas (CATI) con SurveyToGo, el software para encuestas más utilizado por empresas de investigación alrededor del mundo. Servicios de programación, ventas y soporte técnico los 7 días de la semana. Atención en español, inglés y portugués para USA, Canadá y América Latina.

