Integridad institucional, democracia electoral y crimen organizado: un análisis mediante PCA y modelos multinivel
Resumen
Este artículo analiza cómo la democracia electoral y el conflicto del crimen organizado inciden en la integridad institucional en América Latina y el Caribe a partir de un índice construido mediante análisis de componentes principales con datos de V-Dem. Los resultados muestran que ni la democracia garantiza por sí sola mayor integridad ni el conflicto lleva necesariamente a su deterioro, ambos efectos varían entre países, distinguiendo escenarios de resiliencia y de erosión institucional.
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Ali Trabelsi, M. (2023). The Impact of Corruption on Economic Growth: A Nonlinear Evidence. En J. Fahed-Sreih (Ed.), Corruption–New Insights. IntechOpen. https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108876
Bauhr, M., & Grimes, M. (2014). Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal Accountability. Governance, 27(2), 291-320. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12033
Boese, V. A., Edgell, A. B., Hellmeier, S., Maerz, S. F., & Lindberg, S. I. (2021). How democracies prevail: Democratic resilience as a two-stage process. Democratization, 28(5), 885-907. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1891413
Campbell, Y., & Harriott, A. (2024). The Resort to Emergency Policing to Control Gang Violence in Jamaica: Making the Exception the Rule. Journal of Latin American Studies, 56(1), 115-136. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X24000075
Coppedge, M., Edgell, A. B., Knutsen, C. H., & Lindberg, S. I. (Eds.). (2022). Why Democracies Develop and Decline (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009086974
Diamond, L., & Morlino, L. (2004). The Quality of Democracy: An Overview. Journal of Democracy, 15(4), 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0060
Donno, D. (2013). Defending democratic norms: International actors and the politics of electoral misconduct. Oxford University Press.
Duncan, G., & Suárez, C. (2019). The Threat of Organized Crime in Post-Conflict Colombia. En J. Meernik, J. H. R. DeMeritt, & M. Uribe-López (Eds.), As War Ends (1.a ed., pp. 112-132). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108614856.006
Durán-Martínez, A. (2018). Las múltiples dimensiones de la violencia relacionada con las drogas. Drogas y Violencias en América Latina, 35. https://www.icip.cat/perlapau/es/articulo/las-multiples-dimensiones-de-la-violencia-relacionada-con-las-drogas/?pdf
Evans, P., & Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of «Weberian» State Structures on Economic Growth. American Sociological Review, 64(5), 748-765. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312249906400508
Farah, D., & Babineau, K. (2017). The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras. PRISM, 7(1), 58-73.
Fazekas, M., & Tóth, I. J. (2016). From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework with Empirical Applications from Hungary. Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), 320-334. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916639137
Fewsmith, J., & Nathan, A. J. (2019). Authoritarian Resilience Revisited: Joseph Fewsmith with Response from Andrew J. Nathan. Journal of Contemporary China, 28(116), 167-179. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1511390
Flores Márquez, H., Jiménez Gómez, A., & Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. (2024). Sources of Economic Growth in Mexico: Application of Bayesian Model Averaging. Análisis Económico, 39(102), 107-133. https://doi.org/10.24275/uam/azc/dcsh/ae/2024v39n102/Flores
Flores Rivera, L. E. (2024). Conflictos de organizaciones criminales y el principio electoral de la democracia. Política. Revista de Ciencia Política, 62(1), 141-171. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-5338.2024.72097
Freedom House. (2025). El Salvador: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2024
Fukuyama, F. (2004). The Imperative of State-Building. Journal of Democracy, 15(2), 17-31.
Fukuyama, F. (2013). What Is Governance? Governance, 26(3), 347-368. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12035
Grzymala-Busse, A. (2008). Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4-5), 638-673. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313118
Hellman, J., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000). «Seize the state, seize the day»: State capture, corruption, and influence in transition. World Bank Group.
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(04), 725-740. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592704040472
HIIK. (2024). HIIK – Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research [Dataset]. https://hiik.de/
Human Rights Watch. (2022, julio 19). Ecuador: Gang Control of Prisons Enabled Massacres. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2022/07/28/ecuador-gang-control-prisons-enabled-massacres
Innes, A. (2014). The Political Economy of State Capture in Central E urope. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1), 88-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12079
InSight Crime. (2024, septiembre 6). Honduras Profile. InSight Crime. http://insightcrime.org/honduras-organized-crime-news/honduras/
Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490965
Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2009). Variation in Institutional Strength. Annual Review of Political Science, 12(1), 115-133. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015a). Corruption: Good governance powers innovation. Nature, 518(7539), 295-297. https://doi.org/10.1038/518295a
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015b). The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316286937
Norris, P. (2015). Why Elections Fail (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107280908
O’Donnell, G. A. (1996). Illusions About Consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7(2), 34-51. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0034
O’Donnell, G. A. (1998). Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. Journal of Democracy, 9(3), 112-126. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0051
Pierre, J., & Peters, B. G. (2020). Governance, politics, and the state (2nd ed). Red globe press.
Ponce, A. F. (2016). Cárteles de droga, violencia y competitividad electoral a nivel local: evidencia del caso mexicano. Latin American Research Review, 51(4), 62-85. https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2016.0049
Przeworski, A. (2019). Crises of Democracy (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108671019
Reuters. (2024, enero 3). El Salvador says murders fell 70 % in 2023 as it cracked down on gangs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-says-murders-fell-70-2023-it-cracked-down-gangs-2024-01-03/
Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226729589.001.0001
Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions. Governance, 21(2), 165-190. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2008.00391.x
Scharpf, F. (1997). Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1), 18-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/135017697344217
Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295457.001.0001
Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing Accountability. En The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/books/the-self-restraining-state-power-and-accountability-in-new-democracies/
Schomaker, R. M., & Bauer, M. W. (2020). What Drives Successful Administrative Performance during Crises? Lessons from Refugee Migration and the Covid‐19 Pandemic. Public Administration Review, 80(5), 845-850. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13280
Shirk, D., & Wallman, J. (2015). Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(8), 1348-1376. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715587049
Snyder, R., & Durán-Martínez, A. (2009). Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia. Colombia Internacional, (70), Article 70.
Snyder, R., & Durán-Martínez, A. (2009). Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(3), 253-273. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z
Steenbergen, M. R., & Jones, B. S. (2002). Modeling Multilevel Data Structures. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 218. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088424
Swaleheen, M. (2011). Economic growth with endogenous corruption: An empirical study. Public Choice, 146(1-2), 23-41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9581-1
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399-457. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00092-4
Treisman, D. (2007). What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? Annual Review of Political Science, 10(1), 211-244. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.095418
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2016). Federalismo, drogas y violencia. Por qué el conflicto partidista intergubernamental estimuló la violencia del narcotráfico en México. Política y gobierno, 23(1), 11-56.
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2018). Why Did Drug Cartels Go to War in Mexico? Subnational Party Alternation, the Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Large-Scale Violence. Comparative Political Studies, 51(7), 900-937. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720703
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2020). Votes, Drugs, and Violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico. Cambridge University Press.
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2021). High-profile criminal violence: Why drug cartels murder government officials and party candidates in Mexico. British Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 203-229.
Vdeminstitute/vdemdata [R]. https://github.com/vdeminstitute/vdemdata
World Justice Project. (s. f.). WJP Rule of Law Index. Recuperado 18 de junio de 2025, de https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=21846723301&gbraid=0AAAAA-TYemvujS36xt3tmAkB_IHzHpUvp&gclid=CjwKCAjwx8nCBhAwEiwA_z__00GlomYKvktCxJdzT8sncaVsXI9ZvXeW0rs-FIhPNYC1QNhKC38OAhoCCF8QAvD_BwE
Ali Trabelsi, M. (2023). The Impact of Corruption on Economic Growth: A Nonlinear Evidence. En J. Fahed-Sreih (Ed.), Corruption–New Insights. IntechOpen. https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108876
Bauhr, M., & Grimes, M. (2014). Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal Accountability. Governance, 27(2), 291-320. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12033
Boese, V. A., Edgell, A. B., Hellmeier, S., Maerz, S. F., & Lindberg, S. I. (2021). How democracies prevail: Democratic resilience as a two-stage process. Democratization, 28(5), 885-907. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1891413
Campbell, Y., & Harriott, A. (2024). The Resort to Emergency Policing to Control Gang Violence in Jamaica: Making the Exception the Rule. Journal of Latin American Studies, 56(1), 115-136. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X24000075
Coppedge, M., Edgell, A. B., Knutsen, C. H., & Lindberg, S. I. (Eds.). (2022). Why Democracies Develop and Decline (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009086974
Diamond, L., & Morlino, L. (2004). The Quality of Democracy: An Overview. Journal of Democracy, 15(4), 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0060
Donno, D. (2013). Defending democratic norms: International actors and the politics of electoral misconduct. Oxford University Press.
Duncan, G., & Suárez, C. (2019). The Threat of Organized Crime in Post-Conflict Colombia. En J. Meernik, J. H. R. DeMeritt, & M. Uribe-López (Eds.), As War Ends (1.a ed., pp. 112-132). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108614856.006
Durán-Martínez, A. (2018). Las múltiples dimensiones de la violencia relacionada con las drogas. Drogas y Violencias en América Latina, 35. https://www.icip.cat/perlapau/es/articulo/las-multiples-dimensiones-de-la-violencia-relacionada-con-las-drogas/?pdf
Evans, P., & Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of «Weberian» State Structures on Economic Growth. American Sociological Review, 64(5), 748-765. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312249906400508
Farah, D., & Babineau, K. (2017). The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras. PRISM, 7(1), 58-73.
Fazekas, M., & Tóth, I. J. (2016). From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework with Empirical Applications from Hungary. Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), 320-334. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916639137
Fewsmith, J., & Nathan, A. J. (2019). Authoritarian Resilience Revisited: Joseph Fewsmith with Response from Andrew J. Nathan. Journal of Contemporary China, 28(116), 167-179. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1511390
Flores Márquez, H., Jiménez Gómez, A., & Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. (2024). Sources of Economic Growth in Mexico: Application of Bayesian Model Averaging. Análisis Económico, 39(102), 107-133. https://doi.org/10.24275/uam/azc/dcsh/ae/2024v39n102/Flores
Flores Rivera, L. E. (2024). Conflictos de organizaciones criminales y el principio electoral de la democracia. Política. Revista de Ciencia Política, 62(1), 141-171. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-5338.2024.72097
Freedom House. (2025). El Salvador: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2024
Fukuyama, F. (2004). The Imperative of State-Building. Journal of Democracy, 15(2), 17-31.
Fukuyama, F. (2013). What Is Governance? Governance, 26(3), 347-368. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12035
Grzymala-Busse, A. (2008). Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4-5), 638-673. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313118
Hellman, J., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000). «Seize the state, seize the day»: State capture, corruption, and influence in transition. World Bank Group.
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(04), 725-740. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592704040472
HIIK. (2024). HIIK – Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research [Dataset]. https://hiik.de/
Human Rights Watch. (2022, julio 19). Ecuador: Gang Control of Prisons Enabled Massacres. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2022/07/28/ecuador-gang-control-prisons-enabled-massacres
Innes, A. (2014). The Political Economy of State Capture in Central E urope. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1), 88-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12079
InSight Crime. (2024, septiembre 6). Honduras Profile. InSight Crime. http://insightcrime.org/honduras-organized-crime-news/honduras/
Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490965
Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2009). Variation in Institutional Strength. Annual Review of Political Science, 12(1), 115-133. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015a). Corruption: Good governance powers innovation. Nature, 518(7539), 295-297. https://doi.org/10.1038/518295a
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015b). The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316286937
Norris, P. (2015). Why Elections Fail (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107280908
O’Donnell, G. A. (1996). Illusions About Consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7(2), 34-51. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0034
O’Donnell, G. A. (1998). Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. Journal of Democracy, 9(3), 112-126. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0051
Pierre, J., & Peters, B. G. (2020). Governance, politics, and the state (2nd ed). Red globe press.
Ponce, A. F. (2016). Cárteles de droga, violencia y competitividad electoral a nivel local: evidencia del caso mexicano. Latin American Research Review, 51(4), 62-85. https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2016.0049
Przeworski, A. (2019). Crises of Democracy (1.a ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108671019
Reuters. (2024, enero 3). El Salvador says murders fell 70 % in 2023 as it cracked down on gangs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-says-murders-fell-70-2023-it-cracked-down-gangs-2024-01-03/
Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226729589.001.0001
Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions. Governance, 21(2), 165-190. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2008.00391.x
Scharpf, F. (1997). Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1), 18-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/135017697344217
Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295457.001.0001
Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing Accountability. En The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/books/the-self-restraining-state-power-and-accountability-in-new-democracies/
Schomaker, R. M., & Bauer, M. W. (2020). What Drives Successful Administrative Performance during Crises? Lessons from Refugee Migration and the Covid‐19 Pandemic. Public Administration Review, 80(5), 845-850. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13280
Shirk, D., & Wallman, J. (2015). Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(8), 1348-1376. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715587049
Snyder, R., & Durán-Martínez, A. (2009). Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia. Colombia Internacional, (70), Article 70.
Snyder, R., & Durán-Martínez, A. (2009). Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(3), 253-273. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z
Steenbergen, M. R., & Jones, B. S. (2002). Modeling Multilevel Data Structures. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 218. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088424
Swaleheen, M. (2011). Economic growth with endogenous corruption: An empirical study. Public Choice, 146(1-2), 23-41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9581-1
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399-457. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00092-4
Treisman, D. (2007). What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? Annual Review of Political Science, 10(1), 211-244. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.095418
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2016). Federalismo, drogas y violencia. Por qué el conflicto partidista intergubernamental estimuló la violencia del narcotráfico en México. Política y gobierno, 23(1), 11-56.
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2018). Why Did Drug Cartels Go to War in Mexico? Subnational Party Alternation, the Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Large-Scale Violence. Comparative Political Studies, 51(7), 900-937. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720703
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2020). Votes, Drugs, and Violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico. Cambridge University Press.
Trejo, G., & Ley, S. (2021). High-profile criminal violence: Why drug cartels murder government officials and party candidates in Mexico. British Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 203-229.
Vdeminstitute/vdemdata [R]. https://github.com/vdeminstitute/vdemdata
World Justice Project. (s. f.). WJP Rule of Law Index. Recuperado 18 de junio de 2025, de https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=21846723301&gbraid=0AAAAA-TYemvujS36xt3tmAkB_IHzHpUvp&gclid=CjwKCAjwx8nCBhAwEiwA_z__00GlomYKvktCxJdzT8sncaVsXI9ZvXeW0rs-FIhPNYC1QNhKC38OAhoCCF8QAvD_BwE
Flores Rivera, L. E., & López Estrello, A. A. (2026). Integridad institucional, democracia electoral y crimen organizado: un análisis mediante PCA y modelos multinivel. América Latina Hoy , 96, e32394. https://doi.org/10.14201/alh.32394
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