


DOES CHINA'S RISE INFLUENCE ANTI-AMERICANISM? EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA

*¿El ascenso de China influye en el antiamericanismo?
Evidencia de Colombia*

*A ascensão da China influencia o antiamericanismo?
Evidências da Colômbia*

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Abstract

China greatly expanded its presence in Latin America over the last several decades, with most researchers examining China's economic and political efforts. Many U.S.-based researchers, pundits, and policymakers saw China as a potential rival and threat to U. S. hegemony. However, few researchers have examined how average Latin Americans viewed these changes. Building on theories of anti-Americanism, we examine whether views of China are associated with anti-Americanism in Colombia. Drawing on an original survey of Colombians, we find that China's economic model, respondent ideology, and views of Chinese trade and business are weakly associated with anti-Americanism. Other factors have no association. Our findings provide an important early look into the effectiveness of China's soft power in the region and contribute to the field's understanding of anti-Americanism in the region.

Palabras clave:
China; Colombia;
antiamericanismo;
política exterior;
economía

Resumen

China expandió enormemente su presencia en América Latina durante las últimas décadas, y la mayoría de los investigadores examinan los esfuerzos económicos y políticos de China. Muchos investigadores, expertos y legisladores con sede en EE. UU. vieron a China como un rival potencial y una amenaza para la hegemonía de EE. UU. Sin embargo, pocos investigadores han examinado cómo los latinoamericanos promedio vieron estos cambios. Sobre la base de las teorías del antiamericanismo, examinamos si las opiniones sobre China están asociadas con el antiamericanismo en Colombia. Basándonos en una encuesta original de colombianos, encontramos que el modelo económico de China, la ideología de los encuestados y las opiniones sobre el comercio y los negocios chinos están débilmente asociados con el antiamericanismo. Otros factores no tienen asociación. Nuestros hallazgos brindan una importante mirada temprana a la efectividad del poder blando de China en la región y contribuyen a la comprensión del campo del antiamericanismo en la región.

Palavras-chave:
China; Colômbia;
antiamericanismo;
política externa;
economia

Resumo

A China expandiu muito sua presença na América Latina nas últimas décadas, com a maioria dos pesquisadores examinando os esforços econômicos e políticos da China. Muitos pesquisadores, especialistas e formuladores de políticas baseados nos EUA viam a China como um rival em potencial e uma ameaça à hegemonia dos EUA. No entanto, poucos pesquisadores examinaram como os latino-americanos médios viam essas mudanças. Com base nas teorias do antiamericanismo, examinamos se as visões da China estão associadas ao antiamericanismo na Colômbia. Com base em uma pesquisa original com colombianos, descobrimos que o modelo econômico da China, a ideologia do respondente e as visões do comércio e dos negócios chineses estão fracamente associados ao antiamericanismo. Outros fatores não têm associação. Nossas descobertas fornecem uma visão inicial importante da eficácia do poder brando da China na região e contribuem para a compreensão do campo sobre o antiamericanismo na região.

INTRODUCTION*

China greatly expanded its role in Latin America over the last two decades and now forms one of the largest trading partners and investors in the region. Furthermore, the number of high-level state visits, cultural exchanges, and Chinese tourism multiplied many times over. This sea-change in Sino-Latin American relations spurred countless articles and books examining these economic and political

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changes. Consequently, scholars now have a far greater understanding of the political economy of Sino-Latin American relations.

This sea-change in Sino-Latin American relations led some observers to see China's rise as a direct threat to U. S. interests in the region. Elected officials, members of the military, and academics regularly questioned China's professed benign interests Latin America –the region the U. S. considers its backyard. Not surprisingly, congressional hearings, policy white papers, and countless books and articles worried over Chinese ambitions in the region.

Nevertheless, a large gap exists in the literature. With rare exceptions, scholars largely ignore how citizens in Latin America view these changes. It is understandable that prior to 9/11 relatively few scholars examined how citizens viewed other countries and no grand theory of public opinion regarding Great Powers existed. After 9/11, key scholars explored the determinants of anti-Americanism –focusing on whether what the United States is versus what the United States does drives anti-American attitudes in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.¹ We seek to turn this same theoretical lens on Sino-Latin American relations. To what extent does China's political and economic model, or what China is, versus China's political and economic actions, or what China does, drive public views? Specifically, does China's rise threaten how the public views the United States?

We focus on Colombia in order to examine these theories. Colombia occupies an interesting middle-category in Latin America in many ways. Economically, it is not as important to China as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, or Mexico, but its market-size makes developing the relationship worthwhile. Colombia's export profile also occupies a middle ground, being neither as complimentary as Chile or Peru, nor as conflictual as Mexico (Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012). Most importantly, Colombia has been one of the closest allies of the U. S. in the region for decades. Whether it was the fight against drug trade, offsetting the influence of Venezuela, or promoting Colombia as a showcase of democracy and market economics, the U. S. and Colombia shared far more common interests than differences. Whether the rising influence of the United States' chief competitor affects public opinion in a traditionally pro-U. S. state views is in itself a fascinating subject. Consequently, we argue Colombia represents an interesting case to examine whether China's rise influences public opinion regarding the United States.

The paper is laid out in four sections. In the next section, we describe China's expanded role in Latin America and Colombia, as well as our theory regarding the determinants of Great Power public opinion. The third section of the paper outlines our data and methodology. We use an original public opinion survey

1. See Baker and Cupery (2013), Blaydes and Linzer (2012), Carlson and Nelson (2008), Isernia (2006), Jamal *et al.*, (2015), and Katzenstein and Keohane (2006) for examples.

specifically designed to examine both aspects of what China represents—what it is, along with aspects of Chinese actions —what China does. The fourth section presents our analysis and findings. Using ordered logistic regression we find that China's development model, its politics, and views of its trade and business practices are related to views of the United States. The final section concludes and offers suggestions for future research.

CHINA'S NEW ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA

China increased its presence and influence in Latin America in three stages. In the first stage, China simply entered into nascent political and economic relationships with whatever countries in the region that accepted Chinese overtures. Many Latin American countries followed the United States' lead and switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the People's Republic in the 1970s, despite the presence of several anti-communist military dictatorships (Domínguez *et al.*, 2006). During this first stage China's domestic economic reforms were predicated on expanded export markets and a steady supply of raw materials. Hence, Latin America's long history as a supplier of primary products led to a slow, but steady increase in Chinese imports of Latin American minerals, energy, and food, combined with exports of inexpensive manufactured goods to the region (Fornés and Butt Philip, 2012; Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010). This first phase lasted nearly thirty years.

The start of the new century coincided with the second phase of Sino-Latin American relations, rapid expansion. The region's primary product exporters enjoyed a Chinese-driven commodities boom, while its manufacturing sectors faced increasingly stiff competition and lost market share to Chinese producers (Álvarez and Claro, 2009; Gallagher, Moreno-Brid and Porzecanski, 2008; Mesquita Moreira, 2007; Sargent and Matthews, 2009). Trade and investment quickly accelerated (Armony and Strauss, 2012), as did Chinese foreign direct investment to Latin America (Dong, 2013; Gao and Meng, 2015). Political relationships also expanded, with more and higher profile state visits, as well as greater Chinese involvement (including membership) in regional institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank. The global economic crisis of 2008-2009 accelerated these trends (Wu, Liu and Cai, 2011, 2012).

The third stage involves deepening Sino-Latin American relations beyond economic ties to encompass greater political and strategic engagement (Campbell *et al.*, 2022; Ellis, 2020). President Xi traveled to the region in 2014, 2017, and 2018, with an additional visit to Brazil in 2019 for the BRICS summit. He oversaw the expansion of involvement in regional institutions and the launch of new programs. China led the China-Latin America and the Caribbean International Exposition, was involved in the Pacific Alliance, and expanded its One Belt, One

Road/Belt and Road Initiative to include Latin America (Estevadeordal, 2018; Gao, 2018; Jenkins, 2022). Chinese officials and business leaders promised to increase FDI and investment in infrastructure projects.

These moves engendered concern at home in China, in Latin America itself, as well as in the United States. Domestic actors expressed concerns regarding loans to Venezuela, while others in China note their government still had little tangible political influence in the region (Wang, 2015; Yang, 2015). Chinese firms faced protests due to concerns related to labor issues, the environment, and competition concerns (Ellis, 2014). Rival governments pushed back against growing Chinese influence (Vaillant, 2021). Policymakers, military leaders, and scholars in the U. S. questioned China's motives (Campbell *et al.*, 2022; Ellis, 2020). This third stage in Sino-Latin American relations tested China's ability to move beyond the "cash for resources" approach to a deeper level of political and economic exchange.

That China's third stage coincided with two decades of American focus outside Latin America raised concerns that U. S. regional hegemony might have slipped. Some American political leaders saw China's expansion as a direct threat (Ellis, 2014; Johnson and Wasson, 2011). The rule of left leaning governments in some parts of Latin America and outright pro-Beijing governments in Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba exacerbated concerns in Washington, DC (Berg, 2021). In sum, China's expanded interest in Latin America, regional neglect (Peres Milani, 2021), combined with the Trump administration's anti-China and anti-Latino rhetoric (Scheller, 2017) may influence how Latin Americans viewed these Great Powers.


Sino-Colombian Relations

Colombia delayed recognition of the People's Republic of China until 1980, so it was not one of the first countries in the region to engage with Beijing. However, China viewed Colombia as an important "middle power" in the region, along with countries like Argentina, Chile, and Peru (Wu, 2015). Colombia's extractive industries were attractive to China, but its internal conflicts limited Chinese interest (Defelipe Villa, 2015).

Starting in the 2000s, improved security and involvement in the Pacific Alliance attracted greater Chinese attention. Trade between Colombia and China exploded and Colombia grew in importance to Chinese trade with the region (see Figure 1) (World Bank, 2018). Similarly, Chinese FDI stock grew from less than 7 million (USD) in 2007 to over half a billion by 2015 (Wu, 2011, 2012, and 2016). Despite a long-running civil war against communist guerrillas and consistent rightist governments in the 2000s, Sino-Colombian government relations also improved. For example, the Chinese government sponsored a number of Confucius Institutes at leading Colombian universities and Premier Li visited Colombia

in 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Sino-Colombian relations simply expanded quickly at the start of the new century.

Figure 1. Expansion of Sino-Colombian Trade: 2000-2016



Source: World Bank (2018)

While Sino-Colombian relations expanded, deepening these ties remains difficult. The two governments agreed to discuss a Free Trade Agreement in 2012, but during interviews with members of the executive and legislative branches, as well as academics, no one could cite tangible progress toward a deal as of 2016 (authors' personal interviews).² China also views U.S.-Colombian relations as a barrier to closer ties (Ray *et al.*, 2017). Furthermore, while Chinese presidents have visited large trading partners like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, and even smaller partners like Costa Rica, Cuba, Peru, and Uruguay, no Chinese president has visited Colombia (CEPAL, 2011; Myers and Wise, 2016).

2. Note that no tangible progress on a Sino-Colombian FTA has been announced in the past half a decade.

The lack of a presidential state visit is notable given the symbolic value China places on such visits. In short, while China sees Colombia as an important partner in the region, it has yet to move beyond traditional strengths in trade and investment to develop a significant understanding of what distinguishes Colombia from its neighbors. Hence, Colombia offers an important test case of China's "vertical expansion" strategy in Latin America.³

From Colombia's point of view, relations with China present significant opportunities and challenges. On the opportunity side, the rapid expansion of exports and high commodities prices buoyed the economy. Academics concerned with Colombia's heavy reliance on ties with the United States, particularly in the age of the Trump administration, see China as a potential counterbalance (Authors' Personal Interviews 2016; Wu, Liu, and Cai 2011, 2012). Chinese investment, particularly in infrastructure and agriculture, hold particular promise (Authors' Personal Interviews, 2016). During one interview with a business consultant, he stated that the cost of shipping a container from China to Colombia is less than the cost of shipping the same container from a Colombian port to Bogota. He hoped that Chinese investment in infrastructure could facilitate development. In short, China's strength may ameliorate some of Colombia's most glaring weaknesses.

On the challenge side, China runs a considerable trade surplus with Colombia and largely imports low value-added commodities from Colombia. Similarly, Colombian presidents have visited Beijing four times in the last 15 years, without a return visit. Only a small number of Colombian elites enjoy access to the Confucius Institutes and anti-China protests led to the banning of Chinese-made *vueltaio hats* (The Economist, 2013). Similarly, the San Victorino neighborhood of Bogota was racked by protests against small Chinese-owned businesses. Colombian-owned businesses claimed the Chinese owners were illegal immigrants and engaged in unfair business practices, while wearing t-shirts that read, "I buy Colombian. Do you?" and carrying signs that read, "Colombia for Colombians" (El Espectador, 2016; Parra, 2016). Some Colombians were clearly skeptical of China's increased presence in their country.

Perhaps the only group more interested in Sino-Colombian relations than Colombian elites are U.S.-based elites. The PRC donated military and police equipment and even sent military personnel to Colombia's special warfare school—worrying security experts (Brands and Berg, 2021; Ellis, 2020). Senator Robert Menendez introduced the U.S.-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act of 2022, explicitly stating it was to counter "...the creeping influences of extra-regional actors like Russia and China (Chairman Menendez Opening Remarks at Full Committee

3. Wu *et al.*, 2013 define "vertical expansion" as moving beyond trade and economic deals to incorporate political, cultural, and strategic partnerships. These partnerships are layered on top of investment and trade deals; hence the expansion is vertical.

Hearing, 2022).” Similarly, China’s use of soft power such as hosting agricultural trainings, opening Confucius Institutes, investing in the Bogotá metro system all led to concerns that China was weakening the U.S.-Colombian partnership (Ellis, 2022; Laco and Evansky, 2022).

While the extant literature examines Sino-Colombian relations and the ways China may weaken the U.S.-Colombian partnership, few scholars examine whether these macro-level changes influence public opinion.⁴ Do Colombians view China as a positive or a negative? More importantly, do attitudes toward China relate to attitudes toward the United States? In the next section we discuss how attitudes towards China may influence attitudes towards the United States.

Theories of Public Opinion and Great Powers: What they are versus what they do

A growing body of literature now examines public opinion of foreign actors. Initially limited to an occasional survey question or two, the post-9/11 world caused researchers to consider the basis of antipathy toward other countries in a far more systematic fashion. Given the context, much of this work explores the causes and varieties of anti-Americanism (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2006). These scholars tend to focus on two interrelated questions: does antipathy reflect what the other country is—its institutions and culture (Carlson and Nelson, 2008; Isernia 2006) many have argued that international perceptions of the United States are growing more negative and that ‘anti-Americanism’ is going to be a problem for American foreign policy in the decades to come. We examine the debate over anti-Americanism by using survey data collected in more than 26 countries that span East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, with a focus on two empirical questions. First, to what extent do citizens in Asia believe that the United States has a negative (or positive? Or is antipathy toward another country based on what the country does—its foreign policy?

In the post-9/11 era scholars focused on the Middle East. U. S. military actions and friendly relations with autocratic regimes explained anti-Americanism more so than opinions of American democracy and freedom (Jamal *et al.*, 2015; Katzenstein and Keohane 2006). Similarly, pro-American attitudes in Latin America were linked with positive evaluations of both what the United States does and what it represents (Baker and Cupery, 2013). Taken as a whole, what the United States represents, democracy and capitalism, and what it does, military adventures and foreign aid, consistently influence anti-Americanism. We use the logic

4. See Carreras (2017), Morgenstern and Bohigues (2021), Tickner and Botero (2011) for exceptions.

of this literature to examine whether China's emergence as an alternative to the United States affected public opinion in Colombia.

In many ways, China is the economic and political photo negative of the United States. After three decades of neoliberalism (Gallagher 2016; Johnson and Crisp 2003) China has evolved from a poor and mostly rural society into one of the largest economies in the world. As it grew into a major industrial power, it demanded enormous amounts of steel for new factories and cities, copper for electronic wires, petroleum for cars and manufacturing plants, and soybeans and cattle to feed its workers. By the 1990s, many Latin American countries were riding China's coattails and beginning to prosper from the new demand. Ever since China entered the World Trade Organization at the turn of the century, Latin America supplied China with more and more of the primary commodities it needs and more. That in turn has produced one of the most impressive periods of economic growth on the continent in fifty years. And it was more evenly spread too - a region infamous for its extreme inequality saw it decline by a couple of percentage points over the course of the era. In *The China Triangle*, Kevin P. Gallagher traces the development of the China-Latin America trade over time and covers how it has affected the centuries-old (and highly unequal, China's phenomenal economic growth via state-centric capitalism offers an alternative to the Washington Consensus (Ellis, 2014; León-Manríquez *et al.*, 2014). Similarly, China's FDI, infrastructure investment, and multinational corporations like Huawei offered alternatives to American and Western capital (Defelipe Villa 卡米楼 2015; Roy, 2022). Politically, China is a one-party communist state. Given Colombia's long running civil war against the FARC and ELN and the political left's history of electoral futility, China again is the opposite of the United States. The question is whether China's economic model or its political model are related to views of the United States. Does what China is associated with anti-Americanism amongst the Colombian public? Consequently, we hypothesize that attitudes about "What China Is" will affect attitudes in the following ways:

H1a: Positive views of China will be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

H1b: Positive views of China's economic model be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

H1c: Positive views of China's political model be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

While views of what China is may be associated with anti-Americanism, attitudes may also be driven by what China does in Latin America in general and in Colombia in particular. Generally speaking, China's influence —essentially, "What China Does"— is viewed positively in the region (Carreras, 2017; Kaplan, 2018). Elites we

interviewed emphasized Chinese trade and investment offered opportunities for development and provided lower income Colombians access to a range of previously unobtainable consumer goods (Authors' Personal Interviews 2016). However, political and economic leaders often claimed China engages in unfair economic practices (Linley, Reilly and Goldsmith, 2012). In Colombia, the controversies surrounding the *vueltaos* (The Economist, 2013), unfair trade practices (El Espectador, 2016), or unsafe mining operations represented potential missteps (Symmes Cobb, 2022).

Turning to politics, China's political charm offensive has not gone unnoticed. As previously noted, the opening of Confucius Institutes and sponsorship of study or training in China expanded Chinese soft power (Paradise, 2009; Xu *et al.*, 2020). China's ambassadors, Li Nianping and Lan Hu, engaged in a concerted charm offensive, appearing regularly in national media to promote Sino-Colombian relations (Creutzfeldt, 2022). Based on the fears of U.S.-based elected officials, military leaders, and many academics, positive views of China's influence may threaten American interests in its closest ally. Therefore, we hypothesize that attitudes about "What China Does" will affect attitudes in the following ways:

H2a: Positive views of China's effect on the Colombian economy will be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

H2b: Positive views of China's political engagement in Colombia and Latin America will be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

In sum, Colombian attitudes relating to the United States will be associated with how respondents view China itself, as well as the effects of China's actions in Latin America and Colombia. In the following section we outline the data and methods used to test these hypotheses.

DATA AND METHODS

The decision to study mass opinions of China in Colombia was motivated by two key factors. One was Colombia's economic profile. As previously noted, Colombia's export profile is not as complimentary as economic partners like Chile, Peru, or Venezuela. Neither is its profile as directly conflictual as Mexico's export profile (Jenkins and Barbosa, 2012). The other factor is that Colombia is a particularly difficult test case given its long pro-U. S. history. In fact, in every interview with Colombian government, business, and academic leader they stated that the U. S. is the single most important Colombian partner and that no other country is even close (Authors' Personal Interviews, 2016). Hence, Colombia represented a tough case in which to test whether views on China were associated with anti-Americanism (Eckstein, 1975; Gerring, 2007; King, Keohane and Verba 2021).

In order to systematically examine opinions, we contracted with Gallup Colombia to conduct a survey of Colombian views of China. Interviews were conducted by phone using random digit dialing methods in five metropolitan areas: Bogota, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla, and Bucaramanga. These are Colombia's five largest cities, represent five distinct regions, and account for over 40 percent of Colombia's population. Interviews lasted about 15 minutes and were conducted in November of 2016. 700 respondents completed the survey.⁵ While not representative of all Colombians, Gallup's long history of successful polling in Colombia make it likely that this sample represents urban Colombian well.⁶ One set of questions focused both on attitudes related to "What China Is." A second set of questions focused on China's interactions with Latin America and Colombia, which we call "What China Does." To our knowledge this is the most comprehensive survey regarding Colombian views of China to date.

Dependent Variable: Evaluations of China


In order to measure our dependent variable, we asked respondents to evaluate China, as well as Brazil and the United States, early on in the survey. Respondents were asked if they held a very positive, positive, negative, or very negative opinion of each country. We converted their answers into a four-point scale, where higher numbers indicate a more negative evaluations.⁷ Perhaps not surprisingly, a little over 60 percent of respondents held positive evaluations of China, while just over 30 percent held negative opinions. This compares with 67 percent positive and 32 percent negative evaluations of the United States. Attitudes toward Brazil were also similar, with just over 60 percent positive views and 27 percent negative evaluations. A direct comparison of evaluations of China and the United States demonstrates that most Colombian's held similar views of both countries (see Figure 2). This figure presents prima facie evidence undermining hypothesis H1a. Similarly, a c^2 test demonstrates a strong statistical relationship between views of China and the United States ($c^2=120.80$, $p<0.001$). In sum, Colombian views of China are similar to their views of the largest ally and the largest power on their own continent.

5. A copy of the survey is available as Appendix A.

6. See Gasparini *et al.*, (2013) for an example of researchers and the Inter-American Development Bank using surveys conducted by Gallup in Latin America in general, including data from Colombia.

7. We did not offer a neutral response in the survey, though about 8.6 percent of respondents either said they "didn't know" or refused to evaluate China.

Figure 2. Comparison of Evaluations of China and the United States.



Note: bar height represents number of respondents in each category

Source: Gallup survey

Given we are interested in attitudes toward Great Powers and China’s rise, we faced an endogeneity problem. Obviously, we could not use views of What China Is and What China Does to explain overall evaluations of China, as these views were likely endogenous. By using evaluations of the U. S. as our dependent variable we can examine whether nascent views of China were associated with more negative views of Colombia’s closest ally and the cornerstone of Colombian foreign policy.

Independent Variables: What China Is

In order to examine whether specific opinions of regarding China’s political and economic model influence evaluations of the U.S., we include a series of four variables. First, we asked respondents which country’s economic development model represented the best path for Colombia to follow: Brazil, China, the United States. We created a dummy variable that takes a value of “1” when the

respondent believed China represented the best development model.⁸ Second, we asked respondents to express their confidence in Chinese businesses.⁹ This is a four-point scale where higher scores reflect greater confidence. These two variables allow us to examine the extent to which “What China’s Economy Is” is associated with variations in Colombian views of the United States.

Apart from China’s economic model, we also include variables designed to tap into evaluations of China’s politics. First, we asked whether Colombia should adopt China’s political model. This was measured using a four-point scale where higher numbers indicate a more support for the Chinese political model. We ordered all four-point scaled variables so that positive coefficient support our hypotheses. Given the ideology of the Chinese government and Colombia’s history of ideological conflict, we also include a measure of the respondent’s ideology. This is a 0 to 100 scale, where 0=left and 100=right. In sum, we have two variables related to China’s economy and two variables related to China’s politics.

Independent Variables: What China Does

In order to examine whether specific opinions of regarding China’s political and economic relationships with Latin America in general, and Colombia in particular, matter we include five variables. The first three variables ask respondents their opinions related to the effects of China on the Colombian economy. Our first asked respondents their opinion of the growth in trade and investment between China and Colombia. This is a four-point scale where higher values indicate more positive views of this growth. The second variable asked respondents whether growing trade and investment with China increased or decreased employment in Colombia. This is also a four-point scale where higher values indicate more positive views of China’s effects on employment. Next, we asked a similar question, asking respondents regarding the effects of China on economic development using the same four-point scale. These represent evaluations of China’s effect on Colombia’s economy.

Turning to evaluations of China’s foreign policy in Colombia we include two questions. The first asked respondents to evaluate the state of Sino-Colombian government-to-government relations. We use the same four-point scale, where higher scores represent more positive views. The second is a simple dichotomous question that asked if the respondent wanted to see a greater Chinese presence

8. Statistical results did not change appreciably when separating the Brazil and the Other categories, so we have combined them for ease of presentation and interpretation.

9. Our survey question did not distinguish between large, international businesses like Huawei and small, Colombian-based, Chinese-owned business like those in the San Victorino neighborhood.

in Latin America. A “1” represents an affirmative response. Again, we ordered all four-point scaled variables so that a positive coefficient support our hypotheses.

Control Variables

While our main foci are whether “What China Is” and “What China Does” are associated with anti-Americanism, we also include a series of standard demographic controls. We have dummy variables for the respondent’s sex and whether the respondent identifies as Catholic. Next, we control for the respondent’s age. Our fourth variable is a measure of poverty. We asked respondents to evaluate how often they or a member of their household did not have enough to eat, with higher scores indicating more frequent hunger issues in the household. We also included the age at which the individual left formal schooling in order to measure the respondent’s level of education.

Models

Given that our dependent variable is limited and ordered, we use ordered logistic regression. We used a Brant Test to determine whether any of the variables in our models violated the parallel regression or proportional odds assumption and found that several of the variables violated assumption (Fullerton and Dixon 2010; Long and Freese 2014; Stoutenborough, Sturgess, and Vedlitz 2013). Consequently, we estimate models using both the familiar ordered logit approach, as well as the generalized ordered logit approach (Williams 2016)the ordered logit model, aka the proportional odds model (ologit/po. Since the generalized order logit models do not alter our main statistical or substantive results, we present the more familiar ordered logit models in the text.¹⁰

10. The generalized ordered logistic regression models are more complicated to interpret. In our models the dependent variable asks respondents to classify their opinion of the United States on a four-point scale and the method allows us to estimate all levels simultaneously in the model. Level 1 treats the “very positive” category as 0 with all the other categories (“positive”, “negative”, and “very negative”) treated as a 1. Level 2 treats the “very positive” and “positive” categories as 0 and the “negative” and “very negative categories” as 1. Finally, Level 3 treats the “very positive”, “positive”, and “negative” categories as 0 and the “very negative” as 1. The models then include a distinct logit coefficient for each variable that violated the parallel regression assumption, while presenting a single logit coefficient for variables that did not violate this assumption.

RESULTS

We begin our analysis of anti-Americanism by examining the factors related to “What China Is” (see Table 1, Model 1). We find that three of our four variables are statistically significant, though one in the wrong direction. Respondents that see the Chinese economic model as the proper model for Colombia to follow held more anti-American views, just as some U.S.-based policymakers and scholars feared (see Model 1). Trust in Chinese businesses had no influence on anti-Americanism. Turning to Chinese politics, we find that both variables are significant. As expected, those on the political right are more pro-American, while those on the political left are more anti-American. However, those with more positive views of the Chinese political model are less anti-American. We are not sure why this might be the case, but additional study is merited. Taken together, our model partially supports hypotheses H1b and H1c, meaning that perceptions of What China Is may influence anti-Americanism in Colombians.

Table 1. China's Rise and anti-Americanism in Colombia

	Model 1 Effect of What China Is	Model 2 Effect of What China Does	Model 3 Combined Effects
China's Economic Model	0.680*** (0.191)		0.796*** (0.205)
Trust in Chinese Business	-0.170 (0.110)		-0.082 (0.134)
China's Political Model	-0.283* (0.116)		-0.248# (0.129)
Ideology (Rightist)	-0.007* (0.003)		-0.005 (0.004)
Effects of Trade & Business		-0.285# (0.185)	-0.263 (0.162)
Effect on Jobs		0.069 (0.104)	0.123 (0.117)
Effect on Development		-0.011	-0.090

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	Model 1 Effect of What China Is	Model 2 Effect of What China Does	Model 3 Combined Effects
		(0.107)	(0.117)
Sino-Colombian Government Relations		-0.067	-0.015
		(0.196)	(0.215)
Prefer Greater Chinese Involvement		-0.112	-0.135
in Latin America		(0.212)	(0.218)
Female	0.011 (0.179)	0.001 (0.180)	0.039 (0.192)
Catholic	-0.242 (0.191)	-0.304 (0.187)	-0.268 (0.201)
Age	0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Poverty	0.118 (0.090)	0.119 (0.097)	0.144 (0.104)
Education	-0.305*** (0.061)	-0.267*** (0.063)	-0.295*** (0.068)
cut1	-4.733 (0.526)	-4.276 (0.583)	-4.782 (0.599)
cut2	-1.588 (0.490)	-1.238 (0.559)	-1.659 (0.571)
cut3	0.732 (0.498)	1.092 (0.587)	0.658 (0.595)
N	575	564	516
Chi ²	58.78	35.53	55.46

	Model 1 Effect of What China Is	Model 2 Effect of What China Does	Model 3 Combined Effects
<i>Pseudo R</i> ²	0.048	0.031	0.050
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-576.134	-574.118	-518.002

Robust standard errors in parentheses, # p<0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Source: authors' analysis

Our second model tests the extent to which attitudes about “What China Does” serve as a basis for anti-Americanism in Colombia (see Model 2). Surprisingly, only one of the five variables is statistically significant. Namely, those that think China’s trade and business relationships positively influence Colombia tend to score lower on anti-Americanism. This is precisely the opposite of H2a and undermines pundits and policymakers that think China’s increased involvement in Colombia might drive a wedge between the U. S. and its allies.

In our third model we include both our measures of “What China Is” and “What China Does” (see Model 3). Of the nine variables included in this model, only two variables are statistically significant. Positive views of China’s economic model continue to be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism. Again, this is consistent with H1b. However, positive views of China’s political model also continue to be associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism. Again, this contradicts H1c. Interestingly, none of the measures of What China Does were associated with anti-Americanism. Looking across the three models, our analysis showed limited support for the notion that China’s rise poses an immediate threat to U. S. hegemony, at least not in America’s closest ally. Nevertheless, that we found any support for the notion that views of China might be associated with anti-Americanism in this crucial case is somewhat surprising. Additional research is warranted.

Table 2. Predicted Probabilities for Anti-Americanism Related to Development Model and Ideology

Chinese model + Ideology	Views of U.S.			
	Very Positive	Positive	Negative	Very Negative
Chinese model + Leftist	0.048	0.457	0.395	0.099
Chinese model + Centrist	0.067	0.521	0.340	0.072

Views of U.S.				
Chinese model + Ideology	Very Positive	Positive	Negative	Very Negative
Other model + Centrist	0.123	0.606	0.233	0.039
Other model + Rightist	0.165	0.625	0.183	0.027

Source: authors' calculations

While our statistical models indicate direction and significance of relationships, they tell us little regarding substantive effects. Consequently, we calculated predicted probabilities to gauge the impact of statistically significant variables using Model 1 to examine What China Is and Model 2 to examine What China Does (Long and Freese 2014). In Table 2 we divided our sample into those that prefer the Chinese economic model and those that preferred another model, and then varied ideology. Here we see that those that liked the Chinese development model and were on the left had the highest rates of anti-Americanism, while those that liked a different development model and were on the right had the lowest rates. Nevertheless, even leftists favoring a Chinese-style economic development model held pro-American views nearly half the time.

Table 3. Predicted Probabilities for Anti-Americanism Related to Trade and Business

Views of U.S.				
Effect of Chinese Trade and Business	Very Positive	Positive	Negative	Very Negative
Very Bad	0.147	0.614	0.209	0.031
Bad	0.115	0.592	0.252	0.041
Good	0.089	0.558	0.299	0.054
Very Good	0.069	0.514	0.347	0.070

Source: authors' calculations.

In Table 3 we calculated predicted probabilities based on the four categories of the effect of Chinese trade and business. Again, we see that those with positive views tend to be the most anti-American. Still, we only see about an 18 percent swing in anti-Americanism between the most positive evaluations of Chinese trade and business to the most negative. Importantly, we see that even the most

pro-China respondents were, on average, more pro-American than anti-American. In sum, we find evidence, albeit limited evidence, that attitudes regarding What China Is and What China does can influence anti-Americanism in the United States' closest South American ally. As such, further study is warranted.

Of the control variables, only one is statistically significant. The effect of education is negative and significant across all three models, meaning increased education reduced anti-Americanism. This is consistent with what we see in the Great Powers literature. A respondent's sex, religion, age, and economic status had no effect on anti-Americanism.

CONCLUSIONS

We began by arguing that two key research areas informed our research. First, Sino-Latin American relations expanded at nearly an exponential rate over the last two decades and that Colombia was a recent recipient of China's attention. Being a close U. S. ally, how the public viewed China's presence and its efforts at influence expansion helps us understand China's potential and limits. Second, the literature on the determinants of pro-and anti-Great Power public opinion is a recent development. Building on theories of anti-Americanism, we use an original survey of Colombians to test whether "What China Is" or "What China Does" are associated with anti-Americanism. We find that Colombians view China much as they view the United States, not necessarily as a counterweight—at least not in Colombia.

In future work we plan to build on this analysis in two important ways. First, we plan to conduct another survey of public opinion in Colombia to reflect on the recent changes in Sino-Colombia relations and how these changes further influenced Colombians' views of China and the United States. In particular, the survey will focus on the latest drive by Chinese to use vaccine diplomacy from the outbreak of the pandemic to the end of 2022 to help solidify its "vertical expansion" in the country. China's sweeping and sophisticated public relations campaign highlighted its contribution to public health in Colombia, in sharp contrast with the limited U. S. response. We hope the survey will provide some clues as to whether the rise of Chinese soft-power, centering on one of the most challenging public health crises in recent times, resulted in observable shifts in how the public views China and the United States.

Secondly, we plan to move beyond Colombia to examine the determinants of pro- and anti-China views in three other Latin American countries—Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. In addition to using the results of similar public opinion surveys conducted in these countries, we plan to incorporate additional information from a series of elite interviews with political, economic, and academic elites to examine

whether elite and mass opinions regarding China differ. The former will allow us to test whether the determinants of anti- or pro-China views differ in countries with different economic and political profiles. The latter will allow us to examine convergence and divergence of how elites and the general public view China. The combination of rapid growth in the Sino-Latin American relations and China's more recent attempts to move beyond traditional trade and investment relations makes this an important avenue for additional research.

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