WHEN INMIGRATION IS A NEW ISSUE: EVIDENCE FROM CHILE 2003 AND 2017

Cuando la inmigración es un fenómeno reciente: evidencia de Chile en 2003 y 2017

Quando a imigração é um fenômeno recente: Evidências do Chile em 2003 e 2017

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Abstract

In countries where parties have not adopted strong policy positions on immigration–and where the immigrant population is not large–popular perceptions of immigrants might not reflect the ideological divides reported in the literature for countries where immigration is a politically salient issue. We assess the association of ideological identification with the perceptions of immigrants in Chile using two comparable national polls, one from 2003, before the recent immigration wave, and one from 2017, in the middle of an immigration wave, but before parties formally adopted policy positions on immigration. With OLS estimations, we find that, as expected, leftists had more positive views than the rest, but contrary to expectations, those on the right also had more positive views, especially in 2017. Views were more prominent in 2017 than in 2003, with those in the extreme left and extreme right displaying positive views.

Palabras clave:
percepción de inmigrantes; olas migratorias; identificación ideológica; posiciones partidistas; opinión pública; Chile

Resumen

En países donde los países no han adoptado posturas políticas claras sobre inmigración –y donde la población migrante no es muy grande– las percepciones populares sobre inmigrantes pudieran no reflejar las divisiones ideológicas reportadas en estudios anteriores en países donde la inmigración es un tema políticamente sensible. Evaluamos la asociación entre la identificación ideológica con las percepciones de inmigrantes en Chile usando dos encuestas comparables, una de 2003, antes de la ola migratoria reciente, y otra de 2017, en el medio de la ola migratoria, pero antes de que los partidos adoptaran formalmente posiciones políticas sobre la inmigración. Con estimaciones de modelos MCO, reportamos que, como esperábamos, las personas de izquierda tienen posturas más positivas hacia los inmigrantes que el resto, pero los de derecha también tienen una visión positiva, especialmente en 2017. Las percepciones eran más marcadas en 2017 que en 2003, con aquellos en ambos extremos reportando visiones más positivas sobre los inmigrantes.

Palavras-chave:
percepção dos imigrantes; ondas migratórias; identificação ideológica; posições partidárias; opinião pública; Chile

Resumo

Em países onde os partidos não adotaram fortes posições sobre políticas de imigração – e onde a população migrante não é muito grande – as percepções dos imigrantes podem não refletir as divisões ideológicas encontradas em estudos anteriores, realizados em países onde a imigração é uma questão politicamente sensível. Testamos a associação entre identificação ideológica e percepções de imigrantes no Chile usando duas pesquisas comparáveis. Uma de 2003, antes da onda migratória recente, e a outra de 2017, em meio à onda migratória, mas antes que os partidos adotassem posições políticas formalmente sobre imigração. Com as estimativas do modelos MQO relatamos que, como esperado, as pessoas da esquerda têm uma visão mais positiva em relação aos imigrantes do que as demais, mas as da direita também têm uma visão mais positiva, especialmente em 2017. As percepções foram mais fortes em 2017 do que em 2003, com aqueles em ambas as extremidades relatando visões positivas dos imigrantes.

INTRODUCTION

In countries with a sizable immigrant population and where political parties have formally adopted policy positions on immigration—with leftwing parties advocating for pro-immigration policies and rightwing parties embracing more anti-immigration policies—people's perception of immigrants is often consistent with their ideological identification (Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen, 2005; Dennison and Goodwin 2015; Damstra, et al., 2019). Positive views on immigrants are more prevalent among those who identify on the left while those on the right tend to have more negative views (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). However, in countries where parties have not formally adopted policy positions on immigration—and where immigration has not yet been a campaign issues—people's perceptions of immigrants might not reflect an ideological divide. Unfortunately, since public opinion

polls normally only ask about salient issues, in countries where immigration is not a recurrent concern for the population, polls seldomly ask related questions. In this paper, we explore that issue using two national polls in Chile, one from 2017, a year of record immigration, and another from 2003, long before the immigration wave and before immigration became a campaign issue.

In Latin America, after decades of outmigration, intra-regional immigration has increased drastically, with the more developed countries receiving large waves of immigrants. Since 2014, Chile, one of the most developed countries in Latin America, has seen the sharpest increase in immigration in its recent history (United Nations, 2017:30). The growing presence of immigrants made immigration a socially prominent issue in Chile and eventually, it also became political salient, as the rightwing multiparty coalition government introduced a bill to curb immigration. Yet, as we show below, in 2017, when the country held a presidential election, migration was not yet a campaign issue. Here, we analyze if the views on immigrants in Chile in 2003 were ideologically consistent with the views eventually adopted by the different parties.

After discussing the determinants of the perception of immigrants, we postulate three hypotheses on the effect of ideological identification on those perceptions. First, we expect those on the left to have more positive perceptions of immigrants. Second, those who identify with the right should have a more negative perception of immigrants. Third, perceptions of immigrants should become more ideologically prominent when the issue gains salience in society, even before parties formally adopt policy positions. After discussing our methodology and presenting the case of Chile, we test the hypotheses using public opinion polls from 2003 and 2017. We conclude by discussing how these results contribute to our understanding of change in the perceptions on immigration before parties adopt policy positions.

THE DETERMINANTS OF PERCEPTIONS ON IMMIGRATION

Perceptions on immigration are based on previous cultural, socio-economic, political, and religious judgements (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). Some activities in which immigrants engage can negatively affect the assessments of the local population (Muste, 2013). The geographical concentration of immigrants affects perceptions and stereotypes that reinforce negative views (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2009). Border regions and cities with high supply of labor normally perceive immigration in a more negative light (Cea D'Ancona, 2002). When there is strong demand for labor, people are more likely to be receptive to the arrival of immigrants (Fussell, 2014). Views are more positive when respondents are first cued on the contributions made by immigrants (Segovia and Defever, 2010).

People have more positive views when immigrants are already in the country (Muste, 2013:408-409), have a work contract before migrating, and show respect to national norms (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Immigrants with higher educational levels and more reputable jobs generate better perceptions. Having frequent contact with immigrants, associated with positive emotional experiences, induces better assessments (Cea D'Ancona, 2016). In fact, concerns over the effect of immigrants on the culture might weigh more than concerns over their economic impact (Fussell, 2014). People can also develop anti-immigrant sentiments based on negative experiences (Pérez, 2010; Laurence and Bentley, 2018).

The respondent's socio-demographic traits also affect perceptions on immigration. Younger people are more tolerant and more likely to have positive views on cultural heterogeneity (Schalk-Soekar, Van de Vijver and Hoogsteder, 2004; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Those with more education show lower levels of ethnocentrism, displaying higher appreciation of cultural diversity (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). The correlation between education and support for immigration does not respond to salary considerations but to differences in cultural values and in beliefs on the socio-tropic impact of immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). People of lower socio-economic status tend to display negative views of immigrants given their higher vulnerability (d'Hombres and Nunziata, 2016; Muste, 2013). In general, xenophobic attitudes are more likely to be present in lower socioeconomic strata—those more likely to interact with immigrants as potential competitors for jobs (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Also, the higher the perception of a threat, the worse the perception of immigrants (Cea D'Ancona, 2016; Stephan et al., 2005; Shin and Dovidio, 2016; Ward and Masgoret, 2008). Women are more tolerant of multiculturalism (Burns and Gimpel, 2000), but they are not more likely to have a positive perception of immigrants (Haubert and Fussell, 2006).

In countries with large or growing migrant populations, the mass media feeds a negative perception (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008; Igartúa and Cheng, 2009). When the media frames migrants in a negative light, more people associate migrants to violence, crime, and other illegal activities (Igartúa and Cheng, 2009; Ortega and Polavieja, 2012; Burscher, Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). Media coverage of immigration has contributed to the rise of antimigrant groups (Doña-Reveco and Mullan, 2014).

Ideology is associated with views on immigration, especially in countries where a political party exerts issue ownership over immigration policies (Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen, 2005; Dennison and Goodwin, 2015; Damstra et al., 2019). However, ideology does not automatically impact how views on immigration translate into electoral behavior. For example, In Latin American countries where there is class-based voting, there must be a previous political activation of issues that trigger such behavior (Mainwaring, Torcal and Somma, 2015: 98). That political activation

does not necessarily mean that the issues trigger equivalent opposite attitudes and views on the extremes of the left-right scale. Some issues might trigger a strong response among those on the left but might have little importance for those on the right. The salience of issues might be the same for the entire ideological spectrum or might differ for people depending on their own ideological and policy priorities (Givens and Luedtke, 2005, Meyer and Wagner, 2020). Thus, we will not automatically expect that if people on the right of the ideological spectrum adopt a strong position on an issue, those on the left will adopt equally strong views on the other extreme. For example, in countries with a history of human rights violations by a rightwing dictatorship, those on the left might have strong views on bringing human rights violators to justice while those with ideological views like the government that violated human rights might not be as concerned with righting the wrongs of the past (Manzi et al, 2003: 200-203).

Views on immigration tend to be different depending on people's ideological leaning. Those who identify with the right are more likely to have negative views on immigrants, while those on the left are neither more nor less likely to see them in a negative light (Stockemer, 2016). Those identified with the right tend to believe that the state should earmark social programs to natives rather than immigrants (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012). Moreover, since immigration increases competition for collective goods, when people perceive threats to the social equilibrium, there is a corresponding increase in racist attitudes and a worse perception towards immigrants among those identified with the right (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012). Saxton and Benson (2003) report that Europeans with more prejudice and hostile attitudes toward immigrants tend to be more conservative. Thus, we should expect that people identified with the right would be more likely to have negative perceptions on immigration while those who identify with the left would have the opposite views.

The views people have on immigration and the policy positions political parties adopt are closely correlated. As immigration becomes a more prominent issue, rightwing parties find fertile ground for their anti-immigrant views. More than the growth of anti-immigrant views, the salience of immigration is what explains an increase in support for rightwing parties (Dennison and Geddes, 2018). Kiehne and Ayón (2016) find that conservatives see undocumented immigration as a law-and-order issue, while liberals see it from the prism of human rights and social and economic inequality—not surprisingly, those are the positions adopted by main parties in the United States on the issue (Kiehne and Ayón, 2016). More negative views on immigrants and on their impact—like crime—feed support for radical rightwing parties (Stockemer, 2016; Cohrs and Stelzl, 2010). Leftwing parties hold more positive views on immigration and adopt more inclusive policies towards immigrants, but rightwing parties tend to make immigration a more salient issue in their platforms, adopting more negative views (Carvalho and Ruedin, 2018). Haterveld, Kokkonen

and Dahlberg (2017) find that voters update their views on immigration to reflect the views of the parties they vote for, especially in the case of conservative voters. When parties adopt more prominent positions on immigrations, voters follow suit.

Consequently, we postulate two hypotheses on the effect of ideological identification on the perceptions of immigrants in countries where the debate on immigration has not yet become a priority for political parties:

> **H1:** People who identify with the left on the ideological scale compared to those who report no ideological identification have a more positive perception of immigrants.

> **H2**: People who identify with the right on the ideological scale compared to those who report no ideological identification have a more negative perception of immigrants.

Though parties induce public opinion perceptions (Zaller, 1992), party positions are also based on the viewpoints of the citizens they seek to represent (Shapiro, 2011; Slothuus, 2016). Still, as Moreno argues, "in order for values to become sources of durable political cleavages, value conflicts need to be organized in ideological terms by political, intellectual or social elites, and ideological appeals must be articulated by a political party as a mobilizing strategy for electoral support" (2016: 99). That mobilization often generates electoral consequences. If the growth of the immigrant population coincides with an economic crisis, candidates that call for tough policies against immigration benefit from electoral windfalls (Golder, 2003; Creighton, Jamal and Malancu, 2015). Far right parties use the consequences of migration to justify their antimigrant positions and, consequently, all rightwing parties are pressed to adopt more radical positions against immigrants (Givens, 2012). The policy positions of moderate parties are also influenced by the positions taken by radical anti-immigrant parties (Van Spanje, 2010). The positions brokered by the parties' internal factions are based on the popular perceptions that are dominant among their likely voters (Ceron, 2012), though some have questioned the effect of position-taking by radical rightwing parties on the positions of moderate rightwing parties (Alonso and Fonseca, 2012; Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015).

Yet, as the two things normally go hand and hand, it is difficult to establish if parties adopt positions on immigration to respond to their supporters' views or if the positions adopted by parties influence the views of their sympathizers. Assessing the views on immigrants before parties formally adopt policy positions can help elucidate which comes first: the policy positions by parties or the political views by party sympathizers. To test whether the former follows the latter, following Shapiro (2011), we expect that views on immigrants by those in the extremes of

the ideological scale should be more prominent than those with more moderate positions. When those in the extremes of the ideological scale have stronger views on immigrants, parties might want to adopt strong immigration policy positions to differentiate themselves. Thus, the positions parties adopt would be driven by the views of those at the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum rather than the other way around. Consequently, our third hypothesis postulates that:

> **H3**: People on the extreme of the ideological scale have more prominent views on immigrants than those in more moderate positions.

THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION SALIENCE IN CHILE

Though Chile experienced significant government-sponsored immigration in the second half of the 19th century and an influx of immigrants from Europe and the Middle East in the early 20th century, during most of the second half of the 20th century there was limited immigration. In 1982, immigrants comprised only 0.7% of the population (Bravo Acevedo and Norambuena Carrasco, 2018; Urzúa, Leiva and Caqueo-Urízar, 2020). In 2010, that figure was less than 2% (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2017). As Figure 1 shows, immigration has grown from 1.3% of the population in 2005 to 4.25% in 2017. The rapid influx of immigrants responds to economic development (Arias, Moreno, and Nuñez, 2010)—with immigrants coming from neighboring countries and other Latin American countries in economic distress, like Haiti and Venezuela—and it tops what happens elsewhere in Latin America (United Nations, 2017). Though it is still smaller than neighbors,' Chile's immigrant population has grown faster in recent years. Before the 2014-2017 migration wave, migration had not been a campaign issue or one that captured media attention. From 1990 to 2011, the WVS polls included a question on whether, when jobs were scarce, employers should give priority when hiring new employees to Chileans over immigrants. As Figure 2 shows, an overwhelming majority agreed with favoring Chileans over foreigners and there was little variance over time.

Preliminary recent evidence points to some resistance by Chileans to accept the influx of immigrants (Sirlopú et al., 2015). But older studies highlight a more welcoming attitude towards immigrants, though they warn that, as the immigrant population increases, "the relationship between ideological configuration and attitudes toward foreigners" might become stronger "because of the consolidation of migration groups living in the country" (Carvacho, 2010: 230). In Chile, people are also more welcoming of immigrants who have attained higher levels of education (Lawrence, 2015). As shown in Figure 3, a poll conducted in 2008 and 2014 showed that, on a scale from 0 to 4, Chileans had positive views on immigrants, but those

Figure 1. Foreign-born population in Chile as a percentage of national population, 1982-2017

Source: Authors with data from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Chile (INE): http://www.censo2017.cl/descargue-aqui-resultados-de-comunas/

Figure 2. WVS: Employers should give priority to Chileans over immigrants?


Source: Authors with data from World Value Survey polls.

on the left had more positive views in 2008 than in 2014 while those on the right had more positive views in 2014 than in 2008. Thus, in addition to having positive views on immigrants, Chileans were less ideologically aligned in their views on immigrants in 2014 than in 2008.

Since 2014, the influx of immigrants became more notorious, with a rapid rise of Haitians who fled deteriorating economic conditions and Venezuelans who left their country for political and economic reasons. Shortly after taking office, the rightwing government of Sebastián Piñera (2018-2022) introduced a migration reform bill to curb immigration. The bill represented a drastic departure from the traditional lax immigration policies. The leftwing opposition accused the government of discriminating on national origin and ethnicity—as the bill allows for discretionary restrictions to be imposed by the government on Haitians and people from other lesser developed countries. Lack of a comprehensive road to legalization for undocumented migrants and for tourists who overstayed their visas stalled progress on the bill. The president threatened to veto it if congress excluded tougher regulations. The debate evolved on party lines, with the government and rightwing legislators advocating for stricter regulations and leftwing legislators advocating for more lenient policies. A compromise bill eventually passed Congress in mid-2021. With the ascension to power of the leftwing Gabriel Boric administration in early 2022, the issue of immigration has become increasingly associated to rising levels of crime, especially in northern Chile, but the government has not announced any meaningful change in immigration policies.

Public opinion polls—including the widely cited national poll by Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP)—now also include questions on perceptions on immigration. Recent public opinion polls also show that people's views on immigrants are aligning on the same pro-anti views on the left-right scale observed in other countries. Figure 4 shows the result of the 2020 Latinobarómetro poll on whether people believe that the arrival of immigrants favors or hurts the country. Those on the left were more likely than those on the right to have positive views on immigration.

Figure 3. Perception of immigrants in Chile, 2008 and 2014

Source: Las Américas y el Mundo project in Mexico, 2008 and 2014.

Figure 4. Do you believe the arrival of immigrants benefits or hurts the country? Chile, Latinobarómetro, 2020

Source: Latinobarómetro poll for 2020

VIEWS ON IMMIGRANTS IN CHILE BEFORE AND AFTER IMMIGRATION BECAME A SALIENT ISSUE

In 2017, when immigration was at its historical peak and the issue was increasingly relevant in the media, a national CEP poll included several questions on immigration that had been also asked fourteen years earlier, in 2003, when immigration was not an issue. Unfortunately, CEP did not include the same set of questions in any polls in between those years. Fortunately, we can compare the extent to which ideological identification determined views on immigration in 2003 and in 2017.

To confirm that media gave different relevance to immigration both years, we reviewed articles in the two leading national newspapers (*El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*) for the same number of days before the fieldwork began for the 2003 and 2017 CEP polls. We reviewed articles from January 1st to April 26th, 2017—the day the CEP field work began—for 116 days and for the same number of days before fieldwork for the 2003 poll began. We found 9 reports in the two newspapers in 2017, but none in 2003. There were additional media reports on immigration in online news media in 2017, but since there was no comparable massive online media in 2003, we cannot use that information for comparison.

To verify whether immigration was not a salient campaign issue until 2017, we used a publicly available dataset to review the platforms of all presidential candidates since 1999 who received at least 10% of the vote (Navia and Verdugo, 2020). In 1999, neither Ricardo Lagos of the center-left Concertación coalition nor Joaquín Lavín of the center-right Alianza coalition mentioned migration. In 2005, Concertación's Michelle Bachelet program called (p. 88), on eradicating discrimination against immigrants and promised a law to promote the integration of immigrants (p. 90). Neither Alianza candidate, Sebastián Piñera and Joaquín Lavín, who ended up in second and third place respectively, mentioned immigration. In 2009, Election-winner Piñera proposed a policy to attract foreign scientists (p. 30), called for political dialogue with Europe on migration issues (p. 120), presumably to address the arrival of economic migrants from Spain, and expressed a commitment to equal opportunities for immigrants (p. 153). Concertación's Eduardo Frei did not mention immigration. Alternative leftwing presidential candidate Marco Enríquez-Ominami called for respect for immigrant rights (p. 34). In 2013, only winning candidate Bachelet, mentioned immigrants, suggesting that immigration should be promoted in regions outside the capital and associated to labor needs and academic opportunities (p. 117). She also proposed social inclusion and effective integration (p. 155).

Though the number of immigrants was increasing rapidly in the previous years and the issue was becoming relevant in media coverage, immigration was not a salient campaign issue in the 2017 presidential campaign. The Nueva Mayoría (formerly Concertación) candidate, Alejandro Guillier, included only a section on immigration (p. 66) on his platform, proposing a national migration service and a

new immigration law focused on rights, inclusion, and multiculturalism. Rightwing election winner Piñera called for the integration of law-abiding migrants (p. 31), modernizing migration legislation, creating visa programs for high human capital migrants, provisions for inclusion of migrants in the private pension fund scheme and simplifying the deportation of unlawful migrants.

Immigration became a salient political issue starting in 2018 (Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero, 2020). At the start of his term, the Piñera administration issued executive orders to halt the arrival of Haitian immigrants and limit the arrival of refugees from Venezuela (Stang, Lara Edwards and Andrade Moreno, 2020). The decision not to sign the United Nations Global Migration Pact in late 2018 signaled a strong stance against immigration. Thus, while migration did not capture media or political attention in 2003, by 2018 it was a policy priority for the government. A clear ideological divide emerged between the rightwing government that sought to curb immigration and the leftwing opposition that advocated for a more humanitarian approach.

Since previous studies have shown that ideology is an important predictor for electoral decisions of Chileans, even when there is discontent with democracy, political parties, and the elites (Visconti, 2021), as migration has become increasingly politicized, we would voters to express views consistent with those adopted by their likeminded parties. However, since we can also assess people's views before parties adopted policy positions, we can verify whether the party' positions were in line with those previously held by their traditional electoral base.

METHODOLOGY

To evaluate our hypotheses, we use polls from *Centro del Estudios Públicos* (CEP), Chile's most widely cited public opinion poll. CEP polls are nationally representative of adult population, with a +-3% margin of error and 95% confidence interval. The poll has probabilistic and stratified samples and has been widely used for studies on the references and electoral behavior of Chileans (Plumb, 1998; Navia and Osorio, 2017, Enns and Sánchez-Gómez, 2019).

In 2003, the CEP poll included—for the first time in its series dating back to the 1980s—6 questions on the perception of immigrants. Unfortunately, no such questions were included again until 2017, when the CEP poll asked the same 6 questions used in 2003. After 2017, CEP polls have not included those questions again. Thus, we used those two CEP polls, from December 2003 (#46) and April-May 2017 (#79). For sampling procedures, response rates and other methodological issues, please review the CEP poll reports (CEP, 2003, 2017).

Other national polls that have inquired about perceptions on immigration have not systematically used the same questions. Latin American Public Opinion Project

(LAPOP) polls included different questions on perception of immigrants in 2004 and 2016. The wording in the questions used in Latinobarómetro and the World Value Survey (WVS) changed overtime. WVS asked a recurrent question in 1990, 2006 and 2012, but not in recent years, when the influx of immigrants has drastically increased. The *Las Américas y el Mundo* project organized by CIDE in Mexico conducted national polls in Chile and other countries only in 2008 and 2014 (Morandé et al., 2009).

The dependent variable is the perception of immigrants. The questions in the two CEP polls offer 5 answers, from full agreement (1) to full disagreement (5), including a neutral response. Three questions are worded in a way that present immigrants in a positive light and the other 3 are worded negatively. The three questions that have a positive take are 'immigrants are generally good for the economy,' 'immigrants improve society with their new ideas and cultures,' and 'non-citizen legal immigrants should have the same rights as Chilean citizens.' The 3 statements with a negative take are 'immigrants increase crime levels,' 'immigrants take jobs from those born in Chile,' and 'Chile should adopt tougher policies to exclude illegal immigrants.'

Similar questions have been used in comparable research projects elsewhere. Cea D'Ancona (2002) used questions from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) survey to assess the perception of immigration among Spaniards. Some questions were also used in the 2000 and 2001 Eurobarometer polls. The questions were 'Do you believe that, in general terms, immigration is more positive or negative?" and 'Thinking about foreign workers in Spain that come from lesser developed countries, tell me if you agree or disagree with the following opinions [...] immigrants take jobs away from Spaniards, the increase in the number of immigrants feeds higher crime in the country' (Cea D'Ancona, 2002).

To standardize the answers, and since other studies underline the need to distinguish between questions worded positively and those worded negatively (Carvacho, 2010)—we use a 5-point scale from 0 to 4 and recoded all responses so that lower values report negative views on immigrants and higher values report positive views. This way, we can identify those with positive views of immigrants, either because they disagree with a question that has a negative wording (negative scale) or because they agree with a question that has a positive wording (positive scale).

Still, because the wording of the original questions was different, with some attributing high values to negative views and others attributing high values to positive views, the wording of the question might have triggered respondents. For that reason, we conducted exploratory factor analysis to verify the internal consistency of the responses to the six questions. Factor analysis can be used to create an index based on variables that conceptually measure the same. We standardized the recoded answers around their means for each of the six questions and estimated the factors. The factor indicator is a variable that ranges from negative to positive values. The analysis produced two factors, shown in Table 1, one that groups the

positive scale questions and the other that groups the negative scale questions. The factor analysis justifies our decision to separately analyze the association of the independent variables on the negative scale group of questions and the positive scale group of questions.

We estimate separate OLS models on the 3 questions with a negative opinion scale and the 3 questions with a positive opinion scale. To check the robustness of our results, we also estimated the models using two alternative indicators for the dependent variable: the factors and an indicator with the average value, from negative to positive views, for the responses to the six questions. Those models are shown in the appendix in Tables A2 and A3, respectively. The results are consistent with the results we discuss in our analysis below.

Table 1. Scoring coefficients of the factor analysis for perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017

Variable	Original wording	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique-ness	Stand-ardized Mean	Mean
Immigrants increase crime levels	Negative	0.161	0.694	0.491	-0.010	2.994
Immigrants take jobs from those born in Chile	Negative	0.221	0.763	0.368	0.004	2.623
Chile should adopt tougher policies to exclude illegal immigrants	Negative	-0.068	0.733	0.456	0.008	2.334
Immigrants are generally good for the Chilean economy	Positive	0.768	0.105	0.398	0.001	3.009
Immigrants improve society with their new ideas and cultures	Positive	0.787	0.156	0.355	-0.004	3.051
Non-citizen legal immigrants should have same rights as Chileans*	Positive	0.647	-0.002	0.580	0.003	3.335

We conducted the factor analysis after recoding the answers so that negative views have lower values and positive views have the higher values.

Based on varimax rotated factors. Values > 0.6 are highlighted.

The appendix shows the scoring coefficients for the factor analysis separately for 2003 and 2017.

Source: authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the answers to the 6 questions and the averages for the positive and negative opinion scale questions, respectively. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the average answers for the 3 positive scale questions and the 3 negative scale questions for the 2003 and 2017 polls. Both indicators are normally distributed. There were changes in the views on immigrants between 2003 and 2017, with Chileans displaying more positive views on immigrants in 2017 than in 2003.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for questions on the perceptions of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017

Variable	Year	N	Mean	StdDev	Min (negative)	Max (positive)
Immigrants increase crime levels***	2003	1288	3.067	1.121	0	4
	2017	1406	2.948	1.100	0	4
Immigrants take jobs from those born in Chile***	2003	1328	2.304	1.075	0	4
	2017	1435	2.914	1.079	0	4
Chile should adopt tougher policies to exclude illegal immigrants***	2003	1330	2.155	1.009	0	4
	2017	1416	2.495	1.038	0	4
Immigrants are generally good for the Chilean economy	2003	1285	3.002	0.971	0	4
	2017	1379	3.008	0.944	0	4
Immigrants improve society with their new ideas and cultures	2003	1302	3.065	0.998	0	4
	2017	1406	3.041	0.934	0	4
Non-citizen legal immigrants should have the same rights as Chileans*	2003	1323	3.352	1.163	0	4
	2017	1424	3.311	0.945	0	4
Mean: Negative opinion scale questions	-	2502	0.0001	0.743	-2.146	1.891
Mean: Positive opinion scale questions		2502	0.0008	0.739	-1.510	2.169

Difference of means (T Student) at *90%, **95% and ***99%.

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Figure 5. Normalized distribution of questions on the perception of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017 CEP polls

Negative opinion scale questions   Positive opinion scale questions

We recoded all answers so that lower values reflect negative views and higher values reflect positive views.

The distribution combines the responses for 2003 and 2017.

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

The independent variable of interest is identification on the left-right ideological scale. We follow the coding in the CEP poll in 2003 that used a 6-point scale: left, center-left, center, center-right, right, and none (the reference category). We build dummy variables for each category. In 2017, CEP used a 10-point (1-10, left-to-right) scale for identification on the ideological scale. To make the two questions comparable, we coded values 1 and 2 into 'left', 3 and 4 into 'center-left', 5 into 'center', 6, 7 and 8 into 'center-right' and 9 and 10 into 'right'. To check for robustness, we also used alternative coding for center-left (3), center (4-6), center-right (7-8) and right (9-10) and estimated the models, obtaining equivalent results.

Figure 6 shows the distribution of identification on the left-right scale in 2003 and 2017. The number of those who did not identify on the scale was similar in both polls, around 40%. Because fewer people identified with the extreme values for left and right in 2017 than in 2003, we are confident that the results that show differences in perceptions of immigrants between 2003 and 2017 in the extreme values of ideological identification are robust.

Figure 6. Ideological identification in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017

N=1198 (2003) and 1305 (2017).
Source: Authors, with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

As control variables, we include socio-demographic indicators sex, socioeconomic status, education, and area of residency—for which we create four groups: the Santiago Metropolitan Region (our reference category), Northern (from Arica to Coquimbo in the north), Central (from Valparaíso to Concepción, excluding Santiago) and the South (from Araucanía to Magallanes). Most of the immigrant population lives in the Northern area and in Santiago—the regions with the highest share of immigrants and the highest number of immigrants, respectively.

Table 3 shows the corresponding descriptive statistics. Given a possible multicollinearity between schooling and socio-economic status (correlations of 0.53 and 0.48 in 2003 and 2017 respectively), we use years of schooling—a more widely used variable in this kind of studies—as a control variable. We also control for media consumption. Media consumption combines two CEP poll questions, on television consumption and on newspaper readership. Responses for each question ranged from 0 to 2 (none, some, a lot). We added both questions to create a media

consumption variable. That variable ranges from 0 to 4 (with those who watch a lot of television and read lots of newspapers having the highest value).

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for independent variables on perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017

Variable	N	Media	SD	Min	Max
Women	2502	0.588	0.492	0	1
Age[1]	2502	27.82	17.107	0	78
Years of schooling[2]	2502	11.23	4.237	0	20
2017 dummy	2502	0.521	0.499	0	1
Media consumption[3]	2502	1.340	1.25	0	4

Area of residency	N	%	Socio-tropic retrospective	N	%
Metropolitan Region	1006	40.19	Worse	939	37.51
North	317	12.66	Same	1189	47.50
Center	845	33.76	Better	375	14.98
South	335	13.38	-	-	-
Total	2502	100.0	-	2502	100.0

[1]Age: Continuous variable from 0 (18 years) to 78 (96 years); [2]Schooling's Years: Continuous variable from 0 (Not schooling) to 20 (20 years of schooling); [3]Media consumption: Continuous variable from 0 (Not consumption) to 4 (High consumption).

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We first present OLS estimates and show two figures with the coefficient plots for the relevant variables to graphically show the effects. Table 4 shows six OLS estimations. The indicators for the dependent variable are the means of the responses to the 3 positive and negative opinion scale questions, respectively, for the 2003 poll, the 2017 poll, and for both polls combined.

Some results of the models confirm our expectations. Those on the left had more negative perceptions of immigrants in 2003 than the reference category, but only responding to the negative opinion scale questions. In 2017, those on the left

had more positive perceptions of immigrants than the reference category for negative and positive scale questions. Those in the center-left had more positive perceptions of immigrants only for positive scale questions and only in the model that combines both survey years. The findings are consistent with the expectations of hypothesis 1, but only for those on the left in 2017 (not for those in the center-left). In 2003, those on the left had a worse perception on immigrants when responding to negative scale questions.

Those in the center-right had more positive perceptions of immigrants in the negative scale questions in 2003, but they showed no difference from the reference category on both scales in 2017. Contrary to the expectations of hypothesis 2, those on the right had more positive perceptions of immigrants in negative scale questions in 2017—that is, they had better perceptions of immigrants when the questions asked about negative traits of immigrants. Those who identify as rightists did not display more negative views of immigrants in either year.

Those in the center were no different than the reference category in both polls in answering positive and negative scale questions. Those in the ideological poles are more likely to display stronger perceptions of immigrants. Consistent with hypothesis 1, those on the left tend to have more positive views (except in 2003, for negative scale questions) and, contrary to the expectations of hypothesis 2, those on the right also had more positive views of immigrants in 2017 when responding to negative scale questions.

Additionally, to check for the robustness of the effect of ideological identification, in models not shown here, we estimated the association of ideology on a 1-5 left-right scale and as the distance from the center in both directions—excluding the 41.8% in 2003 and 40.0% in 2017 who did not identify ideologically. The association of left-right ideological identification with views on immigrants is not statistically significant. Those at both poles of the ideological scale are more likely to have positive views on immigrants, in line with the results shown in Table 4.

Since immigration became a socially relevant issue in the second half of the decade, it should not be surprising that those on the left did not have a more positive perception of immigrants in 2003—though the reason why leftists had more negative views on immigrants that year merits further research. Yet, in 2017, when immigration was already high, ideological identification triggered a more positive perception of immigrants among leftists. Consistent with the pro-immigrant policy positions by leftwing parties in recent years, leftists have signaled positive feelings towards immigrants.

Though some rightwing politicians, including the Piñera government (2018-2022), have taken hostile positions towards immigrants, rightwing respondents did not display more negative views towards immigrants than the rest of Chileans in 2017, when immigration was socially prominent but not a salient presidential campaign issue.

Hypothesis 3 suggests that people in the ideological extremes have more prominent views on immigration. The models consistently show this for 2017— with those on the left and on the right converging on more positive views of immigrants than those with more centrist positions—than in 2003. Although the data is consistent with our third hypotheses, it is not consistent in the direction we expected. By 2017, when immigration was socially prominent, those in the extremes of the left-right continuum displayed more intense views. Those views were more positive than those of the ideologically non-identified. The models in the appendix, with the alternative indicators for the dependent variable, and using the weights included in the original poll dataset, display results that are consistent with those shown in Table 4.

The discrepancy between the positions embraced by rightwing politicians— and reflected in the harsh anti-immigrant policies of the Piñera administration— and the more positive views displayed by those who identified with the right, especially in 2017, might respond to two phenomena. First, since part of the immigration wave was comprised of Venezuelans, those on the right might report pro-immigrant views reflecting sympathy for Venezuelan immigrants who fled a far-left regime. In fact, the Piñera administration took a strong stance in favor of accepting Venezuelan refugees in mid-2019. Later, in February 2020, Piñera traveled to the Colombian-Venezuelan border to drive support for the protests against the government of Nicolás Maduro and reiterated Chile's commitment to open its borders to Venezuelan refugees. That discourse allowed right-wingers to perceive the arrival of Venezuelan immigrants as evidence of the failure of leftwing economic policies rather than as a potential threat to the national economy.

Second, there might be a growing liberal/conservative divide on moral issues among those on the right. While many right-wingers espouse liberal economic views—which should point to more positive perceptions of immigrants—those who adopt strongly conservative views—especially on abortion, same sex marriage or LGBTQ+ rights—might in turn espouse negative perceptions of immigrants. The Piñera administration adopted some liberal policies on moral issues—for example, by sponsoring a same sex marriage bill in 2021—but it advocated for immigrant unfriendly policies. This tension is reminiscent of the reference to ideologically conflicted persons among conservatives in the U.S. (Ellis and Stimson, 2012).

As for the control variables, women tend to report more positive views of immigrants when responding to positive scale questions in 2017. Those who reside in northern regions have a more positive perception than those in Santiago when responding to negative scale questions in 2017. Those in the center and southern regions—where the presence of immigrants is lowest—tended to have more positive views of immigrants than residents of Santiago when responding to both type of scale questions. Not surprisingly, the worst views of immigrants are found in the northern region, where immigrants comprise a larger share of the population,

while the views in central and southern Chile are more positive than the views in Santiago, the city with the largest influx of immigrants in absolute numbers.

The effect of age was positive in 2003 and more strongly negative in 2017 when responding to negative scale questions. People with more years of schooling had more positive attitudes views of immigrants when responding to positive scale questions in 2003 and 2017. Socio-tropic economic perceptions behave as expected, with those with better perceptions having more positive views of immigrants in both scale questions.

Media consumption of political news is positively associated with the perception of immigrants in both years for both scale questions. While other studies have shown that media consumption intensifies the views people already have, especially among groups in the extremes (Shapiro, 2011), our model shows that those who consume more news tend to have more positive views on immigrants. This might respond to the type of coverage immigration received in Chile in both years. Future research should assess if media consumption interacts with ideological positioning to influence people's views on immigrants. In general, the control variables show the expected signs, though the effects are stronger and more significant for the positive scale questions.

Figure 6 shows the OLS coefficients plots for the effects of identification on the ideological scale on the perception of immigrants. Leftists went from having negative views in negative scale questions in 2003 to having positive views in both scale questions in 2017. In turn, those on the right displayed positive views on immigrants in negative scale questions.

In sum, when there was little immigration in 2003, there were no significant ideological differences between those on the left and right on their views on immigrants. When immigration was on the rise, but it was not a salient campaign issue in 2017, those on the left had more positive views on immigrants, but so did those on the right. In fact, while those in the ideological poles have more prominent views than the rest of the population, those on the left displayed positive views on positive scale questions and those on the right displayed positive views on negative scale questions in 2017 in Chile. That defies the expectations that the ideological divide informs views on immigrants.

After the 2017 presidential election, political parties began to adopt immigration policy positions along the ideological divide observed in industrialized countries, with leftwing parties adopting more welcoming policies towards immigrants and those in right adopting more restrictive immigration policies. The adoption of anti-immigration policies on the part of rightwing parties starting in 2018 was not consistent with the views held in previous years by their ideological support base. Since immigration continues to be a growing phenomenon in Chile and rightwing parties have adopted positions that have turned immigration policy into an ideological battleground, perceptions of immigrants might have already evolved

to reflect the battlefield positions taken by political parties—just it happens else-where in countries where immigration policy is a political divide between the left and right.

Table 4. OLS regression on perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
	Positive opinion scale			Negative opinion scale (reversed)		
Ideological id: Left (2003)	-0.006 (0.073)		-0.020 (0.072)	-0.218*** (0.075)		-0.233*** (0.131)
Left (2017)		0.298*** (0.110)	0.288** 0.132)		0.181* (0.110)	0.422*** (0.131)
Center Left (2003)	0.034 (0.065)		0.004 (0.066)	-0.133* (0.080)		-0.125 (0.079)
Center Left (2017)		0.056 (0.080)	0.054 (0.102)		0.090 (0.079)	0.229** (0.111)
Center (2003)	0.067 (0.073)		0.031 (0.074)	0.058 (0.078)		0.059 (0.076)
Center (2017)		0.030 (0.059)	-0.001 (0.093)		0.011 (0.058)	-0.030 (0.094)
Center Right (2003)	0.107 (0.084)		0.107 (0.085)	-0.085 (0.096)		-0.082 (0.096)
Center Right (2017)		0.082 (0.064)	-0.028 (0.105)		0.017 (0.063)	0.101 (0.114)
Right (2003)	-0.028 (0.061)	-0.002 (0.097)	-0.055 (0.061)	-0.040 (0.070)		-0.047 (0.068)
Right (2017)			0.044 (0.112)		0.242*** (0.096)	0.296*** (0.115)
Woman	0.006 (0.042)	0.146*** (0.044)	0.086*** (0.031)	0.007 (0.047)	0.002 (0.044)	0.005 (0.032)
Area of Residency: North	-0.103 (0.073)	-0.364*** (0.066)	-0.249*** (0.050)	-0.059 (0.074)	-0.057 (0.067)	-0.070 (0.049)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
Center	-0.115** (0.046)	0.137*** (0.053)	0.015 (0.035)	0.047 (0.055)	0.128** (0.052)	0.082** (0.038)
South	0.090 (0.074)	0.051 (0.073)	0.071 (0.052)	0.223*** (0.071)	0.160** (0.068)	0.182*** (0.049)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.0009)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Years of Schooling	0.033*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.004)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.004)
Sociotropic retrosp perception: Same	0.073 (0.046)	0.256*** (0.049)	0.170*** (0.034)	0.158*** (0.052)	0.107** (0.048)	0.128*** (0.035)
Better	0.152** (0.068)	0.342*** (0.068)	0.270*** (0.049)	0.149** (0.075)	0.197*** (0.068)	0.169*** (0.050)
Media Consumption	0.039** (0.019)	0.054*** (0.020)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.047** (0.022)	0.034* (0.019)	0.040*** (0.014)
2017 Dummy			0.197*** (0.048)			-0.096* (0.049)
Constant	-0.627*** (0.093)	-0.412*** (0.109)	-0.614*** (0.073)	-0.115 (0.104)	-0.150 (0.111)	-0.051 (0.078)
N	1197	1305	2502	1197	1305	2502
R Square	0.082	0.112	0.104	0.037	0.045	0.031

We use the weighted values in the polls. The estimations with the unweighted values are in the appendix.

Reference categories are 'none' for ideological identification, 'Metropolitan Region' for area of residency, and 'worse' for socio-tropic retrospective perception.
Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Figure 6. OLS coefficients plot for the effects of ideology on the perception of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

CONCLUSION

For years, immigration has been a contested political issue in industrialized countries with a large influx of immigrants. In recent years, some middle-income countries—like Chile—have also become destinations for immigrants from lesser developed countries in search of economic opportunities or for those escaping political oppression.

The implications of this study go beyond Chile. As immigration becomes an increasingly salient campaign issue in middle-income countries, political parties will growingly use immigration policy as a campaign issue. Research for European countries has shown that when negative views on immigration increase, support for far-right parties also increases (Stockemer, 2016)—especially when the rise in

immigration is associated to an uptick in crime (Cohrs and Stelzl, 2010)—and that, consequently, rightwing parties prime the issue of immigration in their campaigns (Carvalho and Ruedin, 2018) and influence the views of immigrants prevalent among voters (Harteveld, Kokkonen and Dahlberg, 2017). Yet, the case of Chile shows that rightwing parties' advocacy for more restrictive immigration policies does not necessarily respond to a demand from their electoral base. Rightwing voters expressed more favorable views of immigrants than the positions adopted by rightwing parties.

For that reason, we challenge the widely held believe that when rightwing parties adopt stronger anti-immigrant positions, rightwing voters also end up adopting more negative views of immigrants. That is not an automatic or inevitable result. In fact, the political activation of immigration as an electoral and campaign issue, as argued by Mainwaring y otros (2015:98), requires that parties adopt positions on issues that can resonate with their electoral bases. As some issues provoke stronger reactions on one end of the spectrum than on the other, the political activation of issues might not occur concurrently across political parties.

In the case of Chile, there was a stronger pro-immigrant support base on the left than an anti-immigrant support base on the right. Yet, precisely because the left might be more inclined to support immigrants, rightwing parties can turn immigration into an issue that helps polarize the electorate and define identities in a negative light—as the Piñera administration might have done by promoting a bill that sought to strictly regulate immigration. Or, in turn, the political activation of the immigrant issue might result from the negative reaction of leftwing parties to the proposed bill by the Piñera administration. As they had an electoral base that was friendlier to immigration, leftwing parties might have used that bill as an opportunity to polarize its base against the administration. Thus, not surprisingly, after the leftwing administration of Gabriel Boric took office, the issue of immigration did not immediately become a priority issue for the government or the opposition, as it did not resonate as a polarizing issue with voters as much as other issues, like crime or inflation.

To be sure, immigration might become a more relevant issue in future electoral campaigns in Chile. The 2021 presidential election began to show the growing importance of immigration, as a far-right candidate sought to make a strong anti-immigrant stance central to his electoral platform. The fact that José Antonio Kast lost his 2021 presidential bid does not imply, however, that immigration was not a relevant factor in the election. But for that to happen, people must associate the immigration issue with those issues that stand as top popular priorities, like crime, employment, or inflation. If the general perception about immigrants is positive—and right wingers see the rise of immigration as a confirmation or their ideological priors—like the negative effect of leftwing policies on a country's economy as it happened in Venezuela—the issue of immigration might be politically activated in

a different way—with the views on the causes that lead people to abandon their country taking precedence over the impact those newly arrived immigrants will have on the national economy.

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APPENDIX

Table A1. Descriptive statistics for the exploratory principal component factor (PCF) analysis

| Variable	Wording	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Factor of perception on 6 questions on immigration	Positive	2503	-1.92	1	-2.039	2.901
	Negative	2.503	-6.60	1	-2.845	2.549

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table A2. Scoring coefficients of the factor analysis for perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls separately for 2003 and 2017

Variable	Original wording	Factor 1		Factor 2		Uniqueness	
		2003	2017	2003	2017	2003	2017
Immigrants increase crime levels	Negative	0.717	0.745	0.025	0.199	0.483	0.404
Immigrants take jobs from those born in Chile	Negative	0.781	0.751	0.195	0.245	0.350	0.374
Chile should adopt tougher policies to exclude illegal immigrants	Negative	0.634	0.753	-0.034	-0.079	0.595	0.425
Immigrants are generally good for the Chilean economy	Positive	0.067	0.141	0.805	0.734	0.347	0.440
Immigrants improve society with their new ideas and cultures	Positive	0.073	0.221	0.820	0.761	0.322	0.370
Non-citizen legal immigrants should have same rights as Chileans*	Positive	0.115	-0.029	0.561	0.708	0.671	0.496

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Figure A1. Distribution of factor analysis indexes on perception of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017

3 positive scale questions

3 negative scale questions

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table A3. OLS models on perception of immigrants. DV: Cronbach's Alpha (factor analysis)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
	Positive opinion scale			Negative opinion scale (reversed)		
Ideological Id: Left (2003)	0.049 (0.094)		0.037 (0.092)	-0.228** (0.101)		-0.255** (0.100)
Left (2017)		0.394*** (0.137)	0.328** (0.164)		0.319** (0.134)	0.592*** (0.165)
Center Left (2003)	-0.014 (0.084)		-0.046 (0.084)	-0.140 (0.100)		-0.134 (0.099)
Center Left (2017)		0.084 (0.096)	0.126 (0.126)		0.083 (0.091)	0.237* (0.133)
Center (2003)	0.119 (0.097)		0.083 (0.097)	0.093 (0.101)		0.088 (0.099)
Center (2017)		0.028 (0.071)	-0.067 (0.119)		-0.028 (0.069)	-0.093 (0.119)
Center Right (2003)	0.115 (0.105)		0.127 (0.106)	-0.137 (0.124)		-0.136 (0.124)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
Center Right (2017)		0.129 (0.080)	-0.001 (0.130)		0.0003 (0.080)	0.150 (0.146)
Right (2003)	-0.019 (0.082)		0.127 (0.106)	-0.086 (0.087)		-0.098 (0.086)
Right (2017)		-0.085 (0.116)	-0.061 (0.138)		0.282** (0.126)	0.395*** (0.151)
Woman	-0.005 (0.056)	0.159*** (0.055)	0.093** (0.040)	-0.001 (0.063)	0.026 (0.053)	0.011 (0.041)
Area of Residence: North	-0.150* (0.091)	-0.493*** (0.081)	-0.350*** (0.060)	-0.127 (0.093)	-0.127 (0.080)	-0.144** (0.060)
Center	-0.152** (0.060)	0.164** (0.066)	0.017 (0.045)	0.048 (0.071)	0.167*** (0.064)	0.100** (0.048)
South	0.093 (0.096)	0.023 (0.084)	0.051 (0.063)	0.281*** (0.093)	0.182** (0.082)	0.216*** (0.061)
Age	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.00003 (0.001)	0.009* (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Years of Schooling	0.043*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.005)	-0.011 (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.005)
Sociotropic retrosp perception: Same[3]	0.981* (0.059)	0.286*** (0.059)	0.200*** (0.042)	0.189*** (0.067)	0.138** (0.058)	0.160*** (0.044)
Better	0.187** (0.087)	0.423*** (0.085)	0.337*** (0.061)	0.198** (0.098)	0.252*** (0.082)	0.221*** (0.063)
Media Consumption	0.058** (0.025)	0.056** (0.025)	0.055*** (0.017)	0.059** (0.028)	0.050** (0.023)	0.051*** (0.018)
2017 Dummy			0.305*** (0.061)			-0.123** (0.062)
Constant	-0.824*** (0.119)	-0.463*** (0.136)	-0.794*** (0.091)	-0.112 (0.137)	-0.183 (0.134)	-0.047 (0.099)
N	1.197	1.305	2.502	1.197	1.305	2.502
R Square	0.079	0.104	0.103	0.034	0.051	0.032

Reference categories are 'none' for ideological identification, 'Metropolitan Region' for area of residency, and 'worse' for socio-tropic retrospective perception.

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table A4. OLS models on perception of immigrants in Chile

DV: Average of the responses to the 6 questions recoded from negative to positive answers

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years
Ideological Id: Left (2003)	-0.064 (0.060)		-0.078 (0.059)
Left (2017)		0.260*** (0.080)	0.333*** (0.099)
Center Left (2003)	-0.057 (0.053)		-0.065 (0.053)
Center Left (2017)		0.063 (0.056)	0.134* (0.077)
Center (2003)	0.075 (0.055)		0.060 (0.054)
Center (2017)		-0.002 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.068)
Center Right (2003)	-0.009 (0.067)		-0.004 (0.068)
Center Right (2017)		0.047 (0.046)	0.055 (0.081)
Right (2003)	-0.042 (0.048)		-0.055 (0.048)
Right (2017)		0.066 (0.071)	0.120 (0.084)
Woman	0.0007 (0.035)	0.072** (0.032)	0.042* (0.023)
Area of Residence: North	-0.098* (0.054)	-0.227*** (0.049)	-0.181 (0.036)
Center	-0.040 (0.038)	0.132*** (0.038)	0.047* (0.027)
South	0.138*** (0.051)	0.087* (0.051)	0.105*** (0.036)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years
Age	0.002* (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.0009)	-0.0007 (0.0007)
Years of Schooling	0.011*** (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.003)
Sociotropic retrosp perception: Same[3]	0.106*** (0.036)	0.152*** (0.035)	0.130*** (0.025)
Better	0.145*** (0.055)	0.248*** (0.051)	0.207*** (0.038)
Media Consumption	0.042*** (0.015)	0.037** (0.014)	0.039*** (0.010)
2017 Dummy			0.062* (0.035)
Constant	-0.343*** (0.075)	-0.240*** (0.078)	-0.307*** (0.055)
N	1197	1305	2502
R Square	0.051	0.102	0.073

Reference categories are 'none' for ideological identification, 'Metropolitan Region' for area of residency, and 'worse' for socio-tropic retrospective perception.

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Table A5. Table 4. OLS regression on perception of immigrants in Chile, CEP polls, 2003 and 2017 (unweighted values)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
	Positive opinion scale			Negative opinion scale (reversed)		
Ideological id: Left (2003)	0.041 (0.070)		0.037 (0.068)	-0.169** (0.075)		-0.189** (0.075)
Left (2017)		0.292*** (0.102)	0.239** (0.122)		0.228** (0.098)	0.427*** (0.121)

| Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
Center Left (2003)	-0.006 (0.062)		-0.030 (0.063)	-0.108 (0.075)		-0.101 (0.074)
Center Left (2017)		0.061 (0.071)	0.089 (0.093)		0.064 (0.067)	0.178* (0.100)
Center (2003)	0.085 (0.071)		0.057 (0.072)	0.065 (0.075)		0.063 (0.074)
Center (2017)		0.021 (0.052)	-0.045 (0.088)		-0.026 (0.051)	-0.072 (0.089)
Center Right (2003)	0.087 (0.078)		0.095 (0.078)	-0.105 (0.092)		-0.104 (0.092)
Center Right (2017)		0.098* (0.059)	0.001 (0.096)		-0.004 (0.059)	0.110 (0.108)
Right (2003)	-0.015 (0.060)		-0.032 (0.059)	-0.068 (0.065)		-0.078 (0.063)
Right (2017)		-0.067 (0.086)	-0.046 (0.102)		0.199** (0.093)	0.287*** (0.112)
Woman	-0.0008 (0.042)	0.124*** (0.041)	0.074** (0.029)	0.002 (0.047)	0.020 (0.039)	0.010 (0.030)
Area of Residency: North	-0.105 (0.067)	-0.373*** (0.060)	-0.261*** (0.045)	-0.092 (0.069)	-0.081 (0.059)	-0.100** (0.045)
Center	-0.106 (0.044)	0.126*** (0.049)	0.018 (0.033)	0.025 (0.053)	0.138*** (0.048)	0.076** (0.035)
South	0.072 (0.071)	0.020 (0.062)	0.041 (0.046)	0.205*** (0.069)	0.154** (0.061)	0.169*** (0.045)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.0009)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.0009)
Years of Schooling	0.031*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)
Sociotropic retrosp perception: Same	0.068 (0.044)	0.209*** (0.044)	0.144*** (0.031)	0.144*** (0.050)	0.095** (0.043)	0.117*** (0.032)

Variables	Model 1 2003	Model 2 2017	Model 3 Both years	Model 4 2003	Model 5 2017	Model 6 Both years
Better	0.137** (0.065)	0.315*** (0.063)	0.250*** (0.045)	0.154** (0.074)	0.181*** (0.060)	0.164*** (0.047)
Media Consumption	0.040** (0.018)	0.039 (0.018)	0.038*** (0.013)	0.044** (0.021)	0.035** (0.017)	0.039*** (0.013)
2017 Dummy			0.218*** (0.045)			-0.096** (0.046)
Constant	-0.598*** (0.088)	-0.347*** (0.100)	-0.581*** (0.067)	-0.087 (0.102)	-0.132 (0.099)	-0.033 (0.074)
N	1.197	1.305	2.502	1.197	1.305	2.502
R Square	0.076	0.105	0.100	0.034	0.051	0.031

Reference categories are 'none' for ideological identification, 'Metropolitan Region' for area of residency, and 'worse' for socio-tropic retrospective perception.

Source: Authors' with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.

Figure A2. OLS coefficients plot for the effects of ideology on the perception of immigrants in Chile, 2003 and 2017 (unweighted values)

Source: Authors with data from CEP polls #46 and #79.