ArtefaCToS. Revista de estudios sobre la ciencia y la tecnología

What is the Philosophy of Organismal Biology?

2023-05-08T14:24:56+02:00

‘Organism’ Versus ‘Biological Individual’: The Missing Demarcation

2023-05-08T14:25:04+02:00

The demarcation of organisms from other biological individuals has received relatively little attention. In this paper, I extricate and systematize the different ways in which the organism–biological individual relationship has been construed: (1) coalescence of the two concepts, (2) biological individual eliminativism, (3) organism eliminativism, (4) organism as a ‘paradigmatic’ biological individual, (5) organism as a limit state towards which biological individuals tend in evolution and development, (6) organism as instantiating the whole in a part-whole hierarchy of biological individuals, (7) organism as equivalent to physiological individual, and (8) organism as a special kind of physiological individual. I show that, in most of these stances, the organism concept is too imprecise to be demarcated from other biological individuals, which fosters some form of eliminativism. I also argue that the comparisons between organisms and biological individuals are performed in two different modes: ‘horizontally’ (i.e., between individuals not related hierarchically) or ‘vertically’ (i.e., between individuals belonging to different levels within the same hierarchy). Finally, I explain the challenges that each of these comparison modes face and suggest that the ‘vertical’ mode adumbrates a potential way forward.

A Part-Dependent Account of Biological Individuality for Multispecies Consortia

2023-05-08T14:25:24+02:00

This article introduces and defends a part-dependent ontology to conceive of biological individuality in conglomerates formed by organisms of multiple species. According to the part-dependent ontology, the characterization of a set or conglomerate of independent taxa as a biological individual must be based on the relationship that a specific part of that set maintains with the rest, the relationship that the rest of the parts of the set maintain with that specific part being irrelevant. Moreover, it is argued that the biological dependency relationships between the parts of a set can be asymmetric, without this affecting the attribution of individuality to said set. It is also pointed out that such a part-dependent characterization is valid not only for ideas of individuality based on evolution, but also for those based on physiology, or immunology, among others. This makes part-dependent ontology compatible with pluralism over biological individuality.

Typology and Organismal Dispositions in Evo-Devo: A Metaphysical Approach

2023-05-08T14:25:07+02:00

In this paper, we address the characterization of the variational tendencies attributed to homologous traits in evo-devo. After arguing that current theories of homology cannot properly explain why traits do, in fact, vary, we propose to characterize them as disposional natural kinds. In doing so, we appeal to metaphysical resources regarding the characterization of dispositions. From this metaphysical framework, it is possible to argue that only by attributing dispositions to traits (conceived of as natural kinds), is it possible to make sense of their causal and explanatory power. We argue that this particular case study constitutes an example of a kind of interaction between metaphysics and biology that we label Metaphysics from Biology, where the specific demands of a complex reality such as evolution require the development of metaphysical notions that seem to go beyond those present in the literature.

The Concept of Organism in the Philosophy of Hans Jonas

2023-05-08T14:25:10+02:00

The current philosophy of biology, having overcome reductionist temptations, has focused its attention on the concept of organism. Hans Jonas’ thought will be useful in this new context, since it deals with this concept in a profound way. From this conviction, the present text intends to explore precisely the notion of organism in Jonas’ work. To do this, I will begin by exposing the motivations that lead the author towards the concept of organism (section 1). He turns to it as a way out of the dualistic difficulties that, in his opinion, threatened to suffocate philosophical research. In a second step, I will specifically present the idea of organism that Jonas proposes with its most conspicuous features, among them, a close link with the notion of metabolism (section 2). After that, I will look for the connections of the concept of organism with other areas of Jonas’ thought: ontology, anthropology, ethics and theology (section 3). I will then outline some criticisms on Jonas’s ideas, especially regarding the application of the term “freedom” to organisms, as well as the absence of references to biological reproduction (section 4), and end with a concluding summary (section 5).

From Mechanistic Biomedicine to Organismal Systems Medicine

2023-05-08T14:25:18+02:00

Biomedicine, the predominant medical model that emerged during the twentieth century, is founded conceptually on mechanism and reductionism, especially in terms of portraying the patient as a machine reducible to its component parts. Systems medicine, in contrast, has emerged during the early part of the twenty-first century to address problems arising from biomedicine’s failure to cure diseases such as cancer. In this paper, a conceptual framework is provided for shifting from mechanistic biomedicine to organismal systems medicine. Specifically, organicism and holism provide the necessary foundation for viewing the patient not simply as a diseased or dysfunctional body part but as a whole person embedded within a biological, psychological, social, and environmental framework. Although biomedicine’s approach has identified many of the physiological and pathological components of health and disease, a shift to organismal systems medicine promises to deliver the principles and rules by which these components relate and interact with one another in a holistic rather than simply in a reductive mechanistic fashion.

The Construction of a World: The Importance of Play in Evolution

2023-05-08T14:25:14+02:00

Multicellular organisms are not passive entities. Understanding this is important to increase our knowledge about the evolution of species, and to clarify how we perceive and interact in the world. Through multiple mechanisms and processes involving developmental as well as phylogenetic dimensions, these organisms actively navigate their environments. Despite current academic interest in these viewpoints, though, play has not been a central topic in this discussion, particularly in hominids and specifically in Homo sapiens. In this work, we contribute to elucidate the importance of play for niche construction processes and for the emergence of cognition, two fundamental fields within contemporary debates in evolutionary thinking and embodied cognitive science. We claim this is relevant because play is a path through which a very large number of multicellular species inquire, know, build, and transform the world. In the first section, we situate the discussion, and we describe the structure of our arguments. Then, we present the importance of niche construction theory, and the definitions of cultural and developmental niches, to highlight the active role of organisms in modifying (selective and ontogenetic) environments. Later we explain the enactivist perspective and its implications concerning the dynamics, and the embodied and situated properties of organisms for the study of cognition. Afterward we highlight the value of play in this wideview of evolutionary and enactivist frameworks. Finally, we offer conclusions on the implications that this kind of research could have for diverse disciplines —e. g., biological anthropology, cognitive science, philosophy of biology or pedagogy.

Organisms, Life Relations, and Evolution: Inter-Dependencies after Kropotkin's Mutual Aid

2023-05-08T14:25:00+02:00

We examine some implications of Kropotkin’s seminal work on mutual aid as a factor of evolution to analyze how non-competitive life relations are understood in current biological theories. We distinguish two research lines deriving from his work: one of them studies intraspecific relations of altruism and selfishness, and the other one is focused on interspecific symbiotic relations. Furthermore, we use the example of pregnancy and viviparity to extend the analysis to the evolution of novel interorganismic characters. We conclude with a conceptual review of how collaborations and inter-dependencies among organisms shape individual autonomy and sociability in organismal evolutionary biology.