ArtefaCToS. Revista de estudios sobre la ciencia y la tecnología

Introduction

Frans B. M. de Waal — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

Introduction

Introduction to the Monographic Section: “Philosophical Primatology: Reflections on the Work of Frans de Waal”

Joaquín Suárez-Ruiz, Rodrigo López-Orellana — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

Normativity in the Wild. Insights from Frans de Waal

Laurence Kaufmann — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

According to Frans de Waal, both humans and non-human primates possess innate instincts, emotions, and predispositions that facilitate social living. Social activities, such as forming relationships, participating in shared goals, and displaying empathy towards others, are not externally imposed obligations; rather, they are inherent and desirable aspects of social life. Against the utilitarian model of self-interest and Machiavellian intelligence, de Waal suggests a kind of gestalt reversal: far from being a mere means to achieve individual goals, social interactions are a valuable end in itself.

Primitive Normativity in Non-Human Primates?

Laura Danón — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

According to a long philosophical tradition, normativity is an exclusive feature of human animals. However, in the last decades, many philosophers and scientists have begun to explore the possibility of attributing some kind of normativity to other species. Frans de Waal stands out among them for providing a rich repertoire of empirical evidence suggesting that non-human primates behave normatively. Skeptics regarding animal normativity usually question this kind of evidence by offering non-normative explanations of it. Here I suggest that skeptics may justify this preference for non-normative explanations by claiming that they invoke simpler cognitive processes than those who posit some sensitivity to norms (as demanded by Morgan’s Canon). However, I will argue that how compelling this strategy turns out to be will depend on how one understands normative sensitivity. More specifically, I will suggest that we should abandon the most demanding characterizations of normative sensitivity in the literature and adopt the hypothesis that non-human primates may have some kind of “primitive normativity” (Ginsborg, 2011; 2018). Doing this will allow us to elaborate explanations of (some) empirical evidence provided by de Waal that may end up being as simple as those elaborated by the sceptics.

Justice and Related Matters in the Legacy of Frans de Waal

Vicente Claramonte Sanz, Rodolfo Guarinos Rico — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

Initially, we critically examine the current state of knowledge in the field of Philosophy of Biology pertaining to empathy as a subject of scientific investigation. Subsequently, we delve into the constraints associated with empathy in some primates, including humans, recognizing it as a socially situated and evolved attribute. Additionally, we explore its potential as a political asset among humans. In light of these findings, we reevaluate the dichotomy between perspectives that emphasize altruism and egoism as fundamental principles in the biological and ontological senses. Lastly, we put forth the scientifically defendable idea that significant connections exist between empathy and the concept of justice.

The Anthropocentric Bias in Animal Cognition

Carolina Scotto — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

In the classical philosophical tradition, animals had the special function of serving as “objects of comparison” concerning humans. In that sense, philosophy adopted a peculiar comparative perspective focused on the categoric difference that separates humans from other creatures: an exceptionalist perspective. The Humanities developed an anthropocentric canon for the study of animals and privileged the search for differences over similarities of these with humans. On the other hand, the great boost that animal studies received under the influence of Darwin's work promoted a different comparative perspective in the natural sciences. However, especially in comparative psychology, ingent efforts were devoted to avoid the errors that anthropomorphism would entail: attributing human properties to other creatures and privileging similarities over differences. It assumed that anthropomorphic bias entails a more fundamental type of error than anthropocentric bias. Now, this asymmetric diagnosis has beenunmasked with different arguments. In the context of both disciplinary traditions, it is timely to reexamine the most persistent and negative manifestations of anthropocentric bias as a comparative bias for the study of animal cognition. In this work I will identify the following: the homogenization of animals into a single general category; psychological speciesism and the “de-mentalization” of animals; the survival of a hierarchical conception of cognitive abilities; the selective application - only to animals - of Morgan's Canon or anthropodenial and its complement, the assumption of idealized mental capacities in the human case or anthropofabulation; asymmetrical or distorsive methodological strategies for the study of animals versus humans which affects the comparative interpretations; and different manifestations of semantic anthropocentrism.

Evolved and Cultural Intuitions. Highly Speculative Remarks on the Origins of our Sense of Fairness

Rodrigo Braicovich — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

The question of whether the sense of fairness constitutes an exclusively human trait has been answered mostly from two polar positions: the first one unambiguously affirms such exclusivity, thus denying the relevance of cognitive ethology to understand our evaluations of justice; the second one, on the contrary, postulates the existence of a (proto) sense of fairness in non-human animals, strongly related to ours, which would make cognitive ethology highly relevant to understand the mechanisms on which our evaluative practices are based. From a position of extreme caution in relation to the possibility of (eventually) offering concrete evidence in favor of innatist theses such as the one I will defend here, I will suggest that i) in line with the rupturist positions, it is possible to preserve the human exclusivity of the sense of justice, ii) in line with the continuist positions, the relevance of studies coming from cognitive ethology is guaranteed, insofar as (ex hypotesi) our evaluative practices often take as input innate psychological dispositions shared with other species. Finally, I will suggest that the concept of rationalization is central to determine in each case the possible articulation between innate dispositions and explicit justifications.

Frans de Waal, Legal Philosopher

Fábio Portela Lopes De Almeida — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

The claim that only humans are able to reason and act normatively is deeply inconsistent with evolutionary theory, although it is at the root of many premises assumed to be undisputed in legal theory. Recently, in the last thirty or forty years, ethology and primatology have presented evidence that other animals are also agents capable of cooperating based on social norms. In this context, Frans de Waal’s research offered a fundamental pillar for the investigation of the behavior of primates and other mammals, such as elephants and dolphins. This article intends to present how the work of the ethologist can provide subsidies to the revisitation of classical themes in the theory of law. The text discusses how Frans de Waal makes it possible to incorporate into legal philosophy the adequate understanding of moral cognition as a ground to theorize about the notion of legal subject and animal rights, as well as to architect a counterargument to the naturalistic fallacy as an obstacle to a naturalized conception of law.

Social Mechanisms, Antropomorphism and Cognitive Processes in Non-Human Animals. 40 Years after Chimpanzee Politics

Oscar David Caicedo Machacon, Rene J. Campis, Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

The attribution of thoughts and mind to non-human animals generates heated debates and controversies among scholars of animal behavior. Social mechanisms –such as play as a behavior produced by natural selection that has survival value– strongly catch the attention of ethologists, psychologists and philosophers of mind when it comes to establishing how far can we go in embracing scientific anthropomorphism without falling into hasty analogies of naive and uninformed anthropomorphism. This paper appeals to the concept of social mechanisms, among others, in de Waal to address the problem of how to study some survival strategies in social groups, how to justify scientific anthropomorphism and to what extent we can talk about mental processes in other animals.

Homology and Critical Anthropomorphization

Julio Torres Meléndez, Claudia Muñoz Tobar — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

Based on a critical examination of the Pre-Darwinian distinction between activity and use with which Alan Love (2007) attempts to resolve the alleged contradiction contained in the concept of homology of function, we argue that the strategy of anthropomorphization advocated by Frans de Waal in the study of primate social behavior is dispensable. What is required to circumvent the commitment to anthropomorphization is to make explicit the criterion of biological trait identity that is contained in the concept of phylogenetic homology. It is also required to reveal the hierarchical and disconnected structure of psychological category homologies. We argue that making explicit that hierarchical structure and the possibility of multiple realizability of patterns of social behavior that fulfill homologous functions would enable de Waal to respond effectively to critics who deny his thesis of the evolutionary continuity of morality.

From Timing to Planning: Temporal Control of Behavior in Non-Human Animals

Mauro Zapata — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

Future oriented cognition, the group of cognitive processes that incorporate explicit or implicit considerations of future states, is a topic that has received growing interest within animal cognition studies. Through the analysis of associative learning literature and ethological studies, we will justify the attribution of prospective cognition to different species, by way of distinguishing two non-exclusive forms of future oriented cognition: on the one hand planning, on the other hand timing: the cognitive capacity to adjust behavior to temporal regularities in the environment. We will apply this distinction to the work of Frans de Waal on chimpanzees.

Theory-Construction in Comparative Cognition: Assessing the Case of Animal Normativity

Nicolás Sánchez — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

With an extensive amount of research on the social lives of primates, Frans de Waal has been a pioneering advocate for the continuity of human and non-human minds, putting forward the idea that these creatures exhibit rudimentary political and moral behaviors. One of the traits which de Waal focuses on is animal normativity, a set of behaviors functionally defined as adherence to social standards. Recently, some philosophers have endorsed this position, holding that animals show a psychological capacity called normative cognition underlying those and other social behaviors. In this paper, I assess whether advocacy for animal normativity is an exercise of theory construction in comparative cognition. To that end, I present three features of this kind of theory construction. First, the explanatory goal of building functional analyses of cognitive capacities. Second, the conceptual aid of comparative thinking for theory construction. Third, the heuristic value of theory in specifying possible roads of inquiry. Taking these features into account, I assess whether the claims advocates make regarding animal normativity consider them. My answer is negative. First, since some advocates focus on behavioral traits and not on psychological capacities, they are not producing theory in comparative cognition, although, as I argue, they should. Second, there is a disregard for hypothesis testing and no evolutionary considerations to support their views. Finally, the claim that non-human animals exhibit normativity does not seem to have heuristic value.

Invasión silenciosa: la primatología de Imanishi y el sesgo cultural en la ciencia

Frans B. M. de Waal — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

Cuando se trata de nuestra relación con la naturaleza, no hay forma de escapar de la tensión entre percepción y proyección. A menudo, lo que descubrimos en la naturaleza es lo que antes pusimos en ella. En consecuencia, la forma en que los naturalistas han contribuido a la misión de ‘la humanidad ha de conocerse a sí misma’, sólo puede entenderse en el contexto del cristal con que se mire el espejo de la naturaleza. Dado que no nos es posible quitarnos los cristales de esas gafas, la segunda mejor opción que nos queda es comparar otras alternativas.

Normatividad natural: el “es” y el “debe” del comportamiento animal

Frans B. M. — Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 +0200

Suele suceder que la evolución del comportamiento se considera irrelevante para la comprensión de la moral humana, por el hecho de que carece de carácter normativo (el ‘debe’) y consiste enteramente en descripciones de cómo son las cosas o cómo sucedieron (el ‘es’). No obstante, el comportamiento que es producto de la evolución, incluido el de otros animales, no está completamente desprovisto de normatividad. Si se define la normatividad como la adhesión a un ideal o estándar, existe amplia evidencia de que los animales tratan a sus relaciones sociales de esta manera. En otras palabras, persiguen valores sociales. En este artículo reviso la evidencia sobre el hecho de que los primates no humanos intentan activamente preservar la armonía dentro de su red social, por ejemplo, reconciliándose después de un conflicto, protestando contra las divisiones desiguales y deteniendo peleas. Al hacerlo, corrigen las desviaciones respecto de un estado ideal. Sumado a ello, y con el fin de prevenir tales desviaciones, muestran autocontrol emocional y resolución anticipada de conflictos. El reconocimiento de la orientación hacia una meta y el carácter normativo del comportamiento social animal nos permite cerrar parcialmente la brecha entre el ‘es’ y el ‘debe’ erigida en relación con el comportamiento moral humano.